Abstract

This paper examines the ideological and psycho-political mechanisms through which the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains its political legitimacy, sustains social cohesion, and ensures regime durability. The analysis shows how religion, nationalism, economic monopolies, media control, institutional infrastructure, and militarized mobilization function in a mutually reinforcing system of governance. Conversely, the article explores potential events and factors that could lead to the retreat of authoritarian control. Analyzing Iran’s approach requires an understanding of the psychodynamics of state behavior, encompassing not only its diplomatic and military dimensions.

Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Iran employs a pattern of socio-political governance that intertwines ethos and mythos to maintain internal cohesion and project external influence. Mitigating the threat posed by the revolutionary regime requires a scrutiny of the ideological and institutional mechanisms through which the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains its political legitimacy, social cohesion, and regime stability.

Understanding how events shape Iran’s political landscape and analyzing the framework that guides the regime’s decision-making are crucial. Therefore, exploring the core pillars that shape Iran’s national security and strategy is an essential first step in assessing the implications of the latest events on Iran’s statecraft. Although the regime attempts to portray a robust national stance, this posture has inherent vulnerabilities that reveal a different reality, as described in my essay on Iran’s Power Structure.^[1]

Iran’s strategic doctrine is deeply intertwined with processes of identity formation and cognitive framing, which serve as tools for fostering loyalty, justifying political authority, and portraying external conflicts as existential threats. Instead of framing geopolitical rivalry as a matter of pragmatic interest, the Islamic Republic constructs a dual identity narrative—a deliberate form of collective self-definition rooted in the themes of victimization and resistance. This binary simplifies political realities into a clear moral divide between the righteous “self” and the malicious “other,” making compromise not only undesirable but also ideologically unacceptable.

The Islamic Republic’s ruling establishment is well aware of the numerous challenges and vulnerabilities within its governance. As a result, it endeavors to portray a perception of national strength and resilience. The psychological mechanism at play is the activation of a shared trauma schema. By continually invoking historical grievances and present-day threats, the regime evokes a collective siege mentality, which justifies militarized behavior while suppressing dissent. Simultaneously, Iran cultivates a heroic moral identity, projecting itself as a defender of the oppressed, which fosters in-group pride and moral superiority.

Alongside this development of vulnerability, Iran heavily invests in building a heroic moral identity. Using state-controlled media, religious rituals, and political language, the Islamic Republic presents itself as the world leader of the oppressed (Mustazafin), a role based on Shi’a eschatology and Khomeini’s revolutionary beliefs.^[2]

This self-image serves two psychological purposes: first, it promotes pride and unity within the group by viewing national resilience as a sacred responsibility; second, it cultivates a sense of moral superiority that justifies assertive or even aggressive actions in the name of justice. This ethical perspective also helps to recast asymmetric warfare and proxy actions not as acts of hostility, but as moral interventions for the marginalized—thus strengthening the regime’s claim to both political legitimacy and a destined place in history.^[3]

This strategic doctrine shows a sophisticated blend of political psychology, historical storytelling, and strategic statecraft. By linking a narrative of existential victimization with one of moral heroism, the Islamic Republic creates a lasting ideological framework that is both internally consistent and outwardly confident. This framework turns political problems into moral duties, elevates foreign policy to a sacred mission, and makes dissent feel like betrayal. The result is a political culture where identity isn’t just inherited but actively constructed as a tool of power—able to maintain the regime’s legitimacy and extend its influence well beyond its borders.

Ideological Statecraft and National Security

Exploring Iran’s statecraft and power structure requires examining the concept of ‘national security,’ which is a strategic term describing a country’s efforts to protect its existence, sovereignty, territory, citizens, and core values from internal and external threats. It encompasses various approaches, including military, diplomatic, economic, technological, and social strategies. The pursuit of power fosters a collective belief system, shapes perceptions of external threats, and builds loyalty within the population through both material dependence and identity-based attachment.^[4]

The Islamic Republic of Iran represents a distinctive model of ideological statecraft. Its foreign and domestic policies are rooted in a ‘Strategic Depth’ approach that relies on a cognitive framework incorporating revolutionary zeal, divine leadership, and a strategic narrative. The founder of the Islamic Republic established an Islamic government based on religious law, overseen by the clergy, with the authority to supervise all of the country’s executive and administrative functions. By leveraging religious belief, ritualized mourning, and identity politics, Khomeini and his successor go beyond the limitations of traditional power projection.^[5]

Iran’s long-term strategy reflects both geopolitical ambitions and theological beliefs. Its lasting strength comes from the regime’s ability to turn spiritual myths into political realities, sacred suffering into strategic unity, and prophetic hopes into a national purpose. Therefore, Iran’s actions on the world stage can’t be fully understood without considering the deep psychological, religious, and symbolic roots that shape its leadership and policies.

