Since Erdogan’s rise to power in 2002, the Turkish regime and the Muslim Brotherhood movement have cultivated a close relationship, primarily driven by ideological affinity and a shared vision of strengthening the Muslim world under Turkey’s leadership. Both parties view the Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza as strategic opportunities to expand their influence and bolster their political legitimacy across the Muslim world.

The Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood serves as a primary case study in this context. Following the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in 2014 and its escalation a year later, the movement’s leadership found refuge in Istanbul. There, they established a renewed organizational infrastructure that integrates political, humanitarian, and economic activities. These Yemeni exiles are perceived as strategic allies of Erdogan and are vocal supporters of Hamas, leveraging the political and logistical frameworks provided by Turkey.

This study examines the transformation of the Yemeni Islamist movement—from a local political entity affiliated with the Al-Islah party into an international network engaged in fundraising, resource transfer to Hamas, and the promotion of an anti-Israel front. The research is based on an analysis of political and charitable organizations and tracks key figures, such as Hamid al-Ahmar (a Yemeni businessman with ties to Hamas), within the context of Turkey serving as their central hub of operations.

The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood

The scholarly literature is divided regarding the initial establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen. One school of thought suggests that the movement’s roots in the country date back to the 1940s, with the arrival of Al-Fudhayl al-Wartlani, an Algerian member of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is claimed that al-Wartlani traveled to Yemen under instructions from Hassan al-Banna to assist in implementing reforms and strengthening Islamic identity.[1] However, later researchers contest this narrative, emphasizing that it is a false claim propagated for political reasons and as a justification for his execution. According to these scholars, there are no historical documents that substantiate such a connection.[2]

According to the narrative of the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, two main phases can be distinguished in its development in the country:

1.     The first phase (1963–1990):

The movement was founded by a group of young Yemenis led by ‘Abdullah Muhammad al-Makhlafi (1937–1969), who studied in Cairo. The founding phase is dated to the early 1960s and was characterized by clandestine activity, the establishment of an organizational structure, the development of a network of ties across different social strata, and the creation of educational institutions. The covert nature of its activity enabled the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood to avoid direct confrontation with the Yemeni regime and to continue its da‘wa activities.[3]

In the late 1950s, al-Makhlafi traveled to Egypt to complete his studies at Al-Azhar. While in Egypt, he established contacts with senior figures of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazzali and Sayyid Qutb. He also received from the latter a copy of the book Milestones, which Qutb wrote and which significantly influenced subsequent generations of Islamists. Al-Makhlafi circulated the book among students in Yemen.

Between 1959 and 1961, al-Makhlafi secretly founded the Islamic Arab Vanguard Movement together with Sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani and other Islamists, with the aim of strengthening attachment to Islam and consolidating Islamic identity. In 1965, al-Makhlafi was arrested in Cairo on charges of association with the Muslim Brotherhood; he was imprisoned in solitary confinement and expelled to Yemen. In May 1968 he was appointed the General Inspector (Leader) of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, and Sheikh ʿAbd al-Majid al-Zindani was appointed as his deputy. In 1969 he was elected to Yemen’s first parliament, where he served on the Constitution Committee and chaired the Services Committees. In May 1969 al-Makhlafi died in a mysterious car accident. Although he died—or was assassinated—at a young age (33), he had already laid the foundations for the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Yemen.[4] After his death, Sheikh ʿAbd al-Majid al-Zindani was appointed leader of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood.

2.     The second phase (1990 onwards):

1. The establishment of the Yemeni Reform Association – Al-Islah Party (حزب الإصلاح). In September 1990, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen was founded, thanks to the atmosphere of political openness that emerged following the unification of Yemen. This phase was characterized by public activity and active political involvement, including the appointment of representatives to parliament and the government and the formation of broad political alliances.[5] Among its founders, Sheikh ʿAbd al-Majid al-Zindani and Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar stood out; the latter became its first chairman.[6]
2. In 1997, the Al-Islah Party moved into the opposition camp due to its strained relations with the Yemeni regime under Ali Abdullah Salih. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, Al-Islah members joined the wave of protests that swept Yemen against the regime.[7] In 2014, the Houthis launched a broad campaign of territorial expansion in western Yemen, seizing major cities such as Sanaʿa and destroying institutions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In response, and amid fears for their lives, many activists from the Muslim Brotherhood fled Yemen and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.[8]

Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood members in exile in Turkey

The Association of Yemeni Exiles in Turkey estimates that the number of Yemeni exiles in Turkey is approximately 20,000 individuals,[9] including members of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. Upon their arrival in Turkey, the latter focused on reorganizing their institutions and established four new media outlets. Three of these receive Qatari funding: Yemen Shabab,[10] Al-Mahriyah,[11] and Balqis,[12] which operated until November 2025. The fourth outlet, Suhail,[13] is funded by Hamid al-Ahmar, a Yemeni billionaire and a prominent member of the Al-Islah Party.[14]

From Turkey, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood has conducted psychological warfare against the Southern Transitional Council of Yemen and the UAE. It is therefore not coincidental that the latter have called for the closure of these media outlets, claiming that they disseminate false information in an attempt to foment chaos and sow division among the population of southern Yemen.[15] Activists in southern Yemen further allege that the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood cooperates with al-Qaeda with the aim of weakening the power base of southern Yemeni communities.[16]

Logos of the satellite channels of the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey[17]

Abdul Majeed al-Zindani – A Spiritual Leader of the MB in Yemen

Abdul Majid al-Zindani (1942–2024) was a founding member of the Al-Islah party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, established in 1990. During his career, he served as the head of the party’s Shura Council. In 1993, he founded Al-Iman University in Yemen, an institution officially dedicated to Islamic studies. However, in practice, the university also functioned as a recruitment platform for activists supporting Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (widely regarded as the father of global jihad)[18] and Sheikh Osama bin Laden, primarily to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

