The seizure of power in Syria by the Syrian rebels and the overthrow of the Assad regime in a remarkably short period represent a significant blow to the pro-Iranian resistance axis. This is particularly evident in light of the loss of a logistical, economic, and military rear that had greatly assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and armed Palestinians in the West Bank through arms and drug smuggling routes. However, Iran has not relinquished its ambitions in Syria and Lebanon, driven by its aspirations for regional hegemony and its desire to eliminate the State of Israel. It appears that the Iranian regime is actively seeking ways to strengthen ties with the Syrian rebels and is cultivating communication channels with them in a manner that aligns with its strategic objectives in the region.

With the fall of the Syrian regime, the Iranian leadership has offered apologetic arguments regarding its lack of support for Assad, suggesting that the regime’s collapse was the result of an Israeli plot. For instance, Ali Khamenei asserted that the Revolutionary Guards were not obligated to fight on behalf of Assad, claiming that if the Syrian army had demonstrated the capacity to resist the rebels, Iran would have provided military assistance. He further stated that Iran had even warned the Assad regime a few months prior to the rebels’ surprise attack, but Assad underestimated the threat posed by his adversaries. Similarly, Revolutionary Guard Commander General Hossein Salami indicated that Iran had alerted Syria to the rebels’ intentions; however, the Syrian regime chose not to act on this information and underestimated Iran’s overtures.

In recent years, the Assad regime has been perceived by Iran as a weakened power incapable of advancing Iran’s regional interests. In an interview with the Financial Times, a source close to the Iranian regime remarked that Assad had become a burden for Iran, stating, “protecting him was no longer justified and represented a major failure for Iran. Continuing to support him simply did not seem logical and incurred unreasonable costs.”^[1] Assad’s courtship of the Gulf states and his willingness to evacuate Hezbollah from two bases in Syria following threats from Israel have been viewed negatively by the Iranian regime. 

In this context, it is understandable that media reports are increasingly highlighting Iran’s efforts to establish communication channels with the rebels. For instance, there have been reports of agreements reached between the two sides, wherein the rebels promised Iran not to harm the holy sites of Shiite Islam in Syria and to allow Iranian forces to exit the country safely in exchange for Iran’s commitment not to intervene in the conflict. Furthermore, al-Julani sent a conciliatory message to Iran, expressing his intention to maintain good diplomatic relations as long as Iran refrains from interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. He even appointed a sheikh of Iranian Kurdish origin to oversee foreign relations with Iran. The latter also declared that it intended to maintain good relations with the new Syrian regime and even began to use moderate terminology towards the rebels, unlike in the past.

Iran has not abandoned its ambition for regional hegemony, and it appears that it seeks to continue challenging Israel’s power through Syria. To this end, it aims to cultivate ties with Sunni jihad groups in Syria that are intent on continuing jihad activities against Israel from Syrian territory. These groups include Salafi jihadist activists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Syria, members of the Hizb al-Tahrir organization, and other Islamists. Several jihadist activists in Syria have even posted videos on social media expressing their intention to continue jihad against Israel to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem; however, they are currently being restrained by al-Julani’s men.

These groups may receive support from Iran and could cooperate with it in smuggling weapons and drugs to and from Jordan to the West Bank, aiming to ignite another fighting front against Israel, similar to the actions taken by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards prior to the fall of Assad’s regime. The imminent opening of an Iranian embassy on Syrian soil could facilitate Iran’s role as a center for activity and coordination with the rebels on various issues.^[2]

It can be assumed that Iran will seek to restore its channels of influence in Syria by exploiting its ties with the leadership of Al-Qaeda, which has been based in Tehran since the 9/11 attacks. Sheikh Saif al-Adl, who was appointed leader of the organization following the assassination of Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, is considered an enthusiastic supporter of establishing a Sunni-Shiite military alliance led by Iran to combat the United States and Israel. This perspective was articulated in an article he published on July 16, 2024, emphasizing the importance of uniting Muslim nations in the face of the Crusader-Zionist threat. In his view, the management of the campaign against the enemy should be entrusted to “the side with the greatest ability to acquire friends rather than create enemies, and with the ability to build strong alliances with political wisdom and neutralize other adversaries,” implicitly referring to Iran in light of its success in establishing a Sunni-Shiite axis of resistance, which includes terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. ^[3]

On Syrian soil, several jihadist factions are currently operating in close alliance with the al-Qaeda leadership, and some of them even cooperate with or are members of the leading rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. These factions include the al-Imam Bukhari (composed of members of Uzbek origin), Ajnad al-Qawqaz (of Chechen origin), and Jamaat al-Alban (of Albanian origin). Of particular note is the Islamic Turkestan Party in Syria, led by Sheikh Abd al-Haqq al-Turkestani, who also serves as a member of the al-Qaeda Shura Council.

Given this context, it can be assumed that Iran will harness Saif al-Adl to advance its agenda in Syria through his ties with Syrian rebels affiliated with al-Qaeda. It is important to note that al-Julani himself previously belonged to al-Qaeda in Syria, and it remains unclear whether the ideological shift he presents to the outside world—namely, a transition from Salafi-jihadi thinking to a focus on strengthening the stability of the Syrian nation-state—is genuine. In any case, it should be considered that Iran may exploit its influence over al-Qaeda’s leadership in Tehran to enhance its relationship and influence over al-Julani.

Recently, there has been a noticeable trend in strengthening ties with the Kurds in Syria, which is manifested, among other things, in the supply of 1,500 mortars to the YPG and PKK forces. This action apparently indicates an Iranian desire to prevent Turkey from establishing a significant presence in Syria.^[4]

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^[1] Najmeh Bozorgmehr and others, “Iran ‘lost faith’ in Assad before his ousting”, Financial Times, December 8,2024. https://www.ft.com/content/0311cae9-f35b-4e7a-952b-e26aba870549

^[2] “Iran says ‘ready’ to reopen embassy in Syria, holds talks with Damascus”, PressTv, December 25, 2024. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/12/24/739642/Iran-says-ready-to-reopen-embassy-in-Damascus-   

^[3] See: Michael Barak, “A Sunni Shia Army Against Israel and the West?  The alliance between the al-Qaeda leadership and the Iranian regime”, ICT, Aug 8,2024. https://ict.org.il/a-sunni-shia-army-against-israel-and-the-west-the-alliance-between-the-al-qaeda-  

^[4] Avi Nachmani, “Khamenei’s surprising pivot: A new goal amid regional chaos”, JFeed, January 12, 2025. https://www.jfeed.com/news-israel/spyzhj