The Black Continent in 2025 – What to Expect?
Africa remains the epicenter of global terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 59% of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Terrorism is the most significant threat to peace, security, and sustainable development across the African continent. This trend will worsen in 2025 after the withdrawal of European forces and the deployment of Turkish and Russian forces in their place.
Africa is the continent with the fastest population and temperature growth, which raises worries about rising risks for economic instability, food security, migration, and health. Violent and bloody conflicts remain geographically concentrated in a belt that runs from the Western Sahel through large parts of Central Africa to the Horn of Africa.[1]While structural challenges may lead to escalation in many countries and places on the black continent, I believe there are several main phenomena that require special attention in 2025:
- Jihadism will continue to hit many countries in the Sahel and expand into the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa. The eastern Congo and Mozambique will continue to see pockets of Islamist activity. The west coast of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea countries, remain threatened and expected, in part, to ‘suffer’ from radical Islamic organizations.[2] The causes of the spread of jihadism are country-specific. Still, they are often related to the dissatisfaction and alienation of ethno-regional groups, the lack of economic opportunities, general dissatisfaction with the incumbent governments and their extent of presence in the far periphery, as well as the lack of effective territorial control.
- The al-Qaeda-ISIS rivalry will continue and intensify: Since the beginning of 2020, waves of violent conflicts have been brewing between ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Sahel region. Natural resources, hegemony, and internal conflicts are a few reasons that fuel the growing conflict. There are also other reasons: local, regional, and international dynamics that together change the balance of power, putting previously cordial relations under strain.[3] In the Sahel, the two leading terrorist groups accuse each other of deviating from the path of jihad; ISIS always accuse al-Qaeda of being lenient, while al-Qaeda accuses ISIS of being excessively brutal. The two groups have ideological differences and different perceptions of who they consider their enemies to be; this creates a difference in their modus operandi. While al-Qaeda in the Sahel emphasizes fighting the government, officials, and foreign forces, and avoids harming Muslims, ISIS believes in Takfirism and allows its members to kill Muslims who do not follow the tenets of Islam in its view.[4] ISIS’s ideological teachings focus on building dogmatic fighters committed to establishing a caliphate.
- Due to a shortage of resources in the area, these terrorist organizations have been compelled to take over regions where they can make a living, which has led to a shared operational area and regular conflicts between the groups. The sphere of influence of both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates overlaps in certain strategic areas, which usually creates tensions between the two groups.
- Tribal conflicts on ethnic grounds – sometimes these conflicts, between ethnic tribes, on the basis of survival needs overlap with the modest jihadist goals as in the case of Mali – violent conflicts that continue to pose a risk to the territorial integrity of the state. The phenomenon is very common in Mali as well as in Cameroon and Burkina Faso.
- The mass demonstrations against the government have emerged as a prominent challenge to the state and its military forces. Recent years have been characterized by a wave of military coups not only in the Sahel but also in Sudan and Gabon.[5] The demonstrations against the government, often led by youth, sometimes turn violent – as recently seen in Kenya and Mozambique – and warrant further examination.[6] There is no other way to address the demands of today’s young people.
- Presidential elections in Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon and Tanzania. The year 2025 will be marked by four major presidential elections, each raising issues of governance and exchange. What the military will do about the outcome is unknown; anything is possible. [7]
- In an era of heightened global strategic competition, sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as a key theatre of rivalry between states seeking to increase their influence on the continent – a ‘new scramble for Africa. Recent years have witnessed a rise in new ‘global strategies’ with Africa and international summits involving African countries and external powers such as China, Russia, the US, Turkey, India, Saudi Arabia, and, from 2024, South Korea. Africa has emerged as a focus of Turkey’s influence strategy, led by the discreet but assertive approach of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, marked by over 40 official visits to the continent since the early 2000s. In contrast, France’s influence in West Africa has waned as political authorities and growing segments of local populations have criticized its military intervention and foreign policy, often perceived as neo-colonial.
- Emerging concerns: Apart from the current concerns facing the continent, there is a chance that malicious actors would take advantage of the consequences of climate change, which might further destabilize the area. These actors may target critical energy and technological infrastructure or use climate as a pretext to trigger conflicts. Potential attacks on submarine cables, by state or non-state actors, could severely undermine the economic stability of entire countries or regions, especially in areas where a significant number of cables and significant trade traffic converge – such as off the coast of East Africa near Djibouti and the Red Sea. Moreover, the risk of violent conflicts over water resources is expected to increase, specifically on the Nile River. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is causing tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia that could turn into regional warfare. Terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have already exploited water sources by poisoning Lake Chad, for example. This tactic is likely to increase as resources become scarcer.
Elections in several countries – what to expect?
In the Ivory Coast, the political future remains uncertain. After three terms, Ouattara has not yet ruled out a fourth term, while the opposition, led by figures such as Thiam, Laurent Gbagbo, Pascal Effi N’Guessan, and Simon Ehivet Gbagbo, is calling for reform of the electoral code.
In Cameroon, the main question concerns the candidacy of Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982 and is now 91 years old. His possible reappointment has sparked heated debate, while Maurice Kamto has already announced his participation in the vote.
