Abstract

This article analyzes Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s and his successor’s endeavors to delineate the principles of the theocratic regime’s power framework. The transformation instigated by the Islamic Revolution resulted in a reconfiguration of identities, beliefs, norms, and policies, influencing the distribution of resources to enhance Iran’s power structure and national resilience. The essay examines the four essential components of the power structure, highlighting the merits and drawbacks of each aspect separately. This focus will clarify the operation of the revolutionary regime and underscore the interplay between state and society. 

Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a matchless Power Structure based on a profound sense of divine governing authority, exemplified in the ‘rule of the jurisprudence’ (Velayat-e Faqih). This power structure was shaped by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini before the establishment of the Islamic Republic and continued to evolve even after he died in 1989.

Khomeini’s basic notion relies on the premise that the Prophet and the Imams will play significant roles on the Day of Judgment; they will intervene on behalf of their society with God, and through their intercession, even a sinful believer will enter paradise. In other words, the mere fact of belonging to the sect of Twelver Shi’a ensures salvation.^[1]

In Khomeini’s view, the Islamic nation could only be freed of colonialism and puppet regimes through a people’s revolt and the establishment of a theocratic government. In the introduction to his book Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami, Khomeini extensively emphasized the basis of his utopic governance system, setting the framework of righteous believers vs. adversaries.

This work, which over time became the scaffolding for the constitution of the revolutionary political system, displays the construction of Iran’s hybrid system. However, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has undergone significant occurrences that have affected its national security doctrine and left an imprint on its strategy. These changes affected how power was exerted on both the domestic and foreign relations levels.

Defining what the term ‘Power’ means is essential as a preliminary step for the discussion. Power is the ability to influence or direct actors’ actions, beliefs, or behavior. That is to say, power is the ability to make others do or behave according to one’s desired outcomes. It can be achieved by hard or soft power or a combination of them, which is described as smart power.^[2]

According to Joseph Nye, hard power is the ability to use ‘carrots and sticks’ of economic and military might to make others do what you want them to do. In the same vein, he describes soft power as ‘the capability to affect the behavior of others to make others want the outcomes you want’, enabling people to co-opt rather than coerce them.^[3]

The fundamental framework of Iran’s power structure consists of four key components: 1. Military Power, 2. Economic Power, 3. State Actions (Bureaucracy), and 4. Social Cohesion, expressed through norms, culture, and ideas that promote unity. A similar approach can be seen in Iran’s national resilience pattern, which relies on the following elements: A. Diplomacy, B. Information, C. Military Strength, D. Economic Stability, and E. Social Cohesion (collectively known as DIMES).

Military Power involves the forces, weapons, and systems that safeguard the nation’s interests and vital resources. It aims to control or coerce adversaries in various situations and serves as a foundational segment for the political establishment in shaping the state’s grand strategy. Over time, Iran’s perspective was to pursue its objective of imposing costs on Israel without escalating the confrontation to a conventional war. This pattern has changed lately due to its involvement in the ‘Iron Swords’ war.

Economic Power encompasses domestic and international aspects and is essential for achieving national security and economic strength. This concept relates to the ability of an individual, group, or state to influence or control economic outcomes, including resource allocation, production, and wealth distribution.

This power extends beyond financial wealth to include the ability to shape policies, negotiate trade agreements, and impact global markets. Susan Strange highlights that economic power is critical in determining the interplay between states and markets, often dictating the balance of global influence.^[4]Joseph Nye argues that economic power is vital to soft power strategies.^[5]

State Actions involve a bureaucratic mechanism, where decisions are made to conduct the country’s affairs. The Islamic Republic Constitutional system endows supreme power to the jurist, as the representative of the Hidden Imam, with responsibility only to God. Furthermore, it sets up clerically controlled advisory and supervisory Councils with inordinately extensive powers to represent the Shi’ite religious institution. The principles of theocracy, with their full implications within the framework of the modern nation-state, were embodied in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.^[6]

