The issue of Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails has historically evoked profound emotional and political resonance within Palestinian society. Members of the Palestinian Authority and terrorist organizations, spearheaded by Hamas, place immense focus on this matter. This is driven not only by a commitment to securing their release and improving their detention conditions, but also by the recognition that the prisoner issue serves as a potent propaganda weapon to bolster their political and social standing. The passage of the Israeli death penalty law in late March 2026 has profoundly destabilized this dynamic, significantly intensifying Palestinian discourse. This discourse currently vacillates between two poles: a public diplomacy campaign of condemnation that portrays Israel as a violator of international law, and, conversely, operational calls to execute terrorist attacks and abduct Israelis. Israeli decision-makers must remain highly attentive to these trends, aiming both to counter Palestinian initiatives designed to isolate the state internationally, and to concurrently thwart abduction and terror plots on the ground.

Legislation Mandating the Death Penalty for Security Prisoners

Following the severe security incidents of recent years, and against the backdrop of the public debate surrounding the release of hostages, the government coalition began aggressively promoting the death penalty law for terrorists. On March 30, 2026, the Israeli Knesset approved the ‘Death Penalty for Terrorists Law, 5786-2026’ in its second and third readings. The law, which does not apply retroactively to the Hamas Nukhba terrorists (who are expected to be tried under a separate legal framework), will apply to future terror offenses and splits the punishment into two tracks: tightening military law in Judea and Samaria to make the death penalty the default by a regular majority, and amending the civil Penal Law within Israel. The law establishes a rigid 90-day window (with an exceptional extension of up to 180 days by the Prime Minister) to carry out the sentence by hanging from the day it becomes final, with no option for a pardon or future release in prisoner exchange deals.  

The legislation was spearheaded by the “Otzma Yehudit” party, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, alongside Member of Knesset Nissim Vaturi of the “Likud” party. This initiative was predicated on the following assumptions: the potential of the death penalty to deter prospective terrorists from executing lethal attacks; the prevention of future releases of security prisoners, as was customary in past prisoner-exchange deals such as the Gilad Shalit transaction; the administration of justice and proportionate retribution for mass acts of slaughter, rape, and homicide; and Israel’s ongoing state of war, which warrants extraordinary punitive measures.

Despite the law’s passage in the Knesset, it does not enjoy consensus support among all Israeli lawmakers, due to several key contentions: the infringement upon democratic values and human rights, with critics arguing that capital punishment is incompatible with the principles of a democratic state; the lack of empirical evidence proving that the death penalty constitutes a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment; the fact that certain terrorists are driven by a radical religious ideology, harbor no fear of death, and even view it as a desirable objective in their pursuit of martyrdom (Shahada), thereby limiting the law’s deterrent effect; and apprehension regarding international condemnation. Detractors warn that the law could drive a wedge between Israel and Western nations. Notably, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stands out in its opposition to the legislation, citing concerns over potential damage to its standing in the international arena.

The Issue of Security Prisoners in Palestinian Society

Since 1967, the prisoner issue has occupied a central position in the Palestinian national consciousness. Within this framework, prisoners are accorded a status of honor and veneration, predicated on the perception that they are not terrorists, but rather freedom fighters dedicated to national liberation. For decades, Palestinian terrorist organizations have invested immense efforts in securing their release, primarily through the abduction of Israeli soldiers and civilians. Consequently, the struggle for their liberation has evolved into a competition for prestige and social standing among the various Palestinian factions.

In both Palestinian and Israeli collective memory, certain prisoner-exchange transactions are particularly prominent. These include the Ahmed Jibril deal of May 1985, which saw the release of 1,155 detainees in exchange for three Israeli soldiers, and the Gilad Shalit transaction of October 2011, which exchanged 1,027 prisoners for a single soldier. The Palestinian Authority also consistently underscores that under Yasser Arafat’s leadership of the Fatah faction, the largest exchange agreement in Palestinian history was executed in November 1983, resulting in the release of 4,700 prisoners in exchange for six Israeli soldiers. In total, approximately 40 exchange deals—involving airplane hijackings, bus hostage-takings, and other captive crises—took place between 1968 and 2025, culminating in the release of over 8,000 prisoners. These transactions have invariably been perceived as collective Palestinian victories.[2]