The state promotes a societal atmosphere of expectation—based on religious prophecy and revolutionary ideology —that fosters ongoing public mobilization. This future-focused outlook enhances national resilience during crises, deters foreign intervention, and advances Iran’s regional goals. While there is an ongoing debate between tradition and modernity, the hope for future redemption remains a unifying force, especially among marginalized communities facing despair.^[6]

The revolutionary regime has built a multi-layered strategic framework that surpasses traditional models of national security and foreign policy. Instead of merely reacting to external threats or pursuing pragmatic regional influence, Iran promotes a unique mix of symbolic leadership, religious Shi’ite  mythology, ideological mobilization, nationalism, and militarization. Central to this framework is the regime’s ability to connect Islam, historical memory, collective trauma, and sacred narratives, thus maintaining legitimacy and projecting power across borders.^[7]

Ruhollah Ramazani argues that the Iranian Revolution moved Iran’s approach to statecraft into a strategic-political framework, where ideological goals—based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s rejection of nationalism and Western fears—shaped Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. By promoting an “Islamic world order” centered on the umma, the regime sought to reshape global politics in accordance with Shi’a revolutionary principles. Additionally, the regime utilizes both the export of the revolution and support for liberation movements as tools of transnational influence.^[8]

This identity-driven strategy promoted ideological confrontation with rival powers while incorporating religious symbolism, such as politicizing the hajj and promoting the Ashura and Arba’in commemorations, into geopolitical competition. However, beneath its doctrinal stance, Tehran showed strategic pragmatism by secretly engaging with enemies like the U.S. and Israel, demonstrating the balance between ideological narrative and realpolitik in its post-revolutionary governance.

Asef Bayat argues that social movement theory can help study Islamism, emphasizing the need to go beyond simple stories that portray Islamist movements as uniform or unchanging. His article, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory,’ criticizes current perspectives that see Islam as a fixed idea and ignore its various contexts. Instead, he focuses on internal differences, historical changes, and the challenges of analysis. The main idea is the concept of ‘imagined solidarities,’ which explains how divided groups find common ground in authoritarian environments where open discussion is limited. Ultimately, he states that understanding these movements requires acknowledging their diversity, the various actors involved, and the shifting social and political contexts in which they operate.^[9]

Bayat’s article situates Islamist movements within the framework of social movement theory; its reliance on Islamism as primarily adaptive and contingent overlooks the unifying ideological current that links otherwise diverse movements across time and geography. Furthermore, by prioritizing coalition-building and frame alignment, Bayat suggests that opportunistic strategies drive Islamist mobilization more than deeply rooted religious imperatives. Thus, downplays the centrality of faith, scripture, and shared doctrine in shaping the political action of the Islamic Republic.

Shi’ite -Centric Indoctrination

At the apex of the Iranian system lies Islam, not merely as a faith but as a totalizing ideological framework. Religion functions here as what political psychologists term a superordinate identity—a binding category that transcends class, ethnicity, and regional divisions, thereby facilitating a unified in-group identity.^[10] The doctrine of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) combines spiritual authority with political sovereignty, resulting in what can be described as a spiritual-political authoritarianism.

In psychological terms, this creates a powerful source of normative conformity, as citizens align their behavior not only out of fear of sanction but also out of a perceived moral obligation. The symbolic authority of religious leadership, reinforced by theological narratives, generates what Max Weber would term ‘charismatic legitimacy,’ which is then institutionalized in the state’s legal framework.^[11]

Shi’a Islam provides the cultural texture for the regime’s identity project. Rituals such as Ashura commemorations, Friday prayers, and martyrdom ceremonies function as emotionally charged collective experiences that reinforce group solidarity—a process consistent with Durkheim’s notion of collective effervescence.^[12] The process involved is the activation of a shared trauma schema. By consistently emphasizing historical grievances and current threats, the regime seeks to cultivate a collective siege mentality, justifying militarized actions and suppressing dissent. At the same time, Iran develops a cognitive bias of heroic moral identity, portraying itself as a defender of the oppressed, which boosts in-group pride and moral superiority.

The regime aims to promote a psychological conception of the Mahadi’s occultation as a societal longing and expectation, leading to emotionally driven and cognitively mediated processes designed to foster cultural identity. Among populations experiencing varying degrees of personal and societal despair, there exists a marked tendency to transform emotional distress into immediate, action-oriented responses. This dynamic was among the key psychological and sociopolitical factors that contributed to the eruption of the Islamic Revolution, which led to the collapse of the monarchy and the establishment of a Shi’a theocratic regime.

From a theoretical perspective, these rituals serve as triggers for identity salience, bringing the Shi’a in-group identity to the forefront of each individual’s consciousness.^[13] Cultural centers and state-sponsored symbolism embed the ideological narrative into daily life, transforming abstract political goals into tangible cultural norms. The process resembles generational political socialization: young Iranians are not only taught state ideology but are emotionally and socially conditioned to see themselves as inheritors of a sacred struggle.