According to Abdullah al-Zindani, the eldest son of Abdul Majid al-Zindani, Necmettin Erbakan—a pivotal figure in Turkish political Islam and an early political associate of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—was among the university’s founders and served on its Board of Trustees.[19] In 2004, the U.S. government designated Abdul Majid al-Zindani as a supporter of terrorist organizations, alleging that he managed terrorist training camps on Yemeni soil.[20]

Sheikh Abdul Hamid al-Zindani with Sheikh Abdallah Azzam

The Houthi takeover of extensive regions in Yemen and the 2014 raid on Mohammad al-Zindani’s home forced him to flee Yemen for Saudi Arabia.[21] After a five-year stay, he emigrated to Turkey, where he resided until his passing in April 2024. During his time in Istanbul, al-Zindani cultivated strong ties with several Islamist-oriented Turkish politicians. Notable among these was Dr. Fatih Erbakan, son of former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) and a founder of the “New Welfare Party” (Yeniden Refah Partisi). Established in 2018, the party is characterized by its rigid Islamist line.[22]

A meeting held between Abdul Majid al-Zindani & Dr. Fatih Erbakan in Istanbul, December 2021.

Al-Zindani also cultivated close and positive relations with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In May 2023, alongside other Islamic scholars affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, he signed a petition calling on Turkish citizens to re-elect Erdoğan for another term. This endorsement was based on Erdoğan’s military, economic, and healthcare achievements, as well as his accomplishments in international relations. Furthermore, the petition highlighted his defense of Islamic holy sites—most notably Jerusalem—and his role in transforming Turkey into a sanctuary for persecuted and oppressed Muslims.[23]

In July 2023, al-Zindani expressed support for Erdoğan’s vision of constructing a more just world, in which Islam plays a significant role in shaping the New World Order—one no longer dependent on the voting power of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. According to al-Zindani, Turkey, under Erdoğan’s leadership, plays a pivotal role in restoring Islamic power by striving for Muslim unity.[24]

Al-Zindani’s remarks resonate with Erdoğan’s own worldview regarding the necessity of reforming the existing global order, as articulated in his book, A Fairer World is Possible.[25] Furthermore, the Nordic Monitor reported that in February 2014, al-Zindani met with senior officials from the Turkish firm SADAT—which serves as a private military contractor for Turkey in conflict zones—to discuss ways of deepening Turkish influence in Yemen. Tens of thousands of people attended his funeral, including President Erdoğan, who arrived to pay his final respects.[26]

Cover page of a declaration by Islamic jurists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, including Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, calling upon Turkish citizens to elect Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as President of Turkey.

Al-Zindani forged ties with Islamist organizations, such as the Afghan Taliban, as early as during his residency in Yemen.[27] He also maintained relations with leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in exile, such as Wasfi Ashur Abu Zayd,[28] and with the leadership of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.

From right to left: Al-Zindani with Wasfi Ashour; Al-Zindani, accompanied by his son, hosting a Taliban delegation

Al-Zindani and the Palestinian Hamas Movement

Al-Zindani was prominent in his support for the Palestinian cause and the terrorist organization Hamas, providing not only religious legal (shari’a) backing for suicide attacks but also actively fundraising for the group. In 2006, he met with Khaled Mashal in Yemen as part of a fundraising campaign for Hamas.[29] Additionally, he served as a board member of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s “Union of Good” (Coalition of Charity), which was designated by the United States in 2008 as a terror-supporting entity due to its involvement in financing Hamas.[30]

Throughout his exile in Turkey, al-Zindani maintained his engagements with senior Hamas officials, consistently offering explicit and public endorsements of the organization.[31] In March 2022, he exhorted Palestinian factions to unify in defense of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and to persist in their “resistance” against Israel.[32] Notably, he not only justified the October 7 massacre but actively advocated for its escalation.[33]

Furthermore, al-Zindani broke a prolonged silence regarding the friction between the Houthis and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (al-Islah). Against the backdrop of the conflict in Gaza, he called for a domestic reconciliation among all Yemeni political forces to facilitate more effective support for the Palestinian cause. This sentiment was echoed by his son, Mohammad al-Zindani, who promoted a rapprochement with the Houthis despite the Brotherhood’s severe condemnation of Houthi atrocities against Yemen’s Sunni population. He justified this shift by asserting the necessity of a unified front against American backing of “aggression in Gaza.”[34] This drive for alignment culminated in a November 2023 meeting between Houthi and Brotherhood representatives at the Hamas headquarters in Sana’a, an initiative brokered by Hamas representative Ma‘adh Abu Shamala to bridge ideological divides.[35]

While this mediation mirrors Hamas’s efforts to synchronize Hezbollah and the Brotherhood-affiliated al-Jama’a al-Islamiya in Lebanon, Houthi-Brotherhood relations remain fundamentally fraught. Despite seeking a role in a future political settlement through these contacts, the Brotherhood continues to harbor deep-seated resentment over the loss of their strongholds in Sana’a and remains wary of Houthi expansionist ambitions. Consequently, some members residing in Turkey have even sought President Erdoğan’s intervention to counter both the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council (STC).[36]

A meeting held by Hamas representative in Yemen, Muad Abu Shamala (center), at the Hamas headquarters in Sana’a, alongside representatives of the Al-Islah party (Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen) and the Houthi Ansar Allah movement, November 2023

Upon al-Zindani’s death, Hamas issued an official eulogy praising his lifelong commitment to the Palestinian cause and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. A high-ranking Hamas delegation attended his funeral, including Ismail Haniyeh, Khaled Mashal, and Mousa Abu Marzouk. During the event, Mashal noted that two prominent Yemeni figures are remembered as the greatest supporters of the Palestinian issue and the “resistance” against Israel: Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar and Sheikh Abdelmajeed al-Zindani.[37]

From right to left: Al-Zindani with Khaled Mashal and Ismail Haniyeh

A memorial ceremony for Abdul Majid al-Zindani in Istanbul, attended by a Hamas delegation and al-Zindani’s children. From left to right: Abdullah al-Zindani, Ismail Haniyeh, Khaled Mashal, and Mousa Abu Marzook

