Introduction

Recent developments in Syria and Lebanon have dealt a substantial blow to Iran’s meticulously cultivated ‘axis of resistance,’ which has developed over the past four decades. This axis comprises a broad range of militant groups and political factions supported by Iran’s ideological, financial, and military assets, allowing them to impact regional conflicts. This operational structure not only strengthens Iran’s position but also shapes the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, affecting the dynamics of power and deterrence.^[1]

The ongoing conflicts and shifting political dynamics have created challenges for Iranian interests, deteriorating the alliances that once formed a formidable front against the state of Israel. As with previous occurrences, regional volatiles might induce a ‘Ripple Effect,’ impacting the entire region. The repercussions of the ‘Arab Spring’ are still engraved in the collective memory of the Islamic regime. It originated in Tunisia and spread across the region, leading to the ousting of governments in the Middle East. 

Other nations may manifest symptoms like those that contributed to Assad’s downfall, such as corruption, deteriorating living standards, and the rift between state and society. Regional development poses a substantial challenge for Iran, affecting its ability to exert influence and successfully attain strategic goals in the Middle East. Therefore, the revolutionary establishment is searching for a new scheme and alternative routes to overcome the latest challenges and for its ‘axis of resistance’.

The proxy model In Iraq and Syria following March 2003 

Past recollections may shed light on Iran’s strategic framework and modus operandi. This scheme underwent significant evolution following the US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The event created an opportunity for Iran to advance its ‘axis of resistance’ by establishing Shiite militias working under its auspices. Not long after the invasion, Tehran helped build up the Jaish al-Mahdi and the Katai’b Hezbollah militias. These two groups began operations against coalition forces in Iraq, directed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.

The governance void resulting from the collapse of the Iraqi administration in 2003 enabled Iranian policy strategists to broaden their model. In 2007, the IRGC founded the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia. Seven years later (June 2014), al-Hashd al-Sha’abi was established, operating under its auspices. During the fight againstISIS, this umbrella of paramilitary organizations operated alongside the Iraqi army in its efforts to release occupied territories.^[2]

The proxy model of activity suited Tehran by allowing it to conduct extensive warfare in Iraq without leaving a footprint of its role in the fighting. Moreover, when the world’s attention shifted to the battle against ISIS, Iran was able to enhance its proxy model and assert its authority over Iraq’s political landscape by influencing political-appointed personnel and executive positions.

Over time, Iran’s military presence in various parts of the Middle East reflected this proxy approach. The civil war in Syria, which began in March 2011, led to a change in the theocratic regime’s strategy and the advent of a new model. At the inception of the Syrian conflict, Iran employed the familiar method of establishing militias, primarily Shiite, to operate under its aegis by cultivating a plethora of militias. Augmentation of the technique led to the recruiting of Pakistani and Afghani fighters, such as the Zainbayunand Fatmiyun militias. Despite ongoing attacks on supply convoys traveling to Lebanon via Syria, Iran has established a multi-layered approach to strengthen its proxy forces adjacent to Israel’s borders.

Shortly after the IRGC established the Zainbayun and Fatmiyun militias, the Golan Liberation Army was created, aiming to wrest the area from Israel. Moreover, the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqwere both active in Iraq and Syria. Iran’s anxiousness to save the Assad regime from collapsing exceeded its direct involvement, which has led to multi-billion-dollar infrastructure and telecommunication investments.

Iran’s New Assessments After Assad’s Downfall

The collapse of the Assad regime and the deterioration of Hezbollah have dramatically changed Iran’s geostrategy for the region. However, this hasn’t changed its grand strategy and aspirations to exert influence on other regional players. Evaluating Iran’s strategic framework, particularly its balance of power and balance of deterrence, reveals a compelled transition of its course of action. Iran consistently assesses regional developments, prompting the adoption of new tactical approaches, while its overarching strategy remains unchanged. Consequently, enhancing its efforts towards Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan is inevitable. 

