Can West African countries stop the spread of radical Islamic organizations?
Introduction
The challenges associated with the expansion of jihadism in Africa, and especially towards the Gulf of Guinea countries, are formidable. Extremist Islamic terrorism occurs in a number of countries, including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Guinea-Conakry. In several of these nations, there are jihadist cells that have the capacity to grow and spread without danger. The obvious question is why the state armies on the black continent are unable to prevent or defeat the spread of radical Islamic organizations from the schools of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, given the worsening situation and the threats that the violence in Africa poses to the entire world. The answers to this question are not simple, but complex.
As a general rule, for an army to win a battle, it must first and foremost have a coherent strategy that deals with the planning and management of the operations in war. Cohesion between the ranks is a must, as well as clear knowledge of the objectives and purpose of the war.[1] We have witnessed firsthand how these factors significantly impact army effectiveness in previous conflicts, including those in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Levant.
The war on terror begins with consciousness: You don’t fight terror and defeat it with a false consciousness. To win, you must call the murderer by his name, the enemy by his name, the terrorist by his name. It is right to call murderers from Islamic terrorist organizations by their explicit name: “This is Muslim terrorism that threatens all African countries and the enlightened Western world”. The indiscriminate and death-worshipping terrorism led for many years by the fascist wing of Islam, which takes on and takes on form, must be subdued.
In African armies, which are faced with the challenge of curbing the spread of the shackles of radical Islam, these important parameters are lacking, sometimes structurally. The weakness of African militaries stems from a combination of economic limitations, political challenges, and structural issues. Many African nations have constrained economies, leading to limited budgets for defense spending.
Soldiers from different tribes are recruited into the ranks of state armies as professional soldiers. For promotion, the leading criterion in most cases in these armies is correct tribal affiliation, that is, to the ruling tribe and loyalty to its leaders. I do not intend to discuss this broad issue in depth, but I will briefly mention some of the reasons that seem important for the analysis itself.
African nations, as everyone is aware, can consist of hundreds of tribes that are embroiled in long-standing hostilities and from which soldiers are recruited. In practice, a situation has been created in which a vast network of recruits, from different tribes, are strangers to each other, their language is a mixture of local dialects, the connection between them is loose, their worldview is different, and other beliefs also separate them. Many of the recruits have no idea about the internal problems in their country or the region and the associated risks. This ‘fog’ leads to a common phenomenon in African armies of unwillingness to sacrifice one’s life for the homeland, a fundamental element of a warrior’s commitment to his country. The fighters in these armies lack motivation and a sense of dignity and national responsibility in the face of the task assigned to them. Fighting without knowing what you are fighting for and with the constant impression of a citizen of a tribe not respected or supported by a strong political force and unified leadership are crippling disabilities. [2]
In addition, one of the most important reasons for the manifestations of the weakness of armies in Africa is the issue of funding. Several reasons have led to a decline in the funding of state armies: 1) The weakness of the economies of various countries can affect the budget allocated to the security forces; 2) Numerous military coups that regulate political life in Africa; 3) Leaders, due to political instability, reduce the resources allocated to the armies; 4) Military cooperation with Western countries (France, the USA and others) the illusion that there is no need for a strong army, they will do the job; 5) The few operational armies of the continent have been trained and equipped to participate in peacekeeping operations, but they are not capable of conducting an offensive war. [3]
Historically and factually, there is not a single country in the Sahel and West Africa that has not been led/controlled by the army at some point in the last 60 years. There is not a single nation in this region that does not celebrate the annual ceremony of the impressive military parade with great pomp and a demonstration of its military’s ability to ensure national defense. So why do armies that have paralyzed the political life of the countries in the Sahel and West Africa for more than half a century and their wars have consumed billions of francs (CFA), annual budgets related to recruitment, equipment procurement and training of the armies at the expense of basic social sectors (health, education, security, etc.) are failing horribly in the face of armed rebel or jihadist groups?
This article discusses the question I mentioned in the introduction and demonstrates with data the inherent internal weaknesses in the countries involved. I will review the attempts at interstate cooperation as a necessary part of creating an effective fighting force against the spread of radical Islamic organizations, attempts that evade dealing with the roots of the fundamental problems that require the use of soft power and not just kinetic solutions.