The power distribution in the Islamic Republic is interrelated between the Supreme Leader, acting as the head of state, and the President, acting with limited power. This system has advantages and disadvantages and has evolved from various variables. Some are less tangible, acting behind the scenes and influenced by semi-governmental organizations and patron-client mechanisms. Iran’s power distribution is affiliated with its balance of power vision, state-society relations, and path dependence.^[7]

State-society dynamics significantly influence Iran’s social cohesiveness. This connection is primarily due to the unique interplay between civil society and the country’s theocratic-authoritarian system. The religious establishment plays a mediating role in this dynamic. Additionally, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), various autonomous groups, and patron-client relationships are among the most prominent features of this system.^[8]

The founding father of the Islamic Republic assured the public during his inauguration that Islam would provide solutions to all societal graveness and challenges. However, more than four and a half decades after the revolution, the Islamic regime is still attempting to validate Khomeini’s statement. Despite these efforts, social divisions remain unavoidable due to ethnic differences and economic challenges.^[9]

Iran’s Power Structure: strengths and vulnerabilities

Iran’s Military Power

The preamble of Iran’s constitution delineates the religious purpose of its military and establishes Islam as the basis for its doctrine. Faith and ideology should be fundamental in establishing and preparing the nation’s military forces. The constitution cites the Qur’an in Surat al-Anfal (‘Prepare against them whatever force you can muster’…), implying a theological foundation for a defensive or deterrent military philosophy.^[10]

In addition, Iran’s military strategy was built on the foundation of path dependence, particularly during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988). According to an IISS report (2019), this war has caused a large number of casualties and expenses, amounting to around 645 billion USD, resulting in the devastation of its economy and infrastructure.^[11] Another significant result of the Iran-Iraq war was prioritizing the Self-Reliance approach as the nation’s primary strategic asset and blueprint.

The deficiency of the nation’s Air Force capabilities, and the frail state of its infantry and armored divisions, prompted this choice. Relying on launching capabilities without a forefront Air Force can be perceived as a vulnerability in the ‘balance of deterrence’. Nonetheless, Khomeini decided to rely on self-production of warfare capabilities, in light of Iran’s economic and geostrategic situation at the war’s end.

After the war, Iran adopted offensive and defensive strategies based on a domineering approach related to its regional challenges and opportunities. The War significantly altered Iran’s strategic perception, developing its ‘strategic depth’ doctrine. This approach aimed to ensure that future confrontations would occur far off Iran’s borders, ideally as close as possible to Iran’s adversary’s territory. This strategy emerged from the early stages of the war, due to the Iraqi army’s invasion of Iran’s western provinces.

This strategic framework became a cornerstone in the formulation of the ‘axis of resistance’, a policy designed to surround Israel with proxy militias, operating under Iran’s guidance and support. In the past, the revolutionary regime successfully deployed its loyal forces along Israel’s border and equipped them with destructive munitions made by Iran. In doing so, Iran believed that its territory would be shielded from Israeli military retaliation.^[12]

This perception was significantly challenged in late October (2024), when the Israeli Air Force neutralized Iranian defense systems, leaving Iranian airspace exposed. This development disrupted Iran’s ‘balance of deterrence’ perception, and prompted the Islamic regime to reconsider the magnitude of future potential confrontation.^[13]

 Iran’s Military Power is exclusive and incorporates a complex web of authority, bureaucracy, and power structure. Within this network, the IRGC is a prominent actor, and frequently vies for power influence with other security organs, such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Ministry of Interior, and Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).^[14] This multilayer form of institution is characterized by overlapping, redundant responsibilities that frequently put organizations in competition over funding, equipment, and influence.^[15]

Under the constitution, the MOIS is responsible for foreign intelligence collection and domestic counter-subversion. The LEF is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and has diverse responsibilities, including counternarcotics, riot control, border protection, morals enforcement, and anti-corruption. Until 1999, the MOIS was dreaded and accused of assassinating dissidents and activists in Iran and abroad.^[16]