The Islamic regime’s basic notion relies on the premise that the Houthis (Ansar Allah) may function as a substitute for generating a missile threat against Israel now that Hezbollah’s ballistic capability is diminished. The Houthis govern extensive regions of Yemen, including its capital, Sana’a. This Military-political entity originated from Zaydis in the Saada governorate and currently comprises followers of many Zaydis and non-Zaydis ideologies. The Houthis have an extensive military branch that can enhance its launching capabilities and interrupt global naval activities. During recent years, Western forces have been in combat against Iranian-supported Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis’ assault on Jaffa on December 21 unequivocally indicates their intent to inherit Hezbollah’s role in inflicting harm on Israel and supporting Palestinian goals. The assault elicited apprehensions in Israel on whether it was an exceptional malfunction of its defense system or a consequence of a more sophisticated weapon provided by Iran to the Houthis. It is worth noting that the navigation of hypersonic-speed missiles complicates interception efforts. These missiles necessitate sophisticated designs with visible fins on their warheads, as exemplified by modern Iranian models.^[3]

Since 2015, Iran has been utilizing Yemen’s territory as a testing site for enhancing the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ launching capabilities. The recurrent assaults on multiple sites in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have served Iran as a fertile ground for accumulating data to improve its missile’s accuracy. The recurrent launching toward Israel also promotes the accumulation of data and improves the accuracy of Houthi missiles.

General (ret.) Joseph Votel argues that the damage to international shipping and navigation was inevitable since the Houthis started their attacks. Months after their activities commenced, the daily volume of goods transiting the Suez Canal and the Red Sea dropped sharply, and shipping costs per container from North America increased from about $2,500 to over $6,700 per container.^[4]

The Iraqi-Jordanian Axis

After contemplating revitalization strategies following its setbacks in Syria and Lebanon, an inherent part of the revolutionary regime seems to prioritize the Iraqi-Jordanian axis. Hence, promoting its malicious intentions against the State of Israel is generating an alternative process for its overt and covert activities. Its dominance in the Iraqi political and military landscape and the fragile situation in Jordan will probably serve as a central pillar for its modus operandi.

Iraq and Jordan serve as alternative routes to Syria-Lebanon arms and drug smuggling. From Iran’s perspective, wide-ranging infiltration into Jordan, aimed at destabilizing the kingdom through elements loyal to the ‘Axis of Resistance’, is valid. This general rule applies significantly since Jordan’s King Abdullah II is more popular abroad than within his nation.

Since its establishment, Jordan has faced significant economic challenges due to a scarcity of natural resources and limited domestic income alternatives. Additionally, its national resilience has been strained due to inherent problems stemming from several waves of migrants, which are extensive compared to its population. Furthermore, social unrest and demonstrations have consistently impacted Jordan’s internal conditions and political environment. Orit Perlov asserts that ‘Young Jordanian’ factions linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, labor unions, and professional associations orchestrate protests. Independent Palestinian activists have joined these Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations and are utilizing social media to rally support for demonstrations.^[5]

Robert Satloff and David Schenker argued that King Abdullah II was confronted with escalating global and internal threats. External threats present considerable obstacles, but the regime is most endangered when these perils provoke or intensify domestic instability. Internal factors of instability include escalating public discontent due to economic hardship, inadequate political change, and perceived governmental acquiescence to corruption, alongside increasing support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the growth of the Salafist movement.^[6]

The main external ramifications of Jordan’s instability include the spillover effects of Syria’s civil war, such as potential military involvement in the border area, the proliferation of Salafist radicalization, and the substantial burden of maintaining an abundant Palestinian population. External influences and possible interference from Islamist movements in neighboring countries may strain Jordan’s resilience. For instance, a series of protests that compromise the regime’s security could make Jordan more vulnerable to radical Islamist subversion.^[7]

From Iran’s perspective, the establishment of terrorist cells in Jordan and collaborative underground activities with Palestinian terrorist organizations will significantly increase the threat to Israel. Iran has pursued hegemonic ambitions in Jordan for many years, seeking to exert control over the kingdom and potentially use it as a base to act against Israel. These strategies were shaped by Qassem Soleimani, whose ideas were founded on the Islamic IRGC’s ability to create a broad network of non-state allies to promote Iran’s goals.

