For years, the debate over Hezbollah has been accompanied by a central question: Is it a Lebanese organization operating in the interests of the state and the Shiite community, or an Iranian branch that primarily serves Tehran’s regional strategy? The organization itself has cultivated deliberate ambiguity over the years around this issue. Internally, it has presented itself as a Lebanese political and military force and as the “protector of Lebanon,” while in reality it has continued to play a central role in Iran’s regional network of proxies.

However, in the wake of the Israeli-American operation against Iran, “Operation Roaring Lion”, and the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the strategic ambiguity that had characterized Hezbollah for years became increasingly difficult to maintain. Hezbollah’s direct entry into the war against Israel reinforced what many had long estimated: that in the moment of testing, the organization chose the side to which it truly belonged. More than a Lebanese force, Hezbollah operates first and foremost as an arm of Iran and a central part of its regional strategy.

A photo of Ayatollah Khamenei under the caption: The blood of hearts will not dry until justice avenges your departure. Left: A photo of Nasrallah side by side with Ayatollah Khamenei Source: Resistance Media Forum – SIMA

From Tension to Confrontation

Hezbollah presented its first rocket and drone attack against Israel on March 1 as a response to the killing of Ali Khamenei. However, this was not an official declaration of war, but rather the fulfillment of a prior commitment. In a speech he gave a few days before the operation began, against the backdrop of escalating American threats against Iran, the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, declared that Hezbollah would respond if Khamenei was attacked.

For years, Hassan Nasrallah has tried to balance competing pressures, both in the Lebanese and regional arenas. On the one hand, he sought to preserve Hezbollah’s strategic commitment to Iran and the “axis of resistance,” and on the other, to deal with the growing pressure within Lebanon and avoid entanglement in regional conflicts. Naim Qassem appears to be taking a similar approach. However, once Hezbollah publicly pledged to respond, the organization’s leadership’s room for maneuver was significantly reduced.

When Khamenei was indeed killed, Qassem faced intense pressure to fulfill his commitment. Under these circumstances, refraining from responding could have damaged Hezbollah’s credibility, both within the “axis of resistance” and amongst its supporters. The organization therefore presented the March 1 attack as a response to Khamenei’s assassination, claiming that it was a response to what it called the “unjust and treacherous assassination” of the Iranian leader.

On March 2, Hezbollah issued an official statement announcing their intent to join the fighting, which it said followed Israel’s announcement of a large-scale operation against the organization in Lebanon. The organization justified its steps by claiming that Israeli military operations in Lebanon over the previous fifteen months had caused sustained casualties and widespread destruction, while diplomatic efforts had failed to bring about a ceasefire. Within this narrative, Hezbollah presented its actions as self-defence and a legitimate response, emphasizing that its attacks were directed against Israeli military targets.

Since then, Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks against Israel, launching additional rockets and drones toward central and northern Israel, alongside clashes with IDF forces along the Lebanese border. However, the organization did not enter the war from a position of strength. Hezbollah is currently at one of its most significant weak points in recent years: its supporting infrastructure has been damaged, its routes for smuggling weapons from Iran have been reduced, the organization’s financing system in Lebanon and abroad has also been damaged, its command structure has been significantly eroded, and its deterrence capability has been damaged.

Propaganda against Israel – The media department of Hezbollah’s military wing. Official Telegram channel.

The Fronts Faced by Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s decision to escalate the conflict has implications not only on the battlefield, but also in the Lebanese political system, within the Shiite public that supports it, and in the organization’s military and financial structure.

The Political Front in Lebanon

Within Lebanon, tensions over Hezbollah’s role as an Iranian proxy had been growing even before the war broke out. Many Lebanese political figures, along with large sections of the public, had criticized Iran’s growing influence in the country for years. However, the prospect of dragging Lebanon into another war – seen by many as not serving the country’s national interests – has significantly intensified this criticism.

This development comes at a time when Hezbollah’s internal standing was already weakened. The organization is still dealing with the aftermath of the Beirut port bombing, the 2024 war with Israel, and its failure of its presidential candidate in 2025 election in Lebanon. This is compounded by growing political efforts in the Lebanese arena to reduce and even dismantle the organization’s independent weapons arsenal. Against this backdrop, Hezbollah’s military actions could continue to erode its public legitimacy within Lebanon.

