The Rise of the Islamic State in Africa: In the Sahel, West, and East Africa
Twenty-one years after its establishment in 2004, it joined the main Al-Qaeda group in Afghanistan under the moniker “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” In 2014, due to disagreements between the top Al-Qaeda leadership and the group’s field commanders. [1] After breaking away from Al-Qaeda and establishing itself as a separate group known as “ISIS,” the Islamic State’s territory in Syria and Iraq has drastically shrunk in the eleven years since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate in 2014; the group was vanquished in 2017. [2] ISIS lost approximately 50,000 militants and suffered a significant loss of territory. However, while these operations appear to have reduced the territory under its control in Syria and Iraq, they have not completely eliminated ISIS’s ideological and organizational structure. ISIS has developed a flexible network and organizational model to survive on the global stage.
At its peak in 2015, ISIS controlled an area of approximately 230,000 square kilometers, directly controlling an area the size of the United Kingdom, where it imposed its extreme interpretation of Islamic Sharia law and gained a reputation for brutality. ISIS has designated Raqqa (the fourth largest city in Syria) and Mosul (the second largest city in Iraq) as the capitals of its areas of control. ISIS has deployed up to 80,000 militants, including approximately 42,000 foreign terrorists from 120 countries. In contrast, by mid-2025, the number of ISIS operatives in Syria and Iraq is estimated to be between 1,500 and 3,000 fighters.[3]
Although the Islamic State has shrunk in the Middle East, its global reach has expanded significantly, and by the end of 2024, the Islamic State remained the world’s deadliest terrorist organization.[4]
Since the loss of the caliphate in 2019, the organization has undergone radical structural and operational changes. In 2025, the Islamic State relies primarily on a dynamic network of regional affiliates operating with greater operational autonomy than ever before across the globe. As a result of its loss of territory in the Middle East, the Islamic State has gradually shifted to a less hierarchical structure and a more ‘remote management model’[5] in order to improve its chances of survival and the resilience of its regional structures.[6] On the other hand, the ideology of the Islamic State continues to be available online, radicalizing people around the world. [7]
This document is an overview of the expansion of the Islamic State in Africa.
The threat posed by ISIS remains volatile and complex. Behind the diplomatic rhetoric lies a grim reality: Africa is now the epicenter of jihadist violence, with unprecedented intensity in the Sahel and West Africa. In Mozambique, Somalia, Central Africa, and Nigeria, the group is building its logistics networks, funding its operations from various sources, and attracting foreign fighters.
As of mid-2025, the Islamic State seems to be expanding most quickly in Africa, especially in the Sahel. This is due in part to long-standing issues like local grievances and political instability, as well as economic hardship and poor governance. Another factor driving it is the withdrawal of Western military personnel that, until recently, were involved in major counterterrorism efforts and long-standing defense agreements in the region. [8] As a result, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which operates primarily across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, significantly expanded its territorial control over certain rural areas in the Liptako-Gourma border triangle.
The latest available estimates put the ISSP’s strength at between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters.[9] By comparison, the strength of this affiliate was estimated at 425 fighters at the end of 2018. [10] These estimates indicate an exponential growth of between 4 and 6 times in the last seven years. Another rapidly growing affiliate, doubling in size in the past year and steadily becoming a major logistical and economic hub for the Islamic State worldwide, is ISIS, which operates in Somalia.[11] The group has an estimated strength of around 1,000 fighters, including foreign fighters mainly from neighboring African countries. Somalia’s fragile governance, entrenched tribal divisions, and strategic location make it a prime candidate for ISIS’s expansionist agenda. The country’s instability and proximity to Yemen and the Red Sea enhance its strategic importance, offering logistical advantages for smuggling networks and maritime operations (piracy). Somalia is an ideal environment for recruiting forces for the organization, with weak central control and economic hardship exacerbating the grievances of the local population. [12]
By leveraging these vulnerabilities, ISIS is reshaping the region as a major arena of operations. The group aims to integrate into local militant factions, provide financial support and strategic direction, while projecting its influence across East Africa. Neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia are directly affected, as the jihadist expansion threatens regional stability and maritime security.