The IRGC’s mission to support revolutionary movements outside of Iran is carried out by its subordinate force, which promoted the establishment of the Quds Force (also known as the Jerusalem Force or Niru-ye Quds). This Force was established during the initial years of the Iran–Iraq War. It originated from intelligence and special military groups, tasked with conducting asymmetric warfare beyond Iran’s borders. In 1990, Ayatollah Khamenei articulated his principal objective by stating that the Quds Force’s purpose was to create Hezbollah cells globally.^[17] The most prominent among its diverse tasks is promoting Iran’s network of sponsored terrorism (INST) in different parts of the globe.

The INST is an alarming force composed of tens of thousands of members, diverting in their origins, ethnic affiliations, and religious backgrounds. This network is Tehran’s primary asset for launching attacks against the state of Israel and a fundamental instrument for achieving prolonged deterrence. For a long time, Hezbollah has been considered Tehran’s most prominent asset for advancing Iran’s goals of changing Middle Eastern reality.

Hezbollah’s establishment was a consequence of Iran’s success a short time earlier in founding the Badr organization (comprising Iraqi dissidents), which fought alongside Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Hezbollah’s fealty to Tehran was evident in a series of declarations making unequivocally clear that an Islamic order based on Khomeini’s ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ vision was a central plank of its worldview. 

Another branch operating under IRGC auspices is the Basij or Niru-ye Moghavamat-e Basij (the Resistance Mobilization Force), a paramilitary volunteer militia established by the order of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. It comprises civilians, usually young, loyal, and affiliated with the religious-political system, in exchange for official benefits.

The Basij has evolved steadily since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and its security forces are bound with the IRGC. The militia is practically involved in suppressing anti-establishment demonstrations and upholding the moral principles set by the regime. According to Anthony Cordesman, this mobilization force is estimated to encompass more than 20 million volunteers and strongly supports the Islamic regime.^[18]

The IRGC monopolizes Iran’s power structure but is not the only player. The military force, known as the Artesh, also plays a significant role; however, its primary responsibility is to control and secure Iran’s borders. This hybrid structure, which includes separate branches of the Air Force, Navy, and Infantry, is unique and can be traced back to Khomeini’s steadfast opposition and reluctance to depend on its army.

During the country’s recovery from the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC gained significant dominance in numerous sectors, including the economy, energy, industry, and agriculture. The IRGC’s control over the industrial conglomerate Khatam al-Anbiya (“Seal of the Prophets”) exemplifies this dominance. Khatam al-Anbiya holds exclusive rights to most of Iran’s engineering projects, from road construction to developing oil and gas fields and dam construction.^[19]

During the last decade, Iran has implemented a powerful political warfare strategy to increase its regional hegemony. This strategy has been implemented in the context of the transformations that have taken place in the Middle East. Iran gained an unprecedented amount of influence in Iraq as a result of the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the emergence of Shia Iraqi parties in Baghdad. In addition, Tehran has been given an exceptional opportunity to exercise political authority in its western neighbor as a result of the establishment of the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant.^[20]

The influence of the security apparatus, particularly the Revolutionary Guards, is a tangible reality throughout the various segments of the populace. Despite its considerable impact, the diverse factions of the security establishment have not received support from all community segments. The security power scheme does not promote a sense of belonging or affiliation and is not exempt from dangers, temptations, problems, and pitfalls.

Over time, Iran’s military presence in various parts of the Middle East has created anxiety among its Arab Neighbors. Many of its neighbors perceive Iran as not merely a source of revolutionary instability, but also as a non-Arab hegemonic power intent on dominating the region. Moreover, Iran’s pursuit of military dominance is not exempt from weaknesses; its ambition for supremacy and omnipresence may result in overexposure, inner discord, and divisions. This inclination may result in unbalanced foreign hegemony undermining domestic stability.

