The Birth of a Jihadist State is Closer than ever in West Africa
A jihadist state is a social structure that operates according to strict Islamic law, Sharia. It is led by a single leader, or caliph, who combines political and religious roles. The ultimate goal is a state with an unwavering religious regime, and everything modern and liberal is forbidden. Such a state appears to be possible in West Africa.
The radical Islamic terrorist organizations Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda have pledged in their vision, at various stages, to establish such states. Until their establishment, they condemned and attacked any style of a democratic government. Al-Qaeda, for example, has a seven-stage vision, according to which, at the end of the stages, the organization intends to gain complete control over the world. This was the same vision as the Islamic State, which it implemented in 2014 with the establishment of the caliphate after taking over significant areas in Syria and Iraq under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. [1]
Their form of governance is developing throughout West Africa, primarily in the Sahel, as their power increases with territorial dominance.
These groups operate in very large parts of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, in which they aspire to establish a jihadist caliphate. These organizations are not content with the above-mentioned regions under their control; they are heading towards the Gulf of Guinea countries and are approaching the borders of Togo, Benin, and Ghana, which illustrates the expansion strategy that is a central component of their vision.
In the regions they control, they radicalize the population, which is already alienated from the central government, intensify sectarian/tribal conflicts, and thus further destabilize the country’s regions already subject to political, economic, and social instability. Given the weakness of the states, creating an Islamic legal state in West Africa is, in my opinion, a reasonable possibility.
Several key, interconnected factors could contribute to the emergence of a jihadist state in the Sahel, West Africa. These include the population explosion, the failures of the central government, endemic poverty, alienation, and the weakness of the armies that are supposed to fight radical Islamic organizations.
In addition to the reasons I mentioned above, one could easily add the porous physical borders between nations, the smuggling of people, goods, drugs, and weapons, and the fact that rainforests and jungles make it easier for criminal gangs, terrorist organizations, and smugglers to hide and communicate with one another.
This fact helps organizations improve their attack capabilities, establish contacts, and exchange information even with terrorist organizations operating outside the African continent, thus transferring attack capabilities and the means to implement them. An example is the Sambisa Forest in Nigeria, which is used as a hiding place and refuge for Boko Haram and even the ISIS affiliate ISWAP,[2] or the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex on the Burkina Faso-Benin border.[3] The Dida Forest on the northern border of Côte d’Ivoire also serves as a meeting place and hideout for gangs,[4] as does the border triangle known as ‘Liptako-Gourma,’ which covers parts of northern Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, which has become the epicenter of violence in the Sahel.[5] In this area, militant groups, including remnants of the Burkinabé group Ansarul Islam, founded in 2016 by Ibrahim Malam Dicko, fight under the banner of the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition. Other organizations align themselves with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
The series of military coups that took place in West African countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad) in recent years, and at the same time the removal of the combined French and American force from their territory, has, in my opinion, disrupted the fight against the spread of radical Islamic organizations, given these groups a tailwind, brought the local population closer to them, a population from which they will draw their means of subsistence, funding and fighting power. It should be emphasized that the regimes in these countries prioritize their political survival and provide their armies with scant resources to reconquer the remote rural areas and demonstrate full governance. In the vacuum created, Islamic terrorist groups are thriving and expanding their sphere of control.
Far from the outside world, a change occurs in the Sahel, the arid region between the Sahara and the West African savannahs. This change is entwined with the goals of radical Islamic organizations and could eventually lead to the establishment of a jihadist state.
The jihadist vision is clear: to establish a state governed by Sharia law under the authoritarian rule of a caliph, merging spiritual/religious and political power. Entities like Jamaat al-Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM) and ISIS’s Sahl Province are working towards this end with systematic precision.
According to ACLED’s location and combat incident data, deaths from violence in the Sahel region reached 7,620 in the first half of 2024, a 9% increase compared to the same period in 2023. A 37% increase compared to 2022 and a worrying 190% increase compared to 2021.[6]
The demographic explosion, expressed in population growth far exceeding economic progress, leads to a decline in living standards and fosters conditions that make many young people easy prey for recruitment by terrorist groups, economic fragility, and government failure to be accountable, forming a deadly trilogy.