The Analysis
Main Events
Below, I will present several key events that demonstrate the weaknesses of state armies:
On January 8, 2022, members of the extremist Islamic group from the JNIM (Support Group for Islam and Muslims) attacked a fortified position of a force from the Beninese army operating as part of ‘Operation Mirador’ against the spread of radical Islamic terrorism in northern Benin.[4] Media reports described the attack in the cross-border W National Park (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger) as causing the deaths of at least 30 Beninese army soldiers – the heaviest casualty toll ever recorded.[5] Similar attacks occurred on July 20, 2024, against the military post in Kpekpakandi in northern Togo and on October 2, 2024, against Togolese forces in Fanworgou on the border with Burkina Faso. In the first attack, at least 10 soldiers from the Togolese army were killed. In the October attack, nine soldiers and 10 civilians were killed. [6]
JNIM has previously conducted operations in this region with the intention of destroying and damaging certain canal development projects as well as eradicating construction workers.
The Togolese army operating against them was accompanied by Turkish instructors who arrived by helicopter. [7]
On July 15, the BBC reported that some of Sadat’s Syrian fighters in Niger had come under Russian command to fight violent Islamic extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization in the Liptako-Gourma region (the border triangle between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger). [8]
Turkish Engagement
As part of Turkey’s vision to expand its global influence, Turkey is increasing its engagement in Africa. Turkey seeks to create new trade opportunities, build an image as a leading aid and development country, and strengthen relations with Muslim countries in Africa by emphasizing religious and cultural ties. Turkey has become a major player in the security landscape of Africa (Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, and the Sahel countries). This development should be seen against the backdrop of the Turkish President’s effort to place the expansion of the Turkish defense industry at the top of the agenda. (Turkey is a global supplier of drones thanks to competitive models such as the Bayraktar 2TB and Akin. Turkey’s military support includes foreign fighters, mercenaries, and sophisticated weapons such as advanced drones.
The involvement of Turkish military instructors in Togo is apparently different from that of the Russian Africa Corps operating in the Sahel, which is not only engaged in fighting the JNIM but is also involved in supporting the military regimes of the military juntas including Burkina Faso.[9] It should be noted that the Russian ‘Africa Corps’ force suffered many casualties in battles with the JNIM.[10] According to reports, the Turkish private military company (PMC) Sadat, was active in Niger and Burkina Faso. The presence of Turkish military instructors in Togo suggests an expected expansion of the Turkish PMC and the presence of Turkish military instructors in West Africa. Syrian mercenaries Turkish-funded operations began in at least Niger and possibly Burkina Faso in 2024 to protect vital economic sites in which the Turkish government has a stake, such as in mines clearance. [11]
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), an organization that monitors the conflict in Syria, claimed in May that PMC Sadat had deployed some 1,100 Turkish-trained Syrian mercenaries to Burkina Faso and Niger since September 2023. Sadat has also reportedly trained members of the new private security force protecting the leader of the Malian junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta. [12]
The deployment of a Turkish military force in the Sahel is not Sadat’s first time in Africa.
In early 2020, Sadat reportedly sent 5,000 Syrian mercenaries to Libya to repel an attack by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group. With its entry into the Sahel, Sadat appears to be competing with Russia for control and business development in Africa, essentially a tool of the Turkish military that promotes Turkey’s external interests just as the Wagner Force/African Corps does for Russia. [13]
The threat is expanding and spreading towards the Gulf of Guinea.
While the threat of Islamic terrorism varies from country to country, the activity of radical groups in the Sahel since 2012, and in Benin and Togo since 2021, shows that no West African country is immune. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel remains the global epicenter, accounting for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024 and 2025. [14]
Among the Gulf of Guinea littoral states of Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Togo, the Ivory Coast was the first to be hit in 2016 in Grand-Bassam. Although it has experienced relative calm after two years of repeated attacks in its north, the threat remains. The country shares a long border with Mali and Burkina Faso, where security continues to deteriorate.