Iran’s Economic Power

Iran’s economic power is pivotal in its internal and foreign policies. Domestically, Iran’s control over vast natural resources, particularly oil and gas, grants it significant economic leverage. However, the concentration of economic control among political elites and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has often fueled public dissatisfaction, exacerbating internal instability.^[21]

            Article 44 of the Islamic Republic’s constitution stipulates that Iran must maintain an outlined economy in which the state sector encompasses all large-scale and foundational industries, foreign trade, significant mineral resources, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, radio and television, postal and telecommunication services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads, and similar entities.^[22]

Furthermore, Iran’s natural resources constitute a primary source of income, with oil and gas being the most prominent. A financial framework that depends predominantly on these resources establishes a rentier economic structure. This framework has merits and drawbacks stemming from an overdependence on natural resources and a lack of alternative revenue streams.

Internationally, Iran wields its economic power strategically to influence foreign policy. As a major oil producer, it leverages energy exports to create alliances and gain political favor, particularly with nations in Asia and Europe. However, economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies have significantly undermined Iran’s ability to exercise its economic power on a global scale.

Economic policies, including subsidies and market interventions, are frequently used as tools to maintain internal cohesion, but these measures have strained Iran’s fiscal sustainability. An analysis of the political-economic equation can shed light on the reasons for the crisis in the Iranian exchange-rate market. Western experts tend to categorize the Iranian economic regime as a “command economy,” wherein the ruling establishment is the decisive, and exclusive actor in producing and consuming goods and services.^[23]

Fiscal accounts delineate the extent and allocation of government expenditures of public funds or the commitment of a nation’s resources to future obligations. Data from government accounts is crucial for assessing policies and initiatives concerning economic implications and macroeconomic performance. In post-revolutionary Iran, vast public funds are appropriated and redistributed outside the formal budget, illustrating queries arising from large, off-budget activities.^[24]

This scheme of rentier economic power is a double-edged sword, but it is central to Iran’s regional aspirations. By relying on its natural resources, funding proxy groups, and investing in strategic partnerships, Iran seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East, a strategy rooted in using financial resources to bolster ideological and geopolitical goals.

However, these expenditures strain its domestic economy, creating a delicate balance between sustaining foreign ambitions and addressing internal economic grievances. Sanctions and domestic economic discontent are just two obstacles it must overcome, highlighting the intricate relationship between economic resources, policy decisions, and geopolitical strategy.

Over the past decades, Iranians have become accustomed to rationing, which aligns with the country’s economic vicissitudes. The economic downturn has hiked prices across a wide range of basic consumption commodities, and Iranians consider themselves entitled to enjoy the fruit of Iran’s natural resources. This caused a wrought-up civil society, generating social discontent that is impossible to quantify. Despite the civil unrest, from the regime’s standpoint, the means it has developed to contend with social protest have thus far been successful.

The Iranian economy has two parallel axes: the official economy, implemented by the government, and the “charity foundation economy” (the Bonyads economy). The largest of the foundations is the “Oppressed and Disabled Foundation” – the second-largest economic entity in the country after the national oil company.

The work of charity foundations, which originated in the revolutionary regime’s confiscation of the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation, involves supplying the needs of the lower classes, helping the families of those fallen in battle, rehabilitating prisoners of war, providing assorted forms of welfare, and inculcating Islamic education and culture, and so on. 

Over time, charitable foundations have become a powerful economic axis, not subjected to governmental monitoring, taxation processes, reporting, or registration in the state accounting system. Not surprisingly, the inability to monitor these entities has given rise to corruption, tax evasion, and resource allocation outside the framework of the approved annual budget.^[25]

The IRGC and Basij’s financial operations significantly influence and harden the Iranian economy, impacting civil society. Their economic interference distorts the market, marginalizes the private sector, and burdens the public sector due to the covert transfer of public monies to IRGC enterprises. In addition, the IRGC’s increasing wealth makes it increasingly independent of the state budget.^[26]

State Actions

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was formulated on Khomeini’s worldview. It garnered a majority of votes in the October 1979 referendum and was enacted on December 3^rd of that year. It has been founded on essential principles, legal frameworks, and governance that derive their legitimacy from divine authority to the supreme leader as a representative of God’s will until the Mahdi’s return, as Shi’a believers anticipate. 

