Abstract

This paper explores the dynamics of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, focusing on Hamas’s expanding influence under the sponsorship of Hezbollah. The analysis underscores Hamas’s strategic efforts to consolidate control in these camps as part of its broader objective to challenge Israel from multiple fronts. The discussion examines the camps’ socio-economic conditions, including discriminatory policies by the Lebanese government, the influx of non-Palestinian criminal elements, and internal armed conflicts, which have created a fertile ground for radicalization and external manipulation. Key findings reveal that the weakening of Fatah’s authority, exacerbated by declining financial support from the Palestinian Authority and reduced effectiveness of the Palestinian National Security Forces, has further enabled Hamas to position itself as a stabilizing force. The paper delves into Hamas’s use of educational and social initiatives, such as youth programs and solidarity rallies, to enhance its influence among camp residents. It also highlights the emergence of alliances with local actors like Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, bolstering Hamas’s military and propaganda capabilities. The study examines the geopolitical implications of these developments, noting how the October 7 massacre and subsequent war in Gaza have elevated Hamas’s appeal. As Lebanon hosts a significant refugee population, the report warns that Hamas’s growing entrenchment could transform these camps into a new epicenter of resistance, posing significant security risks for Israel and regional stability. The findings provide a nuanced understanding of the intersection between socio-economic vulnerabilities, political factionalism, and regional geopolitics shaping the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

In recent years, Hamas has made considerable efforts to consolidate its presence in Lebanon, operating under the sponsorship and coordination of Hezbollah. This initiative aligns with Hamas’s strategic objective to challenge Israel on multiple fronts, including Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank—a strategy commonly referred to as the “unification of fronts.” This trend is evident in the strengthening of alliances with local power actors, particularly Hezbollah and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, as well as in Hamas’s penetration of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. These camps are viewed as valuable for their human capital and the smuggling networks operating within them.

The October 7 massacre and the subsequent war in Gaza have significantly enhanced Hamas’s reputation, which the organization seeks to leverage to expand its ranks among the Palestinian population in Lebanon.^[1] This document examines Hamas’s entrenchment efforts in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and explores the implications of these activities.

According to official data published by UNRWA, as of 2023, the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is estimated at approximately 490,000, with an additional 31,000 Palestinian refugees displaced from Syria due to the civil war that began in 2011. Lebanon hosts 12 Palestinian refugee camps, funded by UNRWA, with the largest being Ain al-Hilweh. Some camps are surrounded by concrete walls, equipped with security checkpoints, inspection points, guard towers, and other surveillance measures at their entrances. However, the majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do not live within the camps, with only about 45% residing inside their boundaries.^[2]

The economic and security conditions in these camps have been deteriorating due to several key factors:

1. Discriminatory Policies by the Lebanese Government – The Lebanese government imposes various restrictions on Palestinian refugees, barring them from entering the local labor market to maintain the country’s demographic balance with its Christian population.
2. Presence of Criminals and Drug Traffickers – Non-Palestinian criminals and drug traffickers have taken refuge in several camps. In recent years, Shatila in Beirut and al-Baddawi in the north have become hubs for drug trafficking. This has also led to a marked increase in narcotic use, particularly among youth. Leaders of Fatah and PLO factions attribute the expansion of drug networks to high unemployment rates, which reached approximately 93% among Palestinian refugees by 2022.
3. Internal Armed Conflicts – Some camps have become hotspots for violent disputes between families and individuals.
4. Weakening of Fatah and the Palestinian National Security Forces in Palestinian Refugee Camps – The Palestinian National Security Forces, staffed by members of the Fatah movement, are tasked with ensuring the safety and welfare of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, as well as liaising with the Lebanese Army to resolve issues within the camps. In recent years, their authority and effectiveness have significantly declined due to the following factors:
   1. Reduced Funding from the Palestinian Authority – The Palestinian Authority has decreased financial support to refugee camps in Lebanon due to economic hardship and prioritization of aid for Fatah loyalists in the camps. Some argue that this decline is connected to a decision by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to block the transfer of funds. In response, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have expressed frustration with Fatah for failing to improve their living conditions or secure basic rights, such as the ability to work or own property.
   1. Decline in Security and Dissatisfaction with the Palestinian National Security Forces’ Performance– Residents have increasingly lost confidence in the Palestinian National Security Forces’ ability to provide protection. For example, Ain al-Hilweh camp has suffered from persistent instability, characterized by armed clashes and assassinations, partly due to the absence of Lebanese security forces. Between July 29 and August 3, 2023, Fatah supporters engaged in a firefight with the Islamist militant group “Al-Shabab al-Muslim” in Ain al-Hilweh following an attempted assassination of a Fatah member in retaliation for the killing of his brother by the Islamist group. The clashes resulted in the deaths of 14 Palestinians, including the assassination of Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi, a Fatah member and commander of Palestinian National Security Forces in the Sidon area, along with four of his associates. These events forced thousands of Palestinians to flee the camp.

