Chaos in the Sahel: After Mali, is it Burkina Faso and Niger’s turn?
Together with the Tuaregs of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), the jihadists of JNIM (“Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen”) are on the rise in Mali, in a remarkable position of power against a weaker military junta, and are closer than ever to taking Bamako, the country’s capital. What can Mali’s allies, the AES (The Alliance of Sahel States), do in the face of the threat posed to them by radical Islamic organizations, after Mali’s collapse seems closer than ever?
As a reminder, the security agreement of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), created in 2023 by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, led by the military, focused on collective defense and the fight against spreading Islamic terrorism.[1] The alliance established a joint military force of 5,000 soldiers (FU-AES – United Force of the Alliance of Sahel States)[2] to secure borders and close down on radical/separatist armed groups, prioritizing regional sovereignty over ties with ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States) or Western allies. The force increased from 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers last February, amid increasing violence against civilians in the three countries. At the time, upon its establishment, it was said that the force had been reorganized to be able to deal with any scenario.[3]
The junta in Burkina Faso and Niger, which are also targets of Islamist attacks on their territory, and Mali, which is in crisis and may collapse, have put this military alliance to the test. What do the alliance countries intend to do to help Mali on the one hand, and on the other hand, prevent the expansion of the cycle of violence on their territory? Expected aid and cooperation anchored in the military alliance have proven porous.[4] The silent response from AES members Burkina Faso and the Republic of Niger to the series of attacks in Mali demonstrates a coalition that cannot mobilize quickly to defend one of its own, a response that raises fundamental questions about the operational credibility of the alliance.
Mali has not yet fallen, but it is trembling and closer than ever to total collapse. The jihadists, together with the Tuareg rebels, are in a position of strength. Recent events in the form of the fall of key cities and the abandonment of the fighting by the Russian partner also raise serious doubts about the ability of the junta in Mali to deal with the threats to territorial sovereignty posed by the armed groups, as well as the ability and effectiveness of the Russian partners, the ‘African Corps’, to protect their allies in power.
Just a few kilometers away, Mali’s neighbors and partners in the Alliance of the Sahel States (AES) are also threatened. They are led by the army and supported by the Russian paramilitary forces of the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group). The alliance excels in strong rhetoric about common goals and interests and aversion to the West, but as joint action becomes more important, it is rejected in various circumstances.
Burkina Faso and Niger are under pressure from armed jihadist groups. Large areas of Burkina Faso are completely outside the control of the state. The government controls and manages to defend, at best, about 35% of the country.[5] As in Mali, JNIM is also active in Burkina Faso. Al-Qaeda in the Sahel jihadists control the Yagadi region, about 100 km from the country’s first military command area.[6]
However, the terrorist group does not have the ability to form the same alliances as in Mali. The Tuareg are deeply divided, and the FLA has almost no influence outside Mali, so JNIM cannot hope to mobilize the same fighting base as in northern Mali.
In Niger, it is the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) that holds the upper hand.[7] And that makes all the difference. JNIM is the most politically structured jihadist group in the region, the chaos in Mali cannot be replicated elsewhere. An alliance between the two groups is highly unlikely. These alliances are like the sands of the Sahara: they shift and change over time. JNIM deeply loathes the Islamic State in the Sahel and fights it in various ways.[8]
However, this does not protect Niger from jihadist attacks such as the one that occurred last January, when the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on the airport in the capital, Niamey.[9] Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) knows how to exploit chaos and take advantage of the recent unrest caused by its enemies in Mali.
Even though circumstances differ significantly amongst nations, they tend to recur in recent years. Mali was the first to experience a military coup in 2021, followed by Burkina Faso in 2022 and then Niger in 2023. As in Mali, its neighbors demanded the withdrawal of French forces from their territory before joining the Russians to fight the jihadist rebellion.
In the Sahel, the three military juntas believe that the only way to defeat a well-funded, resource-rich and highly motivated rebellion is to wage a large-scale military campaign against it. To do this, they need domestic legitimacy and a variety of military assistance that Russia does not necessarily have the capabilities and resources to provide. Prioritizing the kinetic option, with all its implications, means continuing to neglect basic social and economic problems, a fact that may undermine the stability of the juntas’ governments and deepen the internal crises in those countries, thereby facilitating the penetration of radical Islamic organizations into them.
[1] The Message Communicated to African Regionalization Following the Creation of the Alliance of Sahel States-AES
[2] Alliance of Sahel States to form 5,000-troop military unit
https://wademosnetwork.org/2025/01/alliance-of-sahel-states-to-form-5000-troop-military-unit/
[3] The Alliance of Sahel States-AES uses funds from Burkina Faso’s Patriotic Support Fund, Niger’s Solidarity Fund for the Safeguarding of the Homeland, and Mali’s Support Fund for Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects for Basic Infrastructure and Social Development Projects). The countries are also working to prevent the force from becoming overly dependent on any one external country for support. See Article 10 of the Alliance Charter :
Charte du Liptako-Gourma
Instituant l’Alliance des États du Sahel entre le Burkina Faso, la République du Mali, la République du Niger.
https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/sahel2023.htm
The effectiveness of the AES force will depend on its ability to cooperate with the militaries of neighboring countries – many of which also face threats from violent extremism and criminal networks. The channels for the illegal supply and smuggling of operational resources (weapons, motorcycles, fuel, drones, etc.) to armed groups cross many borders in the region.
[4] Niger and Burkina Faso have reportedly launched airstrikes against rebel positions in key battle zones in Mali, particularly Sénal, Manaka and Kidal, in response to attacks on Malian security forces. Kidal is known to have been captured by the rebels.
[5] Burkina Faso has been facing a dual control system since early 2026, with the country’s security forces fighting to retake territory from jihadist groups, particularly in the rural north and east. While the government claims to have regained control of 71% of the territory – up from around 40% in 2022 – significant areas remain disputed or under rebel influence.
[6] JNIM Multi-Axis Offensive and Consolidation of Rural Dominance
[7] The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), now known as the “Sahel Province”, is a violent Salafi jihadist terrorist organization operating since 2015 in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border region. Founded by Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and pledged allegiance to ISIS, the organization is one of the deadliest groups in West Africa.
[8] JNIM (affiliated with al-Qaeda) and ISIS (specifically ISGS) are fighting in Africa, particularly in the Sahel, over a violent struggle for territorial dominance, resources (they fight for control of gold mines, smuggling routes and taxation of local communities in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) and recruitment supremacy (JNIM fears defections to ISIS. The conflict helps maintain their local support bases and prevents the other from establishing absolute dominance in key areas). This conflict is driven by ideological differences between al-Qaeda’s ‘local first’ approach and the universal, brutal and rapid maximalism of ISIS. ISIS, leading to fierce competition for control of local forces. While they share the goal of destroying secular governments, JNIM prefers to build, or at least pretend to build, local legitimacy and alliances, while ISGS prefers more indiscriminate violence. JNIM accuses ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) of being Kharijites – that is, ‘the apostates’ or ‘the outcasts’, the first religious group to break away from Islam (in the 7th century) and become an independent, extremist and puritanical sect. They believed that a leader (caliph) must be the most religiously deserving, and refused to obey the rule of a caliph, even if it meant civil war. The term is now used as a derogatory term for separatist and radical groups.
[9] On January 29, 2026, militants from the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) launched a major attack on Diori Hamani International Airport and Niger Air Force Base 101 near Niamey. The attack, which included gunfire and explosive-laden drones, was repelled by Nigerien forces and Russian instructors, resulting in 20 militants being killed and 11 captured.
IS terror group claims attack on Niamey airport: Monitoring group
