The countries of Senegal, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea are all part of the huge Sahel area, which stretches 5,600 kilometres from Guinea (Conakry) on the west coast to Sudan on the east coast.

This region, home to nearly 35 million people, has been marginalized on the geopolitical radar for years and is now a highly worrying arena for the escalation of violence by criminal organizations, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and radical Islamic groups seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate, threatening not only the Sahel countries and their neighboring countries, i.e. those that physically border the Sahel countries, but also Western countries in the form of continued illegal immigration and encouragement of terrorist attacks by ‘sleeper cells’ and other actors.

Radical Islamic terrorist organizations such as: AQIM – ‘Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb’ or JNIM ‘Group in Support of Islam and Muslims’ (Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin) affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and ISGS Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) the regional branch of ISIS that became ISSP (Islamic State – Sahel Province), have established deep roots in the Sahel, exploiting inherent internal weaknesses of the state, communal tensions and inter-tribal rivalry and a sense of abandonment of the local population and are, over time, expanding their sphere of control and their grip on the territory. ^[1]

Since 2022, we have witnessed an even more worrying dynamic of expansion and fragmentation: terrorist groups are strengthening their presence in Mali, Burkina Faso (controlling half of the country)^[2], and Niger, while gradually expanding their influence to the Gulf of Guinea countries such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. These organizations are no longer content with carrying out one-off attacks: they establish themselves in territories, impose their laws based on strict Sharia (Islamic law), compete with countries, and sometimes offer a kind of order and organization (including legal ones), physical security and economic (employment), and include war economies based on smuggling (drugs, human weapons, wildlife trafficking, illegal ivory trade, etc.), extortion or exploitation of natural resources. ^[3]

This gradual deterioration towards chronic insecurity calls into question regional and international stabilization efforts, the deterioration weakens the dynamics of development, and exacerbates an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the form of refugees, hunger, and disease.

In a context in which external forces from the West, such as those of France during Operation Barkhane or the UN forces (MINUSMA-United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), or an elite European force, under French command Takuba, have been withdrawn, the fight against the spread of radical Islamic organizations and terrorism in the Sahel has entered a new phase, characterized by greater uncertainty and a rapid reshaping of regional balances.

The entry of Russian mercenary forces from the Wagner PMC company and later the Africa Corps and a military force from Turkey (SADAT) into the void created by the withdrawal of Western forces has suddenly changed the geopolitical balance.^[4] Unfortunately, these new forces have not changed the trend of the spread of Islamic terrorism, nor have they reduced the level of violence in the Sahel countries; they are incapable of doing so. Together with the local troops, these forces are excellent at plundering and committing war crimes against the local populace. ^[5]

Given this new and explosive scenario, it is imperative to examine the causes of the emergence of armed groups and movements in the Sahel, the shortcomings of security measures, and workable alternatives that must be taken into account in order to prevent the spread of terrorism in this vital area.

The Socio-Political and Economic Roots of the Rise of Terrorism

The reasons that explain the rise of armed groups in the Sahel are diverse and deeply rooted in the history and socio-economic structure of the region. The factors that I will mention below are particularly crucial in this dynamic:

1. Economic inequality and social exclusion – Sahelian societies are characterized by deep economic inequality, with a large majority of the population living in abject poverty. These economic disparities, combined with high unemployment, especially among young people, create fertile ground for radicalization. In this region, where public infrastructure is often inadequate and health and education systems are deficient to the point of non-existent, many populations are marginalized and find themselves in situations of extreme instability that also create feelings of alienation towards the central government and its representatives. This social exclusion forces young people, who frequently have no hope for the future, to turn to radical ideologies in search of safety and purpose. These ideologies promise a more just world, a moral order enforced by Islamic law, and financial support.
2. Ethnic rivalries and intercommunal tensions – The Sahel is also characterized by complex ethnic rivalries and intercommunal tensions that exacerbate social divisions. These rivalries are often linked to the management of natural resources, especially in contexts where access to water and agricultural land is critical to the survival of communities, all of which fall under the heading of ‘pastoralism’.^[6] For example, conflicts between herder Fulani^[7] and Dogon farmers in Mali, or between the Mussi and Fulani in Burkina Faso, have created a climate of violence and distrust that terrorist groups have exploited to expand their influence and areas of interest.^[8] Radical Islamic groups have often acted as mediators or defenders in local conflicts, presenting themselves as forces of stability and justice in the face of state powerlessness.
3. The dominance of Islam in the Sahel region does not necessarily mean the absence of internal conflicts within the Muslim community. The activism of violent radical groups and the rise of Salafi reformist movements, who claim to adhere to a strict form of Islam, as opposed to the traditionally dominant Sufi Islam, are proof of this. ^[9]
4. Chronic difficulty for governments in maintaining security – One of the most important factors in the rise of armed groups in the Sahel lies in the ongoing difficulty of states to respond to the needs of their citizens and maintain security in areas far from the centers of power (the Sahel regions). Fragile states such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have experienced an erosion of their legitimacy due to the lack of public services, corruption, and an insufficient capacity to provide adequate protection for their populations – the issue of accountability is nonexistent. As a result, these governments are increasingly perceived as lacking in governance, which paves the way for violent alternatives offered by terrorist groups that exploit the vacuum to rule according to their own perception.
5. Strategies of armed groups and alternative governance – Radical Islamic terrorist groups such as AQIM, JNIM, and ISSP have implemented alternative governance strategies that have attracted a portion of the local population. These groups have often established themselves in areas where the state is absent or has a weak presence, such as in northern Mali or in the border areas between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In addition to providing physical defense, the terrorist organizations promote local justice based on Sharia law, which is regarded as corrupt and ineffectual, as a more efficient and equitable option than state rule. Local populations, disillusioned with the state, are often inclined to accept these new forms of governance, even if they are imposed through coercion and violence. Terrorist groups also play on ideological slogans that appeal to young people seeking meaning and recognition. They promote religious discourses that promote a return to authenticity and a struggle against Western imperialism. This narrative resonates with those who feel marginalized and abandoned by those in power and by the international community.
6. Arms proliferation – Another important dimension of the rise of armed groups in the Sahel is the proliferation of small arms in the region. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, the region has been flooded with a huge influx of weapons that have made it easier for terrorist groups to arm themselves. ^[10] The porous and permeable borders between Sahel countries, especially in areas such as Liptako-Gourma, allow the free movement of fighters, weapons, and funding. This transnationality of terrorist groups makes efforts to secure borders particularly complex and ineffective. ^[11]
7. Geopolitics of instability – The geopolitics of the region, characterized by interstate conflicts and a lack of effective regional cooperation, also fuels instability. For example, differences between international powers on how to address the problem of terrorism in the Sahel, as well as competition for the exploitation and extraction of natural resources, contribute to keeping the region vulnerable. Furthermore, the ongoing instability of neighboring countries such as Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan continues to provide fertile ground for these groups to thrive.
8. Control of natural resources – billions of dollars are lost in Africa due to illegal mining, according to the report “Lessons Learned from the Regional Experience of West Africa in the Gold Sector” of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), published in February 2024. ^[12] Currently, countries are struggling to effectively combat illegal gold mining. This is a problem that West Africa is facing severely, with armed criminal groups taking over these farms to fuel their activities in the region. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF), the volume of gold smuggling in recent years is estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars lost to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The forum adds that illegal gold mining feeds the coffers of extremist groups active in West Africa. ^[13] The porous nature of West Africa’s borders increases the illicit exploitation and circulation of gold in countries where these armed groups are active. For example, gold illegally mined in Burkina Faso can easily reach Mali, Togo, or elsewhere without going through official channels. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), not only is the illicit exploitation of minerals such as gold, silver, and diamonds an important source of income for armed groups, but this trade also benefits other more or less organized gangs that compete for control of lucrative mining areas or smuggling routes. ^[14] This criminal exploitation deprives Africa, where 500 million of its 1.3 billion people live in extreme poverty, of an important source of income and constitutes a dispossession for millions of people who depend on these natural resources for their livelihoods. This illegally mined gold generates huge profits for traffickers when it is sold on the regular market. This income is added to that already obtained through extortion or illegal taxation of populations and allows them to purchase weapons that perpetuate their control in conflict zones.
9. The military coups did not solve the problems; they only made them worse. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are three countries that experienced military coups between 2020 and 2023. Mali experienced a two-stage coup in September 2020 and April 2021, which marked the beginning of another phase in the long-standing political and security crisis that began in 2012. Burkina Faso followed suit in 2022, with a coup in January and another in September. Niger experienced a coup in July 2023, although the security situation was much less severe than in Mali and Burkina Faso. While some military personnel who took control of their countries may have been motivated, at least in part, by a genuine desire to improve the security situation, others were primarily attracted by the lure of power and privilege. The military was able to exploit the population’s deep frustration with the deteriorating security situation and the lack of economic and social progress despite the existence of a democratically elected government. The failure of elected civilian governments to maintain effective control over large areas of the national territory, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, provided the ideal excuse for the military to seize political power. Beyond those currently holding the reins of power, the military is expected to exert a strong influence on political power in the region for several years to come.