Ghana is the only country among them that has not experienced terrorist attacks. However, several incidents have been recorded along its border with Burkina Faso. The same vulnerabilities exploited by radical Islamic organizations in other countries – disputes over control, land clashes, growing dissatisfaction with state authorities, and illegal activities by criminal elements such as unlawful gold mining – have been documented in Ghana. There is evidence to suggest that the nature of the threat of homegrown terrorism in Ghana is changing, but the most significant threat is the recruitment of Muslims in Ghana by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Poverty and lack of employment opportunities put many young people in northern Ghana at risk of recruitment by ISIS. [15]
Given the regional nature of the terrorist threat, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the AES (Alliance of Sahel States) countries must seek to cooperate and fight together against the spread of radical Islamic organizations. The problem is that there is a deep distrust between these two entities that prevent intelligence sharing and security-military cooperation.
While the countries concerned appear to be ‘reacting’ to events and not initiating joint operations, this plays into the hands of the Islamic organizations and makes their job easier. In other words, this passive response seems to ‘blind’ decision-makers in a certain sense because it inevitably creates an underestimated threat assessment, based solely on attacks, which are only the visible part of the phenomenon. All layers, such as funding sources, logistics, operational supplies, and the recruitment of alienated citizens, whose radicalization goes far beyond the sites of attacks and the number of casualties. These layers need to be addressed in an integrated manner to reduce the capabilities of the rebel organizations.
The expansion of radical Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel and in some Gulf of Guinea countries is a direct result of a dynamic in which radical organizations manage to stand firm in the face of military kinetic operations, expanding the span of their territorial control that allows them access to minerals, as a source of funding, and local manpower, mostly alienated, to recruit into their ranks. Furthermore, free movement between countries, in the absence of sealed borders, facilitates the ability to find new shelters and hiding places.
Parks and forests such as the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the Comoé National Park in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Oti-Kéran-Mandori Complex in Togo offer ideal conditions for hiding for terrorist organizations. Controlling and securing these forests is difficult and requires many resources. Their size and nature, as permeable border crossings, make aerial surveillance difficult; however, on the ground, this gives and allows the rebels an advantage in movement/mobility.
Cooperation between countries is the order of the day
To be effective in the fight against Islamic organizations, countries must overcome the distrust that prevents essential intelligence sharing and coordination of military operations to prevent the use of certain territories as defense zones, hiding places, or bases for terrorist/guerrilla operations.
In March 2024, the AES countries announced the deployment of a joint force against Islamic terrorism in Liptako–Gourma. There seems to be no intention of expanding the force to the coastal countries bordering the three countries. Given their limited resources, the AES countries and their coastal neighbors must find the best and most effective way to cooperate while avoiding separate responses and new ad hoc security arrangements. [16] The history of the fight against Islamic Jihad organizations on the black continent over the past two decades, with joint forces of the countries concerned and Western forces, mainly France, and American assistance in the field of drones and intelligence, shows few ‘local’ victories, but cumulative failure (thousands of terrorist attacks and civilian casualties and an impressive territorial occupation, such as the case of Burkina Faso, about 50% of the country’s territory). This failed operational background, along with the continued lack of personal security in the Sahel countries, led, among other things, to military coups in several countries, from which the Western forces were expelled in disgrace and in their place entered the picture of the struggle against radical Islamic elements, Russia and Turkey.
It should be mentioned that, over the past two years, France’s decade-long counter-terrorism operations in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have ended, while the United States recently withdrew its forces that were involved in counter-terrorism operations using drones from Niger. Against this background, the three Sahelians countries have increased their military cooperation with Russia.
As part of this geopolitical alignment, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), [17]which was established in 2017 by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad to combat terrorism and organized crime, was dissolved. [18]
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – ruled by military juntas that have seized power in recent years – established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 as a collective defense organization after their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024.
