Introduction

On December 28, 2025, protests erupted in Iran and rapidly expanded to additional cities and regions across the country. This wave of unrest is marked by heightened intensity and an unusually broad geographic scope. Although the immediate collapse of the regime appears improbable, the protests continue to escalate and gain momentum, and Iran is likely to face substantial challenges in restoring pre-protest conditions. Despite uncertainty regarding the future trajectory, the current developments are already shaping both domestic dynamics and the broader regional environment.

Uniqueness of the current wave of protests

The recent wave of protests is primarily driven by economic factors, particularly the deterioration of living conditions.^[1] These protests have unified sectors that previously refrained from widespread participation, including bazaar traders, whose involvement highlights significant economic and social pressures. Additionally, mobilization by the Iranian diaspora has provided active support and contributed to the international visibility of the protests. Dr. Meir Javedanfar, an expert on Iran and lecturer at Reichman University, notes that the current protests differ from those in 2022 due to broader participation across Iranian society, surpassing the scope of the recent hijab-related demonstrations. The present movement is centered on rising inflation and currency collapse, which affect all segments and regions of the country, including both women and men.

The ongoing protests are marked by intensifying criticism towards the Iranian regime, particularly regarding its legitimacy. This is reflected in reports indicating increasing damage to government symbols as well as attacks on mosques. Criticism also extends to Iran’s foreign policy, especially its financial support for Hezbollah and Hamas amid the current economic crisis. Protest slogans such as “no more Lebanon, no more Gaza” articulate these grievances. In addition, there has been a notable rise in calls from certain protest factions for intervention by Israel and the United States.^[2]

Regime response

The regime appears to be concerned about potential American intervention. Dr. Eitan Azani, Acting Director of the ICT, explains that this has led the Iranian regime to implement a strategy to contain the ongoing violence. First, efforts were made to present the event as a legitimate demonstration, except for a small group of rioters, and to engage with the protesters. Imam Khamenei claimed on January 3 that a protest in itself is legitimate, but that it must be distinguished from riots. According to him, the protest of shopkeepers over the unusual jump in foreign currency rates is a valid and understandable protest. However, he emphasized that, according to the regime, “a number of mercenaries incited by the enemy” are hiding behind the demonstrators and are taking advantage of the protest to chant slogans against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khamenei reiterated that there is room for dialogue with legitimate protesters, and that officials and the establishment should talk to them and listen to their arguments. However, he said, there is no room for dialogue with “rioters,” and called for decisive action against them and “putting them in their place.” ^[3]

Second, the regime aimed to undermine the protest movement by severing communication channels and disrupting internet access.^[4] Despite these efforts, information continues to circulate, including reports of violence by Iranian regime security forces against protesters.^[5] As these reports increase, there are also growing accounts of threats by President Donald Trump to intervene in Iran, in order to support the Iranian people.^[6] In response, on January 9, 2026, Imam Khamenei characterized the U.S. threat as a pretext to attack Iran and seize its resources, stating: “Why is the US so repelled and upset with Iran? Why? The reason is clear. It’s because the wealth of this country and all its financial resources were in the hands of the US. Then the Islamic Republic came along and took these away from them. You can see how they’ve besieged a country in Latin America and taken some actions there. They aren’t even ashamed and explicitly state that this was for oil. For oil! They say they’ve done this for oil!”

The Iranian regime persists in its actions amid allegations that the United States and Israel are influencing these protests to facilitate regime change.^[7] This development occurred against the backdrop of escalating mutual threats in the weeks preceding the protests, as the United States and Israel reportedly considered potential military action against Iran in response to its accelerating long-range missile development and nuclear activities.^[8]

What is the next step? Recent reports indicate an escalation in violence^[9], as the regime plans to deploy the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to suppress protests. Basij forces have already employed live ammunition and conducted widespread arrests, continuing the trend of increasing executions observed over the past year.

Possible developments

Over the past decade, developments in the Middle East have proven difficult to predict, and Iran is no exception. Even if the regime succeeds in withstanding the current wave of protests, its overall stability and the authority of its senior leadership are unlikely to return to pre-protest levels. The erosion of perceived regime stability, combined with the expanding scope of protest participation, points to a significant shift in the relationship between Iranian society and the ruling establishment.