Hamas as the Vanguard of the Struggle for the Release of Security Prisoners

Over the years, the issue of Palestinian prisoners has served as a primary anchor of legitimacy for Hamas within the Palestinian arena. The group’s success in brokering prisoner-exchange deals with Israel—most notably the Shalit transaction and the subsequent exchanges following the events of October 7—has effectively solidified its position as the leading actor in the struggle for prisoner liberation. Consequently, Hamas has reacted with severe vitriol to the death penalty legislation. In its various publications, the movement frames the law as a “fascist” measure and a “war crime.” Basem Naim, a senior Hamas official, characterized Israeli society as afflicted by mental illness and requiring institutionalization due to its endorsement of the law, stating:

“The passage of the law to execute the Nukhba and the heroes of October 7 by an overwhelming majority of 93 out of 120 Knesset members, excluding the votes of the Arab opposition, means that we are dealing with a mentally ill (psychopathic, deranged) society across all its political shades—one that requires isolation and psychiatric hospitalization, rather than the state apparatuses with which it inflicts harm upon everyone.”[3]

As part of its efforts to sway international public opinion and mobilize diplomatic and public pressure against Israel to prevent the law’s implementation, Hamas deploys extensive advocacy and influence networks across social media and various digital platforms. In January 2026, a network linked to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom launched the “Global Campaign to Save the Prisoners.”[4] This initiative introduced several hashtags in both Arabic and English, such as “Stop Executing Prisoners” and “Free Palestinian Hostages,” while coordinating online protests to disseminate these messages. The wife of Hassan Salameh, a senior figure in Hamas’s military wing who is currently serving a life sentence in an Israeli prison, is actively involved in the campaign. She published a manifesto on her X account entitled, “The Palestinian Prisoners Threatened by the Execution Law: Help Spread Their Voice and Message to the World” (see images).[5]

Throughout January and February 2026, the Prisoners’ Media Office—another advocacy arm of Hamas—released a series of publications framing West Bank cities, specifically Ramallah, Jenin, and Qalqilya, as symbols of resistance against Israel. These publications depict Palestinian prisoners originating from these West Bank cities as heroes and emblems of steadfastness (Sumud), sacrifice, and resistance.[6] Furthermore, the Office is responsible for organizing and coordinating public demonstrations against the death penalty law. Between March and May 2026, it utilized its social media accounts to publish manifestos calling for participation in protests against the legislation at various hubs across the West Bank, including Al-Bireh and Hebron. Additional rallies were held in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Notably, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also co-organized these demonstrations. On April 1, the aforementioned Office further promoted a general hunger strike across the West Bank as a form of protest.

From right to left: Cover pages of publications focusing on security prisoners from West Bank cities: “Ramallah in the Balance of Numbers”; “Jenin in the Occupation’s Prisons”; and “Qalqilya in the Memory of the Prisons.”

From right to left: A manifesto issued by Hamas’s propaganda arm calling for participation in a mass demonstration in Al-Bireh against the execution law; a segment from a video showing a demonstration in Gaza condemning the law.

It is noteworthy that Hamas’s propaganda efforts, which cluster all security prisoners into a single category, seek to foster a cognitive and operational “unity of fate” across different arenas. Although the Israeli legislation was explicitly advanced as a dedicated response to the Nukhba terrorists who perpetrated the October 7 massacre, Hamas deliberately operates to blur this distinction within public discourse. In its publications, the movement frames the law not as an isolated, specific event confined to Gazan terrorists, but rather as a “slippery slope” and a dangerous legal precedent that Israel will inevitably apply to all security prisoners in the future, including residents of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. By broadening the scope of the threat, Hamas effectively untethers the debate from the narrow context of the Nukhba, mobilizes the population in the West Bank for demonstrations and hunger strikes, and deprives Israel of the ability to isolate the Nukhba prisoners from the rest of Palestinian society.

