Abstract

On March 28, the Islamic Republic of Iran held its annual Ruz-e Jehani-ye Quds (henceforth: Quds Day) ceremony to express the nation’s support for the Palestinians. Iran makes notable efforts to commemorate this event, mobilizing its citizens to flood the streets in a manifestation of solidarity. As in previous years, members of the military and theocratic establishments issued provocative statements against Israel and denied its existence in the Middle East. However, this year marks a notable shift with an increased emphasis on Iran’s naval capabilities, intended to convey a deterrence message of its capabilities in the Persian Gulf and beyond. 

Quds Day, commemorated on the last Friday of Ramadan, has long served as a platform for Iran to express solidarity with the Palestinians and proclaim anti-Israel statements. However, this year, the Iranian revolutionary establishment highlighted its naval power and missile capabilities alongside the regime’s annual parades through a blend of ‘Hard and Soft Power’ strategies.

This yearly Quds Day manifestation occurs amidst threats from the Trump administration and the weakened power of the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ due to Hezbollah’s defeats and the collapse of the Assad regime. In light of its recent setbacks, Iran is endeavoring to establish new strategic alliances, perceiving Quds Day as an opportune occasion to showcase its strength and recruit potential allies in its ongoing global conflict.

The scrutiny relates to the rationale for the revolutionary government’s decision to showcase its naval strength in the Persian Gulf this year. The clarification for this analysis pertains to several factors. The primary objective is to convey to the United States, the West, and its neighboring countries its potential to interrupt all trade lines traversing the Persian Gulf, or as it articulates, ‘To ignite the Persian Gulf.’

The second motif pertains to its strategic perception, which is influenced and shaped by the Iran-Iraq War, in which Iran lost massive assets as well as lives. The decision to enhance its ballistic and naval capabilities stemmed from an assessment and apprehension of its vulnerabilities in comparison to its adversaries. Furthermore, the fact that the country was under sanctions imposed upon it and the efforts to overcome them generated a unique geopolitical perception.

The Iran-Iraq War had a profound and enduring impact on Iran’s domestic and international affairs. During the war, Iran initiated a multifaceted strategy that integrated ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ methods, interwoven with proxy Militias, which later established the Axis of Resistance.^[1]

The third rationale behind Iran’s decision to showcase its naval capabilities on Quds Day is the strengthening of its military and naval relations with Russia and China, as evidenced by recent joint drills. This demonstration of naval might is closely tied to its efforts in the cognitive realm, where Iran has invested significant energy for a prolonged period. The inspirational methods and cognitive biases are vital elements of Iran’s strategy. Deterrence efforts are associated with its ambitions to present itself, alongside China and Russia, as an alternative to Western and U.S. influence hegemony.

The Quds Day event exemplifies the Islamic government’s uncompromising stance against the existence of Israel. As in previous years, many Iranian citizens, both within the country and abroad, took part in demonstrations without fully understanding their purposes and motives. These ceremonies encompass hate speeches by senior Iranian officials who called for the destruction of Israel and the burning of its flags.

However, the main difference this year was observed in Lebanon, where a significant decrease in the number of participants and parades was noted. This data may suggest a substantial shift in the status of the terrorist organization Hezbollah, following the defeat it experienced and the potential future ramifications for the delicate social fabric of Lebanon. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, delivered his speech just a day later, on March 29. In his proclamation, Qassem emphasized the significance of both the Axis of Resistance and Hezbollah’s support for the Palestinians, under the directives from the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader.^[2]

The decision to commemorate Quds Day was made by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini shortly after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. The decision to mark Quds Day emerged from multiple interrelated variables, which gradually became a vital component of the revolutionary narrative.

This included emphasizing the revolutionary regime’s position on the Palestinian issue, allowing the Islamic regime to portray itself as the dominant power in the Muslim world. Another factor is intertwined with the historical Sunna-Shi’a rift and Khomeini’s aspiration to portray himself as a Muslim leader who transcended it. Consequently, he strove to elevate the status of the Shia sect within the Arab-Muslim world, and supporting the Palestinians served as a common denominator.