In the less severe scenario, protests continue as the government uses targeted repression, makes some economic concessions, and manages the crisis. However, this approach gradually weakens the regime’s legitimacy and ability to deter future unrest or even solve the economic crisis. Brig. General (Res.) Dr. Amnon Sofrin, ICT Research Fellow and former Head of the Intelligence Directorate in the Mossad, claims that what is happening in the protest in Iran does not indicate a critical mass that can lead to the overthrow of the government, for the main reason that the security forces are still under the rule of the regime. Dr. Sofrin explains that the Iranian citizens don’t have enough power to overthrow the regime because security forces are capable of suppressing the protest by force. The only way is through outside intervention. While President Donald Trump threatens Iran with intervention if it harms its citizens, he didn’t state what kind of intervention it would be.

A more drastic possibility, offered by Dr. Meir Javedanfar, is that Iran’s supreme leader could be replaced to calm public anger. The new leader might make major policy changes toward the West and Israel to help solve the country’s economic problems. The appointment of a new Supreme Leader in response to the ongoing crisis could result in a substantial shift in the country’s direction.

Dr. Doron Itzchakov, an expert on Iran and an ICT Research Fellow, concludes and suggests an outline of six interconnected preconditions that are essential for potential systemic disruption: 1. institutional decline, 2. the emergence of charismatic leadership, 3. increased protest awareness and duration, 4. economic collapse and loss of legitimacy, 5. fragmentation within the elite and security sectors, 6. catalytic events. These factors, although analytically distinct, are mutually reinforcing and shaped by collective perceptions, shifts in identity, and emotional triggers that influence mass mobilization. 

Iran’s theocratic regime faces increased pressure amid widespread protests across the country. This has led to the use of more forceful control measures, resulting in significant loss of life. Compared to earlier protests, this wave is the most intense so far. However, Dr. Itzchakov claims that a crucial structural condition for regime change is still missing: As of now, there are no signs of fracture or elite defection within the coercive forces—such as the military and security agencies—or within the main ruling political circle.

Regional implications and the risk of miscalculation with Israel

The protest movement is expanding under influences operating at both the local and national levels. Although concrete evidence of organized coordination on the ground remains limited, Dr. Eitan Azani argues that the involvement of the Shah’s son—currently in exile in the United States—and his public call for mass mobilization have helped elevate the protests to a nationwide phenomenon. Against this backdrop, the Swords of Iron War and the 12-Day War have weakened Iran’s regional and domestic standing, increasing the regime’s sensitivity to both internal unrest and external pressure.

Broader global developments further shape Tehran’s threat perceptions. The United States–imposed regime change in Venezuela is viewed in Iran as a relevant precedent, reinforcing fears regarding regime continuity. In this context, public statements by Donald Trump are interpreted in Iran as direct threats to the regime’s survival, particularly remarks suggesting possible intervention in response to harm to civilians. Such messaging amplifies Iranian threat perceptions and may heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalatory behavior.

As the Iranian regime weakens, the risk of strategic miscalculation, particularly regarding Israel, increases substantially. Historically, regimes facing internal pressure have attempted to alleviate domestic challenges by provoking external conflicts. Iran’s limited capacity to manage multiple fronts—domestic, regional, and international—further constrains its options and increases pressure on policymakers, potentially resulting in rash decisions. Iran’s primary proxy, Hezbollah, is also affected. Dr. Sofrin observes that unrest in Iran complicates funding for Hezbollah, as Iranian authorities are preoccupied with domestic issues. Additionally, Hezbollah has suffered from the situation in Venezuela, where it previously engaged in drug trafficking activities. These developments have weakened the organization, likely resulting in greater restraint, though not leading to voluntary disarmament.

The response in the Arab world

The Arab media discourse surrounding the popular protests in Iran is characterized by hesitation, politicization, and double standards, reflecting regional tensions between Tehran’s supporters and opponents. As Dr. Anan Whabi, expert on the Arab world and ICT Fellow explains, the Arab media presents a duality. Pro-Iranian voices describe the protests as an “external invention” influenced by the US and Israel, while hostile voices emphasize socio-economic crises and call for the overthrow of the regime. Slogans such as “neither Gaza nor Lebanon” illustrate a link between local distress and Iran’s regional policy.

