On the modern battlefield, combat is not only conducted through military strikes but also through images, videos, and, especially, narrative design. In recent years, the battle over public perception has become a central component of conflicts between states and terrorist entities, as they seek to shape the reality perception of various audiences in international and regional arenas. Iran stands out in this context as one of the most sophisticated actors in the field of cognitive influence. In the current campaign, it can be seen how it systematically uses these tools to promote messages and narratives that serve its strategic goals.

Iran manages to walk a fine line in its propaganda messages. On the one hand, it emphasizes operational achievements and promotes messages of victory and operational success, while on the other hand, it frames events in a way that allows it to build a narrative of victimhood. The message it seeks to convey to the world is clear: it did not start the campaign and is not interested in escalation, but is forced to deal with attacks that harm civilians and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, Iranian propaganda emphasizes that despite its “victim” status, it can cause significant damage to Israel, the United States, their regional allies, and their regional economic interests. This combination of victory messages and a narrative of victimhood is at the center of Iran’s influence strategy in the current campaign and is expressed in official messages, propaganda distributed in the media and social networks, and large-scale digital campaigns.

A Message of Victory

The messages of victory within the framework of the Iranian strategy are not constructed from a single message or from a single source. On the contrary, they are deliberately shaped through a variety of channels and tools. Among other things, this is done through statements by senior Iranian officials, reports of operational successes (sometimes even when the operations did not achieve their actual goals), and through activity on social media that includes short videos and posts that are widely circulated. This content presents false information or a distortion of reality. Sometimes statements made by actors in Israel are also used, reframing them in a way that supports the Iranian narrative.

Notable examples of this since the beginning of Operation “Roaring Lion” include statements by senior Iranian officials, including Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who, in the absence of Khamenei Sr., has taken a more prominent position in the psychological war against Israel and the United States. For example, he stated that “the destruction caused by the missiles to Israel is significant, and has made its leaders fearful,” emphasizing to reinforce his words that “this is just the beginning.”[1]

The main message promoted by Iranian propaganda is that the missile attacks are causing widespread destruction in Israel, and that Israeli authorities are hiding the extent of the damage. This message is being spread virally on social media, particularly on TikTok, where videos are posted that purport to show Israel before and after the Iranian missile attack, highlighting images of widespread destruction that do not reflect actual reality. In many cases, artificial intelligence tools are used to create these images and videos, and sometimes images and videos from other arenas, such as Syria and Gaza, are used.

Hezbollah also uses similar means, and its propaganda channels distribute media and influence operations that support the message of victory of the “resistance axis” led by Iran. For example, the Al-Khandaq news channel, which is affiliated with Hezbollah and also operates a Hebrew platform, published a propaganda video on Telegram that allegedly shows Israel after an Iranian attack and attacks by Hezbollah. The video was published under the title “Israel is approaching complete destruction,” and it shows images of Israeli settlements in their normal state alongside photographs of bombs not related to Israel, which are supposedly presented as the state after the attack.

Another example is the emergence of videos from sites that were actually hit in Israel and were originally posted by Israelis. In these cases, content creators affiliated with Iran alter the soundtrack of the video and add cries and pleas supposedly from Israeli citizens begging Iran to stop the attacks. In this way, a virtual reality is created that amplifies the narrative of Iranian “victory” and reinforces the message about the severity of the damage to Israel.

Left: A TikTok video purporting to show widespread destruction from Iranian attacks on Israel; Right: Hezbollah’s propaganda channel Al- Khandaq in a Telegram video – “What’s happening in Israel now? Israel is approaching complete destruction”.

In the face of the United States, Iran seeks to frame a victory narrative according to which it succeeds in neutralizing American capabilities in the regional space and even harming its forces. As part of this narrative, videos are distributed online that simulate damage to American vessels or aircraft, as well as alleged documentation of the capture of American soldiers. However, the United States has denied these claims in each case. Tests have shown that much of the content was produced using artificial intelligence tools and does not reflect events that actually occurred. The distribution of these materials helps to reinforce the Iranian message about harming the capabilities of the United States in the regional space.

A TikTok post simulating the capture of American soldiers in Iran. The content was generated using artificial intelligence.

Iran’s Pre-Campaign Influence Strategy

The message of victory in the current campaign did not emerge for the first time after the start of the operation, but rather constitutes a direct continuation of the influence campaign that Iran began promoting in the days leading up to it. During this period, a message of military superiority was mainly emphasized, designed to deter the United States and Israel from entering the campaign.

For example, in the face of threats from the United States and Israel about a possible attack, videos were distributed on TikTok by accounts affiliated with Iran that included recordings of alarms simulating a warning of an Iranian attack. The videos combine visuals from Israeli news apps, such as the N12 news channel and the Home Front Command app, alongside the caption: “These are the voices we will hear in the coming days.” This is an attempt to create a tangible threat experience using an auditory trigger familiar to the Israeli public. The combination of audio, familiar news branding, and a platform that appeals to a young audience indicates an understanding of media consumption patterns and the emotional vulnerability of the public in situations of tension, and its goal is clear: to exert pressure on the public in Israel, thereby creating public pressure on decision-makers and deterring military action against Iran.