On July 7, 2024, the possibility of deploying a regional counterterrorism force was discussed during the ECOWAS summit in Abuja, capital of Nigeria. [19] The final communiqué issued in connection with the summit instructed the ECOWAS Commission President to “facilitate further consultations on methods and options for mobilizing domestic financial and material resources on a mandatory basis to support the operation of the regional counter-terrorism force.” It also directed him to explore “resource mobilization opportunities” with the AU Commission, including within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 which approved support for AU-led peace support operations through contributions assessed by the UN on a case-by-case basis.[20] The report and recommendations of the Panel were subsequently considered by the UN-EU High-Level Conference in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, on 21 October 2024, where the two organizations agreed to jointly promote the key recommendations of the Panel through their respective institutional organs and mechanisms. [21]
The deployment of a counter-terrorism force in the region was discussed in the recent report of the Secretary-General on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, which called for the acceleration and full operationalization of the Accra Initiative and the ECOWAS Stand-by Force in line with its Action Plan to Counter-Terrorism in West Africa for 2020-2024.
Other security mechanisms in the region included the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad area, which was established in 2015 as a multinational force to combat Boko Haram. [22] Following an attack on 28 October 2024 by Boko Haram that killed 40 Chadian soldiers, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby reportedly threatened to withdraw from the MNJTF, which included soldiers from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Chadian officials believe that their army has not received enough assistance to fight the terrorist group since the major attack of October 2024. Among other things, President Deby claims that the withdrawal of the force from Chad is due to a lack of coordinated efforts between the forces of the member states in a joint war on Boko Haram terrorism. [23]
On April 1 of this year, Niger withdrew from this task force. [24] The argument of the leader of the military junta, Abderrahmane Tiani is that the military organization is ineffective. Another explanation that has been received is the need for soldiers to secure the country’s oil facilities, which are under threat from jihadists.
Somalia also continues to face a serious terrorist threat. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 on Al-Shabaab,[25] dated 15 October 2024, states that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia and explains that the organization can carry out complex attacks against the Somali government. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) remains without forces. [26]
ISIS is also active in Somalia, and the Secretary-General’s latest report on the threat posed by ISIS notes that its affiliate in Somalia “has strengthened, expanded its recruitment and strengthened its financial infrastructure.”[27]
On 27 December 2024, the Council adopted Resolution 2767, endorsing the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to replace ATMIS with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is expected to play an important role in responding to the terrorist threat in Somalia. [28]
Mozambique is also battling a violent insurgency by the Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) affiliate, al-Sunna wal-Jamma ASWJ, in the northern Cabo Delgado province.
The latest report by the 1267 Monitoring Team, published on July 22, 2024, notes that the ASWJ is seeking to expand the conflict and faces “much less resistance given the 2024 withdrawal from Mozambique of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) SAMIM (Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique). [29]
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), authorities are dealing with violent attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). According to the July 2024 report by the Monitoring Team 1267, there was a dramatic increase in ADF attacks during the first half of 2024, with 260 civilians killed in May and June alone. [30]
Despite the worrying picture of the situation on the black continent, as I described above, African countries have made and are making joint efforts to deal with the problem of jihadism.
From 22 to 23 April 2024, Nigeria hosted the “High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting” in the country’s capital, Abuja.[31] UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, Under-Secretary-General
The UN Office of Counterterrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, Miguel Moratinos and other senior UN officials attended the High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. The meeting focused on the analysis of current threats, prevention, capacity-building and international cooperation with a view to reshaping the international community’s collective response to terrorism in Africa. [32]
As part of the Abuja process, the High-Level Meeting is intended to support African-led and African-owned solutions to African problems.
The United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT), in coordination with other partners, stands ready to support the development and implementation of dedicated capacity-building packages for African Member States in the priority areas of assistance identified during the Abuja Summit.
To demonstrate the concern of Heads of State over the deteriorating security situation on the continent, several African Heads of State have held conferences dedicated to countering radical Islamic terrorism and enhancing personal security:
- In March 2023, Mozambique hosted a high-level discussion on ‘Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism by strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and mechanisms. [33]
- In November 2022, Ghana hosted a high-level discussion on ‘Counterterrorism in Africa – an imperative for peace, security, and development’. [34]
- In October 2022, Gabon hosted a high-level discussion on ‘Stronger Regulation, Cross-Border Coordination Key to Stopping Terrorism across Africa Funded by Illegal Trafficking in Natural Resources’. [35]
- Sierra Leone also hosted an ‘Arria Formula’ meeting on ‘Combating the Rise of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in West Africa and the Sahel’ in June 2024. [36]
Indeed, many efforts are being made between countries in Africa, with the help of the West. It seems that the cross-border nature of the jihadist threat requires addressing the problem at the continental level as a whole and not per country. This sounds complex and complicated, but it must be carried out in a coherent and coordinated manner by developing a real strategy against radical Islamic terrorism.