Alongside declarations of condemnation and denunciation, Hamas also threatens to respond with severe force. On May 19, the Israeli channel Kan 11 exposed an internal Hamas directive calling for the abduction of Israeli soldiers in retaliation for the law. The document further asserted that abductions constitute a primary, and indeed the only, mechanism for the liberation of Palestinian prisoners. The communique invoked Ahmed Yassin and Muhammad Deif as historical proponents of soldier abductions, aiming to reinforce the message that kidnappings are not an isolated tactical measure, but rather a continuous doctrine of operation. In the directive, Hamas warned that: “Any harm to the life of a prisoner is a detonator that will trigger the eruption of an all-encompassing volcano, which will leave nothing behind and spare no remnant; this pure land harbors in its depths ‘hidden secrets’ that will shake the earth beneath their feet.”[7]

This directive echoes the strategic doctrine of Muhammad Arman—one of the masterminds behind Hamas’s deadliest terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada, who is currently incarcerated—concerning the abduction of Israelis. Published in 2010, his book, A Perspective on the Resistance from Within, underscores Israeli society’s acute sensitivity regarding captive Israelis, framing the abduction of Israeli soldiers as a highly effective lever of pressure on Israeli decision-makers to secure the release of security prisoners. Arman posits that delays in prisoner liberation exceeding five years risk undermining the resistance’s recruitment capacity; consequently, he argues for the establishment of a mechanism capable of ensuring prisoner releases within a five-year window. To this end, he recommended deploying sleeper cells in the West Bank tasked with abducting an Israeli soldier and holding him for a prolonged period of several years, provided that meticulous preparations for the abduction and concealment of the hostage have been implemented. For instance, he proposed constructing subterranean hideouts, such as bunkers, to hold the captive far from populated areas. In his view, abducting an Ashkenazi soldier is preferable to abducting a soldier of Sephardic or Mizrahi descent, due to the greater media resonance such an abduction would generate, given what he characterizes as pervasive racism within Israeli society.

The Palestinian Authority

On May 12, 2026, Qadura Fares, a prominent Fatah-affiliated figure and the former head of the Palestinian Prisoners’ Affairs Authority, clarified that the death penalty law constitutes a measure that extends far beyond standard judicial procedure, designed primarily to shape the historical and public narrative surrounding the events of October 7. He argued that Israel seeks to portray itself exclusively as a victim, while completely ignoring the broader context of the conflict, the occupation, and the situation in the Gaza Strip. According to Fares, through the utilization of special courts, video documentation, and materials disseminated globally, Israel is attempting to cement a historical narrative aimed at influencing future generations and international public opinion alike.

Fares further contended that Israel does not operate out of a commitment to the principles of international law, but rather adapts its legal system to serve political needs and its nationalist ideology. He stated that Israel attempts to classify Gazan detainees as “unlawful combatants” to deprive them of the protections mandated by the Geneva Convention. In his view, the Palestinian struggle should not merely focus on opposing any specific piece of legislation, but rather on the very existence of the occupation. Additionally, he assessed that while the international balance of power still tilts in Israel’s favor, global public opinion is beginning to shift, indicating that the Israeli narrative will lose its credibility in the future.[8]

The advancement of the death penalty law has also drawn severe criticism among Arab citizens of Israel. Hassan Jabareen, a prominent Arab-Israeli attorney and human rights legal scholar, argues that the law possesses an inherently discriminatory character, as it is effectively directed primarily against Palestinians and is not applied equitably to Jews or settlers. From his perspective, the legislation is not only legally problematic but also liable to entail broad security and political ramifications, potentially exposing Israel to censure and punitive measures in the international arena.[9]

Conclusion

The death penalty law for Nukhba terrorists, which entered into force in late March 2026, constitutes an institutional watershed moment that extends far beyond the domestic Israeli judicial and political arenas. While the legislation was advanced in Israel out of considerations of deterrence, retributive justice, and the prevention of future prisoner-exchange deals, it is perceived within the Palestinian system as a fundamental disruption of established norms and strategic constraints. Responses within Palestinian discourse reveal two distinct approaches. On one hand, Hamas capitalizes on the law to solidify its operational abduction doctrine, translating political anxiety over the loss of the prisoners as a strategic asset into tangible threats of escalation. On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority channels the struggle into the international arena, aiming to fracture the legitimacy of Israeli wartime adjudication and reshape the historical narrative of the conflict.