Two of al-Zindani’s eight children (four sons and four daughters), his eldest son Abdullah and his son Mohammad, also engage in anti-Israel activities on Turkish soil, expressing support for Hamas and the concept of Jihad against Israel.[38] In February 2024, Mohammad al-Zindani emphasized that “Al-Aqsa Flood” (the October 7 massacre) marked a favorable historical turning point, not only for the Palestinian cause but for the future of the region. He argued that, primarily, it halted the trend of normalization between Israel and regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia. Secondly, he claimed that Hamas demonstrated how determination and faith can overcome military superpowers, drawing a parallel to the U.S. defeat by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Furthermore, he voiced support for Houthi maritime attacks against American, British, and Israeli vessels in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, as well as the launching of drones and missiles toward Israel. He asserted that these actions reflect the collective will of the Yemeni people to struggle against Israel and aid the Palestinians.[39]

Mohammed al-Zindani and his father alongside Ismail Haniyeh

Hamid Abdullah al-Ahmar: Profile and Financial Designations

Hamid Abdullah al-Ahmar (b. 1967) is a Yemeni millionaire affiliated with the al-Islah Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has designated him as one of Hamas’s most prominent international financiers. According to official reports, al-Ahmar managed a secret investment portfolio for Hamas, which funded the organization’s operations and the luxury residences of its leaders abroad. His financial support is estimated at approximately half a billion dollars.[40]

He is the son of Abdullah Hussein al-Ahmar (1932–2007), the former Speaker of the Yemeni Parliament, head of the Committee for the Defense of Al-Aqsa, and a co-founder of the al-Islah Party. Hamid al-Ahmar continued his father’s political legacy; in 1993, he was elected to the Yemeni Parliament representing al-Islah and subsequently served on the party’s Shura Council. Following the Houthi occupation of Sana’a in 2014, he fled the country and has since resided in Istanbul, where he manages his extensive business interests. Despite his exile, he remains a senior member of the Yemeni al-Islah Party and holds several other high-ranking positions.

Currently, al-Ahmar manages over 90 businesses across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, some of which reportedly employ Hamas operatives. In November 2022, he resigned as owner and chairman of the Turkish real estate firm Trend Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş (Trend) after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the company for being “owned, controlled, or managed by Hamas.”[41] In October 2024, one year after the October 7 massacre, the U.S. imposed further sanctions on several of al-Ahmar’s companies due to their involvement in funding Hamas.[42]

A notable example of his international holdings is Saba, Trade & Investment s.r.o., a Prague-based firm in which al-Ahmar is the primary owner. The company has failed to file financial reports since its founding in 2014, despite legal requirements. Registered at a residential property in the Kyje district of Prague, the firm is controlled by al-Ahmar’s lawyer, Abd al-Bast Shuja, who holds 5% of the shares, while al-Ahmar retains the remaining 95%. In interviews with Czech media, Shuja claimed the company has been inactive since its inception and that he has not seen al-Ahmar in over a decade. Additionally, al-Ahmar reportedly owns a villa in the Držkov district of Czechia.[43]

In response to these measures, Hamid al-Ahmar condemned the U.S. Treasury’s announcement, emphasizing his continued commitment to the Palestinian cause.[44] The al-Islah Party also denounced the sanctions, suggesting that they might inadvertently bolster al-Ahmar’s political standing. The party stated that the sanctions could “increase public support for him, especially following the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ events,” and might “solidify his status as a symbolic figure of resistance against the occupation, strengthening his position relative to the Houthis, who also claim to defend Palestine.”[45]

Al-Ahmar currently serves as the chairman of two prominent international political organizations focused on the Palestinian issue, which support Hamas’s struggle against Israel:

1.     Chairman of the Executive Board of Al-Quds International Institution (QII)

Al-Quds International Institution was established in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2001. Its stated mission is to bolster Arab and Muslim consciousness regarding the Islamic identity of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, raise public awareness about the situation of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and provide humanitarian aid. In practice, however, the foundation engages in incitement against Israel, supports Hamas, disseminates its ideology, and trains preachers to promote anti-Israel narratives.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022), a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and a prominent supporter of Hamas, was among the founders and served as the head of the first Board of Trustees until his passing in 2022. He was succeeded by Mohammad Salim al-Awa (b. 1942), an Egyptian jurist whose appointment was only publicly announced in December 2025.[46] Alongside al-Qaradawi, three deputies served the institution, including Sheikh Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar, who also headed the foundation’s Yemeni branch.[47] Following his death in 2007, his son, Sadiq bin Abdullah al-Ahmar (1956–2023), inherited his position as head of the Yemeni branch.[48] Hamid al-Ahmar—the son and brother of the aforementioned figures, respectively—has served as the Chairman of the Executive Board of Al-Quds International Institution for many years. On December 8, 2025, he was re-elected to this position.[49]

A photograph of the Al-Ahmar family from 2007. Seated in the front row: Sadiq al-Ahmar, Abdullah al-Ahmar, and Hamid al-Ahmar[50]; Hamid al-Ahmar alongside Muhammad Salim al-Awa at a conference held in Istanbul, December 2025.[51]

In 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury determined that the Hamas leadership manages the activities of the Al-Quds International Institution through its representatives serving on the board of directors and other administrative committees. Notable examples include senior Hamas officials abroad, such as Mousa Abu Marzouk and Osama Hamdan, both of whom have served on the organization’s Board of Trustees. Consequently, in 2012, both the United States and Israel imposed economic sanctions on the institution due to its involvement in financing Hamas.[52] Despite this designation, the organization continues its global operations, maintaining approximately 13 branches in various countries, occasionally operating under different names.[53]

The organization enjoys the support of Turkey, which hosts several of its members on its soil. In October 2021, the organization held a conference in Istanbul regarding Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The event was attended by Hamid al-Ahmar, Sheikh Ikrama Sabri (the former Mufti of Jerusalem), Yasin Aktay (an advisor to President Erdoğan), and Khaled al-Sufyani (a pro-Palestinian Moroccan jurist and the former first Director-General of the Al-Quds International Institution). All speakers emphasized the importance of preserving the Muslim identity of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa against Israel’s alleged “Judaization” efforts. Aktay clarified that Turkey does not settle for rhetoric alone but also takes concrete measures, such as supporting various institutions established to assist the Palestinians.[54]

An invitation to a conference held in Istanbul in October 2021, titled: ‘The Blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque 2020-2021: Will the Conflict Remain a Focal Point of Confrontation?’

