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Is Jordan an Emerging Iranian Anti-Israel Attrition Front?

Abstract

This paper examines the intensifying threats posed by Iran’s expanding influence in Jordan, presenting significant security implications for both Israel and Jordan. Against the backdrop of Israel’s recent operations against Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, the study explores two primary dynamics shaping Jordan’s role in the region. Domestically, the Islamist camp’s growing strength, evidenced by the political gains of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan’s 2024 elections, reflects deep-seated anti-Israel sentiments. Internationally, Iran’s strategy to transform Jordan into an anti-Israel front is highlighted through weapon and drug smuggling networks operating via Syria, facilitating terrorist activities in the West Bank. This study details the broader geopolitical implications, including Iran’s ambitions to weaken Western influence in Jordan, as demonstrated by Iranian-backed attacks on Jordanian and American forces. Additionally, the paper addresses the complex relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and public opinion, which is increasingly sympathetic to Hamas, thereby challenging Jordan’s alliances with Israel and the United States. The analysis concludes with recommendations for enhanced security and intelligence collaboration between Israel, Jordan, and Western allies to counter Iranian subversion in the region.

Introduction

Against the backdrop of Israel’s campaign to eradicate Hamas in Gaza and to thwart terrorist activities in the West Bank, two significant processes are occurring in Jordan that threaten the stability of both Israel and Jordan. The first process is evident in the domestic arena, where the Islamist camp is gaining strength. This growth is fueled by deep anti-Israeli sentiment within Jordanian society, which is dissatisfied with the security ties between the Jordanian regime and Israel. The remarkable victory of the Islamic Action Front, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and closely aligned with Hamas, in the parliamentary elections held in September 2024, clearly illustrates this trend. The second process is seen in the foreign arena and relates to Iran and its affiliates’ efforts to transform Jordan into another battleground against Israel. This is being facilitated through the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and money into Jordan, and subsequently into the West Bank, via pro-Iranian smuggling networks operating in Syria. This trend fueles the motivation for terrorist attacks against Israel among Palestinians in the West Bank and contributes to the increase in the number of Palestinian armed groups. It is no coincidence that the IDF has launched extensive military operations in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Tubas in the northern West Bank to prevent Hamas and Islamic Jihad from establishing a presence there and using it to renew suicide attacks on Israeli territory.

Is Jordan a No Man’s Land?: Iranian Subversion and the Smuggling of Illegal Drugs into Jordan

The Jordanian royal house is perceived by Iran as a distinct ally of the West. This perception is partly due to Jordan’s commitment to a military alliance with the United States, the presence of American military forces and a military base (Tower 22) on Jordanian soil, and the establishment of close security ties with Israeli intelligence agencies. A reminder of this alliance was evident in the Jordanian Air Force’s assistance to the US-led coalition in intercepting Iranian missiles and UAVs that were launched toward Israel in April 2024. Hence, Jordan is considered an obstacle to Iran’s ambitions to expand its regional influence, expel US forces from Muslim lands, and strengthen its foothold within the borders of Israel. In October 2023, the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, published two proclamations emphasizing the importance of arming Palestinians in the West Bank as a means to weaken the “Zionist entity,”[1] and the necessity of unity among Muslim countries, including Jordan, to facilitate the expulsion of the US from the region.[2] The support of pro-Iranian Shiite militias for Jordan also reflects a desire to transform Jordan into an arena of attrition against Israel. In November 2023, Musa Sadr, a prominent Shiite leader in Iraq, called on Jordan to open its borders to Shiite military forces from Iraq. This would allow them to reach the Jordanian-Israeli border and assist the Palestinians in their fight against Israel.[3] In January 2024, Shia militias in Iraq fired missiles at the American military base Tower 22 in Jordan, killing three American soldiers.[4]

Infographics on behalf of Ali Khamenei’s office. The first one on the right describes an action plan for the elimination of the State of Israel, including a section referring to the arming of the Palestinians in the West Bank. The second on the left emphasizes that the expulsion of the USA from the region will be achieved through unity among the Muslim countries, including Jordan

