Iran’s Public Diplomacy in Latin America
Abstract
The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University published several studies emphasizing Iran’s infiltration and the formation of terrorist cells and networks throughout Latin America. This research explores an additional approach by which the Iranian mechanism functions, utilizing many sources of influence and public diplomacy that foster a collective identity across essentially disparate populations. Public diplomacy is vital in shaping Iran’s public image by fostering understanding and empathy among foreign populations regarding its principles, values, and institutions. The Islamic regime seeks to enhance its standing in the Western Hemisphere through various cultural interactions. The hostility towards the liberal democratic principles promoted by the United States and shared perspectives within the Bolivarian Alliance has created a favorable environment for Iran to advance its interests and exert influence.
Introduction
In international relations discourse, public diplomacy encompasses a range of government-sponsored initiatives designed to engage and connect with the foreign populace rather than merely their governments. These initiatives aim to foster meaningful dialogue that promotes mutual understanding and seeks to influence public opinion in favor of the state’s strategic objectives. By leveraging various forms of communication, such as cultural exchanges, media outreach, and grassroots engagement, governments strive to build relationships with foreign populations.
This communication is intended to attract support for the state’s policies and actions on the global stage, ultimately enhancing its soft power and diplomatic influence. The practice of public diplomacy has evolved during the twentieth century along with the global order. Experts employ diverse tools and methodologies, including personal interactions, media interviews, online platforms, and educational exchanges.[1]
Defining what ‘Power’ and social influence mean is essential as a preliminary step for the discussion. Power is the ability to influence or direct actors’ actions, beliefs, or behavior. In other words, Power is the ability to make others do or behave according to one’s desired outcomes. It can be achieved by hard or soft power or a combination of them, described as smart power.[2] According to Joseph Nye, Public diplomacy is vital for exercising smart power. Effective public diplomacy necessitates comprehension of the functions of credibility, self-criticism, and civic engagement in cultivating soft power.[3]
In the same vein, he describes soft power as ‘the capability to affect the behavior of others to make others want the outcomes you want,’ enabling people to co-opt rather than coerce them.[4] Furthermore, Ney asserts that we are witnessing two significant transformations in power utilization within international politics and global affairs. Globalization and the information revolution have led to these changes, which include power diffusion from states to non-state actors and power initiatives between states.[5]
Public diplomacy and soft power are interconnected in international relations. However, the distinction between them in global politics lies in the notion that soft power resources are generated primarily from the values an organization or nation expresses through its culture. Additionally, these resources emerge from the standards it sets through internal values and how it manages interactions with others. While public diplomacy is a tool, governments utilize resources to communicate with and appeal to nations’ foreign populations.[6]
Social influence is another theoretical framework intertwined with soft power and public Diplomacy. This concept delineates how individuals modify their conduct to conform to the expectations of a social context. It manifests in various forms: compliance, socialization, peer pressure, obedience, etc. Social influence generally arises from a particular action, directive, or solicitation; nevertheless, individuals also modify their attitudes and behaviors based on their perceptions of others’ potential actions or thoughts.
Iran’s public diplomacy
The central pillar of Iran’s public diplomacy is generating public sentiment to shape and execute influence while fostering empathy for its perspectives in the geopolitical landscape. Its modus operandi encompasses policies of international relations that extend beyond conventional diplomacy, including governments’ efforts to shape public opinion in foreign nations. It additionally covers how private individuals, groups, and interests from different countries interact, how foreign news is reported and affects policies, and how people share reciprocal information.
The Iranian government and its academic spheres have historically employed public diplomacy to advance their revisionist foreign policy and revolutionary Shiism. In this regard, the cultivation of soft power has gained significant traction among these groups, which regard public diplomacy as a principal method for leveraging the nation’s assets.
The Islamic regime utilizes several influencing strategies, including propaganda and cognitive bias, as a key element of its governance approach. It seeks to impact the ruling class in Latin America and shape public opinion in its favor while boosting support for countries already aligned with Iran. Iranian activists aim to disseminate their ideology and forge new connections globally by emphasizing the Shi’a narrative and advocating for the oppressed. Furthermore, the regime encourages cultural activities to enhance communication, promoting events that foster collective experiences or engage with audiences. These practices are a powerful tool for building interpersonal bonds in Latin American affairs.