Vali Nasr argues that Iran plays a crucial role in Shi’ite politics by leveraging its religious, political, economic, and cultural influence to empower Shi’ite communities, expand its regional power, and challenge Sunni dominance. Additionally, Iran has avoided obvious sectarian posturing; it has used anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric to gain support among both Shi’ite s and Sunnis, aiming to keep its influence in the region.^[14]

The regime embeds this belief into its national identity and foreign policy, portraying Iran’s role as one of moral leadership rather than just regional competition. This symbolic leadership provides strategic continuity, enabling successive Iranian leaders to maintain ideological unity even during periods of political change or crisis. The long-term nature of this myth allows Iran to justify extended struggles, strategic patience, and confrontations with perceived oppressors, especially the United States and Israel, under the guise of spiritual duty and historical destiny.

Religious rituals and commemorative mourning ceremonies act as key tools in the Islamic Republic’s system of social and strategic control. The annual Ashura observances—the commemoration of Husayn ibn Ali’s martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala (680 CE) —are emotionally intense events that reinforce themes of sacrifice, resistance, and moral clarity. These events are more than just spiritual practices; they are powerful political performances that continuously reaffirm the revolutionary spirit within the public consciousness year after year.^[15]

Internally, such rituals help the regime strengthen its legitimacy by reinforcing ideological loyalty and providing a sense of historical purpose. Externally, they act as cultural exports and influence tools. Iran’s outward display of these rituals—through media, religious institutions, and proxy networks—establishes connections with Shi’a populations across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and beyond. These commemorative practices are rich in theological meaning and political importance. They serve as powerful soft power tools that shape regional identity, inspire communities, and legitimize Iran’s actions under the cover of shared faith and martyrdom.

By anchoring national purpose in both revolutionary futurism and messianic prophecy, the regime creates a temporary suspension of discontent. People are conditioned to see current suffering as a sublimated struggle in service of an ultimate, cosmic victory. This results in internalizing the state ideology as a form of emotional resilience: dissent is viewed as betrayal, and suffering only becomes meaningful if endured collectively.

Iran’s concept of strategic depth transcends the conventional boundaries of territorial control and military projection, functioning as a socio-political construct rooted in identity politics, symbolic capital, and the mobilization of collective memory. The Islamic Republic employs this depth not merely through physical deterrence but by embedding itself in the psychological and ideological fabric of both domestic and transnational audiences. At the theoretical level, this manifests as a form of cognitive warfare, in which the regime systematically cultivates narratives that frame its actions as both defensive and morally legitimate.^[16]

The regime actively consolidates and spreads subjective narratives that emphasize external threats, from (what it calls) “Western imperialism” to “Zionist aggression,” and internal moral superiority. This dual approach allows Iran to present its military actions and proxy campaigns as defensive rather than expansionist, framing them as necessary protections for the oppressed. The psychological framework fosters a sense of urgent survival, uniting diverse groups—Shi’a militias, ideological supporters, and marginalized populations—under a common story of resistance.

This identity-based strategy allows the regime to recruit, mobilize, and maintain influence over populations that may otherwise lack organic ties to Tehran. The use of media, education, religious symbolism, and revolutionary slogans creates an information system that maintains loyalty, discourages dissent, and confuses foreign enemies. At the same time, the Islamic regime employs various forms of Cultural Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy to enhance its global influence. Cynthia P. Schneider defines cultural diplomacy as a tool that involves using creative expression, exchanging ideas, information, and people to build mutual understanding between individuals and nations.^[17]

Public Diplomacy encompasses a range of government-sponsored initiatives designed to engage and connect with the foreign populace, rather than merely their governments. This engagement aims to garner support for the state’s policies and actions on the global stage, thereby enhancing its soft power and diplomatic influence. These initiatives aim to foster meaningful dialogue that promotes mutual understanding and seeks to influence public opinion in favor of Iran’s strategic objectives.^[18]

Domestically, one of the most powerful strategic tools used by the Islamic Republic is cultivating societal anticipation. Based on a mix of messianic hope and revolutionary futurism, Iran creates an environment where the public is conditioned to endure hardship while expecting eventual salvation—either through divine intervention or ideological victory.

This future-focused mindset enables the regime to transform suffering into meaning, failure into sacrifice, and endurance into virtue. Particularly among marginalized and disaffected groups, the promise of redemption—whether political, spiritual, or economic—serves as a powerful unifying force. By formulating this framework, the regime aims to prevent internal division, justify external actions, and strengthen its self-image as the bearer of a better future.

Ideological Statecraft and Social Control 

The Islamic Republic of Iran employs a form of psycho-political governance that links historical memory and a heroic mythos to sustain internal unity. Its domestic and foreign policy systems are based on a cognitive-emotional framework that relies on myth-making, symbolic leadership, and identity-building. This framework functions not only to legitimize the regime but to regulate group affect, foster resilience, and mobilize collective behavior.

