Introduction

Bondi Beach, a central public space in Sydney, became the site of a terrorist attack against members of the Jewish community during a Hanukkah event. This incident occurred against the backdrop of a rise in antisemitic discourse and violence, including increased mobilization around anti-Zionist narratives and intensified activity by both jihadist organizations and state-sponsored actors directed against Jewish and Israeli targets worldwide. Since October 7, 2023, these trends have accelerated, reflected in reported antisemitic incidents, greater exposure to hate discourse on social media, and a growing number of attempted and successful attacks on Jewish individuals, institutions, and symbols across multiple regions.

This article focuses on the Sydney attack within this evolving threat environment. The analysis examines the incident in relation to broader trends, including the development of global jihadist discourse, the expansion of antisemitic mobilization, and the operational engagement of Iranian-directed networks. The article further considers the implications of these dynamics for Jewish communities abroad, with a particular focus on security preparedness, policy responses, and the necessity for sustained monitoring and coordinated protective frameworks.

Overview of the Sydney Bondi Beach attack

On December 14, 2025, two armed terrorists carried out a mass-casualty shooting during a public event marking the first night of Hanukkah, a Jewish holiday, at Archer Park near Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia. The event was attended by members of the local Jewish community alongside international visitors. The attack constitutes Australia’s deadliest mass shooting since the 1996 Port Arthur massacre. As a result of the attack, 15 civilians, were murdered. In addition, 42 people were injured.¹

The investigation identified two attackers: Sajid Akram (50) and his son, Naveed Akram (24), both residents of Bonnyrigg, approximately 40 kilometers from Bondi Beach. Sajid Akram immigrated from Hyderabad, India, in 1988 and operated a fruit shop, while his Australian-born son worked as a bricklayer.² Sajid Akram was a licensed firearm holder and legally possessed six firearms at the time of the attack. Australian security agencies recovered six firearms and three improvised explosive devices at the scene and stated that the IEDs, along with two Islamic State flags, were found inside a vehicle registered to Naveed Akram and parked near the attack site.³

A screenshot from a video taken during the Bondi Beach attack shows two terrorists holding firearms and shooting, while bystanders are visible nearby

Australian Federal Police Commissioner Krissy Barrett stated that the Sydney attack was inspired by Islamic State ideology. Naveed Akram had previously been assessed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) for approximately six months in 2019 due to suspected links to an Islamic State cell in Sydney and was ultimately deemed not to pose an imminent threat.⁴ Prime Minister Anthony Albanese later stated that Akram had connections to Isaac El Matari, who had been imprisoned for acting as an Australian Islamic State commander. The investigation also revealed that on November 1, 2025, the father and son traveled to the Philippine city of Davao, returning to Sydney via Manila on November 28, 2025. Australian intelligence agencies are investigating whether the pair received military-style or weapons training during their time in the Philippines.⁵

Behind the global rise in attacks against Jewish communities

The attack in Australia cannot be understood in isolation. Since October 7th, several significant trends have emerged targeting Jewish communities abroad, including a sharp rise in antisemitism, increasing Iranian activity, and a growing global jihadist discourse explicitly calling for action against Jews. Together, these dynamics create an increasingly hostile environment that demands closer examination and sustained monitoring of the evolving threat landscape.

Rise in global jihad discourse and attacks against Jews

In the aftermath of the Bondi Beach attack and the subsequent identification of its links to global jihadist networks, many observers expected the Islamic State to formally claim responsibility. However, the Islamic State did not issue an official claim. Instead, the organization addressed the incident in its weekly Al-Naba editorial under the headline “Pride of Sydney.” In this publication, the Islamic State praised the attack, rejected claims that it refrains from targeting Jewish communities, and ridiculed what it portrayed as the failure of Western security agencies to effectively prevent attacks against Jews and Christians in the West.

Screenshot from the Al-Naba weekly editorial, published by the Islamic State, under the headline “Pride of Sydney.”

Dr. Michael Barak, head of the Global Jihad Desk at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), explains that the attack on Bondi Beach is part of a much broader strategy that Al-Qaeda formulated back in 2005. Al-Qaeda laid out the idea of “decentralized jihad”, a concept designed to change the traditional hierarchical structure of jihadist organizations and instead move toward a diffuse, independent model of jihad. Al-Qaeda was meant to serve as an inspiration for jihadists around the world, leading to what became known as “lone-wolf attacks.”

Dr. Barak continues and explains that jihadists attempted to find ways to mobilize or motivate ordinary Muslims, who are just sitting on the couch at home, to take initiative, go out into the streets, and carry out attacks against Jews and Christians. The strategy was to exploit the internet and to show images of Americans in Iraq or to show suffering in Gaza, all to incite and encourage Muslims to carry out violent actions against Jews. Once the narrative focuses on how Jews are “humiliating” Muslims, it serves as motivation. 