With almost 80% of the population living below the poverty line, the Sahel is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world. Rising unemployment, along with youth between the ages of 15 and 20, provides a vast field of action for recruiting activists and fighters and feeds the armed radical groups.
The UN Secretary-General declared in 2022 that “if nothing is done, the effects of terrorism, violent extremism, and organized crime will be felt far beyond the (Sahel) region and the African continent.” [7]
In other words, the region could become the global headquarters of a jihadist state.
Whether it will be a country, like Burkina Faso, that will be completely conquered and become an extremist Muslim entity/caliphate or a territorial cell divided between several countries controlled by the organizations that will declare it a caliphate, I do not know. Since the Sahel nations are struggling to stop terrorist attacks and the growth of extremist Islamic groups, it is conceivable that a leader will eventually emerge who will proclaim the creation of an Islamic caliphate due to the region’s deep-rootedness.
I mentioned Burkina Faso earlier, and for a good reason. After a brief period of political stability, Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022 that replaced the elected president and parliament with a military junta.[8] Although civil society and the media can still enjoy basic political freedoms, the regime is now considered completely autocratic. The country is facing deep security and humanitarian crises. Due to the terrorist activities of radical Islamic organizations, a significant part of the country, about 40% (as of 2016, the JNIM and the ISGS took control of half of the country’s territory), is no longer under the control of the central government.
The official government led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the head of the military junta, is focused on fighting radical Islamic terrorism, including the deployment of paramilitary forces that are struggling to fight. While regaining control of the country’s territory is of paramount importance to the country, this approach has proven to exacerbate ethnic tensions stemming from the government forces’ treatment of the population in the fighting zones, conduct that is sometimes defined as a war crime. [9] A Human Rights Watch report highlights that significant human rights violations were observed, including unlawful, extrajudicial, and arbitrary killings by security forces, state-sponsored militias, and extremist groups.[10] The report also notes other issues such as corruption, lack of accountability for gender-based violence, inhumane detention conditions, restrictions on freedom of expression, violence against journalists, and human rights violations in local conflicts. Finally, crimes involving violence or threats of violence against members of national, racial, and ethnic minorities were also reported.
The bottom line is that the ruler’s army is struggling to fight and has failed in its attempts to reconquer the country’s territory. Traoré seems unable to reverse the trend. [11]
The jihadists of the JNIM, the organization led by Iyad Ag Ghali, have put Burkina Faso in their sights. Constant attacks and threats to the capital city are exposing the weakness of the ruling military junta. The Islamist organizations in Burkina Faso have increased their attacks on civilians, slaughtering and repeatedly slaughtering villagers, displaced persons, Christian worshippers, and Burkina Faso Armed Forces soldiers.
Despite his promises and ambitions, the ruler, Traoré, seems unable to reverse the trend. The army is more divided than ever. The body of VDP – ‘Volontaires pour la Patrie’ (Volunteers for the Fatherland), on which he relied to curb the spread of Islamic organizations, has not brought the desired results.[12] The new and advanced weapons, including drones, that his army is equipped with have not changed the situation in the fighting. In addition, the military junta’s strategic decision to remove French forces from the country turned out to be a huge mistake.[13] Likewise, the solidarity between the countries of the ‘Sahel Alliance,’ Mali and Niger (Etats de l’Alliance du Sahel), are not causing major upheavals because each is mired in its own difficulties. [14]
The question arises whether a lack of governance and a weak military capacity are the sole causes of the spread of radical Islamic organizations in Burkina Faso. A deeper look into the depths of society in Burkina Faso shows that the Fulani tribe plays a very central role in the fact that radical Islam is taking over the country (about 10% of the population of about 22 million people). The Fulani are a transnational ethnic group spread across the northern third of Africa.[15] Their geographic distribution accurately depicts the regions of the Sahel most impacted by the ongoing Islamist conflict. It should come as no surprise that they are heavily represented in several important Islamist organizations, including some of the most dangerous ones now active in the area. This jihad cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the historical and strategic role of the Fulani as the ‘invisible hand’ that drives it. The involvement of the Fulani in jihad movements is deeply rooted in history, and their influence continues to shape the current conflict in the region. [16]
To understand the role of the Fulani in these jihadist movements, one must first look at their history, particularly the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early 19th century. Established by the Fulani religious leader Usman Dan Fodio, the caliphate became one of the largest empires in West Africa, covering parts of present-day Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. It was built on the principles of radical Islam and aimed to cleanse the region of infidels and impose Islam and Sharia law.