The symbol of the Mahdi functions as a symbolic leader, whose absence paradoxically strengthens collective identity through delayed gratification and idealization. This reflects psychodynamic patterns observed in groups dealing with trauma or loss—especially the development of a containment narrative that turns vulnerability into perceived strength. Iran’s strategic position, therefore, derives legitimacy from this narrative by connecting present endurance with future transcendence, effectively creating a psychological time-bridge that supports long-term outlook mobilization.^[19]

Since its inception in 1979, the regime has developed a governance model in which religious ideology, historical memory, and security concerns are deeply intertwined. This model serves not just as a political system but as a broad socio-political environment, influencing both the thoughts and behaviors of its citizens. The regime’s ability to maintain unity and suppress dissent relies on carefully coordinating multiple interdependent areas: religious authority, cultural indoctrination, nationalist narratives, economic control, media regulation, institutionalized ideology, and enforcement of militarized processes.^[20]

The governance system is supported by a network of ideological, economic, and institutional factors that collectively influence identity, perception, and behavior. By integrating religion, nationalism, economic support, media control, institutional surveillance, and military mobilization, the regime creates a self-reinforcing cycle of legitimacy and obedience. This structure reveals a system that turns religious belief into a tool of governance, transforms mourning into action, and replaces rational cost-benefit analysis with emotionally charged strategic identity. 

Iran’s revolutionary ideology has shaped an economic framework aimed at addressing the sociopolitical challenges of the Islamic Republic. This framework is characterized by a dual dynamic: a state-controlled economy dependent on hydrocarbon revenues, combined with a parastatal system that limits the private sector. This hybrid setup is influenced by sanctions, internal governance issues, and the need to balance regime stability with economic growth. Although there are efforts toward diversification and regional trade links, real growth depends on implementing structural reforms to reduce the influence of state and semi-state actors, such as the bonyads.

Bonyads, or semi-state charitable foundations, serve as a key element in the regime’s control strategy. Officially responsible for social welfare, they operate as monopolies, holding substantial control over Iran’s economy. From a socio-economic standpoint, the allocation of subsidies and jobs through these organizations encourages material dependency and strengthens loyalty through reciprocal obligations.^[21]

Bonyads serve as powerful para-state institutions in Iran, controlling an estimated 40 percent of the non-oil economy and integrating themselves into both economic and social life. The largest, the Foundation of the Oppressed (Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan), has assets of about $12 billion and employs over 400,000 people. Although officially dedicated to veteran welfare, poverty relief, and the promotion of Islam, they also act as tools for political patronage—distributing resources to regime loyalists and strengthening repression of dissent. Psychologically, they foster dependence, group solidarity, and perceptions of state benevolence, thus bolstering the regime’s legitimacy and social control.^[22]

Furthermore, economic patronage networks reinforce system justification: beneficiaries accept the legitimacy of the current political order because their livelihoods are financially dependent on it. The absence of economic pluralism also hampers the development of an independent civil society, limiting opportunities for the emergence of oppositional identities. The latest budget bill released by the government emphasizes economic opacity. It reveals the uneven distribution of oil revenues and the national budget to Iran’s military and security forces, as well as the transfer of state-owned assets into their control.^[23]

The Iranian government maintains tight control over media and communication channels, managing content to match its ideological goals. Psychologically, this reflects a continuous process of setting agendas and framing issues.^[24] By determining what topics are discussed and how they are presented, the regime influences public perception and restricts the availability of opposing narratives.

Social media faces surveillance and selective blocking, fostering a climate of self-censorship.^[25]Monitoring discourse acts both as a deterrent to political activism and as a way to reinforce the idea of pluralistic ignorance—the belief that dissenting opinions are rare or socially unacceptable, even when they are common. The regime’s institutional structures, from schools to religious groups, operate as networks of ideological indoctrination. Educational curricula stress loyalty to the Islamic Republic, glorify martyrdom, and delegitimize Western liberal values.

Social surveillance is embedded in community institutions, reflecting Foucault’s idea of panopticism:^[26]people change their behavior because they believe they are constantly being watched. This widespread surveillance causes internal control, making obedience a habit that doesn’t rely on external forces.^[27]

Iran promotes a calibrated combination of ‘Soft and Hard power’ to advance its domestic and regional objectives and consolidate its strategic posture.^[28] Through soft power strategies, including educational outreach programs, transnational media platforms, and the mobilization of religious institutions aligned with its ideological narrative, Iran builds sociopolitical influence within sympathetic constituencies.

According to Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, hard power is the ability to use ‘carrots and sticks’ of economic and military strength to influence others to do what you want. Similarly, he describes soft power as ‘the capability to affect the behavior of others to make them want the outcomes you desire,’ which enables people to co-opt rather than coerce. The Islamic regime employs hard power tools, such as targeted military actions, advisory deployments, and the development of proxy militias, to gain leverage and deterrence in disputed areas. This hybrid approach allows Tehran to regain influence across its historical and ideological spheres while maintaining some strategic deniability and reducing the risks of direct conflict.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia serve not only as instruments of hard power but also as tools of ideological enforcement. Their recruitment strategies present enlistment as both a patriotic duty and a religious obligation, encouraging citizens to support the state’s security narrative. Psychologically, this aligns with the idea of role internalization, where individuals involved in security or paramilitary roles adopt the regime’s worldview as part of their identity. The IRGC’s influence in economics and media further integrates the security sector into the broader system of social control.