Khomeini aimed not only to alter the governance of the state but also to cultivate a distinct national identity that perceives Islam as the remedy for all societal afflictions. Khomeini’s theocratic concepts were articulated in a collection of lectures published as a book in 1971. His fundamental concept necessitated a reconfiguration of the equilibrium between the state and the hierocracy. According to Said Arjomand’s quotation: ‘the state’s jurisdiction was to be confined to issues like traffic laws and economic management’.^[27]

Brain Fredriksson argues that the state’s executives determine the grand strategy to maintain or achieve peace. At the strategic level, governmental executive agents utilize tools of authority to fulfill the state’s political aims.^[28] This method possesses theoretical validity. However, Iran’s overarching strategy is distinctive due to its covert framework. For example, the supreme leader exercises influence through ‘negative power’ not necessarily by formulating original policy but by blocking alternative approaches.^[29]

Iran’s supreme leader has been exercising influence over the Iranian system. Much of his strength rests on his presumed moral authority and informal networks, as well as shifts in the international and domestic context. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic is utilizing its vision of ‘Political warfare’ as a strategy to achieve hegemony and influence Middle Eastern states.^[30]

Historically, Shi’ite law has shared all the above characteristics: moral idealism in jurisprudence, and personalism in the justice administration. Said Arjomand argues that Shi’ite law was to be extended to cover the public lawfully and criminal justice. Procedurally, Shi’ite law has been implemented through a modified mechanism of the inherited formal ratio analyzed and hierarchical judiciary organization modeled on the West European civil law systems.^[31]

Khomeini’s power structure is generated by advisory and supervisory committees that nominate and endorse individuals for leadership roles and oversee executive actions. Subsequently, Iran’s political structure embodies a tendency for unelected theocratic institutions to dominate elected Republican ones, overlapping with one another. Even institutions established to reduce the overlap between these two groups, such as the Expediency Council, have become victims of the system and significant actors in factional fighting.

The Iranian regime perceives itself as constantly threatened while simultaneously asserting its position as a champion for the oppressed against Western imperialism. Iran’s perception of itself is shaped by a long history of victory and defeat; it sees itself as a once-great power humbled and humiliated by the West, particularly the United States. Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution enhanced Iran’s sense of exceptionalism and created a potent mixture of religious ideology and deep-seated nationalism.^[32]

Iran has persistently implemented a strategy of addressing issues beyond the Arab regimes, establishing itself as the guardian of the Palestinians. Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf, express concern over Iran’s divisive sectarian approach, which aims to inflame Arab Shiite communities and encourage their activism. Iran’s hyper-activism on pan-Arab problems should not be interpreted as a demonstration of its influence but rather as an effort to compensate for its perception of intrinsic isolation.^[33]

Social Cohesion

The collective behavior approach significantly highlights common beliefs and ‘shared values’ as the primary axis of mobilization to action. Thus, social structure encourages those sharing a common identity to unite and act jointly. The Islamic Republic government endeavors to enhance communal behavior, mobilization, identification, and unity to fulfill a yearning for collective action. It employs narratives of Shi’a suffering, religious revivalism, and fundamental allegiances to achieve its goals.

Asef Bayat argues that operating within a structuralist framework (resource mobilization theory), similar to other rationalist models, underscores the rational motivations of actors to participate in collective action. Like other collective behavior; it also assumes a relatively ‘metaphysical’ commonality among social movement participants. However, it differs from it in the commonality of the actors’ comprehension of their mutual interests.^[34]

Consequently, the question emerges: What is the binding link that fostered social cohesion in Iran decades after the Islamic Revolution? Understanding the ideological, ethnic, and social foundations is crucial for understanding the social discourse. The revolutionary establishment seeks to enhance social cohesion through ideological and cultural strategies. Conversely, the elite often utilizes enforcement policy as a tool of intimidation.