The Islamic regime has successfully assembled support from both Shi’a and non-Shi’a groups, diminishing the Sunna-Shi’a rift when it aligns with its objectives. The most loyal supporters are Twelver Shi’as, who are searching for the construction of the collective Shi’a memory and identity.^[8] Iran’s theocratic ideology has spread and attracted several non-Shi’a groups in Jordan, particularly those aligned with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, subversion and dissident affinity enhance Iran’s ability to present itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause, leaping over ethnic divides.

Iran has increased its efforts to clandestine arms transport and explosives via Jordan to terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria. In June 2014, honoring “International Quds Day,” Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, officially ordered the arming of the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria. Since that time, high-ranking Iranian officials have repeatedly vocalized their obligation to support the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. In June 2019, Yahya Rahim Safavi, the military advisor to the Iranian leader and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, asserted that the strategy to arm Judea and Samaria is being carried out according to the leader’s directive.^[9]

Yair Routman argued that Iran aspired to add Jordan to its list of countries under its influence. He quoted a Kuwaiti newspaper that published statements from Qassem Soleimani, expressing that Iran has been effectively present in the region since 2015. From Soleimani’s perspective, Jordan represents fertile ground for establishing its influence through offers of economic assistance and the construction of civilian infrastructure.^[10]

The delineation of Iran’s proxy in Iraq and Jordan can be embodied in the quotation of the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades’ security chief from April 2024. A statement made by the Iraqi declared that “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq intends to equip the Islamic Resistance fighters in Jordan with weapons to open a new front against Israel.” According to the Iraqi official, this plan involves a force of approximately 12,000 fighters armed with various weapons and explosives aimed at “protecting the Palestinians.”^[11]

However, there have been recent developments indicating a reluctance on the part of the Iraqi Shiite militias to launch direct attacks against Israel, preferring instead to limit themselves to transferring weapons via Jordan to Judea and Samaria. A Report of the ‘Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center‘ revealed that an executive of the Iraqi Harakat Al-Nujaba claimed that an accord was established between the pro-Iranian militias and Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shi’a al-Sudani. The official stipulated that the “Iraqi resistance forces” would cease military actions against Israel in support of the Gaza Strip.^[12]

Furthermore, a prominent member of the Shiite Coordination Assembly asserted that the current situation in the region is perilous and unpredictable, and any assault by the militias, whether directed at Israel or American interests, would jeopardize them with potential American or Israeli retaliation and might also render Iraq vulnerable to an attack.^[13]

IDF’s Maarachot journal disclosed that Iran had developed an extensive network of smugglers in exchange for substantial sums of money transferred from the IRGC and its affiliates in Hezbollah. The goal of smuggling ammunition from Jordan to Judea and Samaria has been to support the ‘axis of resistance’ and change its combat dynamics. The new front against Israel was established on the premise of creating subversion and promoting launching capabilities from these regions.^[14]

The report indicates that smuggling aims to supply Palestinians in Judea and Samaria while also undermining the Jordanian administration. The main challenge Jordanian authorities are facing is illegal trafficking through the Syrian border. The Syrian drug smuggling infrastructure, backed by Iran, is probably being utilized for arms trafficking across the Syrian-Jordan border to the “Muslim Brotherhood,” which has a close collaboration with the Hamas network in Jordan.^[15]

Recently, the ‘Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center’ published a detailed document titled “Captured Documents Reveal How Iran Smuggles Weapons via Syria and Jordan.” The document analyzes clearly and coherently the captured documents obtained in the Gaza Strip during the ‘Iron Swords’ war. The revealed documents unequivocally demonstrate the comprehensive strategizing undertaken by the Revolutionary Guards and their allies to infiltrate Jordan and turn it into a front line against the State of Israel.^[16]

The disclosure thoroughly outlines the smuggling pathways, via land, air, and sea, employed by Iran to supply arms to Judea and Samaria through Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The document scrutinizes findings due to the exposure and apprehension of an extensive smuggling network. It unveiled details regarding the operational tactics employed by the IRGC and Hamas in their endeavors to transport weapons to Judea and Samaria, aiming to instigate an additional front against Israel.^[18]