Statements by senior officials in the Jordanian regime condemning Iranian subversion against Arab countries, including Jordan, over the past two decades have heightened tensions between the two. King Abdullah of Jordan coined the term “Shia Crescent” in 2004 to warn against Iran’s plan to establish pro-Iranian outposts in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, which he believed would exacerbate tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. He even accused Iran of intending to establish an Islamic Republic in Iraq. Following the events of 7/10 10, accusations from Jordanian figures condemning Iran became even more pronounced. Bassam al-Amush, a Jordanian diplomat and former ambassador to Iran, has repeatedly accused Iran of undermining the stability of the Jordanian kingdom since the 1990s. In January 2024, he noted that Iran demonstrates a “strategic determination” to penetrate Jordan through various means, including Shia tourism, economic incentives, and an Iranian declaration of intent to invest in various ventures in exchange for bringing Iranian workers to Jordan. He also highlighted concerns about the smuggling of weapons and drugs from Syria into Jordan, the establishment of terrorist cells within Jordan, and the exploitation of the situation in Gaza.[5] In May 2024, he described Iran as an “octopus” attempting to infiltrate and destabilize Jordan.[6]

One of the burning issues that Jordan has faced since before the events of July 10 and even more so afterward is the fight against smuggling networks for weapons and drugs into Jordanian territory. Terrorist and criminal elements on both sides of the Israeli-Jordanian border exploit the challenges faced by Israeli and Jordanian security forces in securing the border, which stretches over 400 kilometers. This situation has facilitated the smuggling of illegal drugs, primarily the drug Captagon, into Israel and the West Bank.

 In May 2024, King Abdullah of Jordan emphasized the importance of combating “armed groups that violate the law and the sovereignty of the country.” He highlighted the actions of these criminal gangs, particularly in drug and arms smuggling, stating that Jordan has been addressing these issues with determination for years to protect its youth from this external danger.[7] In March 2024, Jordanian security forces thwarted an attempt to smuggle weapons from Iranian-backed militias in Syria to members of a Jordanian terrorist cell of Palestinian origin. This cell was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which maintained close ties with the military wing of Hamas. The group had been recruited by Saleh al-Aaruri, a former Hamas member who was killed by the IDF.[8]

A few months prior, Jordanian security forces successfully thwarted additional attempts to smuggle weapons from Iran and its regional allies. The intercepted arms included Claymore mines, C4 explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and 107 mm Katyusha missiles. According to Jordanian sources, most of these weapons were intended for smuggling into the West Bank, while some were reportedly aimed at being used against the Jordanian royal family.[9] Mustafa  Al-Khiari, spokesman for the Jordanian army, stated that investigations into the smugglers apprehended by Jordanian security forces revealed that they had undergone military training by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He noted that the year 2024 was marked by attempts to smuggle high-quality weapons, including RPG missiles, which were intended to target Jordanian border guard forces and weaken the country’s military capabilities.[10]

A cartoon from the Jordanian daily Roya dealing with the issue of the Jordanian Border Guard’s fight against drug smuggling networks on the Jordanian border[11]

The Israel Police and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have made significant efforts to combat arms smuggling into the West Bank. In 2020, the Israel Police successfully thwarted eight smuggling attempts originating from Jordan, resulting in the seizure of over 130 weapons. This trend continued in 2021, with the police foiling 13 smuggling attempts and confiscating 165 weapons. The following year, 2022, saw a marked increase in activity, as law enforcement agencies disrupted at least 35 smuggling attempts and seized more than 300 weapons.[12] In 2023, the situation remained critical, with 381 weapons confiscated in the Judean sector, of which 153 were identified as having been smuggled across the Jordanian border. Furthermore, in the first half of 2024, Israeli security forces thwarted 16 additional smuggling attempts, resulting in the seizure of 200 weapons. These statistics underscore the ongoing challenges faced by Israeli authorities in their efforts to maintain security in the region.[13]