The Local and International Impacts of the Rise of Terrorist Groups

The impact of the rise of terrorist groups in the Sahel is multidimensional and not limited to national borders.

1. The phenomenon of refugees (displaced persons – IDP) – At the local level, the increase in violence has led to massive displacement of populations and worsening humanitarian crises, with millions of people forced to flee their homes and live in precarious conditions in refugee camps. Humanitarian crises and forced displacement, Jihadist violence have led to an explosion in the number of internally displaced persons and refugees. According to the most recent data from the UNHCR and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 5 million people have been displaced in the central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) since 2019, a figure that is steadily rising.^[15] Attacks on civilians, massacres, gender-based violence, and threats to villagers are forcing entire populations to flee, often repeatedly. These massive movements increase pressure on host areas, which are often vulnerable themselves, and make it difficult to access humanitarian aid. Basic services collapse in areas under the control or influence of armed groups; state infrastructure is often attacked, abandoned, or hijacked. Hundreds of schools are closed, health centers become inaccessible or looted, and public workers (teachers, health care workers, administrators) flee rural areas. In 2024, for instance, more than 6,000 schools in Burkina Faso were shut down or rendered inoperable, depriving hundreds of thousands of students of an education. A chronic cycle of poverty, radicalization susceptibility, and illiteracy is made worse by these conditions. ^[16]
2. Local economy in ruins – Traditional economic activities – agriculture, pastoralism, cross-border trade – are severely disrupted. Terrorist groups sometimes impose illegal taxes (Zakat), restrict movement, or ban certain markets, thereby stifling local economies. In some areas, insecurity prevents planting or harvesting, exacerbating food insecurity. ^[17]Strategic trade routes are targeted with ambushes or roadblocks, disrupting trade and driving up prices for basic commodities.
3. Social fragmentation and communal tensions – Terrorist groups exploit ethnic, economic, and social tensions to expand their influence. They manipulate local conflicts, especially over the management of natural resources (water, grazing land), to mobilize or divide communities. This has led to a resurgence of intercommunal conflicts, especially between farmers and herders, and has fostered the emergence of self-defense militias, further complicating the security picture.
4. Erosion of trust in the state, alienation – in areas where the state is absent or perceived as oppressive, local populations may turn to armed groups, not out of ideological devotion, but out of necessity or opportunism. These groups can sometimes offer a form of local ‘justice’, a semblance of security, or services in cases where the state fails. This reality further weakens the legitimacy of state institutions and fuels a vicious cycle of distrust and immense hostility.

International Impact

Internationally, the spread of terrorism in the Sahel extends far beyond the borders of the region, directly affecting security, political stability, migration dynamics, and the geostrategic interests of international actors. The conflict in the Sahel has significant implications on several levels. A growing threat to international security from terrorist groups in the Sahel, notably JNIM (affiliated with al-Qaeda) and ISSP (affiliated with the Islamic State), has gradually expanded their reach beyond Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