In August 2024, the Al-Quds International Institution held a conference in Istanbul regarding the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem. The event was attended by Hamid al-Ahmar, Yassin Hammoud (Director-General of the Al-Quds International Institution), Khaled Mashal (Head of Hamas’s Political Bureau), and Hasan Turan (Head of the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Committee and a member of the Turkish Parliament).During the conference, Khaled Mashal emphasized the commitment to ongoing armed resistance against Israel, calling for the resumption of suicide bombings in the West Bank and financial support for Hamas. For his part, Al-Ahmar justified the October 7 massacre, claiming that Palestinians were left with no choice but to take such action to protect their rights.[55]

A poster issued by the ‘Al-Quds International Foundation’ produced to commemorate the ‘Eye on Al-Aqsa’ conference held in Istanbul, August 2024

On December 6, 2025, the Al-Quds International Institution organized an additional conference in Istanbul titled “The Promise to Jerusalem.” The event hosted approximately 300 guests, including prominent Muslim religious authorities from around the world, such as Mauritania, Qatar, and Russia. In his opening remarks, Hamid al-Ahmar declared his determination to oppose Israel’s alleged efforts to ethnically cleanse Gaza and the West Bank of their Palestinian residents. He further emphasized that any attempts at normalization with the “Zionist entity” must be resisted. Khaled Mashal also participated in the conference via a video link, reiterating the importance of adhering to the armed struggle against.[56]

From right to left: Hamid al-Ahmar at the ‘Promise of Jerusalem’ conference, held in Istanbul in December 2025 by his organization, the ‘Al-Quds International Foundation’; the conference poster featuring the organization’s logo.

2.     Chairman of “Parliamentarians for Al-Quds”

The organization was established in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2015 and comprises approximately 1,500 parliamentarians from around the world, including Western nations. The organization purports to protect Palestinian rights and seeks to establish networks with politicians worldwide to pressure decision-makers and legislators to act in favor of the Palestinian cause and to internationally isolate Israel.[57] Currently, more than eight regional offices operate under the organization: two in Asia, three in Africa, and one each in Europe, Latin America, and Turkic-speaking countries.

According to Hamid al-Ahmar, the organization’s goal was to “unify and coordinate the efforts of parliamentarians, highlighting and directing them toward Palestinian rights, ending the occupation, and establishing a Palestinian state. It was clear to us from the beginning that we should not settle for Arab and Muslim parliamentarians, but rather expand worldwide. […] We have dozens of parliamentarians from Europe, enthusiastic delegations from South America, and broad support from Malaysia—including Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu parliamentarians.” He further stated that the organization’s activities could be characterized as a form of “political jihad” against Israel.[58]

In a press interview in November 2025, Hamid al-Ahmar noted that the organization’s management includes representatives from all Palestinian factions, such as Fatah and Hamas.[59] For example, Salem Abu Musameh, one of the founders of Hamas who was sentenced to prison in Israel in 1991 for his involvement in establishing the movement’s military wing, serves as a board member.[60] NGO Monitor notes that “left-wing parliamentarians” were also involved in the organization’s founding, such as Michele Piras, a former Italian MP and board member who leads the group’s expansion in Europe and was reportedly involved in contacts with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[61] The organization’s Turkish office is headed by Hasan Turan, a member of the Turkish Parliament who also serves as the head of the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Committee and as Hamid al-Ahmar’s deputy in “Parliamentarians for Al-Quds”.[62]

The new Board of Directors of the League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds since April 2024[63]

In April 2024, Hamid al-Ahmar was appointed Chairman of the Istanbul-based global organization, “Parliamentarians for Al-Quds”. Since then, he has invested considerable effort in expanding the network and strengthening ties with politicians worldwide as part of cultivating anti-Israel “soft power.” For instance, in November 2025, he met in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with parliamentary delegations from African nations to discuss ways to support the Palestinians and increase the involvement of African legislators against Israeli activities in Gaza.[64] In South America, he succeeded in establishing a pro-Palestinian lobby within the Colombian Congress.[65]

In Turkey, a close and strong connection is evident with the Turkish regime and other Turkish political parties. On December 4, 2025, Al-Ahmar hosted a delegation from the AKP (Justice and Development Party) at the organization’s offices. The delegation included Turkish MP Fatih Tuna, who serves as the deputy chairman of the AK Party’s Istanbul branch, to discuss methods of supporting the Palestinian cause.[66] On his X account, Tuna noted that “Turkey will continue to be the voice of the Palestinians on every platform and will stand by the Palestinian people as they proudly continue their struggle”.[67]

Hamid al-Ahmar has also successfully cultivated close ties with President Erdoğan. In April 2024, he presented Erdoğan with an honorary gift during a conference in support of Palestinians in Istanbul. The gift reflects the spirit of their cooperation—a key inscribed with the phrase “We shall return” as a symbol of adherence to the Palestinian Right of Return, featuring a Tughra (the official seal of Ottoman Sultans) embedded within the key. This imagery frames Turkey as a leading Islamic power in the struggle to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a Palestinian state.[68] There is also an unconfirmed report suggesting that Hamid al-Ahmar assisted in financing or promoting the interests of Erdoğan and his party.[69]

From right to left: Hamid al-Ahmar presenting an award of appreciation to Fatih Tuna, in his capacity as Vice Chairman of the AK Party’s Istanbul branch; Hamid al-Ahmar presenting Erdoğan with a commemorative picture featuring the ‘Key of Return’ and the Ottoman Sultans’ seal (Tughra).