The spread of radical Islamic terrorist groups under the flags of Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Africa, and the subsequent significant increase in violence and the number of deaths and the creation of huge waves of refugees, should deprive the leaders of the Western world in general and those of the African world in particular of sleep.
Concerns are growing about the future of the AES countries that have failed to deal with Islamic terrorist groups that are succeeding in increasing their attacks and expanding their territorial control westward toward the Gulf of Guinea countries that are populated mainly by Christians, except for Senegal.
I should point out that many African nations are dealing with the need to set aside funds for social services and government initiatives aimed at promoting development, health, education, and other similar areas in addition to the battle against Islamic terrorism, which calls for substantial financial resources, which are frequently insufficient. It can be assumed that the African leadership is well aware of the fact that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism undermines social and economic development in their countries. Therefore, they understand the importance of the need for a holistic approach to combating radical Islamic terrorism and efforts to address the development and socio-economic dimensions of the challenge posed by Islamic terrorist groups.
A Paradigm Shift is a must
Despite decades of joint efforts, strategies to counter radical Islamic terrorism led by France and the United States have failed to curb and stop jihadist groups in the Sahel, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa. It seems that they have inadvertently worsened the situation.
The time has come to adopt a new approach that prioritizes civil defense not only for legal and humanitarian reasons, but also as a central part of the strategy for confronting jihadists.
As previously noted, there are several reasons why attempts to stop the growth of radical Islamic terrorism have failed. For instance, American and French tactics have failed to acknowledge the strategic target of armed organizations’ operations, which is the Sahelian populace and their economic networks.
The countries of the region and their Western supporters have waged an ineffective fight against terrorism: relying on the ‘targeting the enemy’ has contributed to violations, severe human rights violations, deaths of uninvolved civilians, violence based on gender or tribal affiliation, and displacement that has created massive waves of refugees. Islamic jihadists, on the other hand, from Mali, in the Sahel to Nigeria and the Horn of Africa, have adopted an effective form of revolutionary/subversive insurgency while ‘focusing on the population’ that is often alienated from the regime and its institutions. The lack of governance in peripheral areas, years of minimal state presence, a decline in the provision of government services (education, health, employment, essential infrastructure and personal security), alongside empty talk and declarations by central governments, have made it easier for jihadist organizations to fill the void created. They have taken the place of government institutions and expanded their territorial control and, on the other hand, their strategic advantage. Islamic rebel organizations from Mali to the Lake Chad region are combining intensified military action with forms of political, economic and social governance, and are leveraging the synergy between the two. The radical groups carry out guerrilla attacks against isolated local security/military forces. At the same time, they kill and kidnap local political figures, religious leaders, and civilians in communities that do not submit to their authority. According to the jihadists, anyone associated with the government or the military, or who refuses to pay taxes to the jihadists, receives severe punishment, sometimes including execution for the sake of being seen and feared. Furthermore, as Jihadist groups seize weapons from fleeing/retreating military and security forces, while gaining combat experience, they become bolder and challenge local armies that are often at a disadvantage and lacking an adequate response.
Whether it is the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM in the Western Sahel or the Islamic State’s ‘provinces’ (wilayat) in the Western Sahel, Lake Chad and Somalia, most major militant groups have adopted largely similar approaches.
The time has come to reset systems and adopt different ways of operating – that is, a paradigm shift. Future strategy must recognize the methods of operation of jihadist groups and strategically prioritize the protection of civilian lives, property and livelihoods. This action not only ensures a more successful approach that effectively challenges jihadist efforts to control the population, but one that which aligns with the legal obligations and stated values of Western powers if they return to supporting local armies instead of Russia and Turkey.