Terrorist organizations, especially Hezbollah, are known to exploit drug trafficking networks to destabilize state structures. The usage of drugs, particularly Captagon, has constituted a significant source of revenue throughout Assad’s dictatorship. Furthermore, Syrian and Hezbollah’s drug trafficking revenues have long constituted a considerable source of income. The pattern developed in Syria largely relies on Hezbollah’s smuggling network in the Tri-Border Area (Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay). This model presents potential for other organizations to replicate, allowing them to generate illegal profits and strengthen sectarian affiliation.^[20]

ICT’s research associate, Dr. Michael Barak, clarifies that a substantial challenge for Jordan is the struggle against smuggling networks for guns and narcotics entering its borders. In light of the threats from drug and arms trafficking, King Abdullah II’s diatribes infringe upon his nation’s sovereignty, underscoring the necessity of eradicating the phenomenon. He emphasized the activities of these criminal organizations, especially in drug and gun trafficking, asserting that Jordan has been resolutely tackling these challenges for years to safeguard its children from this external threat.^[21]

After more than a decade of conflict in Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees potential leverage in a post-Assad landscape. His optimism stems from the notion that Ankara possesses the most robust networks and a history of collaboration with the Islamist party currently governing Damascus, allowing it to capitalize on the downfall of the Assad regime. Turkey’s emergence as a significant actor in the Syrian scene necessitates a reassessment of the future region ramifications. 

The primary insurgent group that ended Assad’s regime was Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), supported by Ankara’s administration. This Sunni Muslim group was formerly associated with al Qaeda and is classified as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the United Nations. Notwithstanding those classifications, Turkey has offered indirect support to HTS.

The Turkish military presence in the northern Syrian town of Idlib has effectively shielded the region from attacks by Syrian government forces, allowing the organization to govern the province without interruption for years. Additionally, Turkey managed the flow of international aid into areas controlled by HTS, thereby enhancing the group’s credibility among the local population.^[22]

Concluding Remarks

The article focused on the evolving dynamics that have posed challenges to Iranian interests, undermining the alliances constituting a front against the state of Israel. Challenges are constantly brewing in the backyards of many states while others compete for hard and soft power to promote influence and regional hegemony.

After the collapse of Assad’s regime, Turkey and Iran are looking for new practices and policies to influence and exploit its relations with others. The revolutionary regime is implementing various methods and resources to attract the populace of other countries rather than merely their governments. After evaluating regional developments, Iran implements diverse operational approaches while its fundamental strategy remains constant.

A significant challenge looms in assessing how the power transition in Syria will conclude and what form it will take. Turkey emerges as the primary regional winner in this situation, having been the primary supporter of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This group played a crucial role in the toppling of the previous regime and now holds considerable influence over the victorious rebels and opposition factions. Engaging with Ankara will be essential in the regional and international efforts to assist Syrians in successfully transitioning.^[23]

As new dynamic forces emerge in the Middle East, all regional players must heed the alterations and their implications for the region’s security. The recent developments in Syria and Lebanon have severely hindered Iran’s efforts to reshape the Middle East in alignment with its interests. Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps uses all available resources to continue recruiting volunteers for its cause. Iran is also redirecting its strategic focus to Yemen, which is now viewed as a substitute for Hezbollah’s launch capabilities. Furthermore, the Iraq-Jordan axis is being leveraged to create a new front against Israel.

Even though the strength of the Iranian axis is diminishing, the actions of the Revolutionary establishment are expected to continue, particularly with investments aimed at revitalizing the Hezbollah terrorist organization. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards are expected to strengthen their influence in Syria while coordinating their efforts with Ankara, which is viewed as a new dominant force in the Syrian landscape. Regarding the current reluctance of Iraqi militias to engage in further conflict with Israel and the U.S., it appears that the Iranians will attempt to provoke them into action.

The battle for religious, ethnic, and national identity shifts populace attitudes. Revolts reverberated across the Middle East, reshaping relations between states and domestic policies. Iran’s regional efforts and state-controlled interpretations of its theocratic rule model force a new risk assessment and regional outlook. Advancing the Islamic Republic’s endeavors to carve out a place in a new regional order where power is being transitioned situates King Abdullah II at a crossroads.

The magnitude of Iran’s engagement in Jordan is becoming apparent and inevitable. The Islamic regime is generating extensive smuggling routes of munition, drugs, and combatants, aiming to create a confrontation with Israel and deteriorate King Abdullah II’s monarchy. IRGC platforms utilize ideology dissemination, encompassing various means and considerable funds to achieve its adverse hold.