As previously mentioned, Hamid al-Ahmar is an ardent supporter of Hamas. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, he is considered one of Hamas’s most prominent financiers on Turkish soil. In October 2021, he held a meeting with Ismail Haniyeh, the former head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, along with Abd al-Majid al-Zindani and Abdullah al-Zindani, to discuss methods of supporting the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

Furthermore, Al-Ahmar appears to facilitate ties between the Hamas leadership and the “Association of Yemeni Expatriates in Turkey”, which was established in Istanbul in 2015. For instance, in June 2021, the association held a conference in support of the Palestinians, attended by Hamid al-Ahmar and Maher Salah, a member of Hamas’s Political Bureau. The event focused on the Palestinian struggle against Israel in the context of Operation Guardian of the Walls.[70]

From right to left: A meeting between Hamid al-Ahmar, Ismail Haniyeh, and Abdul Majid al-Zindani in October 2021;[71] A poster issued by the “Yemeni Diaspora in Turkey” association, calling for participation in a conference on the Palestinian issue, featuring Hamid al-Ahmar and Maher Salah, a member of the Hamas Political Bureau.

Al-Aqsa Association in Yemen

Reports in the Arabic media suggest that the Al-Aqsa Association in Yemen (Jam’iyat al-Aqsa fi al-Yaman) operates under the guise of an independent charitable organization raising funds for Palestinians. In practice, however, it is allegedly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen and reportedly manages bank accounts in the country on behalf of Hamid al-Ahmar.[72] Although a direct link has not been legally proven, an examination of the association’s official website reinforces this assessment; the site features columns written by Sheikh Raed Salah, leader of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel (which is identified with the Muslim Brotherhood), and Sheikh Ikrama Sabri, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, who maintains close ties with the movement.[73]

The Al-Aqsa Association was founded in 1991 by Sheikh Muhammad al-Maid, who served as its chairman between 1997 and 2002. The association was established to support the Islamic identity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem, as well as to provide humanitarian aid and charitable assistance to Palestinians in Gaza and in refugee camps across the Palestinian diaspora, particularly in Lebanon and Jordan.[74] According to Ahmed al-Rabahi, the current acting head of the association, the Al-Aqsa Association also operates outside of Yemen, maintaining branches in Gaza, the West Bank, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and various Palestinian refugee camps.[75]

It is noteworthy that in 2008, the Al-Aqsa Association launched a fundraising campaign for the residents of Gaza, successfully reaching its goal of raising approximately $100,000 against the backdrop of the Israeli blockade.[76] In that same year, the association managed to establish the “Al-Yaman al-Saeed” (Happy Yemen) Hospital in Jabalia, Gaza, with an investment of $3.5 million. Additionally, it donated 15 ambulances in 2010 and founded a specialized ophthalmology center. However, since the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in 2014, the association has struggled to operate the hospital, and following the recent conflict in Gaza, the facility has ceased to function.[77] According to the association’s reports, it succeeded in raising approximately $36,576,744 between 2001 and 2013 to support various programs, including charity, development, education, healthcare, agriculture, and assistance for orphans, impoverished families, and “families of martyrs.”

Abdullah Omar al-Hatami, the former head of the Al-Aqsa Association, noted that in 2014, the organization was forced to relocate its headquarters to Seiyun in the Hadhramaut Governorate due to the Yemeni Civil War and the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. According to Al-Hatami, there has been a significant response from Yemeni women who donated gold jewellery to support the Palestinian cause; as of November 2023, the association had raised approximately $600,000 through such efforts.[78]

Ahmed al-Rabahi, the current acting head of the association, stated that the organization raised approximately $4 million in 2023 and estimated that fundraising would reach $6 million by the end of 2025. He further noted that the association raised an additional $4 million specifically for the renovation and reopening of the “Al-Yaman al-Saeed” (Happy Yemen) Hospital in the Jabalia refugee camp following the conflict.[79] In July 2025, the Al-Aqsa Association announced it had allocated $1 million for the rehabilitation of infrastructure in Gaza, including the restoration of water wells and the provision of humanitarian aid.[80]

From right to left: Sheikh Abdullah Omar al-Hatami and Ahmed al-Rabahi

It is noteworthy that an examination of the association’s social media accounts indicates collaborations with various Islamic societies. For example, it cooperates with the Islamic Society (Al-Jam’iya al-Islamiya), which is affiliated with Hamas in Gaza.[81] Under this arrangement, the former is responsible for financing the supply of food and water in the Gaza Strip, while the latter is tasked with their distribution to the residents.[82]

Photographs documenting the cooperation between the Gaza branch of the Yemeni Al-Aqsa Association and the Islamic Society in Jabalia – November 2024.

Additional cooperation exists between the association and the Al-Khair Foundation, an international Muslim aid organization based in the United Kingdom and Turkey. The foundation was registered as a British charity on November 19, 2008; however, there are unproven allegations that the organization is responsible for fundraising on behalf of Hamas.[83] It should be noted that Adham Abu Selmiya, an individual with reported ties to Hamas, is employed by the Al-Khair Foundation as the Director of Marketing and Arab World Relations. Previously, he served as a spokesperson for the Ministry of Health in Gaza under the Hamas administration.[84]

Members of the Yemeni Al-Aqsa Association and the Al-Khair Foundation are pictured sorting financial donations in Israeli Shekels (ILS) intended for the residents of the Gaza Strip.

In conclusion, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood continues to maintain its historical ties with Hamas, even from exile in Turkey. These links are further strengthened by leveraging the political, economic, and logistical infrastructure provided by the Turkish regime under Erdoğan’s leadership. The symbiosis between the interests of Turkey, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas has created an efficient and extensive support network that integrates ostensibly humanitarian activities with the financing and support of a terrorist organization.

