JNIM leads ‘Economic Jihad’
In Mali, the JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin), led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who is linked to al-Qaeda, has been besieging the towns of Kayes and Nioro in the Sahel, in the southwest of the country, since September 3.[1] Passengers have been abducted, and the jihadists have halted and set fire to trucks and merchandise. [2]
The Malian army denies any siege, but is increasing operations and patrols in an attempt to secure the roads. The Timbuktu Institute, a research institute based in Dakar, published a study on September 12 analyzing JNIM’s new strategy, which it describes as ‘economic jihad’. [3] This practice is not new; terrorist groups have always used economic terrorism, including sieges, as a tool to suppress their opponents.
The definition of ‘economic jihad’ depends on the context and circumstances. For example, it can be interpreted as the mobilization of all energy and power to achieve a desired goal; whether good or bad; in defending injustice and achieving the ultimate goal, which is that all human activity from an economic perspective is to achieve success in this world and the next. It can be concluded that this economic jihad is a jihad in the provision of essential goods and needs based on various resources. Furthermore, ‘economic jihad’ often refers to donors who knowingly fund terrorist and militant groups, who then use these funds for violent actions under the guise of religious duty.[4] The term can also describe a national policy of economic self-reliance and resistance, such as Iran’s ‘resistance economy’ concept coined by Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei uses the term ‘jihad’ in its spiritual sense to promote self-reliance and resistance to external economic pressure.
According to research by Professor Gabi Weiman of the University of Haifa that was released in the early 2000s, terrorism’s aims have shifted to digital platforms, producing economic turmoil.
The focus on economic terrorism began with the attacks on the Twin Towers, when Osama bin Laden expressed in the videotapes he sent, that the attacks mainly damaged the economic base of the United States, and their goal was to paralyze the economy of the United States and the West. The attacks, which cost about $500,000 to plan, cost the United States $500 billion. [5]
Additionally, one of the terrorist organizations’ secondary objectives in the armed conflicts against the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan is to keep the American funding going toward supporting the army in these nations.
At the same time, the Houthis in Yemen are resorting to economic terrorism, knowing full well that the power of the Saudi Kingdom, Abu Dhabi, and other Gulf states lies in the economy and oil exports. Organizations operating in Africa have a source of inspiration.
The Kayes region in southwestern Mali has become a key strategic target for the JNIM organization, which sees it as a vital space. According to the Timbuktu Institute, the jihadists intend to disrupt the country’s electricity supply in order to destabilize it, as well as to strangle Mali’s economy while isolating the capital in Bamako – the goal is to increase economic pressure on the Malian transitional regime.
The study indicates that almost 80% of Mali’s gold, its main resource, is extracted in the Qais region and that 30% of Mali’s land imports, especially fuel and grains, pass through National Road 1 (RN1), which connects the port of Dakar to Bamako, via Kayes.
The organization’s intentions are demonstrated by the coordinated attacks at the beginning of July this year against military positions along the borders of Senegal and Mauritania, and the one at the end of August against a renovation site on the RN1 road, followed by the imposition of a siege.
All of these clearly reflect the desire to paralyze the flow of trade.
At the same time, the JNIM is strengthening its grip on the center of the country and is constantly preparing new operations aimed at strategic commercial routes.
As for the attacks on trucks and tankers in various parts of the country, the Timbuktu Institute notes that fuel is essential for the Malian army’s operations, which suffer from its absence, and, as far as civilians are concerned, they will increase transportation costs. and push economic actors towards informal networks, which are often taxed by the JNIM. The JNIM seeks to establish parallel economic control. Taxing fuel and transport taxes positions the JNIM as a de facto authority, undermining the legitimacy of the Malian government.
The Timbuktu Institute also notes that the JNIM had already increased its attacks sevenfold in the Kayes region between 2021 and 2024, before the intensification observed since the beginning of July. In recent months, these attacks have no longer been directed only against military or state positions. They have also targeted several industrial sites or mining sites operated by foreign companies, especially Chinese, such as in Bafoulabé. At least three Indians have been taken hostage. These actions could act as a deterrent to foreign investors. [6]
On the military front, JNIM has increased its activity in the Kayes region without easing pressure on the rest of the country, especially in the center of the country. This strategy aims to disperse the Malian armed forces and weaken their ability to defend the capital, Bamako, whose capture is the organization’s ultimate goal.[7] This pressure has repercussions for neighboring Mauritania and Senegal, which are reflected in the disruption of cross-border trade and the risk and destabilization of security.
These attacks by the JNIM organization illustrate the organization’s increasing ability to schedule and launch complex operations, taking advantage of the security vacuum and isolation of Kayes, to destabilize Mali and threaten its neighbors. Its tactical sophistication, logistical resilience, and exploitation of socio-economic dynamics highlight the need for a regional response that combines cross-border cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the like.
The above means that all the state forces of the threatened countries (Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Senegal) must be united.
The desire to contain the radical Islamic threat is understandable and essential. In order to successfully contain it, one must avoid making the tactical mistake of relying solely on military responses, but rather a combination of ‘soft power’ is necessary in parallel with kinetic power.
I would like to mention that the JNIM organization took advantage of the security vacuum created by the end of the operations of the ‘International Cooperation Mission’ MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), and the end of the operational activities of the French army within the framework of Operation Barkhane, but also the fact that the state of Mali withdrew from regional security frameworks, as well as from the economic organization ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).
The inability of the Africa Corps mercenaries and the ESA (Confederation of Sahel States) nations of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to show strong and convincing effectiveness against JNIM further contributed to the organization’s growth.
Without a coordinated regional/global response, taking into account all these socio-political and cultural dimensions, JNIM will continue to exploit regional weaknesses to expand its sphere of control and radical religious influence.
[1] The jihadists from the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) claim to have killed about ten Malian soldiers and looted a large amount of weapons and vehicles in Nioro, and have published photos of the loot to support their claim. However, there is no data on casualties among their ranks, nor are there any photos of the Malian army soldiers who were killed, as JNIM usually does.
[2] On September 14, 2025, jihadists riding motorcycles attacked more than 80 tankers arriving from Senegal under military escort between Kaniéra and Lakamané, in the Kais-Nyoro region of the Sahel. On the 13th of the month, the day before, another convoy of tanker trucks, also under military escort, was attacked between Diédiéni and Kolokani, about 100 km from the capital, Makou.
Les jihadistes détruisent des dizaines de camions-citernes et réaffirment leur blocus à Kayes
[3] https://timbuktu-institute.org/media/attachments/2025/09/11/jnim-kayes.pdf
[4] ‘Economic jihad’ is a theme that features prominently in jihadist fundraising techniques. The idea is simple: leaders call Their supporters engage in what they describe as a religious duty to engage in jihad, if not by physically fighting the enemies of Islam, then by financing those who do so. See: Surah 9 (Al-Tawbah) verse 41.
[5] Gabriel Weimann,” WWW.Terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25(5),2002, pp. 317-332.
Yariv Tsfati, Gabriel Weimann, “Terror on the Internet,” Politika, 4:(1999) pp.45-64.
[6] Jihadist fighters stage series of attacks on Mali military posts
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g88vwn1veo
[7] Au Mali, la filiale sahélienne d’Al-Qaida resserre son étau autour de Bamako
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