Iran has various reasons for asserting its influence and disseminating its ideologies in Latin American nations. The differing worldviews among nations in the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) provided fertile ground for Iran to promote its interests, influence, and involvement.[7] The hostility towards liberal democratic values propagated by the United States enabled Iran’s infiltration. The dispute has historical roots that were more pronounced during the Cold War, marked by the spread of socialist ideology and the growth of Soviet power. The ideological affinity and alignment of interests between Hugo Chávez, the founder of the Bolivarian Alliance, and the communist regimes in Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua catalyzed cooperation with Iran.
The Western Hemisphere represents a new frontier in Iran’s geopolitical landscape competition. The Islamic Republic’s geopolitical aspiration focuses on moving the conflict line closer to the borders of countries perceived as adversaries. This reality has fostered a favorable environment for advancing Iran’s initiatives near the United States’ borders. Consequently, enhancing foreign relations and fostering a favorable perception of Iranian interests in nations adjacent to the United States has become increasingly essential for Iran.
The foundation of the relationship between Latin America’s nations, notably Venezuela, might be aptly characterized by the proverb, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Their mutual objective is to guarantee the survival of their separate regimes against perceived dangers, with the United States as the principal adversary.[8] The bilateral relationship between Iran and Venezuela has enhanced Iran’s footprint in Latin America. The mutual, longstanding membership in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has fostered Iran to achieve its desired outcomes.
The robust anti-American ideology uniting this Iranian-backed network ultimately portrays Iran as a vital companion of the extreme populist Bolivarian Revolution. This mindset is interrelated with Iran’s revolutionary practices and Twelver Shi’a philosophy. The Islamic legal system embodies the divine will interwoven with a revolutionary ethos, facilitating Iran’s recruitment of sympathizers across the Western hemisphere. The theocratic regime’s pursuit of dominance has not relied solely on attractiveness; it has also utilized manipulation and deception to exert control over governments and populations.[9]
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013), the Iranian government sought to build relationships with Latin American countries, investing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and assistance. Ahmadinejad aimed to create an anti-American coalition with Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, strengthening diplomatic ties among developing nations. The foundation of Ahmadinejad’s Latin America policy was establishing an alliance with Venezuela to pursue a lasting Iranian presence at the U.S. doorstep.[10]
According to Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, Iran has relied on the Bolivarian Alliance and its most ardent allies to gain popularity throughout the region. It primarily targets the growth of its diplomatic footprint and Shi’a Islamist cultural centers within the secure borders of the Bolivarian Alliance member nations. By 2015, Iran or its proxy Hezbollah operated around 80 cultural centers in the hemisphere, many of which engaged in activities with radical populist parties that have a similar anti-American ideology. Radical imams, such as Abdul Karim Paz and Suhail Assad, traveled in the region, visiting cultural sites, notably in El Salvador and Chile.[11]
In their concluding remarks, Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau asserted that most nations outside the Bolivarian Alliance would favor engaging with the United States over its foes. Nonetheless, U.S. disengagement from the region and the rise of financially robust alternatives have prompted numerous potential partners to adopt a cautious approach. The escalating anti-U.S. narrative, driven by Russian disinformation and Iranian websites, along with outreach linked to a broad network of cyber partners, is negatively impacting the perception of the United States.[12]
Recently, an example of Iran’s influence in Latin America was manifested by Colombian President Gustavo Petro, who presented an Israel map in Palestinian colors, with an inscribed key along its length, symbolizing the Palestinian right of return.[13] The statements of the Colombian President reflect an intensifying trend expressing the attitudes of Venezuela, Chile, Nicaragua, and other countries in the Western Hemisphere. These cultural activities within the Bolivarian Alliance experienced fluctuations, yet remained consistent in Iran’s mode of action.
The founding father of the Islamic revolution shaped his frame of reference by his deep hatred of Western democracy and liberalism. He developed his worldview around a collective identity that celebrated the struggle against oppression and looked forward to achieving justice with the return of the Hidden Imam. He aimed to establish a unified collective identity defined by a single culture and belief system that encouraged uniformity and collectivism.
To achieve his goal, he cultivated animosity towards groups and individuals he perceived as different and dissimilar. Currently, Iran is a contradictory nation that combines Shiite conservatism with the educated populace’s thirst for democratic discourse. These internal conflicts primarily illustrate the continuous discourse between an Islamic regime vs. an Islamic republic.