Commemorative Poster for Ashraf al-Armoushi, Commander of Palestinian National Security Forces, Assassinated by Islamist Militants

• Inability to Provide Basic Services – The Palestinian National Security Forces have failed to deliver basic services in camps such as Wavel, al-Jalil, and Mar Elias. Additionally, their attempts to negotiate with the Lebanese Army to allow construction materials into Ain al-Hilweh have been unsuccessful, leading residents to rely on smugglers who sell materials at exorbitant prices.
  • Resentment Over Unwillingness to Hand Over Perpetrators – There is growing anger toward the Palestinian National Security Forces under Fatah’s leadership for their refusal to hand over members involved in murders within the camps to the victims’ families, preventing acts of blood feud.^[3]
• Personal Interests of Camp Residents – Some residents have aligned themselves with Hezbollah to secure personal power and influence, as reported by the Saudi al-Majalla.^[4]
• Decline in UNRWA Assistance to Refugee Camp Residents – Residents of the refugee camps accuse UNRWA of negligence and failing to fulfill its responsibilities regarding the development of camp infrastructure, including road paving, sewage systems, water supply, electricity, and healthcare services. This perceived negligence has led camp residents to periodically protest against UNRWA. ^[5]

• Disappointment Over the Lack of a Palestinian State – Amid economic distress and a sense of personal insecurity, Hamas has sought to fill the resulting vacuum by positioning itself as a powerful entity capable of addressing the diverse needs of camp residents, thereby enhancing its political stature and influence. In September 2023, Rafaat Murra, a Hamas representative in Lebanon responsible for public relations, presented Hamas as a mediating force working to establish security within the camps. According to Murra, Hamas and most Palestinian factions held meetings and conducted patrols in Ain al-Hilweh to end armed conflicts within the camp, ensure the immediate withdrawal of armed militants from streets and schools, and facilitate the return of displaced residents. He noted that Hamas’s mediation efforts aimed to prevent disruptions to the education system in the camp, which serves approximately 6,000 students.^[6]  Musa Abu Marzouk, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, revealed that he traveled to Lebanon specifically to participate in talks aimed at achieving calm in Ain al-Hilweh. Ultimately, following pressure from the Lebanese government, it was agreed that Fatah and Hamas would jointly manage Ain al-Hilweh.^[7]  However, it appears that Hamas’s influence in the camp surpasses that of Fatah, as highlighted in a PBS article from August 2024.^[8]

Hamas has also managed to establish its presence in other refugee camps, such as al-Buss, al-Burj al-Shamali in the south, and Burj al-Barajneh in Beirut’s suburbs, despite the challenges Fatah currently faces. In additional camps, Hamas has worked to strengthen its ties with residents, organizing solidarity rallies, such as one held in January 2024 in the al-Rashidiyah camp (See below picture).^[9] Hamas has also focused on expanding its influence in the Nahr al-Bared and al-Baddawi camps near Tripoli. At the end of October 2024, Hamas announced the launch of a humanitarian aid campaign for families displaced from their homes in these camps.^[10]