In Gabon, the August 2025 elections will take place in a particular context following the 2023 coup that overthrew Ali Bongo. The transitional president, Brice Oligoy Nguema, has amended the constitution by strengthening the powers of the head of state. Still, uncertainty remains about his willingness to transfer power to a civilian government.
In Tanzania, President Samia Suluhu Hassan appears well-placed for a second term, buoyed by a growing economy. However, tensions remain over opposition rights and civil liberties.
Geopolitics in 2025 – The New Multipolar Era
The aforementioned events are connected by a secondary thread that includes themes of poor governance, discontent, and significant estrangement from the ruling administrations.
It is necessary to address the basic structural conditions of each country. I am not at all sure that African countries have the necessary forces to cope. Therefore, Western countries, understanding the dangers they face from the collapse of the state order on the Black Continent and the takeover of it by radical Islam, must step in to help, while avoiding paternalism and being aware of the risks of intervention in a foreign country.
Changing geopolitics could be an opportunity as long as the EU, the US, and other players reconsider the nature of their relationships and efforts to promote stability on the African continent in 2025. As part of the rethinking, military assistance of all kinds should not be ruled out. Still, any improvement in living conditions and general government policies will likely have a more calming effect in the long run.
In 2025, African countries in general and the Sahel in particular will struggle to maintain peace and security (territorial sovereignty), as well as the provision of other essential public goods and services.[8] However, the facts and reality appear to indicate that nations, particularly those in the Sahel, are unable to control criminal networks, gangs, and jihadist organizations in both urban and rural areas.
Even if one disagrees with the above conceptual framework, the overall trends are unmistakable from the actual situation.
True, the current situation is not at all similar to the hellish landscape of ‘The Coming Anarchy’ described in Robert Kaplan’s book.[9] Still, the African continent is reaching a point where the comparisons do not seem far-fetched. This should worry the entire Western world much more than is currently happening.
New players have entered the Sahel arena, mainly, but also other countries on the continent: Russia, Turkey, China, and the Persian Gulf states. Military rulers from Mali to Niger are learning the hard way that Russian forces alone cannot eradicate the root problems that have led to the rise of Islamist terrorist organizations in the region. Russian forces (Africa Corps) have suffered significant losses fighting Tuareg separatist rebels and al-Qaeda-linked JNIM fighters in Mali.[10]Armed Islamist groups continue to spread across West Africa along the Gulf of Guinea and into Ivory Coast and Ghana, meaning insecurity will only increase.
Africa does not need solutions imposed from the outside but partnerships that recognize and support the capacity of African countries to solve the challenges they face. If this does not happen, it is likely that 2025 in Africa will be deadlier and bloodier.
[1] ACLED 2024
[2] Central Africa and the Horn of Africa remain affected by multiple armed conflicts (Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia), resulting in severe humanitarian crises.
[3] Among the reasons why al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have chosen the Maghreb and the Sahel as a base of operations may be the presence of local militias characterized by a variety of violent conflicts among themselves. The militias themselves thrive in these regions thanks to the lack of governance and the availability of resources that guarantee survival and a source of funding. Facts that led to inter-tribal conflicts that were exploited by Islamic organizations to provide support, one side or another, in the form of basic daily necessities, weapons, which provided an opportunity for the penetration and spread of the radical ideology of the organizations. This has serious consequences for local civilian populations. In neglected areas of the Sahel, with a weak government presence or the absence of public services, groups such as ISGS and JNIM offer themselves as a strong alternative to the state, providing locals with goods, essential services, security and education according to Sharia – an alternative to government.
[4] Takfiri – “Minority ideology” that supports the killing of other Muslims declared infidels. The accusation itself is called takfir, derived from the Arabic word kefir (“infidel”), and describes someone who is a Muslim declared impure. Since the late 20th century, the name Khawarij has emerged primarily as a derogatory term for Takfiri groups, given that the Khawarij are considered an extremist and even heretical sect. The Khawarij, like today’s Takfiri groups, waged jihad against Muslims they considered insufficiently devout.
[5] Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2024
https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/ten-things-to-watch-in-africa-in-2024
[6] The tendency of political authorities, especially transitional authorities, to cling to power may increase their unpopularity over time, leading to a continued increase in coups and popular uprisings, especially in Francophone countries, which are currently most affected by crises.
[7] The internal divisions within sub-Saharan African governments, particularly in the Sahel, are likely to continue to contribute to rising threats such as corruption, nepotism, and the curtailment of individual freedoms. If left untreated, these governance failures will continue to fuel radicalization, extremist recruitment, and violent popular uprisings, increasing the risk of coups, rebellions, and civil wars.
[8] Gabriele Steinhauser, Andrew Barnett, and Emma Brown, “Africa Has Entered a New Era of War,” The Wall Street Journal (December 31, 2024).
https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/africa-has-entered-a-new-era-of-war-c6171d8e
[9] Robert D. Kaplan “The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War,
Random House (13.2.2001).
[10] The Russian force was invited by the Central African Republic, Mali and Burkina Faso to replace the French military presence, and in Niger to replace the US military presence.