Over the years, both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State built on this approach as they evolved, crafting messages tailored to specific audiences, including content produced in multiple languages. Various publications were released not only to encourage attacks but also to explain how to attack, such as Inspire magazine and texts like The Lone Wolves of Manhattan, which provided guidance for potential attackers.

Both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, before and certainly after October 7th, have used their propaganda channels to call for focusing attacks on Jewish communities in the West. Their messaging references Hitler and even attempts to justify the Holocaust. They present three reasons: first, to weaken Jewish community support for Israel in the West, as they are seen as key financial and political supporters of Israel and the IDF, thereby weakening Israel’s resilience. Second, to undermine Jewish lobbying power in the West, reducing numbers, harming institutions, and thus diminishing Jewish influence in countries that tend to support Israel. Third, it promotes classic antisemitic conspiracy claims, asserting that Jews control the global economy, manipulating public consciousness, and openly calling for genocide and religiously motivated ethnic cleansing of Jews.

Al-Naba editorial explaining “practical steps to fight the Jews” and calling upon attacking Jews in the West.

The Islamic State maintains a theological discourse explaining why it does not currently wage a direct, full-scale front against Israel — but that does not mean it has abandoned the fight against Jews. The Sydney attack, even though the Islamic State did not formally claim responsibility, demonstrates the extent of its ideological influence and inspiration.

The attackers in Sydney had been exposed to this content on social media and drew inspiration from the Islamic State. Their travel to the southern Philippines, which is considered a stronghold of the organization, suggests they may have gone there to receive weapons-related training. However, Dr. Barak emphasized that this does not necessarily indicate they were acting under direct Islamic State command, but rather that they were ideologically inspired by it. However, we must not overlook the potential influence, guidance, and direction that this connection may have created.

In any case, the social climate in Australia is already highly charged and increasingly anti-Israel. Within such an environment, the gap between consuming incitement and resorting to violence becomes significantly narrower.

Growing antisemitism and anti-Zionism worldwide

There has been a substantial escalation in anti-Israel, anti-Zionist, and antisemitic discourse in the context of the war in Gaza since October 7, 2023. What initially existed largely within established BDS networks, pro-Palestinian activist frameworks, and elements of the extreme far-right has increasingly developed into a more mainstream movement, significantly amplified through widespread dissemination on social media platforms. This trend has been reflected in large-scale demonstrations and public events opposing Israel and Jewish communities, as well as in a growing wave of violence against Jews around the world.

According to Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, head of ICT’s Global Far-Right and Antisemitism Desk, the Bondi Beach attack did not occur in isolation. It took place against the backdrop of a dramatic rise in antisemitism worldwide since the events of October 7, and reflects a broader shift from hostile discourse to violent action. In recent months, we have seen an intensification of delegitimization and collective blame directed at Jews, and at times toward the State of Israel, with Jews increasingly perceived as representing or bearing responsibility for Israel’s actions. This blurring of identity and state policy gradually lowers the threshold for physical violence and contributes to the normalization of violence against Jews. From a security perspective, this trend is manifested in the expansion of “soft,” non-organized threats, often carried out by individuals acting without formal organizational affiliation, making early detection and prevention particularly challenging. This pattern is evident in attacks in recent months, including the assault on Jews near a synagogue in Manchester and the stabbing attack in New York.

Dr. Koblentz-Stenzler continues and argues that phrases such as “globalize the intifada” are not rhetorical flourishes. They function as mobilizing language. Abstract enough to spread globally, yet concrete enough to legitimize real-world violence. And indeed, hostile and hate discourse toward Israel and Jewish communities has steadily moved into the mainstream, amplified by social media, global media narratives, legal debates, and extensive criticism of Israel, including allegations of deliberate starvation and killing during the war. As this rhetoric escalated, it contributed to a surge in attacks on Jewish individuals and symbols across the world.

As in many other countries, the Bondi Beach attack occurred amid a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in Australia, particularly in Sydney’s Jewish community. According to the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), reported incidents increased almost fivefold since October 7, 2023.⁶ These included physical assaults, vandalism, harassment, graffiti, posters and stickers, and online abuse, with major spikes in violent attacks and arson targeting Jewish homes, businesses, and community sites.

While the attack at Bondi Beach was clearly directed against Jewish people, a narrative circulating online, mainly among antisemitic and far-right influencers, claims that it was a false-flag operation conducted by Israel. This is neither surprising nor the first instance. Control over the narrative is a central tool these extremists use to influence their audiences and recruit new supporters. ICT Fellow Col. (Res.) Guy Itzhaki argues that “these dynamics demonstrate that social media is not only a channel for distributing information, but a key arena in which the meaning and legitimacy of antisemitic violence are contested.”