In the context of Israel’s campaign in Gaza and southern Lebanon, along with Hamas’s bolstered reputation following the October 7 massacre, it appears that Hamas is determined to translate its growing influence within the Palestinian sphere in Lebanon into tangible actions. This trend was exemplified in December 2023, when Hamas in Lebanon announced the establishment of a Palestinian militia named the “Pioneers of the Al-Aqsa Storm” (Tala’e Tufan al-Aqsa), composed of young individuals from Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, primarily from Ain al-Hilweh, with the aim of aiding in the fight against Israel. However, the initiative ultimately failed due to opposition from the Lebanese Army. ^[11]

Hamas Indoctrination in Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Hamas in Lebanon has been actively working to strengthen its ties with Palestinian youth in refugee camps through meetings, conferences, and sports activities, using these platforms to instill educational messages that emphasize the importance of armed struggle against Israel. The Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sports in Lebanon, responsible for organizing sports activities for Palestinians in Lebanon, serves as a platform for Hamas to bolster its influence among Palestinians in the country. In September 2020, Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s political bureau, held a meeting with representatives of the Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sports in Lebanon during a tour of Sidon and the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.^[12]

On February 19, 2022, Hamas in Lebanon organized a first-of-its-kind conference in Beirut, titled The Youth Salon. The event featured Zaher Jabarin, head of Hamas’s Prisoners, Martyrs, and Wounded Office, and Ahmad Abdul Hadi, Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, alongside the Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sports in Lebanon. The conference addressed the Palestinian issue and methods of resistance against Israel for dozens of young Palestinians.^[13]

In August 2024, the Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sports in Lebanon organized a football tournament in Beirut, featuring Palestinian participants from refugee camps in Lebanon and the diaspora. The tournament was dedicated to Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and in memory of Ismail Haniyeh. At several matches, banners were displayed featuring the images of Hamas operatives in Lebanon who were targeted by Israel (see photos)

Hamas’s indoctrination efforts among youth are also evident in specialized educational programs conducted in summer camps. In July 2021, Hamas launched a four-week initiative titled Sword of Jerusalem, aimed at hosting summer camps for children from refugee camps. The program emphasized the importance of liberating Jerusalem and Palestine. According to Hamas, the initiative sought to “ignite the flame of jihad in the generation of liberation, instill Islamic values and morals, and prepare the army of the anticipated victory for the liberation of Palestine.”. In July 2022, Hamas initiated another summer program titled Generation of Al-Aqsa – “Jerusalem is Ours” in the refugee camps. This program was conducted across 50 youth and young adult centers in Palestinian refugee camps and other Palestinian population centers.^[18]

Alliance Between Hamas and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya

Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, plays a prominent role in providing military and propaganda support to Hamas. On the military front, Al-Fajr Forces, the military wing of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, joined in launching rockets toward Israel starting on October 18, 2023. On the propaganda front, the “Al-Aqsa Aid Organization,” subordinate to Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, actively works to train the young Palestinian generation in Lebanon for combat against Israel across all domains. For example, in September 2024, it collaborated with the Muslim Youth Scouts Movement to organize a workshop titled Generations of the [Al-Aqsa] Storm, which focused on the importance of supporting the jihad war against Israel.^[19]

Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya was founded in Lebanon in 1956 by Fathi Yakan and Faisal Mawlawi and is considered the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Currently led by Sheikh Muhammad Takkoush, the movement has a single representative in the Lebanese parliament, ‘Imad al-Hout. Its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and shared ideological foundations have helped maintain strong relations between the two movements. However, Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya’s relationship with Hezbollah has been marked by tension and suspicion, largely due to Hezbollah’s involvement in fighting alongside Bashar al-Assad’s regime against Sunni rebels in Syria during the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. It was Hamas, under the leadership of Ismail Haniyeh, that played a role in reconciling the strained ties between Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah.

Since Saleh al-Arouri’s arrival in Lebanon in 2017, the relationship between Hamas and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya has grown stronger. This relationship is characterized by military and financial guidance provided by Hamas to Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya. According to reports in the Arab media, Hamas is said to pay salaries to members of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, which grants it significant influence over the movement’s members.^[26]

This may be the reason why Hamas and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya sometimes publish joint leaflets in commemoration of several Palestinian operatives who were targeted by Israel in Lebanese territory, often claiming affiliation with both organizations. For example, in September 2024, Hamas and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya issued a joint statement commemorating Hussein Mahmoud al-Nadir, head of the Al-Aqsa Aid Organization in Marjayoun and Hasbaya, who was targeted by Israel. Both movements claimed him as one of their members.

