Mali in Trouble: Attack on Bamako and Kati Undermines Junta Security Narrative
On April 25, 2026, a number of military locations, including Kati, the capital Bamako, Modibo-Keïta/Sénou International Airport, Gao, Kidal, Sévaré, and Mopti, were the target of coordinated strikes by the JNIM, the independent Tuareg rebels in Mali. The Malian army claims to have regained control of the situation. The situation is not yet clear.[1] This large-scale attack exposes the vulnerability of the military junta led by Assimi Goïta and calls into question the narrative of reconquering and eliminating the Islamist rebel factions and establishing security in the country with the help of its Russian ally.
The attack on the Kati military camp and facilities near the airport in Bamako on April 25 sends a negative message to the Malian military junta. The town of Kati is no ordinary target: it is a garrison town on the outskirts of Bamako,[2] which houses the country’s main military base. General Guetta lives there, giving the attack both political and military significance.
The attack also hit the home of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, who was killed.[3] The Malian army announced late this morning that the situation was “under control,” noting that operations to clear the area of rebels were continuing.
The attack sequence is concerning since it seems to be a coordinated attack on multiple targets rather than an isolated attack.
The continuous crisis that started in 2012 includes the current security situation, when Tuareg tribal rebellions and jihadist Islamic groups took control of large areas of northern Mali.[4] More than a decade later, the risk that Bamako faces is the re-emergence of this front between separatist groups and jihadist organizations.
At this stage, there is no full and verified acceptance of responsibility that would allow all the attacks to be attributed to a single entity. However, several security sources point with certainty to the involvement of the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate that appears to be coordinated with the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), a coalition dominated by Tuareg groups.[5] The FLA, for its part, claims to have taken control of positions in Gao and a military camp in Kidal. These claims have not been definitively verified.
In 2023, the recapture of Kidal by the Malian army and its Russian allies was declared a historic victory for Bamako.[6] To see this city under renewed struggle, or even partially recaptured, according to the separatists, is a symbolic blow for the junta. The political narrative of a regime that has basedits legitimacy on the promise of restoring national sovereignty is directly impacted by the problem, making it more than merely a military one.
Since the withdrawal of French forces from Operation Barkhane and the end of the MINUSMA mission, Mali has chosen to rely heavily on Russia to rebuild its security apparatus.[7]
The UN mission in Mali was officially closed on December 31, 2023, following a Security Council resolution adopted at the request of the Malian authorities. The change and reliance on Russia did not prevent the continued expansion of armed groups. The Russian presence itself evolved and intensified: the ‘Wagner Force’ officially left Mali in June 2025, and was replaced by the ‘Africa Corps’, a paramilitary structure more directly controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
As previously stated, the Malian army continues to struggle to stop complex and simultaneous attacks, particularly in the close neighbourhood of the capital, Bamako, and the reliance on Russia has not resolved the underlying issue.
The attack of April 25, therefore, reveals a major contradiction. By cutting off relations with France, the MINUSMA’s mission, and some of its previous Western allies, the military junta in Bamako asserts that it has restored its strategic sovereignty.
But this declared sovereignty clashes with another operational reality: armed groups retain a capacity for initiative, mobility, and coordination that goes far beyond simple rural harassment.
Additionally, the Mali crisis is taking place in a confused diplomatic environment. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally withdrew from ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States) on January 29, 2025, and established their own ‘Alliance of the Sahel States’ (AES). Mechanisms for regional cooperation have been weakened by this separation, although ECOWAS currently maintains some freedom of movement and trade with the three countries.
For Mali, the attack comes at a particularly delicate time. The government regularly accuses external actors of supporting or tolerating armed groups, while neighboring countries and international partners fear a security crisis that could spread throughout the region. If the attacks around the cities of Bamako, Gao, Kidal, or Sévaré expand, it is to be expected that the entire balance of power in the Sahel could be further undermined.