From a political psychology standpoint, the system’s resilience depends on its ability to unite material welfare, social belonging, and moral duty into a single, inseparable framework. This blend of ideology and lived experience makes opposition costly not only politically but also personally and psychologically. However, the very depth of this integration might also be a hidden vulnerability: if a major rupture occurs in one of these pillars—such as economic collapse, ideological disillusionment, or loss of coercive power—the others may no longer be enough to keep the regime stable.

Vulnerabilities in Iran’s Social Cohesion Framework

Initially, it appears that Iran’s efforts to unify its socioeconomic divisions have effectively maintained the stability of the revolutionary regime. Nevertheless, Iran’s ethnic diversity presents inherent challenges to governance and stability that cannot be ignored. There are psychological and structural factors that could trigger a revolutionary rupture in the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the regime’s ideological, institutional, and coercive structures seem resilient, authoritarian stability often masks deep-rooted vulnerabilities.

Integrating political psychology with comparative revolution theory, the analysis identifies six interconnected preconditions for potential systemic disruption: (1) institutional decline, (2) the emergence of charismatic leadership, (3) the expansion of protest consciousness, (4) economic breakdown and loss of legitimacy, (5) elite fragmentation, and (6) catalytic events. These elements, although distinct analytically, reinforce each other and are influenced by collective perceptions, shifts in identity, and emotional triggers that shape the dynamics of mass mobilization.

Authoritarian regimes excel at projecting stability through centralized control of discourse, repression, and the monopolization of political legitimacy. However, history shows that these systems can collapse quickly when multiple destabilizing forces come together. Revolutions in authoritarian settings rarely begin from a single grievance or incident; instead, they result from the combined effects of political, economic, and social factors that fundamentally change how citizens perceive themselves and the regime.

From a psychological perspective, revolutionary rupture requires more than just structural weakness — it calls for a shift in political thinking and collective identity. Citizens must experience what Doug McAdam calls cognitive liberation: a change from seeing the regime as unavoidable to viewing it as both illegitimate and removable.^[29] This process often occurs beneath the surface of public politics, making it especially difficult to predict in tightly controlled environments like the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The erosion of bureaucratic capacity and weakening of state institutions weaken the regime’s ability to sustain practical governance and symbolic legitimacy. In Iran’s case, the decline in service effectiveness, corruption in public administration, and political repression diminish system justification—the psychological process through which people rationalize and defend existing social arrangements, even at their own expense.^[30]

As institutional trust declines, citizens become more receptive to alternative political narratives, leading to an ideological pluralization that challenges the regime’s monopolistic claims to truth and morality. This phase is critical because it destabilizes the normative compliance that underpins authoritarian resilience, creating openings for dissent to spread.

Charismatic leadership is crucial in turning underlying discontent into organized political action. Psychologically, charisma offers personalized legitimacy, shifting loyalty from discredited institutions to an individual who represents an alternative view of governance. The leader’s symbolic influence promotes a higher-level identity, allowing diverse opposition groups—covering class, ethnicity, and ideology—to come together around a shared cause.^[31]

For authoritarian regimes like Iran, where opposition movements are often fragmented by repression and ideological divisions, the emergence of such a figure can significantly boost collective efficacy—the belief that coordinated action can lead to meaningful change. This transformation in perception often precedes mass mobilization. However, as of the time of writing, it does not appear that the Iranian opposition has been successful in assembling and promoting a leader who can unite the various forces that oppose the Islamic Revolutionary regime. This phenomenon arises from multiple factors, including the banishment of rivals, house arrests, and various intimidation strategies that inhibit opposition forces from coalescing under a charismatic leader.

Protest movements grow, centered on the central plateau, which causes participants to stop seeing themselves as marginal dissenters and instead view themselves as empowered political agents. This shift indicates an increase in both internal political efficacy (the belief in one’s ability to influence politics) and external political efficacy (the belief that political authorities respond or can be made to respond). Iran’s contemporary history is marked by societal unrest resulting from social and ethnic deprivation. Over the last three decades, Iranian authoritarianism has faced multiple societal insurrections but has successfully suppressed them through violent repression.

However, Iran’s ethnic composition poses a challenge to the regime because of the diverse array of linguistic, cultural, and sectarian identities across its provinces. Most Persians, primarily Shi’a, live on the central plateau, stretching from Tehran to Esfahan and Fars. Meanwhile, significant Azeri Shi’a communities are primarily located in the northwest, particularly in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan.