Khomeini’s diatribe included anti-Western and anti-Israel proclamations that incorporated antisemitic tropes derived from conspiracy theories. The preface of Khomeini’s book Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami delineates the adversary of Islam within this framework. This effort, evolving into the foundation for the revolutionary ideology, facilitated the unique connection between the Bolivarian Revolution, initiated by Hugo Chávez in 1998, and the Islamic Revolution. Both aimed to strengthen their political institutions autonomously, notwithstanding the divergent paradigms advocated by each revolution.[14]
Jorge Paredes Esteban asserts that the incursion into Latin America is part of a systematic and long-term strategy to project itself internationally and fight against its natural foes—the United States and Israel. Therefore, in addition to the overt practices employed by the theocratic regime’s public diplomacy, a network of its illicit activities supports acquiring financial resources and other intelligence practices.[15]
Nicholas Cull argues that public diplomacy should be categorized into several key dimensions. In his article “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,”[16] Cull categorizes public diplomacy discourse into five elements, providing valuable framework and insights. While Cull’s article does not analyze the revolutionary Shiite governance approach, his findings may shed light on hidden aspects of Iran’s contemporary policy.
The five constituents articulated and explored in Cull’s article are (1) listening, (2) Advocacy, 3) Cultural Diplomacy, 4) Exchange Diplomacy, and 5) International Broadcasting. The similarities between Cull’s perception and Iran’s pattern of international relations converge in various respects, providing a foundation for the upcoming analysis.
Listening
Among the five dimensions of public diplomacy, listening plays a crucial yet often overlooked role. While typically associated with fostering mutual understanding, listening can also be strategically employed for influence and intelligence gathering. The Islamic regime recognizes the power of listening in shaping public perceptions and strengthening interpersonal connections, making it a foundational aspect of its diplomatic strategy.
Listening creates an interpersonal connection that benefits individuals and groups and is pertinent to almost every field, including psychology, management, health, education, and public relations.[17] The Islamic regime is well cognizant of the significant influence of listening on interpersonal connections in multiple spheres. It fosters listening and advocacy as an initial stage of its public diplomacy.
A Harvard Business Review article referenced psychologist Carl Rogers, who, by 1952, promoted listening as a means of self-transformation. Rogers theorized that when speakers feel that listeners are empathic, attentive, and nonjudgmental, they relax and share their inner feelings and thoughts without worrying about what listeners think. This safe state enables speakers to delve deeper into their consciousness and discover new insights about themselves, even those that may challenge previously held beliefs and perceptions.[18]
An additional Harvard Business Review published in 2018 by Itzchakov and Kluger highlighted the power of listening in helping people change. The strength of listening-induced change is that it comes from within the individual rather than being coerced from an outside source. This makes listening a prominent tool in facilitating stable intrapersonal changes.
The longing for positive evaluation and social affiliation is fundamentally embedded in human nature. Numerous studies have demonstrated that positive interpersonal relationships, defined in various manners, produce many beneficial emotional, cognitive, and behavioral results for people and communities. Perceived responsiveness, defined as the extent to which an individual’s sense is recognized, validated, and cared for by significant others, has garnered considerable interest in relational studies.[19]
A comprehensive study on High-Quality Listening reveals the importance of attention, comprehension, and positive intention communicated through various practices. Good listening fosters a sense of being understood and valued, promotes the significance of Social Psychology, enhances social interactions, and generates social influence.[20] Iran’s foreign policy frequently employs listening not merely as abstract procedures independent of specific content but as a qualitative technique that fosters the ideals and objectives of the participating parties.