Civilian protection should play a key strategic role in confronting Jihadist groups in Africa, given that civilians represent the main focus of Jihadist groups. Civilians are both a target and a resource for armed groups. Therefore, controlling them is a key element in their success as insurgents/subversives. Therefore, abuse and mistreatment by a country’s military forces, as is the case on the ground, makes it more likely that the population will shift to supporting armed groups, including providing intelligence, carrying out missions, and recruiting fighters. Moreover, African countries have a legal mandate to protect human rights and property in their constitutions and other guiding legislation, making civilian protection a legal, not just a strategic, imperative. To implement an effective civil protection strategy, military commanders and local leaders must minimize human rights violations and mitigate harm to uninvolved civilians.
Moreover, militaries must monitor the minimization of civilian casualties and provide appropriate tactical training to frontline soldiers. They must also adopt a zero-tolerance approach to sexual abuse and violence, which have become a tool of war on the continent.
Focusing efforts on civilian protection can help turn the tide against insurgent groups. Not only is this strategy legally and morally sound, it is also key to long-term success against Jihadist insurgents. Such an approach is strategic primarily because it directly targets the central focus of jihadist armed groups: control over civilian populations. Without this civilian control, militants are exposed, isolated, and under-resourced.
Conclusion
Considering past and present military failures, it is clear and agreed that a reorganization of security force structures is needed to better respond to identified threats, as well as the integration of missions into a coherent global defense policy, which will strengthen the relevance, operational capacity of militaries in Africa. However, sustainable initiatives are needed to address the political barriers that prevent reforms and the establishment of more constructive civil-military relations, without alienation. The status quo will not suffice. The public should be included in the analysis of national security issues to reinterpret the role of militaries, particularly in light of the fact that many dangers today originate inside. Clarifying the military’s duty to civilians is a necessary step in this process.
The armies are required to have a clear code of conduct, supported by a continuous effort to instill ethical values throughout the force necessary to establish and strengthen standards of constitutionality, integrity, service and respect for human rights – which in practice does not exist and causes the phenomenon of alienation and fear of the killing armies in uninvolved civilians, sometimes more than the Islamic Jihad organizations. Due to the widespread phenomenon of corruption, oversight mechanisms are required to ensure that funds are properly transferred for the benefit of national security.
Can African countries do this and overcome the spread of jihadism without Western cooperation? I doubt it.
A paradigm shift is required in the military response and the definition of an active counterstrategy in radical Islamic terrorism in general and in particular against the state, the development of constitutional non-constitutional intelligence operations, and human capabilities.
[1] The weakness of military professionalism in Africa is well illustrated by the instability on the continent: military coups/weakened democratization, tribal/ethnic rebellions, the collapse of armies in the face of attacks by irregular forces, corruption, looting, involvement in illegal trade activities, and human rights violations. This pattern has continued for decades after the end of colonialism, despite staggering amounts of aid to the security sector and long-standing rhetoric about the need to strengthen civil-military relations on the continent.
[2] African armies created during the colonial era were designed not to protect the population, but to protect the government from the civilians. To achieve this, ethnic minorities were often disproportionately recruited into the armies to control the majority groups. These patterns continued in the postcolonial period, as military leaders from minority groups had strong incentives to resist any transition to democracy and majority rule.
[3] The place of the military in the strategic concepts of African leaders since the postcolonial era, independence, has been in the defense of the regime and internal development. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the military was never considered a real instrument of defense before the September 2002 war. For the first president, Houphouët-Boigny, state spending should be devoted to social issues, hence the low share of the national budget allocated to security. Furthermore, military forces should be a tool of development, not a security bastion. However, it should be taken into account that engineering units are preferred over infantry units; why? The army is used to build infrastructure, for campaigns to raise awareness against social/tribal evils and divisions rather than to protect the security of the territory. This concept, adopted by all his successors in Côte d’Ivoire, is undoubtedly the vision most common to ancient African leaders and their successors. For more information, see : Dominique Bangoura, Les armées africaines : 1960-1990 (Centre des Hautes études sur l’Afrique et l’Asie modernes, 1992).