Kurdish communities are marginalized and located near Iraq’s border. Meanwhile, another disadvantaged Arab population is in the Khuzestan lowlands in the southwest. The Turkmens live along the northeastern border with Turkmenistan, and Baluch populations—mainly Sunni—reside in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan. Additionally, smaller groups such as the Lurs, Qashqai, and Mazandarani are spread across various regions, emphasizing Iran’s diverse ethnic and sectarian makeup.

Matthias Basedau and others argue that Iran’s authoritarian system maintains stability through carefully calibrated repression that limits the mobilization potential of aggrieved minorities, effectively influencing the psychological cost–benefit analysis of resistance. The regime’s strategic marginalization of religious minorities—such as restrictions on Sunni religious infrastructure, including the ban on building mosques in Tehran, and the systemic exclusion of the Baha’i community—strengthens a political environment where grievances are expressed but rarely escalate into organized violence. This controlled suppression serves not only as a coercive governance tool but also as a psychological deterrent, fostering a climate of learned political passivity that sustains regime dominance while neutralizing potential sources of sectarian dissent.^[32]

Economic crises are potent triggers of revolutionary potential, especially when material hardship coincides with a loss of social recognition—the feeling of being excluded, humiliated, or denied status. According to the relative deprivation theory (Ted Gurr), it is not just absolute poverty, but the distance between expectations and reality, that drives unrest.^[33]

In Iran, an extended economic decline, worsened by sanctions and mismanagement, could lead to shared grievances among different social groups—workers, students, ethnic minorities, and parts of the religious community. This shared sense of discontent raises the chances of sustained mass protests. Economic crises or the erosion of social recognition can amplify unrest. Material hardship triggers grievance convergence, where diverse social groups experience overlapping forms of deprivation, increasing the likelihood of coalition-building.^[34]

In political psychology, this stage is marked by increased emotional arousal—specifically, anger, humiliation, and resentment—which research shows are potent drivers of protest participation. The regime’s failure to address these grievances further deepens perceptions of incompetence and moral bankruptcy.^[35]

Iran’s infrastructure is in chaos, preventing it from providing essentials like consumer goods, water, and energy to its people. After the twelve-day war with Israel, conditions have worsened because of climate issues and high temperatures affecting citizens across Iran. Clearly, an economic crisis breeds dissatisfaction with the authoritarian government, which can lead to large protests that threaten the regime’s survival.

Structural disruptions in the energy sector—shown by repeated power outages—have worsened inflationary pressures on basic goods like rice, fruits, and vegetables, leading to greater material hardship across communities. Similar crises in the industrial and agricultural sectors have further intensified this cycle of suffering, planting grievances throughout different parts of Iranian society.

The combined effect of these conditions has not only caused confusion and dissatisfaction but has also weakened the regime’s ability to maintain social cohesion through its revolutionary strategies. A clear example of this psychological strain is the tragic suicide of a farmer in Baluchistan (Iran International 09/08/2025), which shows how economic instability is increasingly leading to despair and self-destructive actions. Recognizing these mental health factors is crucial for evaluating the regime’s strengths and vulnerabilities.

Revolutions rarely succeed without divisions within the ruling elite. Elite fragmentation, such as between the clerical establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, signals to the public that the regime’s internal unity is breaking apart. These divisions weaken the coercive forces and create political space for challengers. Elite fragmentation reduces the fear that prevents citizens from acting. It also supports opposition by showing that disagreement exists among top leaders, which helps normalize criticism and undermines the regime’s claims of total support.

While structural and psychological preconditions lay the groundwork for revolutionary enthusiasm, a catalytic event often triggers the transition from simmering unrest to outright revolt. Examples include the killing of a protester, an obvious act of corruption, or a humiliating foreign policy failure. Such events act as flashpoints, converting scattered grievances into a unified moral outrage that accelerates mobilization. A catalytic event can ignite emotional arousal that surpasses fear, creating a sense of urgency. The speed and scale of mobilization following such events often overwhelm the regime’s ability to respond effectively.

The death of Mahsa Amini (September 2022), while in the custody of Iran’s morality police, served as a powerful catalyst for widespread protests, sparking deep-rooted socio-psychological grievances against the Islamic Republic. What began as localized outrage over the government’s intrusive regulation of personal morality quickly grew into a nationwide protest movement, notable for its unprecedented size, cross-generational participation, and the prominent role of women as both symbols and agents of resistance.^[36]

Psychologically, the movement tapped into shared experiences of humiliation, loss of control, and intergenerational frustration, turning the protest space into a place for reclaiming dignity and redefining social identity. The regime, seeing this as a serious threat to its ideological legitimacy, used a two-pronged approach of forceful repression and psychological warfare. This led to a violent crackdown combined with messages that labeled the protests as foreign-led sedition.

By spring 2023, the sustained application of psychological deterrence, coupled with the absence of unified leadership within the opposition, eroded the protesters’ momentum, allowing the entrenched political elite to reassert control. This episode illustrates the interplay between authoritarian resilience and the psychological dynamics of dissent, where state power rests not only on coercive capacity but also on the ability to shape collective perception and suppress the political imagination of resistance.