Iran did not inadvertently discover a favorable environment in which to expand its influence in Latin America. An Atlantic Council report shows that successive waves of mass migration have flowed from the Middle East to the Continent. When the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, Venezuela had become a significant refuge for those seeking to escape the dire conditions of the conflict. Venezuela’s vibrant economy improved living standards and attracted many Lebanese families and individuals. At the same time, Iran and Hezbollah took advantage of this historic migration route to Venezuela to build support networks.[21]
The report evaluates that in Venezuela, Iran’s support network functions through compartmentalized familial clan structures that integrate into the illicit economy controlled by the Maduro regime and into the regime’s political apparatus and bureaucracy. Many clans are embedded within the Venezuelan state and society, supported by strong Lebanese and Syrian communities that extend into neighboring Colombia.[22]
The cultivation of listening and empathy in Latin America prompted Iran to establish cultural institutions, appoint representatives, and inaugurate embassies. In 2007, Iran undertook a concerted initiative to strengthen its influence in Latin America by establishing embassies in Nicaragua, Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia. Two years later, an embassy was established in Ecuador. Consequently, Iran built a notable formal presence in Latin America, with diplomatic missions already functioning in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and Venezuela.[23]
Advocacy
The Oxford Dictionary describes advocacy (of something) as providing public support for an idea, course of action, or belief. Nicholas Cull argues that advocacy in public diplomacy is an actor’s endeavor to navigate the international landscape. This can be accomplished through international communication efforts to promote a specific policy, ideology, or the actor’s broader interests among a foreign audience. This includes other domains, such as embassy press relations and other informative initiatives aimed at cultivating a requisite level of engagement.[24]
The Iranian establishment’s advocacy implementation suggests that public support is related to social interaction and shaping social identity. It promotes the attraction of ideas, values, and culture through media publications and association with the populace, which aims to advocate social contact. Furthermore, the psychological idea is founded on the premise that each individual seeks to attain a favorable social identity as a member of a specific group. The revolutionary establishment recognizes that social identity significantly influences individual identity, given that most individuals function collectively.
During the last two decades, Iran’s initiatives to support Latin American populations undoubtedly exemplify a significant advancement in fostering advocacy. In 2009, Iran established a hospital in an impoverished area of Bolivia, illustrating its endeavors to win hearts and minds. Media outlets facilitated advocacy and influenced public opinion by publishing the hospital commencement.
Iran has engaged with the Latin American populace by transitioning from conventional high-level diplomatic discussions to more public initiatives. Nonetheless, the intentions of goodwill remained ambiguous. Oscar Castellanos Del Collado argues that on the inaugural day of the hospital’s operation, Bolivians were astonished to observe that the female personnel donned veils as mandated by the Iranian-sponsored healthcare institution.[25]
Iranian agents and emissaries identified connections and commonalities with specific local Christian communities, primarily Catholic, in Latin America. The common denominator was cultivated by adopting a ‘Liberation theology,’ a fusion of Marxism and an anamorphic interpretation of Catholic doctrine. The anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist discourse and advocacy for local laborers and the impoverished fostered mutual interests.[26]
Advocacy and economic practices have been employed in international relations as forms of ‘smart power’ and public diplomacy, fostering reciprocity and advancing mutual interests. The recent press conference by Colombian President Gustavo Petro illustrates the significant role of advocacy in the geopolitical landscape. During the conference, Petro announced that Arab nations were considering assuming a substantial portion of Colombia’s foreign debt.
Gustavo Petro’s visit to the Middle East commenced on February 11 (the anniversary of the Islamic Republic’s founding) and lasted approximately one week. During the press conference, the Colombian president announced that a significant outcome of the visit was the agreement of Arab nations to address Colombia’s economic and social challenges. He encouraged them to make substantial investments and procurements in his country.[27]
Research released by the Atlantic Council examines the complex link between Iran and the Venezuelan administration. In response to Venezuela’s acute gasoline shortages, the Maduro administration sought aid from Iran in 2020, culminating in a gold-for-gas agreement orchestrated by prominent individuals such as Tareck El Aissami and Alex Saab. The report emphasizes the participation of Iranian businesses such as Mahan Air and the National Iranian Oil Company, which are associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[28]
Iran’s public relations in Venezuela is attributed to the enhanced capacity of Hezbollah’s support network. Hezbollah’s influence and infiltration of Lebanese expatriate groups provide Iran with an avenue to expand its presence in Venezuela. Notable entrepreneurs like Alex Saab must foster this relationship with Iran due to their linguistic proficiency, cultural insights, and comprehensive knowledge of the Middle East.[29]
Iran’s relationships with local citizens were intentionally based on the concept of extending its sphere of influence beyond the Shiite communities that migrated to South America. Connecting with groups with distinct collective identities is insufficient; an extensive infrastructure that transcends relationships based purely on religious affiliation is necessary. Forming a sphere of influence and conscience is not confined to groups with homogeneous identity characteristics; instead, it necessitates engagement with groups and individuals exhibiting diverse cultural and ideological attributes.
Consequently, Iran has endeavored to establish relationships using several cognitive and emotional traits to augment its areas of influence. This relationship was facilitated by ideological themes of disseminating revolutionary ideology and associating it with Catholic, Marxist, and Socialist traits, profoundly embedded in the collective memory of the local populace.