The Palestinian issue and the conflict in Gaza serve as a primary catalyst for strengthening these ties, providing all parties involved with opportunities to expand their political influence and legitimacy throughout the Muslim world. The findings of this research contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics between transnational Islamist movements, terrorist organizations, and supporting regimes. Furthermore, they highlight the necessity of a multidimensional approach to countering terror-financing networks. Such an approach must include increased international cooperation among charity regulators, the monitoring of key personnel movements—rather than just financial flows—and the recognition that certain geographical regions serve as hubs for problematic activity. Without a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish dimension, it remains difficult to grasp the full map of international support for Hamas.

Annex: Companies owned by Hamid al-Ahmar

Companies owned by Hamid al-Ahmar designated by the U.S. Treasury [85]	Business Activity Center
Al Ahmar oils supply and distribution الأحمر لتموين والتوزيع الزيوت	Yemen
Al Ahmar Trading Group مجموعة الأحمر التجارة	Yemen
Al Salam Trading and Agencies General Establishment مؤسسة السلام للتجارة والتوكيلات العامة	Yemen
Sama International Media	Sanaa – Yemen
Sabafon International Sal Offshore	Beirut – Lebanon
Sabaturk Dis Ticaret Anomin Sirketi	Istanbul – Turkey
Investrade Portföy Yönetimi A.Ş.	Turkey
Trend Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş (Trend)	Istanbul – Turkey He served as the chairman of the real estate company until his resignation in November 2023.
Vivid Enerji Yatirimlari Anonim Sirketi Established on November 15, 2017	Istanbul – Turkey
Saba, Trade & Investment S.R.O	Czech Republic
Without Designated
Investrade Company A partner company to the Turkish firm Investrade Portföy Yönetimi A.Ş	Bahrain
BSC International Trade and Investment Co An affiliate of the Turkish company Investrade Portföy Yönetimi A.Ş.	Bahrain

---

[1] “Al-Fudhayl al-Wartlani… The Che Guevara of Political Islam” [in Arabic], Al-Jazeera, March 28, 2018. https://tinyurl.com/3tbyvv2n; Farea Al-Muslimi, “In Exile in Turkey, Yemen’s Muslim Brothers Cling to Caliphate Dreams”. New Lines Magazine. May 23, 2024. https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/in-exile-in-turkey-yemens-muslim-brothers-cling-to-caliphate-dreams/

[2] Tawthiq al-Ahdath, “Sheikh al-Fudayl al-Wartalani and the Yemen Issue… What is the Brothers’ Connection to It? His Death Sentence… His Declaration of Innocence” [Arabic], YouTube, 6 August 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHmwjcrzeaw

[3] Balkis Channel, “Documentary Film: The Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Yemen – ʿAbdullah Muhammad al-Makhlafi” [Arabic], YouTube, 6 February 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DeRoCvoezoY   

[4] Ibid.

[5]  Fawzi al-ʿUwaydi, “Islamic Currents in Yemen: The Challenge of Survival in a Turbulent Environment” [Arabic], Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 1 January 2025.

[6] Farea Al-Muslimi, “In Exile in Turkey, Yemen’s Muslim Brothers Cling to Caliphate Dreams”. New Lines Magazine. May 23, 2024. https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/in-exile-in-turkey-yemens-muslim-brothers-cling-to-caliphate-dreams/

[7] Al-Yaman Podcast, “From the Muslim Brotherhood to Al-Islah: The Islamic Movement in Yemen” [Arabic], YouTube, 22 July 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpRvIrTJll4

[8] Marie-Christine Heinze, “Reversals of Fortune: The Islah Party in Post-Salih Yemen”, in Marie-Christine Heinze (ed.), Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after, London: I.B. Tauris, 2018, p.184-203.

[9] The Yemeni Diaspora in Turkey [Arabic], https://www.turyed.org/about

[10] @TVyemenshabab, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/@TVyemenshabab/videos

[11] @AlmahriahTV, YouTube,  https://www.youtube.com/@AlmahriahTV

[12] On 25 November 2025, the Balqis channel announced the cessation of its broadcasting activities in Turkey after ten years of covering the Yemeni arena, citing unspecified difficult circumstances. Yemeni sources report that the decision was linked to financial difficulties and political pressure on the Turkish government in light of regional geopolitical shifts. “End of Broadcast: Belqees TV Ceases Operations”, YemenOnline, November 29, 2025. https://www.yemenonline.info/special-reports/10922;

[13] @SuhailChannel1, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/@SuhailChannel1/videos

[14] Abdullah Qaid, “Yemen Funding Journalism” (eds. Theodore Southgate & Marius Dragomir), Media and Journalism Research Center, August 2024. https://journalismresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Yemen-Funding-Journalism-1.pdf

[15] “The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood’s channels are collapsing… A call to boycott the media of lies and rumors” [in Arabic], Al-Mashhad Al-Arabi, October 20, 2025. https://almashhadalaraby.com/news/533753

[16] “Report: Houthi–Muslim Brotherhood coordination with Al-Qaeda to weaken the Southern forces… A network of roles extending from Al-Mahra to Bab al-Mandab” [in Arabic], Hadhramaut, October 21, 2025. https://h21.news/506272/21/10/2025/

[17] @sadamplpheth, X, October 20, 2025. https://x.com/sadamplpheth/status/1980315028533244211

[18] For a more detailed account of Sheikh Abdallah Azzam, refer to: Thomas Hegghammer, The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad, Cambridge University Press, 2020.

[19] @daawahtv1, “Special Discussion, Part 8: Dr. Abdul Majid al-Zindani” [in Arabic], YouTube, May 11, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5LzlVj_goA4

[20] “United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 24, 2004. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js1190 

[21] Al-Zindani described his escape as a miracle, claiming to have passed through 31 Houthi checkpoints before reaching a government outpost near Marib. Tawfeek Al-Ganad, “Abdelmajeed al-Zindani: The Demise of Political Islam’s Leading Figure in Yemen”, Sanaa Center, July 15, 2024.