[4] ‘Operation Mirador’, which the Beninese army is conducting, aims to deal with attacks by armed terrorist organizations and thus respond quickly to the deterioration of the security situation in the north of the country and prevent it from spreading inland.
In May 2019, the kidnapping of two French citizens in Benin and the assassination of their local guide raised the level of security alert in the north of the country. Since then, Benin has been facing terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare by radical Islamic terrorists based in the Sahel who seek to expand their operations to the Gulf of Guinea countries. To deal with this threat and secure the borders, the army launched ‘Operation Mirador’ in early 2022. 3,000 soldiers, in these areas, some of which are difficult for journalists to access and lack communication capabilities.
Dans le Nort du Bénin, l’opération militaire Mirador face à la pression terroriste. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/grand-reportage/20230925-dans-le-nord-du-b%C3%A9nin-l-op%C3%A9ration-militaire-mirador-face-%C3%A0-la-pression-terroriste
[5] Comment le Benin compte faire face aux attaques djihadistes sur son territoire. https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c5ye8ldjjgno
Comment le Bénin répond depuis 2022 aux activités terroristes au nord de son territoire. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230914-comment-le-b%C3%A9nin-r%C3%A9pond-depuis-2022-aux-activit%C3%A9s-terroristes-au-nord-de-son-territoire
Death toll in Benin national park attacks rise as France opens terror probe. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220211-death-toll-in-benin-national-park-attacks-rises-as-france-opens-terror-probe
Five rangers, soldiers killed in attack in Benin, park management says. https://www.yahoo.com/news/five-rangers-soldier-killed-attack-203717334.html
[6] Au Togo, au moins douze soldats tués dans une nouvelle attaque dans le Nord. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/07/20/au-togo-au-moins-douze-soldats-tues-dans-une-nouvelle-attaque-dans-le-nord_6182799_3212.html
Terrorist attack in Togo: 19 dead near the border Burkina. https://www.24heures.bf/attaque-terroriste-au-togo-19-morts-pres-de-la-frontiere-du-burkina/
[7] Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/
[8] Leaving Syria’s civil war to be a mercenary in Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjer5ewr34jo
Turkey’s Deployment of Syrian Mercenaries in Africa. https://www.institude.org/opinion/turkeys-deployment-of-syrian-mercenaries-in-africa
[9] But the Russians, through the Vanger Force/African Corps, have a poor track record in counterinsurgency in general and in Africa in particular. Their relative success as a counterinsurgency force in the Central African Republic (DRC) does not provide a good model for export and deployment to counterterrorism in Africa. An attempt to eliminate the Islamic State affiliate in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique failed miserably. Worse, their strategy—if you can even call it a strategy—seems to focus solely on trying to find a military solution to the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, when decades of counterinsurgency research and first-hand experience show that terrorism cannot be defeated by kinetic means alone.
[10] Wagner Mercenaries Clash with Rebels and Jihadists in the Sahel. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-september-13
[11] Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/
[12] Pro-Turkey Syria mercenaries head to Niger to earn cash. https://www.syriahr.com/en/333879
[13] Sahel: Sadats, Turkish Wagners in Niger. https://www.newcentre4s.org/EN/2024/10/10/sahel-sadats-turkish-wagners-in-niger/
[14] Global Terrorism Index 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2025#:~:text=Sahel%20remains%20global%20terrorism%20epicentre&text=The%20Sahel%20accounts%20for%2051,recorded%20at%20least%20one%20fatality.
[15] Why Ghana faces a growing jihadi threat. https://www.dw.com/en/why-ghana-faces-a-growing-jihadi-threat/a-71590013
[16] West African juntas set up a joint anti-terrorism force. https://www.dw.com/en/west-african-juntas-set-up-joint-anti-terrorism-force/a-68460562
[17] Mauritania and Chad pave the way for the dissolution of the G5 Sahel anti-jihadist alliance. https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/06/mauritania-and-chad-pave-the-way-for-the-dissolution-of-the-g5-sahel-anti-jihadist-allianc
[18] African nations form G5 to work on Sahel security, development. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-sahel-g-idUSBREA1F0P520140216
[19] ECOWAS Defense, Foreign Affairs Ministers Meet in Abuja. https://www.channelstv.com/2024/12/11/ecowas-defence-foreign-affairs-ministers-meet-in-abuja/
[20] In December 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2719 to examine on a case-by-case basis requests from the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and access to contributions assessed by the UN as intended for Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The resolution, which stipulated that the UN would contribute 75% and the remaining 25% would be jointly mobilized by the two organizations, is an important milestone in the UN-EU partnership for peace and security in Africa.