In this regard, the proponents of ‘exporting the Islamic Revolution principles’ have relied on Ali Shariati’s worldview and his proclamations encouraging the populace before the Islamic Revolution. Shariati (1933–77) was dubbed the ‘Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution’ advocating ‘Red Shiism’ and working to marry Marxist views with Islam to achieve revolutionary class consciousness.[30]
Shariati fostered connections among groups and individuals from various ethnic and ideological backgrounds who opposed the principles of Western capitalism and criticized Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s monarchical authoritarianism. His lectures and the dissemination of his views at Hosseiniyeh Ershadsignificantly contributed to mobilizing the populace and advancing the chain reaction of the Islamic Revolution.
Shariati’s form of radicalism embraced the sacred role of martyrdom (shahadat). Shiite mujtahids and thinkers praised martyrdom in the name of God as the ultimate sacrifice. The notion of historical suffering embodied by Shahadat reinforced the Iranian revolutionaries’ determination. This view also cemented Shiites over the centuries and helped maintain a common bond and global communal unity.[31]
Cultural Diplomacy
Cultural diplomacy is an endeavor by an entity to navigate the international landscape by disseminating its cultural resources and accomplishments abroad. It involves exchanging ideas, knowledge, artwork, languages, and other cultural aspects between countries and their citizens to promote understanding and collaboration. It aims to foster comprehension and empathy among foreign populations regarding a nation’s principles and institutions to garner widespread support for its economic and political goals.
Cultural diplomacy entails exchanging cultural dimensions to promote mutual understanding and enhance inter-nation interactions. By using revolutionary symbols and Shi’a spiritual ideals as an alternative to Western culture, Iran’s cultural diplomacy aids Islamic rule in fostering a favorable national image. Iran advances its culture and narrative via cultural institutions, events, language classes, and educational initiatives.[32]
The Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO) is the Islamic Republic of Iran’s primary agency for conducting and supervising cultural outreach abroad. It reports to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Vezarat-e Farhang va Ershad-e Eslami), cultivates and amplifies cultural relationships with other nations, and enhances the Islamic Republic’s cultural connections with other communities.
The Islamic Culture and Relations Organization is Iran’s primary public diplomacy entity. It adamantly represents Iranian culture and civilization and facilitates unity among Muslims worldwide. Furthermore, it revives and promotes Islamic culture and teachings globally and disseminates information regarding the principles and realities of the Islamic Revolution.
Cynthia Schneider argues that the prospects for fostering cultural diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim countries are extensive. Numerous avenues exist for advancing cultural diplomacy in critical domains: cinema, music, and literature. Film production is firmly established in Iran, Egypt, and India, expanding into other Arab and Muslim nations.[33] The Islamic Republic employs films designed to elicit Shi’a culture and narrative, emphasizing the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali in the Battle of Karbala (680 CE) by portraying him as a wellspring of inspiration and courage.
Furthermore, the regime denounces Western music, citing it as corruptive and detrimental to Islamic beliefs. Nonetheless, its outlets endorse Persian music to foster attraction and societal transformation. Cynthia Schneider describes literature as an essential motif for empowering art and fostering the potential of cultural diplomacy.[34] Accordingly, Islamic governance employs multilayered literature, translating novels into Spanish to cultivate a revolutionary narrative through emotional appeal.
The Islamic regime utilizes sports tournaments with foreign countries to promote cultural diplomacy. Cultural exchange enables individuals to discover and connect despite existing divisions and differences. Iran invests considerable effort in showcasing athletic achievements, which are tied to national pride. The Olympic Games, along with football, basketball, and weightlifting, illustrate this consciousness and practice alike.
Exchange Diplomacy
Exchanges promote interactions among government officials, NGOs, and others engaged in discourse, facilitating collaboration, networking, and sharing perspectives. Furthermore, they augment global shared experiences among bureaucrats, scientists, students, educators, and others. These connections span societies, governments, and representatives of diverse cultures and political systems. Exchanges assist in spreading cultural information among societies. They promote mindsets, especially political ones, within other societies to foster deeper relationships between people.
It is widely accepted that one of the best ways to appreciate and understand different cultures is through international educational and cultural exchanges involving in-person contact. Coincident with prominent programs like Fulbright, Erasmus, and Rotary, Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (CIG) fosters and oversees student exchanges and various aspects of cultural diplomacy.