[22] @rprefahpartisi, Instagram, Yeniden Refah Partisi, December 2, 2021. https://www.instagram.com/p/CW_IZZDoeru/ ; @DoganBekin, X, December 2, 2021. https://x.com/DoganBekin/status/1466483881327144964

[23] Islamic Scholars Call for the Election of Erdoğan” [Arabic], Muntada al-Ulama, May 9, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/52m2n625

[24] @ASSAMDER, “Prof. Dr. Abdulmecid Zindani” [Turkish], YouTube, January 29, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNz816NC0QI

[25] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, A Fairer World is Possible, Turkuvaz Kitap, 2021.

[26] Ahmed Jawda, “With Erdoğan’s Participation: Thousands Attend the Funerals of al-Zindani and the Sheikh of the Ismailaga Community” [Arabic], Al-Jazeera, April 23, 2024.

[27] “Al-Zindani’s Meeting with an Official Taliban Delegation Sparks Yemeni Uproar” [Arabic], Erem, October 22, 2022. https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/vu9n5rqz3n

[28] Wasfi Ashur, “Abdelmajeed al-Zindani: A Life of Knowledge, Action, and Jihad,” International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), April 26, 2024. https://www.iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=35026 

[29] Yaakov Kaatz, “Mashaal meets with al-Qaida leader”, The Jerusalem Post, April 14, 2006. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/mashaal-meets-with-al-qaida-leader/article-18996 ; “Abd Al-Majid Al-Zindani”, The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch. https://www.globalmbwatch.com/abd-al-majid-al-zindani/ 

[30] “Treasury Designates the Union of Good”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 12, 2008. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1267 

[31] “Al-Zindani Meets with Hamas Leadership,” [Arabic], Palestine Information Center (Palinfo), July 16, 2023. https://palinfo.com/news/2023/07/16/843790/

[32] @ilkhanewsarabic, “Abdelmajeed al-Zindani: Sacrifice all that is precious for the defense of Al-Aqsa!” [Arabic], YouTube, March 3, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3T7wUqQKJA

[33] @AlmahriahTV, “Speech by Sheikh Abdelmajeed al-Zindani regarding Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” [Arabic], YouTube, October 9, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zge2zlzP2jI

[34] @arabicpost, “Why is Yemen among the greatest supporters of Gaza? Dr. Mohammad bin Abdelmajeed al-Zindani on the Arabic Post Podcast” [Arabic], YouTube, February 21, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w2mBqPTFx0; @moohhha, X, January 18, 2024. https://twitter.com/moohhha/status/1747977645852119437

[35] “A joint visit to the Hamas office in Sana’a reveals the friendly ties between the Houthis and al-Islah” [Arabic], Sahafah 24, November 23, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/yueetkj4.

[36] Ali  Bakir and Corrado  Cok, “The US needs to put its weight behind ending the Qatar crisis”, TRT World, November 2, 2020. https://www.trtworld.com/article/13115265

[37]  “Led by Haniyeh and Mashal: A Senior Hamas Delegation Offers Condolences on the Passing of Sheikh al-Zindani” [Arabic], Yemen Shabab, April 24, 2024. https://www.yemen-shabab.com/news/92875; @AAlshajea, X, April 24, 2024. https://x.com/AAlshajea/status/1782880629215953196

[38] @AlmahriahTV, “Sheikh Abdelmajeed al-Zindani’s Stance Regarding the Struggle of the Hamas Movement in Palestine” [Arabic], YouTube, May 18, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qS0vCP3LhLg

[39]  @ArabicPost, “Why is Yemen Considered the Greatest Supporter of Gaza? Dr. Mohammad bin Abdelmajeed al-Zindani on the Arabic Post Podcast” [Arabic], YouTube, February 21, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w2mBqPTFx0

[40] “Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network”, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), October 7, 2024. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632

[41] “Counter Terrorism Designations”, U.S. Department of the Treasury: Office of Foreign Assets Control, May 24, 2022. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20220524; Abdullah Bozkurt, “Hamas front company in Turkey continues its operations despite US sanction”, The Nordic, February 22, 2023. https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/02/hamas-front-company-in-turkey-continues-its-operations-despite-us-sanction/; Official website of Trend GYO: www.trendgyo.com.tr

[42] “Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network”, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), October 7, 2024. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632

[43] Thomas Smith, “US-sanctioned Hamas backer owns company and home in Czechia”, Expats, May 22, 2025. https://www.expats.cz/czech-news/article/uncovered-us-sanctioned-hamas-backer-owns-company-and-home-in-czechia; “Hamas Financier Owns Company and Villa in Czech Republic”, Prague Morning, May 22, 2025. https://praguemorning.cz/hamas-financier-czech-firm-villa/

[44] “Statement by Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar in Response to American Sanctions” [Arabic], Hameed al-Ahmar Official Website, October 9, 2024. https://hameedalahmer.net/Details/337870

[45] “Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar: A History of National Struggle and Support for the Palestinian Cause” [Arabic], al-Islah Net, October 12, 2024. https://alislah-ye.com/news_details.php?sid=11567    

[46] “Al-Quds International Institution Elects Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar as Chairman of its Board of Directors” [Arabic], Mareb Press, December 9, 2025. https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=215367

[47] “Al-Quds International Institution” [Arabic], Al-Maarefa.  https://tinyurl.com/yznxyxpe

[48]  Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar Elected President of the Yemen Branch of Al-Quds International Institution” [Arabic], The Official Site of Sheikh Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar, February 25, 2008. https://tinyurl.com/453u895r

[49] “Al-Quds International Institution Elects Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar as Chairman of its Board of Directors” [Arabic], Mareb Press, December 9, 2025. https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=215367

[50] https://www.alahmar.net/

[51] Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar Re-elected as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Al-Quds International Institution for a New Term” [Arabic], Hameed al-Ahmer Official Website, December 8, 2025. https://hameedalahmer.net/Details/378065

[52] Declaration of Organizations as Terrorist Entities under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948″ [Hebrew], Office of the Prime Minister, December 2, 2012. https://www.gov.il/he/pages/2012_des5253; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Two Hamas-Controlled Charities”, October 4, 2012. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1725

[53] Ohad Merlin, “Via Front Companies and Major Banks: This is How South Africa is Involved in Financing Hamas” [Hebrew], Maariv, January 24, 2024. https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/article-1070799

[54] @HameedAlAhmar, Facebook, October 28, 2021. https://tinyurl.com/4kmp9bhw

[55] @abu.judi.1441, Facebook, August 25, 2025. https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=978807983998779

[56] @HameedAlAhmar, Facebook, December 26, 2025.

https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1394282148725708&set=a.265596601594274

[57] “The Vision” (in Arabic), Parliamentarians for al-Quds and Palestine, https://lp4q.org/ar/post/14

[58] Arabic Post, “The War on Palestine Has Not Ended.. The Role Now [Lies] with the Peoples of the World” [Arabic], YouTube, November 1, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnmTXnHaxQ4

[59]  Ibid.