Born in 1754 in present-day Nigeria, Usman Dan Fodio was deeply concerned about the perceived corruption and laxity in Islamic observance among the Hausa rulers of the time. In 1804, he declared a jihad against these rulers, accusing them of deviating from the principles of Islam. Within a few years, his movement gained widespread support among the Fulani and other marginalized groups, resulting in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1808. The caliphate was organized into emirates, each ruled by an emir appointed by the caliph. It implemented Sharia law and emphasized Islamic education, often through memorization of the Quran. Its success was largely based on its military power, which helped enforce the laws of the caliphate and maintain control over its vast territories. The Sokoto Caliphate was not only a religious and political entity but also a militant empire built on the principles of jihad. [17]
Another significant Fulani-led jihadist movement occurred in Macina, in present-day Mali, in 1818. A Fulani religious leader named Seku Amadu declared jihad, establishing the Macina Empire. Like previous Fulani-led jihadist states, the Macina Empire was governed by sharia law and played a significant role in the spread of Islam across West Africa.
In the past 20 years, the Sahel and Nigeria have seen a dramatic increase in Islamist violence, with the Fulani playing a disproportionately large role in the conflict. While the motivations behind their involvement are complex and varied, including simple greed, the primary motive remains jihad. [18]
What we are seeing today is a continuation of the Fulani’s long history of religiously motivated violence. Several major militant groups in the Sahel have a significant Fulani presence. The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) is one such group. Not only has ISWAP recruited many activists from Fulani communities and maintains strong ties with Fulani leaders, but so has Jamaat Nasir al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), which was formed in 2017 as a coalition of several militant factions, including the Fulani-led Macina Liberation Front (FLM).
JNIM has carried out and continues to carry out numerous terrorist attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Ansaroul Islam, founded by Fulani preacher Ibrahim Malam Dicko, operates in northern Burkina Faso and is responsible for numerous attacks on both military and civilian targets. These activities have contributed significantly to regional instability in general and Burkina Faso in particular. The group’s activities have created a humanitarian crisis, exacerbated intercommunal violence, displaced thousands of people from their homes, and plunged the region into greater chaos. But the Fulani are also disproportionately affected by violence in the Sahel. More than half of the civilians killed by the military or other ethnic militias in Mali and Burkina Faso in recent years have been Fulani, according to data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The violence against them is directed by radio broadcasts with racial arguments and social media posts that portray all Fulani as terrorists. Widespread insecurity and the rise of violent extremist groups have led many Fulani communities to arm themselves. Due to insufficient protection provided by the state, these communities either form militias for collective self-defense or join jihadists for short-term security.
The Fulani’s leadership and hidden influence within these militant groups remain crucial. Their ‘invisible hand’ is the key to whether chaos continues or there is potential for peace. Prioritizing a deeper understanding of the Fulani tribe’s role can slightly change this understanding and explain why Burkina Faso and the Sahel countries may become an Islamic caliphate in the near future.
As the situation continues, it is not inevitable or unreasonable to assume that the radical Islamic organizations will eventually succeed in capturing the capital city of Ouagadougou and establishing the caliphate, which is their ultimate goal.