The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remains one of the most dominant and active terrorist factions, with an estimated force of 2,000-3,000 fighters operating in the Lake Chad Basin. The West Africa Province was established in March 2015 when the Nigerian Boko Haram organization switched allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS. [13]
The success of the Islamic State in Africa is no accident. It exploits an ecosystem of chronic fragility. Its consolidation and expansion can be seen on several fronts: the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. This region is the heart of the insurgency of radical Islamic organizations. [14]
Another branch of the Islamic State with less significant activity on the continent is ISCAP (Islamic State’s Central Africa Province), which operates mainly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.
The Islamic State’s presence in Libya and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt is significantly smaller in terms of both the number of fighters and operational impact.
The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter of Boko Haram, has emerged as one of the most sophisticated affiliates of ISIS. It carries out attacks and provides alternative governance (e.g., taxation and the administration of legal justice under strict Sharia law) in addition to engaging in violent acts, in which it provides services to disenfranchised and alienated populations, as an alternative to a corrupt and ineffective state.
Another group, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is more brutal than ISWAP and has been able to exploit inter-ethnic dynamics between different farming and herding communities (pastoral communities) in its expansion across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and now towards the Gulf of Guinea countries.[15] The rise of the Islamic State has been aided by recent military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which have radically changed the security landscape of the Sahel. The new military juntas, driven by anti-Western rhetoric, have ousted French, American, and European forces, which had previously led counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation operations, albeit with limited success.[16] Their new partners are Russian mercenaries from the Wagner PMC group, now known as the Africa Corps, a group that operates on behalf of the Kremlin on several levels.[17] The Turkish military force, SADAT, joined the Russian force with the goal of boosting Turkey’s influence on the continent and expanding sales of cutting-edge weapons, primarily drones (Bayktar).
This has not only created a security gap but also damaged international cooperation, intensified competition between the West and Russia and China on the continent, and, above all, allowed jihadist groups greater freedom of action and expansion.
The Islamic State, Ansar al-Sunna Mozambique (ISM), whose fighters are called al-Shabaab, is terrorizing the residents of the Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique and threatening the natural gas projects of Western companies worth billions of dollars.[18] ISIS-Mozambique continuously targets businesses and government organizations in the energy-related area where the projects are situated.
The organization has suffered combined military counterattacks from countries in the region, but it is still very active and shows its ability to inflict economic damage that causes enormous damage to the country. [19]
The Islamic State’s Central African Province (CAR) affiliate, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), is similarly carrying out massacres across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The group is made up of a diverse coalition of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and Islamists from the Salaf Tabliq group, a militant group formed in 1995 in opposition to the government of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.
The ADF uses the kidnapping and killing of civilians to instill fear among the local population and undermine trust in the government.
ISIS attacks in these areas typically target civilians and military installations. Furthermore, convenient crossing points are continually being established in the Beni region of North Kivu, near the Ugandan border, for further expansion.
The African continent is not a geographic magnet for international jihadists as Syria and Iraq were more than a decade ago. There is no mass influx of volunteers from around the world as there was on the Turkish-Syrian border or, before that, to the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan. However, the ISIS franchise still has an abundance of recruits on the war-torn continent, most of them young, local, alienated, unemployed men who see joining the organization as a ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ in their view.
The conflict between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State – ISIS leads
The conflict between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Africa stems from a rivalry for dominance and resources, rather than disagreements over a central ideology.