The Islamic Republic’s statecraft is based on the assumption that exchanges can be among the most significant and uplifting experiences, reflecting Islamic culture, values, and norms. Additionally, it promotes the international education of thousands of young people while equipping them with essential cross-cultural communication and interaction skills.
Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader, was sent to study in the United States and returned to Egypt with radicalized views. He harbored a deep-seated hatred for everything that represented Western culture, which he characterized as meaningless and encouraging immorality. Qutb’s radicalization was expressed through his concept of ‘new Jahilliyah,’ which became a cornerstone of his ideology and led him to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, succeeding Hassan al-Banna.
According to Qutb’s radical theory, any government that does not uphold Islamic law is perceived as an infidel regime. Consequently, it can only be overthrown by bringing together a group of virtuous individuals who will distance themselves from society and, if necessary, resort to force against governments that appear as Muslim. The elitism and eagerness for violence was an inherent part of his approach, followed by an inclination towards Puritanism. The outcome of his approach led to mutual exclusion between his followers and the mainstream of Islamism, whose leaders continued the legacy of Hassan al-Banna.[35]
Student exchanges for international studies are widely recognized practices, and in recent years, they have emerged as a significant element of global cultural diplomacy. It is worth noting that the countries that favor exchange programs for students from South America are the United States, Canada, England, and Spain. Since Iran is not a popular destination for South American student exchanges, many educational activities occur at Iranian-run cultural institutions spread throughout the continent.
However, the extensive exchanges and proceedings conducted in cultural centers established by Iran throughout South America are directed at subversion and dissension activities against nations identified by the Islamic Republic as adversaries. A comprehensive study by Dr. Michael Barak, Senior Research Associate at the International Institute for Counterterrorism, reveals the use of cultural centers for subversion and dissent.
Michael Barak’s article scrutinized al-Tajammu al-Arabi wal-Islami li-Da’m Khiyyar al-Muqawma, an international pro-Iranian platform to strengthen the resistance axis against the United States, Israel, and its allies. The Lebanon-based pro-Iranian group has international connections and ties to other terrorist organizations, including PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[36]
The organization successfully established a global network comprising religious and secular radical entities and individuals with a shared worldview and interests. Some members have acknowledged that the network is intended to bolster the resistance axis and undermine its adversaries. The network functions extensively in Latin America through exchanges and cultural events sponsored by Iran and Hezbollah.
Additionally, to strengthen regional network connections among Tajammu’s members, a meeting was recently convened by Suzan Khalil, the network coordinator in Venezuela. The study also revealed the responsibilities of its members in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and other countries.[37]
International Broadcasting
Discrepancies between what is envisioned and the actual foster an ongoing discourse between justice and utopia, in addition to subjective reality as perceived in human cognition and imagination. This visual disparity engenders a presentation that elicits a spectrum of emotions (both positive and negative) articulated in diverse manners. As a result, Iran’s utilization of media sources enhances the national image, fosters relationships, and promotes mutual understanding, strengthening Iran’s strategy for conveying its narratives and viewpoints.
Iran’s authoritarian regime aims to control information availability primarily through state-controlled media, which increases susceptibility to Western information and influence. In doing so, Iran creates barriers to its vulnerabilities, including democratic values, open markets, and freedom of the press. However, Iran’s attempt to censor the flow of information has its drawbacks. While the regime has blocked social media platforms, many Iranians have turned to virtual private networks (VPNs) to restore internet access.[38]
The Islamic Republic utilizes several influencing strategies, including propaganda and cognitive bias, as a key element of its governance approach. It seeks to impact the ruling class in Latin America and shape public opinion in its favor while boosting support for countries already aligned with Iran. Iranian activists aim to disseminate their ideology and forge new connections globally by emphasizing the Shi’a narrative and advocating for the oppressed. Furthermore, the regime fosters cultural activities to optimize the medium of contact, promoting events of collective experience or engaging with audiences, utilizing it as a potent instrument for interpersonal bonds in Latin America’s affairs.