The economic impact could be severe. Insecurity disrupts transport routes, raises the prices of imported goods, and puts pressure on Bamako’s supply lines. As you may recall, JNIM had already imposed a gasoline import ban in 2025 and escalated attacks on tanker convoys, which occasionally caused the capital to come to a standstill. A demonstration of the JNIM’s ability to damage the economy as much as the army. The mining sector, a pillar of Mali’s finances, is also vulnerable. Gold is by far the country’s largest export. In this context, any continued deterioration in the security situation could negatively affect investment, transport, insurance, and the country’s ability to benefit from its resources.
For the population, this attack is mainly reinforcing a sense of anxiety. Roadblocks, patrols, and militarization of public spaces are no longer enough to calm them when fire breaks out near the airport or in a sensitive garrison town like Katy.
Long thought to be centered in the country’s north and center, the battle now appears to be moving closer to the regime’s core.
[1] Armed groups launch coordinated attacks across Mali
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyx7nnrkqdo
Attacks in Mali Mark Long Trajectory of Worsening Security
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/attacks-in-mali-underscore-worsening-security-trajectory/
[2] The city, 15km from the capital, is home to Mali’s army headquarters and the residence of General Assimi Goitta, the president of Mali.
[3] Mali defense minister killed as country hit by wave of rebel attacks https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yvy7v66ndo
[4] The 2012 Mali crisis was a multifaceted disaster that began in January 2012, characterized by a Tuareg-led rebellion in the north, a military coup in the capital, and the subsequent takeover of the rebellion by Islamist extremist groups, although the (secular) MNLA had launched the rebellion, They were quickly overshadowed by Islamist groups, notably Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). This series of events led to the collapse of the Malian state in the north, severe humanitarian suffering, and led to international military intervention. Following an Islamist push towards the capital, France launched Operation Serval in January 2013 to retake the north, and subsequently sent a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA).
[5] The Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA), founded in Tinzaouatène on 30 November 2024, is the new name of a coalition of Tuareg separatist armed groups in northern Mali. The Front for the Liberation of Azawad is a Tuareg rebel movement fighting for self-determination for northern Mali. An opportunistic ally of jihadists, the organization is led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, and has united existing factions, including the HCUA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), MNLA (High Council for Unity of Azawad), and parts of the MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad) and GATIA (Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies), to fight against the Russian-backed Malian army. Their goal is to establish an independent state.
[6] The Kidal offensive was an attack by the Malian government and Wagner Group mercenaries (PMC) against the rebel coalition, the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD), with the aim of capturing the rebel-held Kidal region. The offensive was part of a renewed conflict between the Malian junta that came to power in 2021 and former Tuareg rebel groups that signed the Algiers Agreement in 2015, creating a ceasefire and de facto rebel control of the region. The attack was also an attempt by Malian forces to take over MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) camps in the Kidal region after the Malian junta ordered the mission to leave the country by the end of 2023.
Malian forces, assisted by a Wagner force, captured the town of Tessalit and its MINUSMA base in late October after clashes with the CSP-PSD over control of the town and the evacuation of peacekeepers from Chad. Malian forces and Wagner forces subsequently captured the regional capital Kidal in the Battle of Kidal on 14 November, and Aguelhok on 20 December.
On the Wagner force leading the way, see: Au Mali, Wagner toujours en première ligne pour Goïta
https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1492980/politique/au-mali-wagner-toujours-en-premiere-ligne-pour-goita
On the evacuation of the MINUSMA mission, see: UN peacekeeping mission ends after decade
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67851525
On the occupation of Kidal, see : Mali : l’armée prend Kidal, fief des rebelles du Cadre stratégique permanent
David Doukhan. “Mali – The Battle of Kidal” International Institute for Counter-terrorism (November 2023).
https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Doukhan_Mali-The-Battle-of-Kidal_2023_22_11.pdf
[7] ‘Operation Barkhane’ was a major counter-insurgency operation led by the French military, which operated in Mali and the wider Sahel region from August 2014 to November 2022, with the aim of combating Islamist armed groups. Following rising tensions with the Malian military junta, French forces were required to leave the country, completing their withdrawal from the country in August 2022, thus ending their official military presence.