In April 2024, an article published by the New York Times asserted that illegal arms smuggling into the West Bank occurs primarily via two significant routes. The first route involves the smuggling of weapons across the Jordanian border, facilitated by pro-Iranian militias operating in Syria. These militias transport weapons into Jordan, where they are subsequently handed over to Bedouin intermediaries who smuggle them into Israel. Upon arrival in Israel, the weapons are reportedly transferred to Arab Israeli crime organizations, which are responsible for further transporting them into the West Bank.[14] A notable case occurred in December 2023, when the Israel Police and the IDF apprehended a group of four Israeli smugglers, identified as Israeli Arab residents in the Yeruham area, while they were attempting to smuggle 137 weapons and 250 cartridges across the Jordanian border, with a total estimated value of NIS 6 million.[15] The second route for arms smuggling operates through the Lebanese border, where the Lebanese militia Hezbollah is primarily implicated in facilitating the transfer of arms to Israeli Arabs at the Lebanon-Israel border, who then transport these weapons into the West Bank.[16]

The prices of the illegal drug market smuggled from Jordan to Israel and the West Bank according to the data of the Israel Police for 2022[17]

Efforts to execute terrorist attacks originating from the West Bank 

The influx of funding, weapons, and drugs smuggled into the West Bank by terrorist organizations significantly enhances the motivation of operatives to execute attacks within Israeli territory. For instance, in June 2024, the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) uncovered a terrorist cell originating from Nablus that was planning a suicide attack on Israeli soil, orchestrated under the direction of Hamas based in Turkey.[18] Subsequently, on August 18, 2024, a serious terrorist attack targeting a synagogue in southern Tel Aviv was averted due to the failure of a substantial explosive device carried by a suicide bomber who had travelled from Nablus to Tel Aviv.[19] This thwarted attack is believed to have prompted the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to initiate a military operation aimed at disrupting terrorist activities within the West Bank.

The terrorist cell that planned to carry out an attack on Israeli territory and was exposed in the West Bank by the Shin Bet in June 2024.

The Jordanian Public and the Swords of Iron War

The ongoing military campaign in Gaza has contributed to a significant increase in anti-Israeli sentiment among the Jordanian population. This trend is manifested through various channels, including the proliferation of anti-Israel opinion articles in the Jordanian press. Additionally, there has been a notable rise in conspiracy theories alleging Israel’s intentions to expel the Palestinian population from the West Bank and to extend its territorial claims towards the East Bank of Jordan. Public opinion polls indicate growing support for the events surrounding the 7/11 massacre, while pro-Palestinian demonstrations are characterized by a pronounced opposition to peace agreements with Israel. Furthermore, these demonstrations have included calls for the Jordanian monarchy to revoke the existing agreement that facilitates the flow of water from Israel to Jordan, among other expressions of dissent. For example, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Advocate Muhammad Ahmed Al-Majli, called on Jordan to arm the armed Palestinian factions in the West Bank:

“The establishment of a competent Palestinian military resistance in the West Bank constitutes a critical national interest for Palestinians and aligns with Jordan’s strategic interests. This necessity arises from the evident shortcomings of various approaches to conflict resolution and the prevailing illusions surrounding the possibility of attaining a comprehensive and mutually acceptable peace that would facilitate the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Consequently, it is imperative for Jordan to cultivate a robust relationship with Palestinian resistance factions, extending both political and military support, whether overtly or covertly. Furthermore, Jordan must facilitate the acquisition of diverse weaponry for these factions within the West Bank. Such measures are essential, as these groups represent the primary line of defense for Jordan against the expansive ambitions associated with Zionism.”.[20]

In June 2024, Jordanian security forces detained Muslim Brotherhood member al-Majali for a security investigation after he wrote on his Facebook account that the strategic purpose of the presence of US military forces on Jordanian soil was to protect the Israeli occupation forces. Al-Majali was fined and he was forbidden to leave the territory of the Jordanian kingdom[21]

A post published by Muslim Brotherhood supporter Muhammad al-Majali about the financial fine he received from the Jordanian regime for criticizing the presence of an American military base on Jordanian soil (the post has been deleted from al-Majali’s Facebook page).