In alignment with its regional plan, Iran has established a network of proliferating echo chambers, anchored on its state-owned satellite platform HispanTV, the Venezuelan radical populist network teleSUR, and the Russian official news outlet RT en Español. These platforms function concurrently with social media accounts on sites like Twitter(X), Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Telegram groups to synchronize storylines progressing from minor platforms to mainstream media content in a brief timeframe.[39]
The strong anti-American ideology uniting this Iranian-backed network ultimately portrays Iran as a vital intellectual ally of the radical populist Bolivarian Revolution while articulating the United States as an oppressive and reckless resource exploiter. The media outlets’ messaging alignment creates the narrative that the Iranian Revolution and the Bolivarian Revolution share a common anti-U.S. These ongoing narratives have contributed to the decline of U.S. political, military, and economic influence in Latin America, with no comparable U.S. counter-narrative or sustained effort to counter them.
Iran and Venezuela enhanced their collaboration through their media outlets by establishing a shared narrative. The revolutionary characteristics of the Iranian and Venezuelan governments were emphasized, clarifying the connections and similarities between the Bolivarian and Iranian revolutions. Both sought to expose their audiences to values and narratives despite the differing models promoted by each revolution.
Numerous European nations and the United States have viewed the editorial stance of HispanTV and its English counterpart, PressTV, as a threat since their inception. The British government chose to ban its broadcasts in 2012, and the Spanish government followed suit in 2013. This situation triggered an immediate response across Europe. Similarly, HispanTV and Press TV have been banned from various U.S. platforms, such as Google, Facebook, and X, since 2019. However, this effort to stop Iran from broadcasting its content has not had an equivalent impact in Latin America, where HispanTV is featured among the channels offered by several television streaming platforms.[40]
Concluding Remarks
Iran’s public diplomacy in Latin America is a multifaceted strategy to expand its influence and adverse Liberal-democratic values and U.S. ascendency. Iran seeks to foster a favorable perception of its principles and values among Latin Americans by leveraging listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange programs, and international broadcasting. The shared anti-American sentiment and opposition to capitalism have facilitated Iran’s alliances with leftist governments, allowing it to establish a significant presence in the region. This strategic initiative underscores Iran’s commitment to advancing its geopolitical interests and promoting its revolutionary ideology on a global scale.
Iran’s engagement in Latin America is a strategic scheme generated by a perception of shared emotional dissension and opposition to capitalism. The rejection of neoliberal globalization promoted a natural alliance between Iran and various segments of the Latin American populace. Notwithstanding the fundamental disparities in their worldviews, conceptions, political aspirations, and cultural interpretations, Shia Islamists and Bolivarian adherents have exhibited a predominant pragmatism in their engagements.[41]
Under the supervision of the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, Iran advances its ethos and narratives through cultural institutions, events, language courses, and educational programs. The extensive initiatives conducted in the cultural centers established by Iran throughout South America create a conducive environment for promoting subversion and antagonism to Israel and other nations considered adverse by the Islamic Republic.
The current reality results from a prolonged process that gained momentum during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency and continues to evolve as these lines are written. Iran functions effectively in countries with a minimal presence of Western nations, particularly the United States. This vacuousness provides fertile ground for Iran to exploit its desired outcomes and cultivate various subversive activities. Therefore, the risk assessment conducted by Israel’s decision-makers must include a thorough examination of the currents and processes emerging in Latin America’s countries to mitigate the growing influence of the Iranian regime.
[1]. Eytan Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World (March, 2008), pp. 55-77
[2] . Joseph S. Nye, Power in the Global Information Age from Realism to Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 1-8.
[3]. Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World (March, 2008), pp. 94-109.
[4]. Joseph S. Nye. “Soft power: the means to success in world politics” (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p. 5.
[5]. Joseph Nye, and Jack Landman Goldsmith, “The Future of Power,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 64, No. 3 (SPRING 2011), pp. 45-52.
[6]. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,’ P. 95.
[7] . The members of the Bolivarian Alliance are- Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
[8]. Henry Ziemer, Tina Dolbaia, Mathieu Droin, ‘Russia and Iran in Latin America Same Outlook, Similar Playbooks,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (JULY 2024), Pp. 1-15.
[9]. Seth G. Jones, ‘ Soft Power: Understanding Iran’s Power and Exploiting Its Vulnerabilities,’ in ‘Containing Tehran,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 2020), Pp.37-47.
[10] . Michael Rubin, ‘Iran’s Global Ambition,’ American Enterprise Institute, vol. No. 3 (March 2008), Pp. 1-9.
[11]. Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, ‘Security in the Western Hemisphere: Extra-regional Actors in Latin America,’ Prism, the Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University, Vol. 8, No. 1. (2019), pp. 96- 113.