The Institute for Palestine Studies in Ramallah posits that the Israeli death penalty legislation may ultimately yield counterproductive results relative to Israel’s initial objectives. First, a Palestinian operative who knows an execution sentence is inevitable is likely to fight to the end in the field rather than surrender, thereby increasing the casualty toll for IDF soldiers. Second, it could fundamentally alter the paradigm of negotiations; Palestinian resistance factions may shift their demands in future transactions—instead of demanding the release of prisoners (who may have already been executed), they will likely demand political and strategic concessions, such as lifting the blockade, opening border crossings, and altering the geopolitical reality on the ground. Third, it could transform the liberation doctrine. The law is liable to shift the Palestinian consciousness from the tactical aspiration of “liberating the prisoner from the jail” to the strategic ambition of “liberating the land from which the jail itself will be dismantled,” thereby transforming the tactical struggle over captive exchanges into an all-encompassing existential war over the land.[10]

Consequently, the discourse on this matter necessitates a comprehensive examination of the full spectrum of potential ramifications for the judicial system, Israeli society, and Israel’s global standing. Israeli decision-makers and the defense establishment must recognize that Palestinian discourse is not merely a propaganda tool, but a reflection of emerging operational lines of action on the ground and potential trajectories of escalation. Implementing the law within its designated timelines will require enhanced counter-terrorism readiness by security agencies to thwart abduction attempts, alongside the formulation of a targeted public diplomacy response in the international arena. Without an integrative cost-benefit analysis encompassing all considerations, this legal move may yield nothing more than a declarative achievement, while its long-term operational and diplomatic consequences remain profoundly complex and challenging.

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[2] “The Law for the Execution of Palestinian Prisoners: The Zenith of the Confrontation Between the Central Government’s Commitment to Freedom and Deterrence” [Arabic], Institute for Palestine Studies, April 15, 2026. https://www.palestine-studies.org/ar/node/1658903

[3] @DrNaimbasem [in Arabic], X, May 12, 2026, https://x.com/DrNaimbasem/status/2054098252425732309.

[4] “Hamas-Linked Network Behind Red Ribbon Campaign for Palestinian ‘Hostages’ – Exclusive,” The Jerusalem Post, May 15, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-896290.

[5] @gufran_zamil, X, May 9, 2026, https://x.com/gufran_zamil/status/2053053410908250269; @gufran_zamil, X, May 9, 2026, https://x.com/Free4prisoners/status/2053030143187165513; @enqath1, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/enqath1.

[6] A Comprehensive Comparison of the Conditions of Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Occupation Prisons” [Arabic], Asra Media Office, January 15, 2026, https://asramedia.ps/?p=66339; “Jenin in the Occupation’s Prisons” [Arabic], Asra Media Office, January 15, 2026, https://asramedia.ps/?p=66310; “Qalqilya in the Memory of the Prisons: Figures Summarizing the Stories of Prisoners, Martyrs, and Children Behind Bars” [Arabic], Asra Media Office, February 14, 2026, https://asramedia.ps/?p=66991; “Ramallah in the Balance of Numbers: Extensive Arrests and Martyrs Behind Bars” [Arabic], Asra Media Office, February 1, 2026, https://asramedia.ps/?p=66501.

[7] Elior Levy, “Due to the Terrorist Death Penalty Law: Hamas Calls to Escalate Efforts to Abduct Soldiers,” Kan 11, May 19, 2026, https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/1042616/.

[8] Qudsna, “From Death Penalty Courts to Shaping the Narrative: Israel Rewrites the Events of October 7 Through Power and the Judicial System | Qadura Fares | Window” [Arabic], YouTube, May 12, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYydDa7NnUU.

[9] Arab 48, April 1, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/4ecc47m5.

[10] Sujoud Awawdeh, “The Law for the Execution of Palestinian Prisoners: The Zenith of the Confrontation Between the Central Government’s Commitment to Freedom and Deterrence” [Arabic], Institute for Palestine Studies, April 15, 2026, https://www.palestine-studies.org/ar/node/1658903.