On September 8, 2024, an escalation in violence was marked by the fatal shooting of three Israelis, perpetrated by a Jordanian individual identified as Maher Diab al-Jazi, a member of the al-Huwaitat tribe, at the Allenby crossing. This act elicited a notable degree of sympathy and approval among certain segments of the Jordanian population. For instance, Muhammad Ahmed al-Majli, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, composed poetry in commemoration of the assailant.[22] In response to this incident, Hamas issued a call for Jordanians to emulate al-Majazi and to engage in further attacks against Israeli citizens.[23]

The al-Huwaitat tribe, traditionally seen as loyal to the Jordanian monarchy, publicly expressed its support for the attack, reaffirming its solidarity with the Palestinian cause.[24] This declaration of support appears to challenge the prevailing policies of the Jordanian regime concerning Israel, indicating that even factions within the monarchy’s loyalist base are dissatisfied with the current approach of containment regarding Israel’s activities in the West Bank and Gaza. This situation underscores the urgency for reevaluation and potential alteration of existing policies.

A proclamation by the Gaza al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas, praising the terrorist attack by the Jordanian terrorist at the Allenby crossing in September 2024

An additional manifestation of the rising anti-Israeli sentiment prevalent among the Jordanian populace is evidenced by the electoral success of the Islamic Action Front party, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and maintains associations with the Hamas movement. In the parliamentary elections held on September 11, 2024, the party secured 32 seats, garnering approximately half a million votes, which accounts for roughly one-fifth of the total seats in the lower house. In the wake of this victory, the party leadership publicly dedicated their achievement to the Jordanian murderer.

The party leader, Murad Adailah, subsequently articulated that the Islamic Action Front aims to confront four significant challenges following their electoral success: 

The economic challenge, particularly in addressing the rising unemployment rates among the youth demographic;

  1. The promotion of individual freedoms;
  2. The preservation of the Islamic identity within Jordanian society;
  3. The provision of support for Palestinian opposition to Israel as a means to safeguard Jordan and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

He emphasized that his party was dedicated to aiding the Palestinian struggle, framing this as a critical issue that necessitates the protection of Jordan from perceived attempts by Benjamin Netanyahu to undermine the nation’s stability. He further asserted that such attempts could escalate should Donald Trump be re-elected as President of the United States.[25]

Summary

The Iron Swords campaign has significantly heightened anti-Israeli sentiment within Jordanian society, which predominantly expresses sympathy for Hamas. This emerging trend aligns with the interests of Iran, which appears poised to exploit this sentiment to incite the Jordanian populace against the royal family and destabilize the regime. Evidence of this trend is manifested in the recent terrorist attack at the Allenby crossing, as well as in the collaboration between pro-Iranian Shia militias and affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan engaged in the smuggling of drugs and weapons. Furthermore, this trend is underscored by the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the recent parliamentary elections. 

Nevertheless, the Jordanian regime appears to be attempting to navigate the tension between prevailing public opinion that is hostile to Israel and the imperative of safeguarding its national interests, which include maintaining strong relations with the United States and upholding the peace agreement with Israel. In light of these dynamics, it is imperative for Western allies, particularly the United States and Israel, to enhance security and intelligence cooperation with Jordan to effectively counter such threats emanating from the Iranian-led resistance axis.


[1] See: Michael Barak, “Key Trends: The Escalating Security Situation in the West Bank”, ICT, July 21, 2024. https://ict.org.il/the-escalating-security-situation-in-the-west-bank/ ; Ali Khamenai (in Arabic), October 5, 2023.  https://arabic.khamenei.ir/news/7886

[2] Ali Khamenai (in Arabic), October 3, 2023. https://arabic.khamenei.ir/news/7573

[3] Musa Sadr (in Arabic), Twitter, January 3, 2024. https://x.com/Mu_AlSadr/status/1720357529505456247

[4] “Jordan drone strike: who are Islamic Resistance in Iraq and what is Tower 22?”, The Guardian, January 29, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/jordan-drone-strike-who-are-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-and-what-is-tower-22

[5] Bassam al-‘Amush, “Jordan and Israel” (in Arabic), Amon, January 13, 2023. https://www.ammonnews.net/article/823850

[6] “Is Iran penetrating the fifth Arab capital and hitting Jordan?” (in Arabic), Syria TV, May 17, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bM9YOxSUKc