Hamas and Hezbollah

The extensive activity of Hamas in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon would likely not be possible without the approval and sponsorship of Hezbollah. The alliance between the two organizations is not new and began to take shape following the deportation of Hamas’s leadership to Lebanon by the Israeli government under Yitzhak Rabin in 1992. Since then, their ties have grown stronger, except for the years 2011–2016, during which relations soured as Hamas joined the Muslim Brotherhood’s criticism of Hezbollah for its involvement in the massacre of Sunnis in Syria.

In 2017, Hamas elected a new leadership under Ismail Haniyeh, who prioritized strengthening ties with Iran and Hezbollah and expanding Hamas’s presence in Lebanon to bolster the Sunni-Shiite resistance axis against Israel. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, openly acknowledged the alliance, even announcing that Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Palestinian resistance factions had established a joint operations room in Lebanon, which includes officers from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), aimed at coordinating the fight against Israel.

According to think tank analysis, Lebanon’s lack of governance and the continued military dominance of Hezbollah on Lebanese soil—despite the blows it has sustained from Israel—make the country a safe haven for Hamas members. Senior Hamas leaders such as Saleh al-Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’s political bureau, who settled in Beirut in the summer of 2018, and Khalil al-Hayya and Zaher Jabarin, who arrived in Lebanon from Turkey shortly after al-Arouri, are responsible for expanding Hamas’s military activities in Lebanon. From Lebanon, these leaders also attempt to incite unrest in the West Bank.

The alliance with Hezbollah provides Hamas with “strategic depth” and enables the group to expand its influence in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. For instance, following October 7, Hezbollah facilitated Hamas’s recruitment and training of hundreds of young people from refugee camps in training facilities outside the camps.^[27] This alliance also serves Hezbollah’s interests, including solidifying the resistance axis, enhancing Hezbollah’s image as a protector of Sunnis in Lebanon and beyond, and using Hamas as a proxy in its conflict with Israel from Lebanese territory.

Hamas has also cultivated strong ties with the Arab and Islamic Gathering for the Support of the Resistance Option (Al-Tajamu Al-Arabi wa Al-Islami Li-Da’am Khiyar Al-Muqawama), a pro-Iran umbrella organization that includes Sunni Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as well as Shiite groups like the Houthis in Yemen. Closely affiliated with Hezbollah, this organization oversees an international network that includes Marxist activists and radical left-wing academics in the West who justify resistance against the United States and Israel.^[28]

Hezbollah and Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Hezbollah facilitates the strengthening of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s influence among residents of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, while simultaneously working to bolster its own standing within the Palestinian population in Lebanon. This is achieved by cultivating an image as a powerful entity supporting the struggle of Palestinian terrorist factions against Israel, as well as through humanitarian aid to refugee camps. These efforts are carried out via the Committees for Action in Refugee Camps and the Committee for Support of Resistance in Palestine, headed by senior Hezbollah official Hassan Hubballah, who is responsible for fostering ties between Hezbollah and the Palestinians.

These organizations subsidize basic goods and medicines for refugee camp residents,^[31] fund Palestinian demonstrations, and organize conferences praising armed resistance against Israel, often highlighting Iran’s contribution to the Palestinian struggle. For instance, on December 10, 2020, the Committees for Action in Refugee Camps held an online conference with the participation of Hassan Hubballah and representatives from refugee camps in southern Lebanon, focusing on resistance to normalization with Israel.^[32]

“Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” in Lebanon

While Hamas’s position strengthens amid the ongoing campaign in Gaza, Fatah’s influence in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon appears to be weakening due to reasons already mentioned. It is possible that Fatah seeks to restore its standing through increased involvement in supporting terror activities against Israel from Lebanese soil. Munir al-Maqdah, commander of Fatah’s military wing in Lebanon, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, has stated several times, including to PBS, that his organization supports the struggle of West Bank residents against Israel in various ways.^[33]

Arab media reports indicate that the organization assists in funding and smuggling weapons into the West Bank. According to Israel, Khalil al-Maqdah, the brother of Munir al-Maqdah, collaborated with Iran’s Quds Force to facilitate arms smuggling to the West Bank.^[34] Notably, in August 2024, Israel targeted Khalil al-Maqdah, and in October 2024, it targeted Hassan al-Maqdah, Munir al-Maqdah’s son, for their involvement in terror activities against Israel.