A video distributed on TikTok simulating an alarm in Israel was distributed in the days leading up to the operation with the aim of inciting anxiety and pressure among the Israeli public, thereby creating pressure on decision-makers and deterring military action against Iran.

Towards the United States, in the days leading up to the operation, there was intensive use of artificial intelligence videos that allegedly show Iranian preparations for launching ballistic missiles, destroying American warships, and symbols that emphasize Iranian superiority – such as a predatory lion, a hammer, or a giant hand, and large or prehistoric creatures in front of American symbols. Some of the videos also feature derogatory representations of American leaders. For example, the President of the United States is shown kneeling in front of the Supreme Leader of Iran against the backdrop of a burning American warship. These messages are not only propaganda, but are intended to deter war, and to present Iran as a force with strategic superiority over the United States.

From left to right: A TikTok post of a giant monkey identified with the Iranian regime’s flag chasing Americans fleeing a US city; a video purportedly showing damage to US infrastructure and aircraft; a video showing President Trump kneeling in front of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in surrender in front of an American ship that was allegedly hit by an Iranian attack. All of the videos were posted on TikTok and were made using artificial intelligence tools. These videos were posted before the operation and were intended to demonstrate Iranian military superiority and deter the US from a possible attack.

An analysis of the publications from the period preceding the attack and an analysis after more than ten days of fighting indicate the existence of a deliberate hand that prepared the ground in advance and is still operating strongly at this stage. It can be identified that the messages of “readiness” that were disseminated before the operation were translated during the fighting into messages emphasizing victory and operational success. However, the rapid transition to messages of victory may also indicate a certain operational distress on the part of Iran, which results in increased propaganda efforts and influence in the battle over public perception. Similar patterns were identified in the analysis carried out during Operation “Rising Lion”,[2] where there was also a focus on simulating victory over Israel and the United States and humiliating their leaders.

A Message of Victimhood

From the beginning of the conflict, Iran emphasized that this was a “defensive war,” while simultaneously presenting its achievements in harming Israel. However, at this stage, a development is evident in the propaganda arena: alongside messages of victory, Iran also seeks to present itself as a victim of indiscriminate attacks by the United States and Israel. This framing is intended to influence international public opinion. Images of smoke rising over Tehran or of wounded civilians in the streets are distributed in order to create international and media pressure on Israel and the United States and to strengthen the voices calling for an end to the campaign.

The narrative of victimhood is not surprising within the Shiite perspective. Historical Shiite identity is largely based on a consciousness of sacrifice that originates from the memory of the Battle of Karbala and the death of Imam Hussein. This event has become a symbol of sacrifice and struggle in the Shiite consciousness. However, since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, an attempt has been made to transform the narrative of sacrifice into a narrative of active resistance, with the figure of Hussein presented as a symbol of revolutionary struggle and not just as a symbol of suffering, and therefore it is not surprising that Iran’s dynamics around the narrative of sacrifice versus the narrative of victory.

In the context of the current campaign, certain actions and attacks are used to frame a narrative of nepotism. For example, the attacks on Iranian oil facilities as proof of “chemical warfare.” The same images are repeatedly circulated on social media and propaganda channels: thick smoke rising over Tehran, wounded people in the streets, and messages emphasizing the suffering of civilians. Esmail Baghaei, a spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, said that Israel’s attacks on Iranian fuel storage facilities constituted “deliberate chemical warfare,” claiming that the attacks released toxic substances into the air.[3]

In other cases, it has been claimed that American strikes deliberately hit a girls’ school, killing over 170 students. Alongside this, footage of civilians being injured is consistently circulated, aimed at reinforcing Iran’s image as a victim in the campaign.

Left: Publication about an alleged American Tomahawk missile hitting a school in Iran; Right: additional reference to hitting a school and killing children.

A publication by the Revolutionary Guards about a teacher who was present at an alleged attack on the school in Minab in which children were allegedly killed.

The message is also directed inward. Within Iran itself, the regime seeks to strengthen the victims by instilling national unity around an external enemy. Therefore, in addition to the above images, images of demonstrations in support of the regime and of citizens expressing solidarity with the leadership inside and outside Iran are also being distributed at the same time. For example, PressTV, an Iranian propaganda channel, published a video purporting to capture pro-Iranian demonstrations in Los Angeles. This is made possible, among other things, due to the regime’s almost complete control over the Internet and the information that comes out of the country. The regime determines which images from Tehran reach the world – and which ones do not.