The two groups share the same goals: to eliminate secular and Western influence and to establish an Islamist state in West Africa. However, differences between their central organizations have disrupted cooperation and led to a violent and ongoing conflict. [20]
Al-Qaeda favors a local approach to jihad that can bridge ethnic tensions and gradually implement Islamic law. The Islamic State favors a universal approach that targets perceived non-believers and rapidly implements maximalist Islamic law.[21] The ISSP justified a ‘war’ against JNIM because of the latter’s “infidel leaders”, especially regarding their more permissive approach towards civilians and Christians. [22]
The Jamaat al-Nusra al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) was formed in 2017 by the merger of numerous Jihadist organizations. [23]
This merger solidified the groups’ ties and expanded their geographical reach into Burkina Faso and Niger. One of the merged groups is Katiba Macina, and a closely related group, Ansarul Islam; both are dominated by Fulani tribesmen. The former operates in central Mali and the latter in Burkina Faso. The inclusion of the Fulani is essential, as they are numerous and widespread, but historically marginalized throughout the Sahel, which is a pastoral and nomadic society.[24] This has placed them in violent conflict with settled agricultural communities. The JNIM is still largely led and influenced by the Tuareg tribes, and is more diverse and decentralized than the groups were in 2012.[25] As a result, the JNIM has been able to recruit from a wider range of Sahelian communities and manage ethnic tensions.
The conflict between the two groups has been sporadic; in late 2023, the ISSP pushed the JNIM out of the Menaka region of Mali.
Both are prevalent in the triangle region of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (Liptako Gourma).[26] JNIM is more prevalent in Mali and Burkina Faso, while the ISSP is prevalent in Niger. Thus, the JNIM and the ISSP are waging simultaneous insurgencies that clash intermittently.[27]
As previously said, when their areas of influence overlap, wars result as both factions aim to create their own power bases and dominate populations and regions. This rivalry is a regional expression of a global competition for leadership within the global jihadist movement, with each group attempting to manipulate and undermine the other in order to gain supremacy and attract fighters and resources.
In mid-2025, the Islamic State (IS) faction appears to be gaining momentum in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, expanding its territorial control and increasing attacks against both military and civilian targets.[28] While JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel, has also shown a renewed ability to attack urban centers, ISIS’s growth has been attributed to factors such as political instability, economic hardship, and the withdrawal of Western forces, suggesting that ISIS is now the more dominant force in the conflict-ridden region.
In conclusion, ISIS and its affiliates in Africa are using the continent’s continuous wars and increasing instability as a springboard for terrorist attacks and regional expansion. ISIS is exploiting the deep social divisions in civil societies stemming from tribal loyalty and ethnic affiliation, alongside the weaknesses of the central government of the Sahel countries, which are expressed in the absence of a security presence, the lack of health and education infrastructure, the failure to provide a solution to the problems of daily existence resulting from drought and the struggle for water wells, etc. This chaotic situation makes it easier for the Islamic State to recruit children/boys into its ranks, to pass on radical indoctrination to them, and to integrate them into the active operational force.
In general, ISIS’s decentralized operations continue to spread and expand, while regional, interstate cooperation is decreasing. There are deep and ongoing gaps in securing borders, ensuring personal security, and in the internal struggle to finance the fight against radical Islamic terrorism, without which the war is doomed to failure.
[1] The origins of the Islamic State can be traced to Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a group founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999. Zarqawi, a Jordanian extremist, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004, transforming his organization into Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
[2] On June 6, 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces launched an operation to liberate Raqqa. On July 9, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared the liberation of Mosul from the Islamic State. Raqqa was liberated on October 17. On December 9, Iraqi military forces took full control of the border with Syria. The second Iraqi civil war ended.
[3] Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/counter-terrorism-briefing-on-the-secretary-generals-strategic-level-report-on-isil-daesh-9.php
[4] Deadliest terror groups in 2024
[5] A ‘remote management model’ is a strategy or system for monitoring and controlling IT infrastructure, devices, and teams from a location other than the physical site. This goal is achieved through tools such as Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software, which enables proactive system maintenance, automated updates, and real-time troubleshooting for a variety of endpoints. For people management, a successful ‘remote management model’ emphasizes clear communication, clear goals, and strong leadership to maintain productivity and engagement The workers. ISIS has adopted this model and operates according to its principles.