The discourse reflects Arab concerns about the “Spillover of the protests,” but also exploitation to weaken Iran in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Dr. Whabi continues and explains that Arab solidarity with the protesters is limited, and focuses on human rights aspects without direct confrontation with Tehran. The Arab media discourse surrounding the popular protests in Iran is characterized by hesitation, politicization, and double standards, with clear differences between media outlets identified with the pro-Iranian axis and those opposing it. It is also influenced by official concerns in the Arab world about the “contagious” spread of the protests to the domestic arena, and from regional calculations related to Iran’s role in the region

In the end, media outlets identified with countries or forces allied with Iran tend to adopt the official Iranian narrative, linking the protests to an “external conspiracy” or “security sabotage,” and emphasize Israeli-American intervention as a central factor. In contrast, media outlets close to Iran’s regional rivals present the protests as proof of the failure of the “Islamic Republic model” and use them to criticize Tehran’s policy in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

Conclusion and recommendations

The current protest represents a direct continuation of previous movements and is driven by a multidimensional crisis: structural crises include water and energy shortages, pervasive government corruption, and the collapse of the local currency. Public resistance to foreign policy is evident in widespread outrage over the allocation of one billion dollars to Hezbollah^[10], Palestinian organizations, and other proxy groups, while the local population endures a severe economic crisis.

The current wave of protests in Iran marks a turning point for the regime, even if it does not lead to its collapse in the short term. The joining of key economic players and parts of the elite, alongside deep economic erosion and growing international pressure, create a reality of ongoing instability and damage to the ability to govern. This situation increases the risk of miscalculations in the regional arena, and in particular vis-à-vis Israel, while reducing Iran’s ability to simultaneously manage internal crises and other external fronts with particular prediction in the decrease in funding support for Hezbollah.

Even if that will happen,Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash, Former Head of the Military Intelligence Directorate in the IDF, explains, the ideology of resistance has not been discarded; rather, Iran’s preferred and primary method of advancing its objectives remains the use of force – it continues and will continue to operate against Israel, in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and against Israel and Jewish targets abroad.

Recommendations and emphasis for Israel
In light of the evolving dynamics, Israel should adopt a restrained and forward-looking approach by maintaining a policy of non-intervention and refraining from direct involvement in the protests. At the same time, it should prepare for potential escalation, including the possibility of a direct Iranian response against Israel under the pretext of “igniting the protests.” This approach must be accompanied by sustained intelligence alertness, with close and continuous monitoring of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs alongside developments on the ground.

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^[1] Christou, W. (2025, December 30). Iran to listen to protesters’ ‘legitimate demands’ after widespread dissent. The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/30/iran-protesters-demands-widespread-dissent-currency-living-standards

^[2] Friedson, F. (2026, January 5). Iranian protesters urge Trump, Netanyahu to act as protests escalate nationwide. Jewish Journal. https://jewishjournal.com/news/worldwide/386146/iranian-protesters-urge-trump-netanyahu-to-act-as-protests-escalate-nationwide/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[3] Telegram. Ayatollah Khamenei. https://t.me/Khamenei_en

^[4] Christou, W. (2026, January 8). Iran plunged into internet blackout as protests over economy spread nationwide. The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/08/iran-plunged-into-internet-blackout-as-protests-over-economy-spread-nationwide

^[5] Associated Press. (2026, January 10). Death toll in violence surrounding nationwide protests challenging Iran’s theocracy reaches at least 116, activists say. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/c867cd53c99585cc5e0cd98eafe95d16

^[6] CBS News. (2026, January 10). Iranian protests rage as deaths mount and Trump renews warning of possible U.S. intervention. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-protests-deaths-mount-trump-warning-pahlavi-calls-for-city-takeovers/

^[7]Euronews. (2026, January 9). Demonstrations in Iran: What are the possible scenarios? Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/09/demonstrations-in-iran-what-are-the-possible-scenarios?

^[8] i24news. (2025, December 31). Report: future attack on Iran discussed during Netanyahu–Trump talks. i24news. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/artc-report-future-attack-on-iran-discussed-during-netanyahu-trump-talks

^[9] Associated Press. (2026, January 10). Death toll in violence surrounding nationwide protests challenging Iran’s theocracy reaches at least 116, activists say. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/c867cd53c99585cc5e0cd98eafe95d16

^[10] Times of Israel. (2025, November 9). US official: Iran funneled some $1 billion to Hezbollah this year despite sanctions. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-official-iran-funneled-some-1-billion-to-hezbollah-this-year-despite-sanctions