The term public diplomacy was introduced to distinguish it from conventional diplomacy employed by governmental entities. Initially, individuals perceived public diplomacy as a supplementary notion that enhanced conventional diplomatic methods. Subsequently, non-state entities, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and companies, began participating in public diplomacy, altering the dynamics of diplomatic engagement.^[35]

Joseph Ney contends that public diplomacy is interconnected with soft power since it allows governments to allocate resources for communication and public engagement. Both theories (Public Diplomacy and Soft Power) originate from the principles embodied in the nation’s culture. The precedents it promotes through its internal practices and regulations disclose how it handles its relations with others.^[36]

Iran distinctly utilizes soft power and popular diplomacy concepts for its domestic and foreign requirements. Its commemoration centers (known as Hosseiniyeh) offer spiritual practice, religious education, cultural activities, historical lectures, mourning rituals, and economic support to the community. These institutions serve as mechanisms to cultivate loyalty to the revolutionary regime and recruit adherents, predominantly from the lower socioeconomic classes. The Hosseiniyehs are employed to disseminate revolutionary doctrine, undermine the ideological foundations of opponents, and shape the informational landscape by manipulating public opinion and social media.

National pride and reputation constitute significant pillars in forming the post-revolutionary collective identity. Reputation has always been important in Middle Eastern politics, especially in the Islamic Republic. In geopolitical terms, reputation is related to public diplomacy; its essence lies in the “good impression” that a country aims to create in its society and among the public of other nations.^[37]

However, Iran’s history abounds with social rifts due to its ethnic complexity, which Khomeini’s supporters utilized during the Islamic revolution to achieve their goals. Although there are discursive claims to monocultural societal frameworks, human societies are mainly heterogeneous.^[38] This is also valid regarding the identities of specific ethnicities or religions, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran’s estimated population is 91 million, predominantly Iranian-Persian individuals. Nonetheless, other diverse ethnic groups constituting Iran’s society include Kurds, Azeris, Gilakis, Mazandarans, Lurs, Turks, Tats, Talish, and Baloch. Khomeini, cognizant of the Iranian ethnic fragmentation and its historical implications, aimed to foster national and civil cohesion within the broader Islamic context and Shia narrative in particular.

Thus, Separatism in Iran is not a new phenomenon, scalded in the regime’s consciousness. In 1946, the uprising of the Kurdish minority led by Qazi Muhammad, which brought about the establishment of the ‘Republic of Mahabad’ under Soviet patronage, is still engraved on the Islamic Republic’s historical consciousness. In due course, the Kurdish uprising was a chain reaction following the uprising of the national movement of Azerbaijan led by Jaffar Pishevari, which had begun two months earlier.^[39] Furthermore, the Iranian Kurdish minority eventually revolted against the governing authority, with some of its members allying with the Iraqi military during the Iran-Iraq War.

The Iranian revolutionary regime employs religious orators (also known as Sokhanran) to cultivate a common identity and bolster its authority. There is an affinity between Christian and Islamist propagandists in their modus operandi, which endeavors to influence the different segments of society. Iranian orators attempted to uncover the connection between Islamic tradition and theocratism by legitimizing the leader’s power.

Iran’s state-society relations are largely affected by the social media. Social networking services have long been popular among Iranians and significantly impact state-society interactions in Iran. By 2006, Iranians were among the most engaged users on Orkut and Myspace, prompting government censors to entirely prohibit access to both platforms.^[40] The Iranian government’s use of social media grew more overt during the 2009 elections, particularly in its effort to launch and conduct a “soft war.”