Summary

In recent years, Hamas has sought to expand its control over Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon as part of its broader efforts to reassert its authority there, whether through theoretical partnerships with Fatah or independently. According to think tank analysis, power struggles over influence in the camps are not new; however, in the aftermath of the October 7 massacre and Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza and Lebanon, Hamas’s appeal appears to be on the rise.

The think tank believes that if the ongoing campaign against Hamas results in the total collapse of its governance capacity and the destruction of its military power in Gaza, Lebanon could become the new center of gravity for Hamas’s Gazan leadership. It should be noted that as early as 2017, Lebanon became a refuge for Hamas leaders from Turkey after they were forced to leave due to the reconciliation process between Israel and Turkey.

This development could intensify Hamas’s efforts to establish a stronger presence in Lebanon and recruit Palestinians not only in refugee camps in Lebanon but also in the West Bank, Syria, and Jordan. This trend could threaten the stability of the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank, and Israel.

The think tank further believes that while Hamas operates in cooperation with and under the sponsorship of Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is not subordinate to Hezbollah. Instead, Hamas maintains its own independent policies and acts in accordance with its interests, all while preserving cordial relations with Hezbollah.

Appendix 1: Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Appendix 2: Hamas Members in Lebanon

Appendix 3: Hamas Targeted Members in Lebanon

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^[1] In a report published by a journalist from The Guardian, the presence of graffiti and murals that extol Hamas and commemorate the events of the 7/10 massacre is documented within the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Lebanon. Simona Foltyn, “‘We are with them’: support for Hamas grows among Palestinians in Lebanon”, The Guardian, April 26, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/26/we-are-with-them-support-for-hamas-grows-among-palestinians-in-lebanon

^[2] UNRWA, July 2023. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon;   

^[3] Intisar al-Dinan, “Palestinian National Security in the Refugee Camps… An Army for Whom and Against Whom”? [in Arabic]. Al-Rasif, March 22, 2024. https://shorturl.at/kmwIf

^[4] Samir Zariq, “Lebanon… Palestinian Refugee Camps Amid Chaos with Hamas and Hezbollah” [in Arabic], al-Majallah, July 6, 2024. https://shorturl.at/iftLN

^[5] Ibid; “Clashes in the Ain al-Hilwa Camp… the Campaign is Renewed” [IN Arabic], Lajiin, August 4, 2023; “The Palestinians of Lebanon…the Nakba continues” [in Arabic], The Palestinian Information Center, June 21, 2023. https://palinfo.com/news/2023/06/21/840613/

^[6] “Rafat Murrah to al-Shehab: There is a Palestinian party that insists on continuing the fighting and renounces the agreements,” [in Arabic], Sheab, September 14, 2024.

^[7] “Abu Marzouk reveals the behind-the-scenes story of the ceasefire agreement in Ain al-Hilweh camp” [in Arabic], Palestinian Information Center, September 16, 2023. https://palinfo.com/news/2023/09/16/850458/

^[8] PBS NewsHour, “Inside a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon where Hamas is Gaining Popularity Amid War”, YouTube, August 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JeiLGeY1T9s

^[9] January 24, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0BBNsxjVeCJg6dx4cP7wamrhcWDvwQ1wBF8KPpZ1haHUQ3cDtCkkK35EF6Z12xsXHl&id=100076058782608   

^[10] “The Public Activity in Hamas in Lebanon” [in Arabic], Quds Bres, October 29, 2024. https://qudspress.com/164225

^[11] “”Hamas” retreats after widespread Lebanese rejection of the “Al-Aqsa Storm Vanguard”, [in Arabic], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 5, 2023. https://shorturl.at/vgswh

^[12] “Haniyeh meets with the Palestinian Institute for Youth and Sports” [in Arabic], al-Resalah, September 7, 2020. https://shorturl.at/2u5Ah    

^[13] “The Palestinian Foundation for Youth and Sports in Lebanon participates in the first youth salon for the youth sector in Hamas with the leadership of the movement”, The Palestinian Institution for Youth and Sport, February 21, 2022. https://www.pal-iysport.net/?p=28689

^[14] “Photos: Haniyeh meets with the Palestinian Youth and Sports Foundation” [in Arabic], al-Resalah, September 7, 2020. https://shorturl.at/2u5Ah

^[15] The Palestinian Institute for Youth and Sports in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 22, 2024. 