[12]. Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, ‘Extra-regional Actors in Latin America,’ P. 109.
[13]. https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/global/860486
[14] . Wilson Center, ‘Anti-Western Influence Campaigns in Latin America: Understanding the Russia-Venezuela-Iran Triangle,’ Izabella Tabarovsky interviews Emanuele Ottolenghi. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/audio/anti-western-influence-campaigns-latin-america-understanding-russia-venezuela-iran-triangle
[15]. Jorge Paredes Esteban, ‘Penetration and Influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Latin America,’ the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, (June 2023), Pp. 1-43
[16]. Nicholas J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (Mar., 2008), pp. 31-54.
[17]. Guy Itzchakov and Harry T. Reis, Listening and perceived responsiveness: Unveiling the significance and exploring crucial research endeavors,’ Current Opinion in Psychology, Vol. 53 (October 2023), Pp 1-6
[18] . Guy Itzchakov and Avraham N. (Avi) Kluger, ‘The Power of Listening in Helping People Change’ Harvard Business Review, (May 2018), Pp. 1-7.
[19]. Guy Itzchakov and Harry T. Reis, Listening and perceived responsiveness, P. 1.
[20] . Itzchakov, G., Reis, H. T., & Weinstein, N. How to foster perceived partner responsiveness: High-quality listening is key. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, e12648. (November 2021), https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12648
[21]. Joseph M. Humire, ‘Hezbollah and Crime-Terror Convergence: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime,’ Atlantic Council (2020), Pp. 1-5.
[22] . Humire, ‘Hezbollah and Crime-Terror Convergence,’ P. 5.
[23]. Sergio Castaño Riaño, ‘Iran’s soft Power in Latin America: HispanTV,’ Dialogo Politico, No. 15, (Montevideo, Uruguay, 2024), Pp. 1-23.
[24]. Nicholas J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, P. 32.
[25]. Oscar Castellanos Del Collado, ‘Iran’s Public Diplomacy in Latin America: When Anti-U.S. Rhetoric is Not Enough to Convince,’ USC Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/iran%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-latin-america-when-anti-us-rhetoric-not-enough-convince
[26]. Esteban, ‘Penetration and Influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ ICT, P. 10.
[27]. https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/HistorialVida/VIDA3825.pdf
[28]. Joseph M. Humire, The Maduro Hezbollah Nexus: How Iran-backed Networks Prop up the Venezuelan Regime, Atlantic Council (2020), Pp. 1-3.
[29]. Humire, The Maduro Hezbollah Nexus, P.1.
[30]. Doron Itzchakov, ‘Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its longstanding ramifications,’ Israel Affairs (Oct 2023), Pp. 1-22. DOI:10.1080/13537121.2023.2269701
[31]. Assaf Moghadam, ‘Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad,’ in Assaf Moghadam editor, Terrorism and Political Violence, (New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2007), pp. 125-143.
[32]. Federico Donelli, ‘Persuading through Culture, Values, and Ideas.’ Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 2019), pp. 113-134.
[33]. Cynthia Schneider, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You’d Know It If You Saw It,’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (FALL / WINTER 2006), Pp. 190-203.
[34]. Schneider, ‘Cultural Diplomacy,’ P. 199.
[35]. Hassan al-Banna was an Egyptian schoolteacher, Imam, and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has become one of the largest and most influential global Islamist and terror movements.
[36]. Michael Barak, ‘Al-Tajammu:a Pro-Iranian International Platform to Leverage the Resistance Axis,’
International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), August 2021, Pp. 1-29. https://www.ict.org.il/images/Al-Tajammu%20-%20Michael%20Barak.pdf
[37]. Ibid, https://www.ict.org.il/images/Al-Tajammu%20-%20Michael%20Barak.pdf
[38] . Seth G. Jones, A Containment Strategy, in, ‘Containing Tehran: ‘Understanding Iran’s Power and Exploiting Its Vulnerabilities,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020), Pp. 58-65.
[39] . Emanuele Ottolenghi interview. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/audio/anti-western-influence-campaigns-latin-america-understanding-russia-venezuela-iran-triangle
[40] . Sergio Castaño Riaño, ‘Iran’s soft Power in Latin America: HispanTV,’ Dialogo Politico, No. 15, (Montevideo, Uruguay, 2024), Pp. 1-23.
[41]. Esteban, ‘Penetration and Influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ ICT, Pp. 10-17.