The narrative cultivated by the regime aimed to confront the prevailing hegemony of the US and Western countries (referred to as the ‘arrogant powers’) and to advocate for the unity of the Muslim world against their influence. Furthermore, the relationship between Khomeini and the Palestinians did not stem from a cohesive religious ideology, but rather from mutual interests that developed during his exile in Iraq, where he effectively consolidated opposition to the Shah’s regime.^[3]

Over time, the rituals associated with Quds Day have evolved into a manifestation of solidarity with the Iranian regime and its revolutionary values, both within Iran and abroad. Nonetheless, it is crucial to emphasize that a significant portion of Iran’s current population was not born in the years leading up to the revolution and, therefore, is being misled by the regime’s propagandists. These individuals are striving to foster an anti-Zionist, anti-Western mindset with overt anti-Semitic overtones. 

The fact that generated the founder of the Islamic Revolution’s attitude and cultivated his hatred towards the state of Israel is perceived as a paradigm. In Khomeini’s introduction to his book ‘Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami,’ he focused extensively on identifying his vision of the ‘enemies of Islam’. This document, which over time became the cornerstone of the Islamic regime’s constitution and political system, presented the Jews as enemies of Islam. Similarly, he positioned Israel at the core of his resistance framework, declaring the threat it poses to Islamic values.^[4]

Khomeini’s unwavering opposition to Israel’s presence in the region became, over time, a model for those seeking to demonstrate their loyalty to him and his legacy. After his death in June 1989, his statements regarding Israel continued to gain power and societal influence. Despite differences of opinion, the various factions of the government and the regime’s attitude toward Israel remained constant and presented a unified anti-Israel front. This stems from the fear that an opinion not aligned with that of the revolution’s instigator could result in a loss of political legitimacy and might even provoke a judicial tribunal. 

The hostility of the Islamic Republic towards Israel stems from both strategic and ideological considerations. On the ideological level, although it sometimes seems that the attitude towards Israel and the US stems from the same conceptual pattern, there is a fundamental difference. Iran’s position vis-à-vis the US is based on a deep conceptual conflict that involves stinging historical memory, but Iran has no objection to the US’s right to exist. 

This is not the case with Israel. The current Revolutionary government, encouraged by the security establishment, entirely rejects Israel’s presence in the Middle East. The Iranian regime’s anti-Zionism does not necessarily reflect the feelings of the Iranian people, who are concerned with their daily lives. The display of mass processions on Quds Day is not a testimony to pure ideology. The participation of large numbers of Iranians in marches is not proof that the entire Iranian populace shares the animosity towards Israel promoted by the regime. 

Concluding remarks

The Quds Day ceremonies have historically served as an Iranian platform to legitimize the regime’s policies both domestically and internationally. From the regime’s viewpoint, defending the vast investment of resources in favor of the Palestinians at the expense of its populace is required. It is well-known that Iranians experience high inflation and a low standard of living; therefore, the revolutionary regime strives to establish domestic legitimacy.

One may argue that Quds Day is closely intertwined and serves as a catalyst for the dissemination of Islamic revolutionary zeal beyond Iran’s boundaries. The concept of the ‘second Islamic revolution’ refers to the export of the Islamic revolution to other countries, aiming to support a pan-Islamic strategy that Iran seeks to promote. This strategy seeks to establish a common ground for recruiting activists beyond the Twelver Shi’a sect.The presentation of Iranian naval capabilities and its capacity to obstruct international trade passing through the Persian Gulf is a further instance of the Islamic regime’s efforts to project a perception of military might to attract new allies due to its losses in Syria and Lebanon. Essentially, a significant aspect of the extravagant show is to exert influence and attraction on the masses’ hearts and minds, both within Iran and across the broader Muslim world.

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^[1] Doron Itzchakov, ‘Iran’s New Anti-Israel “Resistance Axis,’ BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 747, (February 2018), Pp. 1-4.

^[2]‘Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (March 24 – 31, 2025),’ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/spotlight-on-terrorism-hezbollah-and-lebanon-march-24-31-2025/

^[3] Doron Itzchakov, ‘Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its longstanding ramifications,’ Israel Affairs, Vol. 29, Oct. 2023, Pp. 1094-1114, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2023.2269701 

^[4] Doron Itzchakov, ‘Iran’s Quds Day: Ideology or Interests?’, BESA Center Perspectives No. 876, (June 2018), Pp. 1-4