The answer to the question in the headline seems trivial: it depends on who is targeted, for what purpose, and, no less importantly, where the target is assassinated. It turns out that decision-makers don’t always address this complex issue, and Israel pays a heavy price for it.

Since October 7, 2023, one could argue that the targeted killing of Hamas leaders has contributed to the weakening of the organization in terms of command and control, and perhaps also in its military effectiveness. However, on the fundamental level of the organization’s motivation to continue fighting Israel, there has been no change. Unlike the success against Hezbollah, there has been no noticeable decrease in Hamas’s motivation to continue its guerrilla warfare against the IDF. Hamas, as an organization, continues to refuse Israel’s terms for resolution and to return the hostages. Moreover – there has been no phenomenon of mass surrender of its fighters. Hamas fighters surrendered (if at all) only in local incidents when they were under a local siege. It is quite clear that the targeted killing of Hamas leaders has not brought about the desired results.

Part of the ineffectiveness of the targeted killing of senior Hamas officials, especially at the political level, stemmed from “Hamas’s survival adaptation to targeted killings,” but primarily and above all, from Israel’s own conduct.

“Targeted Killing” – How Hamas different from Hezbollah? 

The “Swords of Iron” war, in its various stages, dramatically demonstrated the centrality of targeted killing in Israel’s military strategy against terrorism and also against enemy states. The killing of leaders of terrorist organizations is a common tool in Israel’s security strategy. The idea behind it is simple: a blow to the head of the organization is meant to paralyze the chain of command, undermine stability, and deter the next generation. Israel has acted to kill senior leaders and commanders in Hezbollah, Hamas, and even in the army of a sovereign state—Iran.

Over the years, this policy of assassinations has shown impressive effectiveness, but sometimes its damage has dramatically outweighed the benefits expected by decision-makers. The discussion about the effectiveness of the targeted killing strategy for fighting terrorism and in which cases its damages significantly outweigh its benefits is extremely important. As the policy of targeted killings is a cornerstone of the fight against terrorism, this discussion is essential for formulating a sober and realistic counter-terrorism strategy.

The targeted killing of senior Hezbollah leaders demonstrates the potential effectiveness of killing senior members of a terrorist organization. The killing of Nasrallah, Hashem Safieddine, and other senior leaders of the organization clearly contributed to its weakening, brought about a ceasefire, and contributed to Hezbollah effectively accepting the daily and continually eliminating of its operatives by Israel. Therefore, precisely in light of the impressive influence and effectiveness of the targeted killing of senior Hezbollah officials, the question of the ” The Paradox of Power” in the killing or attempted killing of Hamas leaders requires serious consideration.

Effectiveness in Question

In the past, there were indeed cases of targeted killing attempts of Hamas leaders that were seen as influencing Hamas’s motivation to confront Israel. The killing of Ahmed Yassin and other senior Hamas officials in 2004 is actually an example of such a certain success. Although Hamas responded with a number of severe suicide bombings immediately after Yassin’s killing, the prevailing assessment is that in the longer term, the killing of Yassin and other senior officials who came after him (like Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi) severely damaged Hamas’s command and control mechanism and threw the organization into internal turmoil, which contributed to a certain extent to a relative calm and a decrease in attacks at the end of the Second Intifada.

The decision to kill senior officials in a terrorist organization should take into account international relations and other costs. An example of such considerations is the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. Decision-makers certainly weighed the consequences of killing Haniyeh in Iran – a sovereign state and a seemingly regional power with the ability to harm Israel. It is possible that the killing of Haniyeh ultimately had a positive indirect contribution to the 12-day war against Iran. However, one must of course ask whether the killing of Haniyeh contributed in any way to achieving Israel’s goals against Hamas?

One can certainly question the value of Haniyeh’s killing in Iran, but the obligation to ask questions about the utility of the attempted killing of Hamas’s leadership in Doha, Qatar (September 2025), is more difficult. The killing in Doha forced decision-makers to deal with extremely complex considerations. Among other things, it required addressing the implications of the killing on Israel’s relations with the Sunni Muslim axis, Israel’s standing in the eyes of the West and the United States, and probably also the possibility of dramatic consequences for the negotiations with Hamas and the chances of releasing the hostages.