Left: Pro-regime demonstrations outside Iran; Right: Pro-regime demonstrations inside Iran

This pattern of action is also reminiscent of Hamas’s public relations strategy in the days following the October 7 attack. A report published by the Institute for Counterterrorism Policy (ICT) in the first weeks after the attack found that Hamas initially emphasized its military achievements, such as infiltration into Israeli communities and attacks on IDF forces.[4] However, the organization quickly realized that this framing did not serve it in the international arena. The widespread support for Israel and the global shock of the massacre led to a change in messaging. Hamas quickly shifted to a more familiar narrative of victimhood and shifted from documenting military achievements to images of destruction and civilian suffering in Gaza. These images became a central tool in the struggle for global public opinion, and a tool that proved to be particularly effective.

In Iran’s case, too, the use of the victim narrative is primarily intended to serve as a tool of awareness against a backdrop of operational weakness. Instead of emphasizing significant vulnerabilities in its military system, Iran seeks to portray the United States and Israel as indiscriminately attacking civilians and harming civilians and civilian infrastructure, including energy and electricity infrastructure.

Significance and Conclusions

The cognitive arena has become an integral part of Iran’s military strategy. For Iran, the struggle is not waged solely through military means, but also through shaping the perception of reality. Disseminating images, videos, and shaping narratives are not complementary activities to military combat but rather an integral part of it. In this way, Iran is trying to influence the way the war is perceived in the domestic, international, and regional arenas.

Previous events also show how controlling the framing of events is a key tool for the Iranian regime. A study published by the  ICT at Reichman University, which examined the wave of protests in Iran in December 2025–January 2026, found that the Iranian authorities deployed a coordinated information system to manage the crisis.[5] In the first phase, some of the economic difficulties were acknowledged, but within a short time, the public debate shifted to blaming “foreign actors,” primarily the United States and Israel, for organizing the protests. The demonstrations were later presented as part of a broader campaign against Iran, and their suppression was presented as a national achievement. The key finding was that controlling information and the way it is presented has become a key means of preserving the stability of the regime, as in the present case, where this tool is a significant part of the strategy in preserving the regime.

The combination of a victory narrative and a victim narrative allows Iran to operate in two arenas simultaneously. On the one hand, the victory messages are intended to convey strength and deter further fighting. On the other hand, framing events through a victim narrative seeks to generate international legitimacy and work to exert political pressure on Israel and the United States to stop the fighting. The goal is the same in both. By combining the two messages, Iran is able to appeal to different audiences at the same time.

The use of artificial intelligence is changing the balance of power in the battle over public perception. The ability to quickly produce large amounts of content, sometimes without any basis in reality, allows Iran to intensify its influence activities at low cost and at a high rate, with the algorithms of social networks serving as a force multiplier. Another way is to distort reality. Here too, it is a relatively simple operation, using images and videos from events that actually occurred, but reframed in a way that serves the desired narrative. Both methods are not complex to perform, do not require high professional expertise, and can be carried out both by the regime itself and by its supporters. Sometimes, it is even the activity of actors that do not receive direct guidance, but act independently in accordance with the spirit of the leadership’s main messages and statements, and produce content that matches them.

The unity between Iran and its proxies also exists in the digital arena. The use of similar narratives by Hezbollah and other elements in the resistance axis indicates that the campaign is not local but part of a broad and coordinated array of influence.

Understanding these processes may help formulate effective ways of coping in the ideological arena with Iran and its proxies. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need to also consider the way in which certain military operations may be exploited for propaganda purposes and influence the perception of the campaign. In certain cases, a military operation aimed at damaging the enemy’s capabilities may actually serve the narrative it seeks to promote and undermine the broader goals of the campaign. For example, the Israeli attack on oil facilities in Iran was quickly exploited by Iranian propaganda to present Israel and the United States as harming civilian infrastructure and the civilian population. This framing created a significant ideological effect both within Iran and in the international arena, to the point of creating tensions between the United States and Israel over this issue. This case illustrates how events in the military arena can quickly become a tool in the struggle for the narrative.

Therefore, alongside military achievements on the ground, strategic planning of the awareness campaign alone or accompanied by active moves is also required. As mentioned, success in the modern campaign is not measured only by results on the battlefield, but also by the ability to shape the way these events are perceived in the public and international arena.

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[1] The Telegram channel of the Iranian News Agency IRNA.

[2] Haberfeld, D., & Azani, E. (2025, June 20). Iranian TikTok campaign seeks to shape war perceptions using AI.https://ict.org.il/iranian-tiktok-campaign-seeks-to-shape-war-perceptions-using-ai/

[3] Telegram channel affiliated with the Iranian regime

[4] Azani, E., & Haberfeld, D. (2023). Hamas media campaign: “Al Aqsa Flood.” ICT. https://ict.org.il/hamas-media-campaign-al-aqsa-flood/

[5] Haberfeld, D. (2026, February 4). Iran’s information warfare during the December 2025 – January 2026 protests and its continued influence on Israel and the West. https://ict.org.il/irans-information-warfare-during-the-december-2025-january-2026-protests/