Mark Collett (British far right activist) Telegram channel – Poster titled: Was the Bondi Attack a False Flag?⁷

Iranian operations against Israel and Jews abroad

Since October 2023, Iran and its proxies have been linked to attempted and successful attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide, using both direct IRGC or Hezbollah operatives and locally recruited criminal networks. Plots have been foiled in Brazil⁸ against synagogues, in Cyprus against Israeli and Jewish communities, and across Germany and Denmark involving espionage and weapons procurement. In Europe, Iranian-directed gangs have been connected to incidents targeting Israeli diplomatic facilities in Sweden and Belgium, as well as arson against Israeli-owned businesses in southern France and planned attacks in Germany. The United Kingdom has likewise reported multiple disrupted Iranian plots against Israeli, Jewish, and dissident targets. 

Importantly for Australia, this global trend extended to its territory. Australia’s domestic security agency, ASIO, concluded that the December 2024 firebombing of the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne was linked to Iran, describing it as part of a broader pattern of antisemitic attacks orchestrated through intermediaries by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.⁹

Dr. Eitan Azani, acting director of the ICT, stresses that Iran and its proxies—particularly following the Twelve-Day War during which Israel and the United States targeted Iranian nuclear facilities and military assets—have become even more convinced of the need to continue, and even escalate, their activities against what they perceive as the “weaker link”: Jewish communities abroad. The IRGC and Hezbollah maintain extensive global networks, and therefore, the increasing number of attempted attacks should not be viewed as surprising, and such efforts will likely continue across multiple arenas.

Under growing threat: what’s next for Jewish communities worldwide?

A broader phenomenon: The need for a holistic and multi-layered approach

The Bondi Beach attack should not be understood as an isolated incident but as part of a broader and ongoing phenomenon that Jewish communities around the world are likely to continue facing in the coming years. As Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler argues, focusing solely on the perpetrators risks overlooking the wider social, ideological, and technological environment that enables such attacks to materialize. The concept of a “global intifada” is becoming increasingly mainstream and poses a risk not only to Jewish communities but also to Western countries. It encompasses a radicalizing ideology that encourages violence and legitimizes attacks against civilians.

Therefore, an holistic and multi-layered approach is essential to understand the threat and develop effective strategies for prevention, resilience, and response.

Security of local Jewish communities

Informal representatives of the local Jewish community in Sydney emphasize the need for a deeper understanding of the threats facing Jewish and Israeli communities in Australia, alongside stronger involvement of both established community security bodies and the wider, diverse community. They stress the importance of coordinated cooperation with Australian security agencies to enhance protection and resilience.

This approach offers a broader strategic perspective that should be adopted not only in Australia but also in other countries with large Jewish communities, as the evolving situation is expected to generate further threats and potential attacks. The most immediate risk, according to Dr. Eitan Azani, of copycat attacks is high, and it does not matter whether they come from jihadists, Iranian-backed groups, or antisemitic extremists. A successful attack and the relative ease of carrying it out may encourage others to take similar actions.

This should include intelligence capabilities—particularly OSINT—which are becoming essential for monitoring, identifying, and mitigating risks to Jewish communities. As Acting Director Dr. Eitan Azani notes, comprehensive open-source intelligence, including an in-depth understanding of enemy capabilities, is critical for detecting emerging trends, mapping hostile networks, and enabling timely preventive action. Likewise, ICT Fellow Col. (Res.) Guy Itzhaki emphasizes that safeguarding Jewish communities today requires not only physical protection—such as guards at entrances and reinforced infrastructure—but also an active presence in the digital domain, where radicalization, coordination, and narrative manipulation increasingly take place.

Laws, regulations, and state responsibility

At the same time, governments must reconsider the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding hate speech, incitement, extremist organizations, and online radicalization. ICT Senior Researcher, Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Uri Ben Yaakov suggests that strengthening legislation against incitement to antisemitic violence, improving law enforcement capabilities to track extremist networks, and enhancing international intelligence and judicial cooperation are critical steps. This includes addressing Iranian, jihadist, far-right, and far-left ecosystems; regulating online platforms more effectively; ensuring accountability for those who spread operational guidance or glorify violence; and developing clearer policies for protecting Jewish communities. Ultimately, the responsibility for ensuring Jewish communal security cannot rest solely on the communities themselves; it must be recognized as a national security priority and addressed through coordinated government–community partnership.

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3. NSW Police Force. (2025). Latest news – NSW Police public site. NSW Government. Retrieved December 17, 2025, from https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/news/news ↩︎
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6. ECAJ. “The ECAJ 2023 Antisemitism Report – ECAJ.” ECAJ – Executive Council of Australian Jewry, 26 Jan. 2024, www.ecaj.org.au/the-ecaj-2023-antisemitism-report/.
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7. Telegram: https://t.me/markacollett/18754
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8. Ottolenghi, E. (2024, February 20). Hezbollah terror plot in Brazil. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). https://ict.org.il/hezbollah-terror-plot-in-brazil/
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9. Reuters. (2025, August 27). Australia’s intelligence agency traces Melbourne synagogue firebombing to Iranian involvement. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-link-australian-synagogue-attack-uncovered-via-funding-trail-spy-agency-2025-08-27/
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