1. Expansion of the circle of terrorist attacks – Since 2021, attacks have been regularly documented in northern Benin, Togo, the Ivory Coast, and even Ghana, raising concerns about the spillover of terrorism into the Gulf of Guinea countries. This change is worrying governments in the sub-region and international partners, especially the European Union and the United States, who see it as a new front in the fight against global terrorism. ^[18]
2. Cultivating connections around the world – international terrorist networks – these groups continue to strengthen their international ties, especially with other branches of al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in North Africa, Libya, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic, and sometimes even in distant regions such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This fact increases the risk of terrorist sanctuaries, similar to those observed in other conflict zones, which could host foreign fighters or serve as a logistical base for attacks outside the African continent.
3. Disruption of migration dynamics and pressure on Europe – The ongoing instability in the Sahel region is fueling migration flows towards North Africa and ultimately towards Europe. The link between insecurity and forced migration is well documented by organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Many internally displaced persons or refugees who no longer have opportunities in their home nationstry to cross the Sahara, often with the help of smugglers, and the Mediterranean Sea, taking great risks to reach Europe. European migration management policy is therefore directly influenced by the security situation in the Sahel, which partly explains the EU’s commitment through initiatives such as the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S) or the European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF). ^[19] These programs aim to ‘address the root causes’ of irregular migration, but have been criticized for their approach, which is sometimes too security-oriented at the expense of long-term development. ^[20]
4. Challenges to multilateral intervention and international cooperation – The rise of terrorism in the Sahel has posed severe challenges to traditional mechanisms of international intervention. The relative failure of certain missions, such as MINUSMA in Mali, which was forced to withdraw in 2023 at the request of the Malian army, illustrates the limits of UN multilateralism in the face of the contexts of hybrid insecurity and growing sovereignty. Furthermore, the end of the French-led Operation Barkhane in 2022 and the subsequent redeployment and reduction of French forces in the littoral states reflect a paradigm shift in the management of transnational threats. ^[21]These withdrawals are often interpreted as a loss of Western influence, which leaves the field open to other powers, primarily Russia through the Wagner Group (Wagner PMC) and later Africa Corps, as well as Turkey with the SADAT force. The Sahel has become an area of geopolitical rivalry: Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf States, and the Western powers are pursuing competing policies of influence, turning the security crisis into a global strategic issue.
5. Economic and security risks for foreign partners – The instability in the Sahel also affects the economic interests of many foreign countries. Mining companies (especially French, Canadian, Russian, and Chinese) operating in the region, especially in the exploitation of gold, uranium, and lithium, are a regular target of attacks or are threatened by terrorist groups. The example of Niger, a major uranium producer, is particularly significant: attacks on convoys, sabotage of infrastructure, or threats to mining areas can affect energy supply chains. In 2024, these attacks claimed the lives of around 1,500 people. ^[22]
6. Challenges to global security governance – The rise of terrorism in the Sahel highlights the partial failure of exclusively military or centralized approaches to the ‘war on terror’. Many academic analyses and international reports are now calling for a paradigm shift, favoring integrated approaches based on local development, community reconciliation, social justice, and political inclusion.

Summary

A sustained international response and the need to find sustainable solutions in the face of the spiral of violence tearing the Sahel apart are a MUST, and would have been nice one hour earlier.

It is clear that the response can no longer be military/kinetic alone. After many years of a multitude of armed operations, the implementation of various counter-terrorism strategies, alongside security partnerships, the results remain limited, sometimes even ineffective. Armed radical Islamic groups continue to gain momentum, states become more fragile, and populations sink into distrust, fear, or exile.

To break this impasse, it is essential to think of a renewed path of local and international responses in light of the existing local reality. It is not enough to kill the fighters of radical Islamic terrorist organizations; others will always take their place. The sources of radicalization themselves must be dried up, that is, social fractures, exclusion, humiliation, and institutional vacuum. This requires rebuilding, in the long term, states capable of protecting, listening to, and representing their citizens, including in the most vulnerable and remote areas. The legitimacy of a state cannot be limited to statements: legitimacy is achieved on the ground, in villages, schools, and markets, through a respectful, fair, and effective public presence, through action. Local development programs, inter-community dialogue, access to education, and economic resilience are essential pillars for offering concrete alternatives to young people, who too often remain exposed to despair or violent narratives today. It is also essential to restore the capacity of Sahel societies to act in the face of challenges such as climate change, economic changes, and questions of national/ethnic identity. Promoting justice, social cohesion, and respect for human rights is not a humanitarian luxury, but a security strategy in its own right, often more effective and sustainable than armed and lethal military interventions.

The Sahel’s future is fought not just on the battlefield but also in institutions, social interactions, and consciousness.

This requires a comprehensive political vision, based on a detailed understanding of local dynamics and a truly equal partnership with African actors. Without it, international efforts risk continuing to pursue an enemy that has adapted to the flaws of an exhausted system.

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^[1] Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion. https://acleddata.com/report/newly-restructured-islamic-state-sahel-aims-regional-expansion

^[2] While precise figures are difficult to establish, radical Islamic groups control large parts of the north and east, creating areas where government authority is minimal and civilians are at extreme risk. The phrase “jihad controls half of Burkina Faso” describes the widespread and devastating impact of the Islamist insurgency that has destabilized the country, rather than a precise territorial division. The violence has disrupted governance and created a dire humanitarian situation, particularly, as noted, in the northern and eastern regions.

^[3] The Sahel is currently the region in the world most affected by jihadist violence. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Sahel accounted for 19% of all terrorist attacks worldwide and 51% of terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2024, up from 48% in 2023. Five of the ten countries most affected by terrorism are in the Sahel.