The state’s soft war has been executed using various intersecting methods. Several newspaper articles, books, and television shows emerged to educate the Iranian public about the adversary’s soft war and the appropriate responses. This entails engaging state actors and individuals to provide media content and analyses that captivate new audiences and subvert the adversary’s soft warfare efforts. In other words, combating the adversary’s soft war necessitates the implementation of the state’s counter-version.^[41] The soft war also commenced within the domestic realm, targeting various population segments to foster social cohesiveness while delegitimizing individuals perceived as dissenters against its activities.

Accordingly, Iran has been enhancing its power structure by advocating hard and soft power as an inherent part of its political framework. The country has intensified its efforts to cultivate a strategic campaign to shape a desired public mindset for an extended period. This narrative production incorporates historical events to promote a necessary national ethos and foster social cohesion.

Concluding Remarks

One may assume that Iran’s power structure is robust and stable. However, an assessment of the structure’s module exposes inherent vulnerabilities. In the military purview, the Islamic Republic has developed asymmetric capabilities to compensate for its conventional inferiority. As a result of the current changes, Iran’s’ axis of resistance,’ notably its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, has been stripped of its significant asymmetric capabilities.

These changes would affect the future balance of power in the Middle East. However, Iran’s strategic framework shows that the regime would strive to alter its situation by finding a new geopolitical landscape for leverage. Another vulnerability can be perceived in the nation’s Air Force and armored frail state. This susceptibility prompted reliance on launching capabilities as its pillar of deterrence. The current geopolitical reality has generated a breach in its deterrence as well.

Iran’s dependence on rentier income from oil and gas, coupled with a lack of alternative revenue streams, may result in a precarious economic situation. Notwithstanding substantial oil and gas income, inflation and the depreciation of the local currency indicate a deficit of confidence between the populace and the banking sector. The sanctions imposed on Iran compel its officials to explore options to avert economic catastrophe. Historical occurrences demonstrate that Islamic rule has effectively evaded sanctions by assisting nations, commercial enterprises, and individuals operating on its behalf.

Sociological literature frequently pertains to socio-economic aspects, including shared values, civic culture, social order, control, and social solidarity. Moreover, income, social networks, social capital, and identity play significant roles.^[42] This pattern pertains to the Islamic Republic; nevertheless, governmental actions have concentrated on harmonizing the interests of the Supreme Leader, the security apparatus (notably the IRGC), and the religious establishment.

This political framework significantly influences the policies implemented by the Islamic Republic and exacerbates state-society relations. The long-lasting divide between ordinary Iranians suffering persistent economic hardship and the ruling elite is unavoidable. The Islamic theocracy is prepared to expend considerable resources in its relentless pursuit of regional hegemony to the detriment of its populace.^[43]

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^[1]. Etan Kohlberg, ‘The Evolution of the Shi’a,’ Belief and Law in Imami Shi’ism, (Hampshire: Variorum Publishers, 1991), P. 7.

^[2] . Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age from Realism to Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 1-8.

^[3]. Joseph S. Nye. “Soft power: the means to success in world politics” (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p. 5.

^[4] . Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, 2nd ed. Chapter 2, ‘Power in the World Economy” (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 23-44.

^[5] . Joseph Nye, and Jack Landman Goldsmith, “The Future of Power”, Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 64, No. 3 (SPRING 2011), pp. 45-52.

^[6] . Said Amir Arjomand, ” Constitution-Making in Islamic Iran: The Impact of Theocracy on the

Legal Order of a Nation-State”, History and Power in the Study of Law, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Pp. 115-116.

^[7] . Path dependence is a concept in economics and social sciences that refers to past events or decisions influencing present decisions.

^[8]. Kazem Alamdari, “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to 

Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government”, Third World Quarterly, 2005, Vol. 26, No. 8 (2005), pp. 1285-1301.

^[9] . Ethnology: a branch of cultural anthropology that analyzes cultures, especially concerning their historical development: the similarities and dissimilarities, between them.

^[10]. Erik A. Olson, ‘Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer, 2016), pp. 63-93.