Although analytically distinct, the preconditions are closely linked. Institutional decline encourages charismatic opposition; economic crises increase protest awareness; elite fragmentation boosts the effects of catalytic events. The interaction of these factors reaches a revolutionary tipping point, after which regime survival becomes unlikely. In this framework, revolutionary rupture results not from a single cause but from the combined influence of structural decline, economic grievances, leadership dynamics, and elite defection. When triggered by a catalytic shock, these mechanisms create a self-reinforcing feedback loop that destabilizes authoritarian regimes and threatens their survival.

Concluding Remarks

This essay explores Iranian statecraft from two interconnected perspectives that both fit together and, to some degree, seem to conflict. The analysis explains how the Islamic Republic of Iran uses ideological and institutional strategies to uphold its political legitimacy, promote social unity, and sustain its regime’s survival. It also investigates the factors and circumstances that might cause the regime to lose control. Additionally, these sequential dynamics can lead to revolutionary shifts within authoritarian regimes.

Drawing from political psychology, social movement theory, and comparative politics, it examined the dynamics between legitimacy decline, institutional erosion, leadership emergence, protest growth, socio-economic crises, elite fragmentation, and catalytic events. The analysis shows how these stages are both structurally driven and psychologically influenced, illustrating that revolutions depend as much on collective identity and belief systems as on material conditions.

Iran aims to build a dual identity story of victimization and resistance, mixing religion, nationalism, and history, framing external conflicts as existential threats to foster social cohesion and resilience. The efforts to cultivate a collective ideological mindset are embedded in an internally cohesive and externally assertive mindset; however, this does not guarantee the regime’s political durability.

The primary challenge for analysts observing upcoming changes in authoritarian regimes is that they often occur within informal, hidden networks outside of official political discussions. The lack of transparency in Iran’s political landscape makes it especially challenging to identify these trends. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s ideological and institutional resilience should be analyzed carefully. The preconditions outlined here, when aligned and mutually reinforcing, could cause a revolutionary rupture. Political psychology emphasizes that revolutions are not merely the result of structural failures but also involve profound changes in identity, perception, and emotional involvement.

While the Islamic Republic shows adaptive resilience typical of entrenched authoritarian regimes, its stability is not guaranteed. Regime destabilization in such situations often arises from the combination of structural weaknesses and psychological tipping points in collective identity, perceived legitimacy, and future outlook. Understanding this link between material conditions and belief systems is crucial for accurately predicting the chances and direction of political change in Iran.

* Dr. Doron Itzchakov is currently a Research Associate at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University, where he specializes in Iranian politics, foreign policy, and regional security dynamics. In this role, he contributes to cutting-edge research on Iran’s geopolitical goals, its changing role in the Middle East, and the wider implications for Israel and regional stability.

Dr. Itzchakov holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and African History from Tel Aviv University. His doctoral dissertation, titled ‘Iran-Israel Relations 1948–1963: The Iranian Perspective,’ examined the early bilateral relationship between the two countries, analyzing how internal Iranian politics and regional developments influenced Tehran’s approach to Israel. 

Dr. Itzchakov specializes in Iran’s history and politics, Iran-Israel relations, and Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East, with a particular focus on the intersection of ideology, strategy, and national interest. His research explores Iran’s geopolitical ambitions, the evolution of its strategic alliances, and the internal and external factors that influence Tehran’s regional policies. He is also recognized for his expertise in interpreting the implications of Iran’s actions on Israel’s security landscape and regional stability.

Notes

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^[1]. Doron Itzchakov, Iran’s Power Structure, ICT publications, Reichman University, December 24, 2024. Iran’s Power Structure – ICT

^[2] . Sami Zubaida, “The Early Ideological Conditions of Khomeini’s Doctrine of Government,” in Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East (Beer Sheba: Ben-Gurion University Press, 1993), Pp.  60–70.

^[3]. Kenneth O. Jobson and Dean S. Hartley III, Achieving Cognitive Warfare Superiority Amidst Accelerating Change, Phalanx, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Spring 2022), pp. 28-31

^[4] . Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘National Security,’ The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Oxford University Press, Jun., 1990), pp. 143-152.

^[5] . Ray Takey, Khomeini’s Ideology and Iran’s Grand Strategy,’ in Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Pp. 11-18.

^[6]. Said Amir Arjomand, ‘The Reform Movement and the Debate on Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov., 2002), p. 722.

^[7]. Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Hebrew version, (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, 2008), Pp. 24-27.

^[8] . Ruhollah K. Ramazani, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy,’ Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 549-559.

^[9]. Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory,’ Third World Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 891-908.

^[10] . Regarding the term ‘superordinate identity’, see: Marianne E. Krasny, ‘Identity,’ Advancing Environmental Education Practice, (Cornell University Press, Comstock Publishing Associates, 2020), Pp. 158-159.