Resolution 2719 (2023) / adopted by the Security Council at its 9518th meeting, on 21 December 2023. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4031070?ln=en&v=pdf
[21] Note to Correspondents: Joint communiqué of the 8th AU-UN Annual Conference. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2024-10-22/note-correspondents-joint-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-8th-au-un-annual-conference
[22] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a multinational force, comprising mainly military units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Headquartered in N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, the force is tasked with ending the Boko Haram insurgency.
[23] Chad president threatens to withdraw from regional force after Boko Haram attack kills over 40 Chad troops. https://www.voanews.com/a/chad-president-threatens-to-withdraw-from-regional-force-after-boko-haram-attack-kills-over-40-chad-troops-/7851832.html
Chad army will stop joining regional operations against jihadists – president. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/chad-army-will-stop-joining-regional-operations-against-jihadists-president-idUSKCN21T0JU
[24] Niger’s junta withdraws from Lake Chad anti-Islamist force. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/01/niger-junta-withdraws-from-lake-chad-anti-islamist-force
[25] Resolution 2713 (2023). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2713(2023)
[26] The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is a former African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Formerly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which began in 2007 and ran until 2022, ATMIS aimed to fully transfer security operations to the Somali National Armed Forces. The operation involved troops from the East African countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti and Uganda. ATMIS transitioned to the AU Stabilization Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in early 2025. Financial constraints and rising tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia during late 2024 complicated the transition.
[27] Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/counter-terrorism-briefing-on-the-secretary-generals-strategic-level-report-on-isil-daesh-8.php
[28] Resolution 2767 (2024). https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2767(2024)
[29] Letter dated 19 July 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/191/91/pdf/n2419191.pdf
[30] See In footnote 13.
[31] High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/events/high-level-african-counter-terrorism-meeting-abuja-nigeria
[32] By ‘high level’, we mean the quality and rank of the participants in the meeting. In addition to those mentioned, four presidents, 10 ministers, and eight national security advisers from 29 African member states also participated. In addition, representatives from seven regional and subregional organizations, 17 civil society organizations and various UN bodies.
[33] UNODC and the EU Support Mozambique in Strengthening Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/latest-news/2023_unodc-and-the-eu-support-mozambique-in-strengthening-criminal-justice-responses-to-terrorism.html
A Double-Edged Sword: Peace Support Operations and Conflict Management in Northern Mozambique. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/20930.pdf
S/2023/147 Security Council: In the UN Library
[34] Security Council Report- November 2022 Monthly Forecast. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-11/counter-terrorism-11.php
[35] Stronger Regulation, Cross-Border Coordination Key to Stopping Terrorism across Africa Funded by Illegal Trafficking in Natural Resources, Speakers Tell Security Council. https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15056.doc.htm
[36] Statement on Countering Terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel. https://buildingtrust.si/statement/statement-on-countering-terrorism-in-west-africa-and-the-sahel/
An ‘Arria-formula’ meeting is an informal meeting of the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which must be convened by a member of the UNSC in order for the meeting to take place. The Arria formula is an informal arrangement that allows the Council greater flexibility to be briefed on international peace and security issues. It has been used frequently and has gained increasing importance since it was first introduced in March 1992. The Arria formula has gained particular importance because, in the Council’s long-standing practice, only delegations, senior government officials (of Council members) and UN officials could speak at Council meetings and regular consultations. The Arria formula allows a Council member to invite other Council members to an informal meeting, held outside the Council chambers (traditionally in the prestigious Conference Room 7), chaired by the inviting member. The meeting is called for the purpose of a briefing by one or more individuals considered to be experts on a matter concerning the Council. The formula is named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, who devised it in 1992 during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