Global Terrorism Index 2025, pp.48-52.. https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2025.pdf

^[4] Russia’s Growing Footprint in Africa’s Sahel Region. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/russias-growing-footprint-in-africas-sahel-region?lang=en

Turkish Military Presence in Africa: Redefining Ankara’s New Roles. https://tasam.org/en/Icerik/73868/turkish_military_presence_in_africa_redefining_ankaras_new_roles

^[5] Takeaways from AP report on Wagner allegedly committing war crimes by promoting atrocities. https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-videos-war-crimes-mali-burkina-icc-takeaways-035a63a7e2c82f24c80aa3898388b18a

Wagner Group faces war crime accusations over posting atrocities on social media. https://www.africanews.com/2025/06/23/wagner-group-faces-war-crime-accusations-over-posting-atrocities-on-social-media

^[6] Pastoralism is a subsistence system and form of animal husbandry in which herders raise domesticated animals, such as cattle, sheep, or goats, on extensive natural pastures, primarily in arid, semi-arid, or mountainous areas unsuitable for agriculture. It is characterized by extensive mobile land use and relies on communal resource management to survive in changing environments. Pastoralism is a vital economic system for millions of people, providing food, milk, and fiber, and contributing to ecosystem health through practices such as maintaining healthy rangelands through grazing. In the Sahel, tribespeople are increasingly exposed to negative interactions with other groups as they compete for access to fertile land and resources, which, in the absence of governance, creates a tendency for self-defense and heightened social conflict.

For more on the Sahel context, see the link:

Reinforcing pastoralism in the Sahel and West Africa: a decade of progress and the path forward. https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/africacan/reinforcing-pastoralism-in-the-sahel-and-west-africa-a-decade-of-progress-and-the-path-forward

^[7] Many ethnic groups in Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso and other countries view the Fulani as alien, and as a result, members of the group suffer more from government neglect, lack of access to economic opportunities, restrictions on movement within and between countries, and religious extremism.

^[8] The Fulani-Mossi conflict refers to a series of attacks and massacres between Fulani herders and Mossi farmers, mainly in Burkina Faso. The conflict is a sub-conflict of the jihadist insurgency in Burkina Faso that began in 2015, although ethnically motivated killings and attacks did not occur on a mass scale until the Yirgou massacre in 2019. On the night of December 31, 2018, and January 1, 2019, JNIM jihadists attacked the village of Yirgou, in the Barsalogho department, Burkina Faso. Later reports and investigations indicated that up to 210 people were killed.

Burkina Faso: Yirgou attack toll rises from 13 to 46 deaths. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/698033/politique/burkina-faso-13-tues-dans-une-attaque-suivie-de-represailles-intercommunautaires

While anti-Fulani sentiment has fueled conflicts in Nigeria and Mali for decades, the conflict between Fulani and Mossi groups has been largely defined by pro-government Koglweogo groups from the Mossi tribe, who make up the majority of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland. Fulani militants make up a large part of jihadist groups such as Jamaat Nasr al-Islam (JNIM) and al-Muslimeen and the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISWAP), and Fulani civilians are often targeted by government forces on suspicion of being affiliated with these groups.

^[9] Salafism is an Islamist sect within the Sunni branch of Islam that refers to the ‘righteous fathers’, i.e. the first three generations of Islam, as an example and model, according to which one should act, as opposed to relying on later religious determinations. The central principle of Salafism is that Islam was perfect in its early days, but over the centuries, undesirable innovations were added to it due to external influences. Salafism is a modern movement that attempts to shake off the traditions that have been added to Islam over the years and seeks to renew Islam in a form that is closer to that which existed in the days of Muhammad, while adapting it to the contemporary era. Salafi jihad is the stream that advocates extremist Islam within the Salafism movement. According to the ideology of the movement, jihad is a central tool in making Islam the only religion in the world, and therefore there is an obligation to act in ways of war against other religions, and against Muslims who do not practice Islam.

Sufism is a mystical branch of Islam that emphasizes love and purpose in action, rather than the law itself. While other branches of Islam believe that the Prophet Muhammad died and his legacy is set in stone and cannot be changed, Sufis believe that the Prophet Muhammad continues to speak to his followers through holy religious teachers who are connected by a mystical chain to Muhammad and who are the ones who decide everything

^[10] Firearms Trafficking in the Sahel. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta_sahel/TOCTA_Sahel_firearms_2023.pdf

^[11] Since the Libyan crisis in 2011, the Sahel region has been facing a wave of violence that has worsened year by year. Security has deteriorated significantly in the border strip of the Liptako-Gourma countries (Mali – Niger – Burkina Faso). The porousness of the borders of the Liptako-Gourma countries is quite evident, as not all borders are clearly defined or implemented. The existence of alternative routes, consisting of bypass roads around border posts, is marked throughout the border areas. Therefore, these routes can sometimes allow people to cross the border with goods and merchandise without being checked by the police, customs and other authorities. In this area, a strong connection has developed between armed groups and criminal groups and drug traffickers. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoun, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISSP) and the Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) are the main terrorist groups operating in the Liptako-Gourma border area. In addition, they have gained the loyalty of several local groups such as Ansar Dine, Ansarou, and Moujaho-.