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=927991626011532&set=pcb.927991699344858

^[16] The Palestinian Institute for Youth and Sports in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 22, 2024. 

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=921130620030966&set=pb.100064021095696.-2207520000&type=3

^[17] The Palestinian Institute for Youth and Sports in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 16, 2024. 

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=924249639719064&set=pb.100064021095696.-2207520000

^[18] “Hamas in Lebanon continues its summer camps, Generation Al-Aqsa – Jerusalem is Ours”, The Palestinian Information Center, July 25, 2022. https://palinfo.com/news/2022/07/25/218441/

^[19] September 15, 2024. https://www.instagram.com/nusratalaqsa.bekaa/p/C_8gsGfCvKM/

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Nusrat al-Aqsa in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 29, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=491752123614201&set=pb.100083382510523.-2207520000&type=3

^[22] Nusrat al-Aqsa in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 29, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=491752483614165&set=pb.100083382510523.-2207520000&type=3

^[23] Nusrat al-Aqsa in Lebanon Facebook Account, August 31, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=492966720159408&set=pb.100083382510523.-2207520000&type=3

^[24] Nusrat al-Aqsa in Lebanon Twitter Account, July 15,2024. https://x.com/NUSRATALAQSA1/status/1812885999489359941/photo/1

^[25] “Hezbollah Secretary General Meets Hamas Delegation to Discuss Situation in Gaza” [in Arabic], al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 5, 2024. https://t.ly/QoXaL   

^[26] Samir Zariq, “Lebanon… Al-Fajr Forces, a military wing of Al-Jamaa’a or Hamas” [in Arabic], al-Majallah, November 9, 2024. http://surl.li/zixhly

^[27] “With Hezbollah’s help, Al-Qassam recruits hundreds from [refugee] camps in Lebanon… Is Lebanon experiencing a new militarization?” [in Arabic], Al-Mashhad – YouTube, August 26, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDUqslCbpqI

^[28] See Michael Barak, “Al-Tajammu: a Pro-Iranian International Platform to Leverage the Resistance Axis”, ICT, August 2021. https://www.ict.org.il/images/Al-Tajammu%20-%20Michael%20Barak.pdf

^[29] “Hamas representative hosts a delegation from the global Al-Tajma’a that supports the resistance!!” [in Arabic], Al-Tahari, December 14, 2023. https://t.ly/jRFIb

^[30] “Hamas meets with Hezbollah in Lebanon… This is what took place at the meeting” [in Arabic], Palestinian Information Center, December 29, 2021. https://palinfo.com/news/2021/12/29/262400

^[31] See, for example, a health day held by the action committees in the refugee camps in Lebanon in May 2024. The Refugee Camps Aid Committees Facebook Account, May 15, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=985872846873273&set=pb.100063517002612.-2207520000

^[32] Action Committees in the Refugee Camps in Lebanon Facebook Account, December 10, 2020. The webinar has been removed from the link. https://www.facebook.com/allijancom/videos/204529174699683

^[33] See: PBS NewsHour, “Inside a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon where Hamas is Gaining Popularity Amid War”, YouTube, August 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JeiLGeY1T9s.

^[34] Bula Estih, “Israel Targets Commander of Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades on Charges of Involvement in Sending Money and Weapons” [in Arabic], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, August 31, 2024. https://shorturl.at/G7cfk

^[35] “The Palestinians of Lebanon… Witnesses of the Nakba, Sabra and Shatila, and the Wars of the [Refugee] Camps” [in Arabic], Al-Arabi al-Jadid, undated. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/interactive-stories/nakba/lebanon.html