[7] “The speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Arab Summit at the Thirty-third Permanent Session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level in Bahrain” (in Arabic), King Abdullah website, May 16, 2024. https://shorturl.at/EfvoV

[8] “Jordan foils an Iranian plot to arm a Hamas-linked Brotherhood cell” (in Arabic), Al-Arab, May 5, 2024. https://shorturl.at/F33po

[9] “Jordan Thwarts an Arms Smuggling Attempt… and Arrests a Cell of the “Brothers”” (in Arabic), al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 15, 2024.https://shorturl.at/htTah

[10] Najm al-Din Qassem, “The Gaza War and the Trojan Horse Jihad: Iran’s New Tool to Harm the Security and Stability of Jordan” (in Arabic), Akhbar al-Aan, March 30, 2024. https://shorturl.at/uHKsR

[11] Facebook, May 18, 2023. https://shorturl.at/wScGG

[12] “A Rapid Increase in the Volume of the Huge Smuggling that Has been Thwarted this Year so Far: about 300 Illegal Weapons and 2,150 kg of Drugs” (in Hebrew), IDF, August 28, 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yc4rhkmm

[13] Hanan Grivand, “We must not Lose”: the Campaign against Arms Smuggling from Jordan” (in Hebrew), Israel Hayom, June 7, 2024. https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/defense/article/15878554

[14] Arnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Smuggles Arms to West Bank, Officials Say, to Foment Unrest With Israel”, New York Times, April 9, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-west-bank-weapons-smuggling.html

[15] Dean Shmuel Elmes, “6 Million NIS: a Large Arms Smuggling Operation was Caught at the Jordanian Border”, (in Hebrew), Globes, November 23, 2023. https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001463894

[16] Arnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Smuggles Arms to West Bank, Officials Say, to Foment Unrest With Israel”, New York Times, April 9, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-west-bank-weapons-smuggling.html

[17] “Valuation of Contraband” (in Hebrew), Israel Police, 2022.

https://cdn-media.web-view.net/i/ww3xwccasc/________-_______-min_2_1.pdf

[18] “Shin Bet thwarts Turkey-based Hamas cell terror attack in Israel”, The Jerusalem Post. June 3, 2024. https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-804818

[19] For more information about attempts by Palestinians in the West Bank to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli territory, see: Michael Barak, “Key Trends: The Escalating Security Situation in the West Bank”, ICT, July 21, 2024. https://ict.org.il/the-escalating-security-situation-in-the-west-bank

[20] Muhamamd Ahmad al-Majjali, “Arming the West Bank is a Strategic Jordanian Interest” (in Arabic), JO24, December19, 2023. https://jo24.net/article/490699

[21] Muhamamd Ahmad al-Majjali, Facebook (in Arabic),, June 6, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/lawyer.a.almajali/posts/pfbid0Nvdq7oCySNpxWgnTD8CvgbEFS8a1VvL6em9q5MeVbq7113fPh5DsHCV654W1PsxU(the link was erased); Muhamamd Ahmad al-Majjali, Facebook (in Arabic),, June 11, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=386069271127836   

[22] Muhamamd Ahmad al-Majjali, Facebook (in Arabic), September 9, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/lawyer.a.almajali/posts/pfbid0372MWPpfvVZbD4Cw6cKJfYUg8uXZq4qx1AVysSYKqLaq6W55QeaTGqR9i5k32CdC8l

[23] Shehab Agency, Twitter (in Arabic), September 9, 2024. https://x.com/ShehabAgency/status/1833140615694979283

[24] The al-Huwaitat tribe tribe has about a quarter of a million members and lives in the Ma’an district in southern Jordan. For the declaration of support see: Khaberni, Twitter, September 9, 2024. https://x.com/khaberni/status/1833104585486925898

[25] The General Inspector of the Jordan Brothers: We have 4 Priorities and the Elections Proved our Popularity (exclusive)” (in Arabic), Al-Estaklal, May 18, 2024. https://alestiklal.net/ar/article/almraqb-alaam-ljmaah-alikhwan-almslmyn-fy-alardn-mrad-aladhaylh-l-alastqlal

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