^[11]. Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Charismatic Politics and the Symbolic Foundations of Power in Max Weber,‘ New German Critique, (Winter, 2002), No. 85, pp. 67-103.

^[12]. Michikuni Ôno, ‘Collective effervescence and symbolism,’ Durkheimian Studies, (Berghahn Books, 1996), New Series, Vol. 2, pp. 79-98

^[13] . Identity salience refers to how prominent, accessible, and likely to be activated a specific social identity (such as national, religious, professional, ethnic, or gender identity) is in a particular situation. In social psychology and sociology, it explains the chances that a specific identity will influence a person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions. 

^[14]. Vali Nasr, ‘When the Shiites Rise, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 2006), pp. 58-71.

^[15]. Abby Kulisz, ‘Trauma Unending: Shi’i Islam and the Experience of Trauma,’ Journal of Religion and Violence, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2017), pp. 274-290.

^[16]. Kenneth O. Jobson and Dean S. Hartley, ‘Achieving Cognitive Warfare Superiority Amidst Accelerating Change,’ Phalanx, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Spring 2022), pp. 28-31. 

^[17] . Cynthia P. Schneider, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You’d Know It If You Saw It,’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Fall / Winter 2006), pp. 191-203.

^[18]. Doron Itzchakov, ‘Iran’s Public Diplomacy in Latin America,’ The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), March 16, 2025, Pp. 1-17. https://ict.org.il/irans-public-diplomacy-in-latin-america/

^[19] . Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran’s Regime of Religion,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, (Fall/Winter 2011), pp. 131-147 

^[20] . Mahmood Sariolghalam, ‘Is Iran an Ideological State? ‘ Atlantic Council (2024), Pp. 1-16.

^[21]. Doron Itzchakov, ‘Iran Faces Economic Challenges as Its Currency Plunges,’ BESA Center Perspectives No. 819, May 1, 2018, Pp. 1-4.

^[22]. Keith Crane, Rollie Lal, and Jeffrey Martini, ‘Domestic Politics,’ Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities(RAND Corporation, 2008), Pp. 7-31.

^[23]. The last budget bill was submitted to the Majlis by Iran’s President, Masoud Pezeshkian, on October 15, 2024

^[24]. Agenda-setting theory indicates that the media, by selecting and emphasizing specific issues, greatly influence which problems attract government attention, thereby shaping public opinion on particular topics. The theory suggests that media can sway public perception by focusing on particular issues, and it has been widely studied and applied across various media formats.

^[25] Self-censorship is the act of controlling or restricting one’s own expression, typically out of concern or respect for the perceived preferences, sensitivities, or authority of others, often happening without explicit external influence or coercion. Veronica Ma, ‘Propaganda and Censorship: Adapting to the Modern Age,’ Harvard International Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Winter 2016), pp. 46-50.

^[26] . ^{Panopticon — a framework created in 1787 by political philosopher and jurist Jeremy Bentham as part of his social and legal reform efforts. This architectural design, applicable in various settings such as industries, schools, jails, shelters, and refuges, helps organize and control society.}

^[27]. Michel Foucault, “Panopticism” from “Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison”, Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts (Autumn, 2008), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1-12. 

^[28] . Regarding Soft and Hard power see: Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World (March 2008), pp. 94-109.

^[29] . Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Social Movements and Elections: Toward a Broader Understanding of the Political Context of Contention,’ The Future of Social Movement Research, (University of Minnesota Press,2013), Pp. 325-346.

^[30] . Mark Rubin and Miles Hewstone, ‘Social Identity, System Justification, and Social Dominance: Commentary on Reicher, Jost et al., and Sidanius et al,’ Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 6, (Dec., 2004), pp. 823-844.

^[31].  Scott D. Neufeld and Michael T. Schmitt, ‘Solidarity Not Homogeneity: Constructing a Superordinate Aboriginal Identity That Protects Subgroup Identities,’ Political Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 3 (JUNE 2019), pp. 599-616.

^[32]. Matthias Basedau, Jonathan Fox, Jan H. Pierskalla, Georg Strüver, and Johannes Vüllers, ‘Does discrimination breed grievances—and do grievances breed violence? New evidence from an analysis of religious minorities in developing countries,’ Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, No. 3 (May 2017), pp. 217-239.

^[33]. Ted Gurr, ‘Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,’ World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jan. 1968), pp. 245-278.

 ^{32. Matthias Basedau, et al. ‘Does discrimination breed grievances—and do grievances breed violence’? pp. 234-239.}

^[35]. Doron Itzchakov, ‘Protests in Iran: Social Challenges vs. Foreign Policy Ambitions,’ BESA Center Perspectives No. 705, January 3, 2018, Pp. 1-5.

^[36]. Doron Itzchakov, ‘The Hijab Protest: Between Continuity and Change,’ ICT publications, Reichman University, March 2, 2023, Pp. 1-7. The Hijab Protest: Between Continuity and Change – ICT

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