Political decisions taken by the Lebanese leadership during the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel reflect this trend. Both Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun emphasized that Hezbollah’s independent military activity is illegal, and that the authority to decide on war and peace lies solely with the Lebanese state. At the same time, the Lebanese authorities have also taken steps against the presence and activity of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the country. Moreover, since Hezbollah joined the campaign, ministers in the Lebanese government have even demanded the arrest of the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, as reported by Hezbollah on the organization’s support channels on Telegram.

Photo of Naim Qassem: A post on a Telegram channel affiliated with Hezbollah in Lebanon claims that ministers in the Lebanese government sought to issue arrest warrants against Naim Qassem.

These steps are likely intended to draw a clearer distinction between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s military activities, as well as between Lebanon and Iran’s broader regional strategy. In doing so, Lebanon is signaling to both the United States and Israel that Hezbollah’s actions do not reflect the state’s official position, and that Lebanon seeks to regain its sovereignty and distance itself from the broader regional conflict.

Hezbollah, for its part, has strongly criticized these developments. Member of Parliament Muhammad Raad, a representative of the organization, accused Israel of preparing for war even before the attack on Iran and rejected the Lebanese government’s position. He said that it was the government’s position on the issue of disarming the “resistance” that encouraged the Israeli escalation.

The Shiite Front in Lebanon

Within Lebanon’s Shiite community, reactions to the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel are becoming more complex. While Hezbollah continues to enjoy a significant support base among many Shiites, who see it as the community’s protector and a central part of the “axis of resistance” against Israel, recent developments have also revealed growing criticism among parts of the Shiite population. This criticism is particularly pronounced among communities that fear further displacement in the wake of military escalation and renewed war.

Hezbollah’s decision to join the fighting has caused confusion and discontent among parts of its Shiite support base and even among political allies and has exposed some cracks in the organization’s internal support. One of the key figures in this regard is Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement and a key partner in the Hezbollah-Amal political bloc. Hezbollah reportedly previously promised Berri that it would not enter the conflict if the United States and Israel attacked Iran, an issue that has heightened tensions within the Shiite leadership after the organization ultimately chose to escalate the conflict.

The Military and Financial Front

One of Hezbollah’s key weaknesses is its financial system. The banking and financing networks that support the organization, along with Iranian financial assistance, have served for years as the “oxygen” that enables the existence of the organizational apparatus. These resources allow Hezbollah not only to operate its military capabilities, but also to continue to maintain its extensive civilian systems, including social services such as education, health, and welfare, which constitute a central pillar of its influence within Lebanese society.

Despite suffering a significant blow during the 2024 war with Israel, which included the elimination of senior figures and commanders, Hezbollah still retains significant military capabilities, including an arsenal of rockets and drones, and continues to maintain operational forces along the border. However, Israel is operating against the organization’s logistics and financing networks, increasing pressure on Hezbollah’s ability to wage a prolonged conflict.

Conclusion: The End of Strategic Ambiguity

Hezbollah’s decision to join the fighting exposed the limitations of the dual identity that the organization had tried to maintain for decades, between its role as a Lebanese political actor and its role as a pillar of the Iranian-led resistance. Faced with the killing of Iran’s supreme leader and increasing pressure from Tehran’s regional network, the organization chose to prioritize its strategic commitment to Iran. However, this decision comes at a price. In the domestic arena, Hezbollah is facing growing political criticism and a loss of legitimacy within Lebanon, while in the regional arena it is subject to ongoing military pressure and damage to its financial and logistical infrastructure. This damage could gradually weaken its ability to maintain its military power and the array of social services on which its influence rests.

Therefore, Hezbollah’s entry into the war is not expected to yield significant strategic gains in Lebanon or the region. Instead, the organization may face a prolonged process of erosion of its status both in the Lebanese system and as a central player in the regional Shiite axis. In this sense, the war has not only exposed Hezbollah’s strategic affinity with Iran – it may also mark the beginning of a period in which the organization’s political, military, and financial resilience will be tested.