[6] “ISIS has today dispersed to [remote] parts of the land where it [still] fights battles from time to time,” is how Zvi Barel put it. See:
Tzvi Barel’ “Who Heard about Syria?”, Haaretz (November 12, 2018). https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/world/middle-east/2017-12-14/ty-article-magazine-ext/.premium/0000017f-e043-d7b2-a77f-e347036e0000
The idea of an ‘Islamic State’ was a pillar of ISIS ideology. The slogan “It Remains and Expands” (Baqiya wa Tatamadid) reflected a convergence between two of the organization’s main principles: building an Islamic state and jihad. Both suffered greatly as a result of the defeat, but jihad seems to have triumphed. The organization still calls itself the ‘Islamic State’ and refers to its soldiers as the ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate’ (Jund al-Khilafa), but this seems to be Just an imaginary simulation of a state. See:
The “Islamic State” Without a State. https://dayan.org/content/islamic-state-without-state
[7] ISIS no longer rules a territory. But its recruits still pose a global threat. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/02/middleeast/isis-recruits-global-threat-intl
[8] Top counterterrorism official warns of ISIS’ rapid rise in Africa. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/25/top-counterterrorism-official-warns-of-isiss-rapid-rise-in-africa-00191571
[9] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4055363?ln=en&v=pdf
[10] Jason Warner, Charlotte Hulmehe, “The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
August 2018, Volume 11, Issue 7
[11] DAESH’s expansion in Somalia, its strategy, and regional security impacts
[12] https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/daeshs-expansion-in-somalia-its-strategy-and-regional-security-impacts/
Somalia is a jumble of competing international influences, as Turkey moves ever closer to Mogadishu, the United Arab Emirates reclaims Somaliland, and Egypt seeks to curb Ethiopian influence by warming ties with the federal authorities of Somalia. The Houthis in Yemen are collaborating with al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. China is ready to exploit any rift between the Somali federal government and the United States – an international playground loaded with state interests, at the expense of local residents.
[13] Smadar Shaul and Yoram Schweitzer, “The Islamic State and its Intentions for Africa”, The Institute for National Security Studies, 2015, pp. 211-217.
[14] ISIS exploits weaknesses, recruits’ personnel in gray areas and raises funds through regional centers and cross-border networks.
[15] Other factions operating in the Sahel, ISGS and IS-Sahel of ISIS. These groups compete with the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM in the region and have intensified the cycle of violence. Unlike al-Qaeda’s partners, ISIS-Sahel and its Lakurawa branch have been accused of indiscriminate massacres, including against Muslim civilians. This tactic has contributed to previous divisions within extremist groups, such as the division of Boko Haram into JAS and ISWAP in 2016, due to disputes over civilian casualties. The origins of Lakurawa can be traced back to Malian herders who fought with the Seleka coalition in the Central African Republic (CAR) around 2012–2013. After clashes with the Malian army, they fled to Niger and later settled permanently in northwestern Nigeria, where they were recently declared a terrorist organization – the Lukawara organization.
See my article: New terrorist organization declared by Nigerian government – Lukawara organization from 28.9.2025
New Nigerian jihadist group declared terrorists. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqjvqe4n7gzo
Is Lakurawa the emerging face of terror in the Sahel?
[16] In early 2022, France ended its nearly decade-long counterterrorism operation in Mali after a breakdown in relations with Mali’s new military leadership, the arrival of Russian troops from the Wagner Group, and rising anti-French sentiment across the region. France ended both Operation Barkhane, which focused on counterterrorism and supporting regional forces, and the French-led Task Force Takuba, which was made up of European forces.