The Islamic regime seeks to use public diplomacy and soft power to win the hearts and minds in Iraq and Jordan. Public diplomacy is a tool that both state and non-state actors use for various objectives, such as influencing others, setting agendas, mobilizing support, enhancing promotion and prestige, fostering dialogue, mutual understanding, and supporting shared values.^[24]

However, given the significant rift between the Hashemite Monarchy and the Islamic Republic, the government’s actions are often met with mistrust, leading to public skepticism. Consequently, the revolutionary regime has chosen to focus on subversion and intensifying domestic instability, aided by smugglers and militia networks operating under its auspices. 

Therefore, Israeli decision-makers must stay alert to the emerging east front to prevent unexpected contingencies. The unstable situation in Iraq and Jordan, along with the porous border areas between Jordan and Israel, presents opportunities for those with malicious intent and could significantly challenge Israel’s national resilience. The collaboration between Jordan and Israel will significantly affect Iran’s accomplishments in the Jordanian sphere and its prospective initiatives in the Hashemite Kingdom.

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^[1] Deterrence theory refers to the scholarship and practice of how threats of using force by one party can convince another party to refrain from initiating another course of action.

^[2] Doron Itzchakov, ‘Iran’s New Anti-Israel “Resistance Axis,’ BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 747, (February 20, 2018), Pp. 1-4. 

^[3] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-834360

^[4] https://www.mei.edu/blog/situation-red-sea-not-getting-better.

^[5] Orit Perlov, ‘An Evil Wind from the East?’, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1848 (April 2024), Pp. 1-5.

^[6]  Robert Satloff and David Schenker, ‘Political Instability in Jordan,’ Council on Foreign Relations, (May 2013), Pp. 1-12. 

^[7] Satloff et al., ‘Political Instability in Jordan’, Pp. 3-4.

^[8] Shi’a Islam is adhered to by approximately 10–15% of the global Muslim population. Twelver Shi’ism is the predominant and most influential Shi’a subsect, including around 85% of the global Shi’a Muslim population. Additional groups comprise the Isma’ili, Zaydi, Alevi, and Alawi. 

^[9]  ‘Smuggling weapons from Iran through Syria and Jordan,’ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he 

^[10]  Yair Routman, ‘The strategic danger from the east: Is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan already an Iranian province? Maarachot Journal (IDF Publishing, Aug. 2024), https://www.maarachot.idf.il/29947.

^[11] Ibid, https://www.maarachot.idf.il/29947.

^[12] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he 

^[13] Raz Zimmt, ‘Spotlight on Iran, December 18 – 25, 2024,‘ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-iran-and-the-shiite-axis-december-18-25-2024/

^[14]  Routman, ‘The strategic danger from the east,’ https://www.maarachot.idf.il/29947

^[15] ‘The strategic danger from the east,’ https://www.maarachot.idf.il/29947

^[16] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/captured-documents-reveal-how-iran-smuggles-weapons-via-syria-and-jordan/

^[17] Source: ‘Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan,’ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the ‘Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center’

^[18] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/ 

^[19] Source: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the ‘Israeli Intelligence Heritage’ and Commemoration Center

^[20] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/guay-designated-hezbollah-terrorist-organization-joining-argentina-gives-paraguays-government-better-tools-deal-hezbollahs-activities-especially-tri-border-area-ser/

^[21] Michael Barak, ‘Is Jordan an Emerging Iranian Anti-Israel Attrition Front?’, ICT– the International Institute for Counterterrorism(October 2024), Pp. 1-12.

^[22] Gönül Tol, ‘How Turkey Won the Syrian Civil War: Assad’s Downfall Is a Boon for Erdogan, at Least for Now’ Foreign Affairs, (December 2024). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/how-turkey-won-syrian-civil-war.

^[23]  https://www.mei.edu/blog/special-briefing-after-assads-fall-whats-next-syria-and-region

^[24] Geun Lee and Kadir Ayhan, “Why Do We Need Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy? Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked, and Collaborative Public Diplomacy,” Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (June 2015), pp. 60-61.