[60] “Sayyid Abu Masamih”[Arabic], Vision for Political and Development, November 2, 2023. https://vision-pd.org/سيد-أبو-مسامح/

[61] Ailin Vilches Arguello, “Hamas-Linked Lobbying Network Expands Political Influence in Europe, New Report Shows”, The Algemeiner, February 11, 2025. https://www.algemeiner.com/2025/02/11/hamas-linked-lobbying-network-expands-political-influence-europe-new-report-shows/

[62] Arabic Post, “The War on Palestine Has Not Ended.. The Role Now [Lies] with the Peoples of the World” [Arabic], YouTube, November 1, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnmTXnHaxQ4

[63] @HameedAlAhmar, Facebook, April 30, 2024.

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=981669513320309

[64] “The League holds a series of meetings with parliamentary delegations during its participation in the activities of the African Parliamentary Union conference”, Parliamentarians for al-Quds and Palestine, November 22, 2025. https://lp4q.org/en/post/9135

[65] “The Colombian Congress approves the formation of a parliamentary friendship committee with the State of Palestine.”, Parliamentarians for al-Quds and Palestine, September 17, 2025, https://lp4q.org/en/post/8921

[66] “Solidarity Visit to the Jerusalem and Palestine Platform” [Turkish], AKP Istanbul, December 4, 2025, https://akpartiistanbul.com/haberler/haber-detay/kudus-ve-filistin-platformuna-dayanisma-ziyareti; “Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar, Chairman of the League, Receives a Delegation from the Human Rights Committee of the Justice and Development Party…” [Arabic], Hamid al-Ahmar, December 5, 2025, https://hameedalahmer.net/Details/378059.

[67] @drfatihtuna, X, December 6, 2025, https://x.com/drfatihtuna/status/1997340484927148123/photo/1

[68] @HameedAlAhmar, Facebook, April 26, 2024, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=979217230232204.

[69] “Hamid Abdullah Al-Ahmar: Erdoğan’s errand boy in the Arab world”, Nordic Monitor, February 6, 2019, https://nordicmonitor.com/2019/02/hamid-abdullah-al-ahmar-erdogans-errand-boy-in-the-arab-world/

[70] Yemeni Expatriates in Turkey, “Palestine is Our Primary Cause” [Arabic], YouTube, June 6, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EqVJxTQB1s8; @turyedtr, Facebook, June 5, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/turyedtr/photos/pb.100064587406323.-2207520000/2006617539476822.

[71] @alrahbi5, X, October 1, 2021. https://x.com/alrahbi5/status/1443866710373814293

[72] “Al-Aqsa [Association] Funds Brotherhood Activities in Yemen” [Arabic], Al-Youm Al-Thamen, May 20, 2018, https://alyoum8.net/posts/21484

[73] https://www.aqsaorg.com/

[74] “Head of Al-Aqsa Association to Al Jazeera: The People of Yemen are Supporting Gaza and Calling for its Rescue” [Arabic], Al-Jazeera, August 17, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/wc887zxk

[75] “Al-Aqsa Association: A Yemeni Organization that Provided Gaza with What Nations Failed to Do (Dialogue), [Arabic]” Al-Anbaa, August 2025, https://alanbaonline.com/?p=87142

[76] “Extensive Celebration in Yemen in Support of Besieged Gaza and the Launch of a Fundraising Campaign to Support the Steadfastness of its Residents” [Arabic], The Palestinian Information Center, January 26, 2008, https://palinfo.com/news/2008/01/26/188712/.

[77]  Jaber Saber, “Head of the Al-Aqsa Association in Yemen: The Yemen War Affected Popular Support for the Association, and the Gaza War Restored Momentum Despite Harsh Economic Conditions” [Arabic], Yemen Shabab, November 25, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/5emfz3x2.

[78]  Ibid.

[79]  Ibid.

[80]  @AqsaOrganizationye, Facebook, July 6, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122206946234052299&set=a.122116210388052299.

[81] Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a founder of Hamas, established Al-Jam’iya al-Islamiya as a charitable association in 1976. See: “The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)” [Arabic], Institute for Palestine Studies, December 6, 2018, https://www.palestine-studies.org/ar/node/236024.

[82] @Marib_aqsaa, X, December 15, 2024, https://x.com/Marib_aqsaa/status/1868266944958185975.

[83] Matthew Levitt, “Combating the Networks of Illicit Finance and Terrorism,” The Washington Institute, p. 8, October 26, 2023, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/levitt_testimony_10-26-231.pdf.

[84] “Adham Abu Selmiya” [Arabic], Vision Center for Political and Development, August 15, 2023, https://vision-pd.org/أدهم-أبو-سلمية/; Lena Gaber, “Aid Workers or Terrorists? The Truth Behind the ‘British Charity’,” Honest Reporting, March 18, 2025, https://honestreporting.com/aid-workers-or-terrorists-the-truth-behind-the-british-charity/.

[85] Abdullah Bozkurt, “Top Muslim Brotherhood operative intensifies lobbying campaign in Turkey for Hamas”, The Nordic Monitor, November 12, 2023. https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/11/top-muslim-brotherhood-operative-intensified-lobbying-campaign-in-turkey-for-hamas/