[17] Anti-French sentiment has risen in the Sahel region. Russia has sought to fill the gap in the Sahel and West Africa, with mixed results. Initially, this was done through the private military company Wagner Group, which Russia used as a “low-cost strategy to increase its footprint in Africa.” Following the death of the group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, Russia’s presence is now more visible through the ‘Africa Corps’ under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Russian forces in the Sahel are in some ways under deep strain and militarily exposed; Russia is losing credibility as a reliable partner for African governments. Russian forces have become a target of JNIM.
[18] Al-Shabaab’s activity in Cabo Delgado has severely damaged energy facilities, causing the suspension of major onshore natural gas projects, such as those led by Total Energies and ExxonMobil. These attacks have directly affected infrastructure and posed a threat to the safety and well-being of workers, leading to operational outages and the suspension of projects worth billions of dollars. The fighting has also exposed broader issues, including social and economic instability, human rights concerns and environmental risks, complicating the potential benefits of energy development for the region and the country.
What peace in Cabo Delgado means for Mozambique and its neighbors. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-peace-in-cabo-delgado-means-for-mozambique-and-its-neighbours
[19] Joint military operations against ISIS have been conducted in Mozambique, involving international forces such as Rwanda, regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and support from the United States and the European Union to confront the terrorist group in the Cabo Delgado province. These efforts have achieved some success in reducing the number of rebels and recovering territory, although the overall situation remains complex and requires ongoing attention.
[20] What Are the Major Differences between al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic State?’ https://www.saisjournal.eu/article/14-What-Are-the-Major-Differences-between-al-Qaeda-and-the-Islamic-State.cfm
[21] Mathieu Pellerin, Les violences armées au Sahara. Du djihadisme aux insurrections ? https://www.ifri.org/fr/etudes/les-violences-armees-au-sahara-du-djihadisme-aux-insurrections
[22] Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082
[23] Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) is a terrorist group based in Mali and active in large parts of West Africa, including parts of Burkina Faso and Niger. It was formed in March 2017, when four extremist groups based in Mali – Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) and the Sahrawi Emirate of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – announced their merger, thus establishing their cooperation. The leader of JNIM, Iyad ag Ghali, pledged allegiance to the AQIM emir, the al-Qaeda emir and the leader of the Taliban.
[24] The Fulani tribe is one of the largest ethnic and tribal groups in Africa, with over 40 million people. They live mainly in West African countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal and Chad. They have their own language called Fulani. A significant proportion of the Fulani – a third, or about 7 to 10 million – are pastoralists, and their ethnic group has the largest nomadic pastoralist community in the world. The majority of the Fulani ethnic group consisted of semi-sedentary people, as well as farmers, scholars, artisans, traders, and landed nobility. As an ethnic group, they are bound together by the Fulani language, their history, and their culture. The Fulani are almost entirely Muslim, with a small minority being Christian and animist.
[25] The Tuareg – a predominantly Muslim ethnic group, pastoralists, have historically been marginalized throughout the Sahel. With the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, where they had fought and acquired extensive weapons, they began pushing Malian security forces out of northern Mali in early 2012. A variety of jihadist groups, both directly and loosely affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, joined the fight opportunistically. They were aided by a massive influx of weapons smuggled from Libyan warehouses after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. Jihadist groups quickly took control of the territory and established a proto-caliphate that included the regional capital, Timbuktu. They provided security and governance, along with justice and education systems.
[26] alafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel?mkt_tok=NDc1LVBCUS05NzEAAAGW6c-06jHtQg56hEntzPgVzrPR_HZVjMQufAccBEGZOoLtZsmTt8iitoWg89YBlXXWU3rqchKU5XUyHoYAfO0X0KV82T3_DqzOr7SAK2siKBRzUw_6
[27] Manni Crone,” Islamic State’s Incursion into North Africa and Sahel: A Threat to al-Qaeda?”
Connections, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 2017), pp. 63-76. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326471?seq=1
[28] UN experts say Islamic State group almost doubled the territory they control in Mali in under a year. https://apnews.com/article/mali-islamic-state-alqaida-violence-un-e841e4d5835c7fa01605e8fd1ea03fcf
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