Their strategy is to eliminate the presence of security forces and administrative and political authorities in the territories they wish to control, thereby instilling fear among the populations and leading them to believe that the state is incapable of protecting them.

^[12] Learnings from West Africa’s regional experiences in the gold sector. https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/learnings-from-west-africas-regional-experiences-in-the-gold-sector

West Africa’s Gold – The New Caviar of the Gold Sector. https://www.aurumres.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/West-African-Gold-June-2024.pdf

^[13] How ‘blood gold’ is fueling conflict in West Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c17ww8dv1rwo

^[14] Transnational Organized Crime in the Sahel. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Tocta_Sahel.html

^[15] The countries of the Sahel region are facing a deepening protection crisis driven by conflict, insecurity, and climate shocks, resulting in both prolonged and new displacement. https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/sahel-emergency

Total Population of Concern. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis

^[16] Burkina/Education: The number of closed educational structures is decreasing, 2,390 students and 71 teachers are returning to school. https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article129703

^[17] Food security is a term that describes a situation in which a household or individual has direct and daily access to food in a quantity and quality that meets their basic needs. In contrast, food insecurity is a situation in which a household or individual does not have direct or daily access to food. Food insecurity in the Sahel is a worsening crisis, driven by the interplay between conflict, climate change and poverty, with millions facing hunger and millions more at risk of malnutrition, particularly in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Climate hazards such as droughts and floods are reducing agricultural yields, while worsening conflicts are disrupting food systems and causing displacement. Global economic pressures and limited funding for humanitarian assistance are further exacerbating the situation.

^[18] Recalibrating Coastal West Africa’s Response to Violent Extremism

Recalibrating Coastal West Africa’s Response to Violent Extremism

^[19] European Union steps up support for people displaced from the Sahel into coastal countries. https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/press-releases/european-union-steps-support-people-displaced-sahel-coastal-countries

   Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Sahel & Lake Chad. https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/where-we-work/regions-countries/sahel-lake-chad_en

November 2022 – Workshop of the Secretariat of the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S) on Protection of Civilians in the Sahel: Consolidating an Integrated Approach. https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/novembre-2022-atelier-du-secretariat-du-partenariat-pour-la-securite-et-la-stabilite-au-sahel-p3s-sur-la-protection-des-civils-au-sahel-consolider-lapproche-integree

^[20] Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Sahel & Lake Chad. https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/where-we-work/regions-countries/sahel-lake-chad_en

November 2022 – Workshop of the Secretariat of the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S) on Protection of Civilians in the Sahel: Consolidating an Integrated Approach. https://www.coalition-sahel.org/en/novembre-2022-atelier-du-secretariat-du-partenariat-pour-la-securite-et-la-stabilite-au-sahel-p3s-sur-la-protection-des-civils-au-sahel-consolider-lapproche-integree

^[21] On November 9, 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the anti-insurgency military operation Barkhane would officially come to an end after a review of the engagement in the framework of the National Strategic Review (RNS).

Operation Barkhane is intended to provide ongoing support in the fight against terrorists and insurgents and to train the armies of Mali and Niger. A few weeks earlier, in Mali, the last remaining French soldiers left the country after handing over the keys to the Gao base (GAO) to the Malian armed forces. A 10-year cycle of intervention The French military operation in the Sahel has come to an end. In general, the military operation has been heavily criticized. Security conditions in Mali and Burkina Faso have deteriorated considerably, with a significant increase in violence since 2019. This situation has led to a series of coups organized by military and political elements seeking to distance themselves from France. Russia has taken advantage of the instability to send its forces to the region, fanning the flames of anti-French sentiment.

After ten years, France to end military operation Barkhane in Sahel. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/09/after-ten-years-france-to-end-military-operation-barkhane-in-sahel_6003575_4.html

^[22] Deadly convoy ambush in western Niger kills 21. https://www.trtworld.com/article/18241040

Jihadists ‘summarily executed’ 127 people in Niger, says rights group. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gkx78xeg8o

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.