A Feeling of Déjà Vu – Assassinations in a Sovereign States

The feeling of déjà vu arising from the attempted killing in Doha is not a result of wild imagination. The incident in Doha is very reminiscent of the attempted killing of Khaled Mashal (September 1997). The similarity begins with the fact that in both cases, the assassination attempt was decided upon by Benjamin Netanyahu. Both assassination attempts were carried out in September in Arab countries with which Israel has significant relations. In both cases, the assassination attempt had international damages and prices, at least in the short term.

Furthermore, the utility of both assassination attempts is questionable, and some would argue that their damage outweighs the potential value of their imagined benefit by orders of magnitude. But, Netanyahu does not have exclusive copyright on the failures and damages of targeted killings. The failed assassination attempt of Ali Hassan Salameh (1973), in what is known as the Lillehammer affair, is another example of resounding failures with international relations damage.

Therefore, a crucial consideration in the targeted killing of terrorists is the political impact of involvement of important states. Does that sound trivial? It turns out that decision-makers often decide on targeted killings whose damage is greater than their hoped-for benefit. Moreover, they refuse to learn the lessons of the past.

Hezbollah – An Actor with Room to Maneuver 

Hezbollah is an organization with a centralized structure, but it is also a complex political-social actor within Lebanon. Since the 1980s, it has established itself as a military force, a social movement with an extensive welfare system, and a political force in the government. Its leadership, which is in close contact with Iran, is required to navigate a sensitive political reality and maintain a balance between confrontation and stability⁵⁰. Hezbollah has something to lose. It is clear that Hezbollah made efforts to preserve its military capabilities in the “Swords of Iron” war. Throughout the first year of the war, under Iranian instruction, Hezbollah was careful to maintain red lines against Israel and avoided extreme escalation. The pager incident and the subsequent killing of its senior officials left the organization severely weakened. Hezbollah had something to lose: the remnants of its legitimacy in Lebanon, the preservation of its capabilities for the service of its Iranian masters, and its continued existence as a fighting force. Israel allowed Hezbollah to continue to exist by a conscious decision and reached a ceasefire without demanding its disarmament or the exile of its senior officials.

Hamas – Trapped in the Logic of Confrontation⁷

Hamas is built as a multi-branched organization (military, political, social-religious) with its leadership dispersed among the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, abroad (Doha, Turkey), and even broader Islamic communities. As part of its survival, the organization developed backup mechanisms that allow mid-level leaders to quickly rise and step into the shoes of those who have been killed. The organizational culture educates everyone to be “ready for martyrdom” and thereby reinforces continuity. Hamas views targeted killings as “moral victories”: every leader becomes a martyr who strengthens the religious-jihadist narrative. Therefore, the killings are not perceived as a strategic loss but as a strengthening sacrifice.

Finally, unlike Hezbollah, where targeted killing is perceived as a survival risk, Hamas sees assassinations as a pretext for revenge and an internal unifying factor. Often, killings actually increase the motivation to confront Israel in the short term. Beyond all this, Hamas draws its legitimacy mainly from being the “spearhead” of the armed struggle against Israel. This is the source of its power against the residents of the Strip, against its competitors like Islamic Jihad, and even against broader audiences in the Muslim world.

The Hamas leadership cannot stop the armed struggle without fatally damaging its political standing and its control over Gaza; it does not have the room for choice that Hezbollah has. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas does not have the option of lowering its profile and enjoying a “complete truce,” since Israel does not allow its continued existence as a military force. Hamas remains trapped in a logic of continuous confrontation, and therefore the killing of its leaders does not reduce the urge to fight and does not fundamentally change its support mechanisms.

The fundamental difference between the two organizations stems from their strategic ability to choose. The central question is whether the organization’s leadership can afford to stop or reduce the confrontation without losing its legitimacy, control, and perhaps its justification for existence. In other words, does Hamas have a real option to agree to Israel’s terms for ending the campaign?

The central Israeli failure is that targeted killings of a leadership are only relevant when the organization has the option to choose to “compromise” in a way that will allow it to survive. When Israel does not present such an option to the organization or its leaders, there is no real “deterrent” or motivational value to a targeted killing. Therefore, the killing in Doha without offering any practical option to Hamas (the survival of the organization and its leaders) is of no significant value. Even more so, the damage from the assassination attempt in Doha is unfortunately very significant, at least in the short term.

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.