[1] In June 2014, ISIS fighters captured Mosul and Tikrit and took control of the border between the countries. Al-Baghdadi, appearing at Friday prayers at Mosul’s Grand Mosque, declared the establishment of a caliphate and gave it its new name – the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
[2] Jihadists Kill at Least 40 Farmers in Northeast Nigeria
[3] Benin’s W National Park Becomes ‘Headquarters’ for Terrorists
[4] Keeping Jihadists Out of Northern Côte d’Ivoire
[5] Violent Extremism in the Sahel
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel
[6] The Sahel
[7] Secretary-General’s address to the General Assembly
[8] In 2022, Burkina Faso experienced two military coups in one year (in January and September) – critical developments that exacerbated the country’s already fragile political and economic environment. In March 2022, Lieutenant General Paul Henri Damiba, the leader of the January 2022 coup, was sworn in as president of the transitional government following the arrest of President Christian Kaboré, He dissolved the parliament and government and set up a military junta. Then, Burkina Faso experienced a second coup less than 9 months later in September 2022, when Captain Ibrahim Traoré ousted Dembele. Like his predecessor, Captain Traoré justified the coup on the basis of the deteriorating security situation stemming from the growing threat of jihadist-inspired Islamist terrorism. The trigger for the September coup was a violent attack on September 26 by al-Qaeda-linked jihadists on a convoy of 150 trucks carrying food to Djibo, one of the largest cities in the war-torn north of the country, which left 37 people dead, 27 of them were soldiers. The city of 62,000 inhabitants has been under siege by terrorist organizations since February 16/17, 2022.
[9] Burkina Faso: UN Human Rights Chief gravely concerned by rise in killings of civilians
[10] Human Rights Watch Burkina Faso Events of 2022, (2023). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/burkina-faso
[11] Les djihadistes accentuent la pression sur le Burkina Faso
https://mondafrique.com/confidentiels/les-djihadistes-accentuent-la-pression-sur-le-burkina-faso
[12] On April 13, 2023, Captain Ibrahim Traore, president of Burkina Faso’s transitional government, which aims to retake 40% of the country’s territory, controlled by jihadists affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, declared a state of emergency. “Faced with this security situation, the health and integrity of the nation depends on a wave of national spirit from all its daughters and sons to find a solution.” Authorities have issued a series of emergency directives that give the president the right to seize people, goods and services and the right to restrict certain civil liberties.
Burkina Faso declares a general mobilization in the face of increasing jihadist attacks
[13] The military junta in Burkina Faso also decides to expel about 400 special forces soldiers from France and cuts military ties with France. In place of France, Burkina Faso turns to Russia and develops military ties with it to fight the jihadists through the Africa Corps expeditionary force/mercenaries.
[14] The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) was created on September 16, 2023, between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso under a mutual defense agreement. The signing of the treaty relating to this alliance, called ‘Liptako-Gourma’, led to meetings between the heads of state and plans for initiatives that would push the new structure further towards the statutes of the alliance, which transformed it into a confederation.
[15] The Fulani people are an ethnic group in the Sahara, the Sahel and West Africa, widely dispersed throughout the region. They inhabit many countries, living mainly in West Africa and the northern parts of Central Africa, South Sudan, Darfur and areas near the Red Sea coast of Sudan. The estimated number of the Fulani people is unknown, due to conflicting definitions of Fula ethnicity. Various estimates place the figure at around 30 million people worldwide.
[16] Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries
[17] Even before the Sokoto Caliphate, the Fulani people established caliphates as follows:
In the 18th century, the Caliphate of Fouta-Djalon in Central Guinea;
In the 19th century, the Fulani Empire of Macina in Mali (1818-1862) led by Sékou Amadou Barryi, and later Amadou Sekou Amaado, who conquered Timbuktu; in the 19th century, the Sokoto Empire in Nigeria.
[18] The Fulani are largely nomadic/semi-nomadic and live in the semi-arid climate of West Africa. Due to population growth and desertification, Fulani nomads have had to move south to more fertile lands to graze their flocks, which has created conflicts with the settled farmers. These conflicts are presented as ethno-religious conflicts.