^[11]. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘Tehran’s Strategic Intent’, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), p. 15.

^[12] . Iran views itself as a leader of an ‘axis of resistance’ composed of Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemenis Houthis, the Syrian regime, pro-Iranian Palestinian groups, Shi’a Iraqi militias, and Shi’a afghani-Pakistani militias.

^[13]. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-826259.

^[14]. Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, (California, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 13.  

^[15]. David Thaler, Alireza Nader Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, Frederic Wehrey, ‘Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamic’ (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 33.

^[16] . Frederic Wehrey et. al. The Rise of the Pasdaran, p. 10.

^[17] . The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘Tehran’s Strategic Intent’, p.17.

^[18]. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran’s Security Efforts: Repression Works Until It Doesn’t,” The Crisis in Iran, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018, Pp. 4-5.

^[19] . Doron Itzchakov, ‘The Tehran Summit and Iran’s Regional Ambitions’, BESA Center Perspectives, No. 954 (September, 2018). Pp. 3-4.

^[20]. Linda Robinson, Todd Helmus, Raphael Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson and Katya Migacheva, ‘Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses’ (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), Pp. 125-126.

^[21] . Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, ‘Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 95, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 203-205

^[22]. Ali Alfoneh, ‘The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting of Iran’s Economy’, American Enterprise Institute, No. 3, June 2010, Pp. 1-10.

^[23] . Doron Itzchakov, “Iran Faces Economic Challenges as Its Currency Plunges”, Besa Center Perspectives, No. 819 (May, 2018), Pp. 1-4.

^[24]. Hadi Salehi Esfahani and Farzad Taheripour,’ Hidden Public Expenditures and the Economy in Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov. 2002), Pp. 691-718.

^[25]. Itzchakov, “Iran Faces Economic Challenges”.

^[26]. Alfoneh, ‘The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting’, P. 5.

^[27] . Arjomand, “Constitution-Making in Islamic Iran”, P. 118

^[28]. Brain Fredriksson, National and Military Powe, Globalness, (Air University Press, 2006), P. 11.

^[29]. Jerrold Green, Frederic Wehrey, Charles Wolf, Understanding Iran, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009), p. 7.

^[30] . Linda Robinson et al., ‘Modern Political Warfare’, p. 125. The term “political warfare” is attributed to George Kennan, who viewed the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union as a matter of state competition and a battle of ideologies between liberal democracy and Communism.

^[31]. Arjomand, “Constitution-Making in Islamic Iran”, P. 115.

^[32] . David Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, Frederic Wehrey, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010), Pp. 19-20.

^[33]. Jerrold Green, et al.  ‘Understanding Iran’, p. 34-39.

^[34]. Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 891-908.

^[35]. Geun Lee and Kadir Ayhan, “Why Do We Need Non-state Actors in Public Diplomacy? Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked, and Collaborative Public Diplomacy,” Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (June 2015), pp. 57-77.

^[36]. Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-109.

^[37] . Joseph Nye, ‘Countering the Authoritarian Challenge’, Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No. 15, (Winter, 2020), pp. 94-109.

^[38]. Paul Hedges, ‘Conceptualising Social Cohesion in Relation to Religious Diversity: Sketching a Pathway in

 a Globalised World’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, issue 16 (May, 2020), Pp. 1-23. 

^[39]. Doron Itzchakov, Iran and the Kurdish Challenge’, BESA Center Perspectives No. 600, September 30, 2017, Pp. 1-4.

^[40]. Niki Akhavan, “Social Media and the Message,” Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution, (Rutgers University Press, 2013), Pp. 86-87.

^[41]. Akhavan, “Social Media and the Message,’ Pp. 96-101.

^[42] . Hedges, ‘Conceptualising Social Cohesion’, P. 7.

^[43] . Doron Itzchakov, ‘The Iranian Regime versus the Fuel Protests’, BESA Center Perspectives, Paper No. 1357 (November 2019), Pp. 1-3.