The source of weapons held by radical Islamic organizations in the Sahel
Captain Ibrahim Traoré, President of Burkina Faso, accuses imperialist powers of supporting Islamic terrorist groups to maintain their influence in Africa in the face of Russian and Turkish takeovers. In an interview with the Russian media outlet Sputnik, broadcast on Radio Diffusion du Burkina (RTB) on May 14, 2025, the head of state confirmed that the enemies facing Burkina Faso are not just isolated terrorists, but armed forces supported by foreign interests. [1]
Traoré condemned the remarks of American General Michael Langley, commander of AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), about exploiting Burkina Faso’s mineral resources for the benefit of the ruling elite and demanded a public apology. Amid the growing tensions, Traoré noted that his country is determined to defeat terrorism, despite foreign intervention that he describes as neo-colonial. [2]
“We are at a rather extraordinary stage in the fight against terrorism,” Traore declared, “terrorist groups are now benefiting from new technologies, advanced combat techniques, and logistical means that can only come from powerful elements. All this has been provided to them by the imperialists,” the president insisted. For the Burkinabé president, there is no doubt that the Western powers, under the guise of cooperation, are manipulating and exploiting these armed groups to maintain control of Africa.
Meanwhile, in Burkina Faso, Islamist terrorist groups are stepping up attacks and occupying Diapaga in the east, after the town of Djibo, where the army and its forces, the ‘Volunteers of the Fatherland’ (VDP- Volontaires de la patrie) were defeated,[3] and after the pro-government forces were also repelled by jihadist attacks in the communes of Solé and Yondé.[4]
According to OCHA, the humanitarian situation in Burkina Faso in April 2025 continues to deteriorate (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Through the Group for Rapid Coordination of Operations for Rapid Response (GCORR), humanitarian services reported over 60,000 new displaced persons, with 53% being women and children. This is an increase of 80% compared to the situation in March 2025. Dédougou and Tougan in the Boucle du Mouhoun region received more than 50% of these displaced persons. The North, East, and Sahel regions received more than 6,000, 5,100, and 5,000 people, respectively. [5]
Where do the weapons used by armed groups come from?
Researchers from the Conflict Armament Research (CAR) organization have published the results of an extensive in-depth study tracing the origins of arsenals used by Jihadist groups in the central Sahel.[6] The vast majority of these weapons are several decades old. At least 20% of the jihadist arsenal comes directly from the regular military forces of the Sahel. The weapons are obtained mainly during attacks on military bases and military convoys of countries in the region.[7] Contrary to assumptions of massive external supplies, most of the weapons used by Jihadist groups come from local sources. One of the most surprising results of the CAR study is the lack of tangible evidence of direct arms supply outside the central Sahel. This conclusion casts doubt on several theories:
- The hypothesis of direct supply links with Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.
- Conspiracy theories circulating on social media accuse certain foreign powers (including France) of arming jihadists.
These revelations highlight the importance of focusing on local dynamics to understand and effectively combat the jihadist threat in the Sahel.
One of the most dangerous regions in the world is the central Sahel – the tri-border region: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger. This region, known as Liptako–Gourma, has experienced a massive escalation of violence in the past decade, pitting sub-state armed groups against national security forces and community militias in a violent and bloody conflict that has caused massive population displacement.[8] In 2024, the Sahel accounted for more than half of the world’s terrorism-related deaths, or 51% of all global deaths, a historic high according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI).[9]
Two prominent Salafi Islamic terrorist groups have expanded their influence in this region: the JNIM (Group for Support of Islam and Muslims) affiliated with al-Qaeda and the ISGS (Islamic State in Greater Sahara) affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS) – exploiting the security vacuum in this region, considered, as mentioned, a global hotbed of violent extremism.
Across the Niger River, in the Lake Chad region (the border between Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon), the countries mentioned are facing an endemic security crisis linked to the presence and terrorist activity of two rival radical Islamic groups that emerged as a result of the split in the Boko Haram organization: ISWAP (Islamic State in West Africa) and JAS (Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad). [10]
Since 2015, CAR researchers have cataloged and located weapons and ammunition in these areas to analyze their origin. Their report, published on April 28, 2025, sheds light on the composition of terrorist groups’ arsenals and the local dynamics of arms trafficking.
The study is based on an investigation of more than 700 weapons seized by regional security forces from Salafi jihadist groups between 2015 and 2023 in the Liptako-Gourma region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) and the Lake Chad border region.
The CAR researchers worked in collaboration with police, gendarmerie and judicial authorities, mainly in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
According to the study, the seized stockpile appears to consist almost exclusively of military weapons, in particular assault rifles, nearly 80%, as well as grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars, and even rocket launchers.
According to the study, Kalashnikov assault rifles are primarily imported from China and Russia, with minor amounts also coming from Eastern European nations that manufacture them, including Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Most of the equipment is old, several decades old: about 65% of the weapons were manufactured in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Only 34 of the 726 weapons analyzed were manufactured after 2011 (less than 5% of all guns).
To identify the origin of the weapons, the researchers analyzed the serial numbers indicating their places of manufacture. Using the marking code unique to the weaponry supplied by ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), they then went back and followed their original route.
The researchers were able to determine that a significant portion of the stock initially supplied to regional armies was diverted or returned by jihadist groups during attacks. According to the experts’ investigation, almost a quarter of the weapons seized from Salafi-jihadist groups in Liptako-Gourma came from the possession of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. These weapons are often lost or abandoned during failed jihadist attacks against the armed forces of the armies.
In addition, these groups also hold significant stocks of weapons from previous conflicts. These weapons circulate in regional illicit markets, the report notes, being bought and sold by various actors, traders, jihadists, or members of local militias. According to the researchers, terrorist groups sometimes sell weapons to finance the purchase of new equipment or to pay their recruits, especially in the form of gold mined in local mines. However, this phenomenon remains limited; they usually keep their arsenals under wraps. In these regions, weapons are accessible to everyone because it is a region saturated with wars that have been going on for decades, and they are mainly simple weapons that characterize the terrorist, such as the Kalashnikov (AK-47) rifle, weapons that are known for their minimal maintenance and can be maintained for a very long time. The report does not find evidence to suggest that the arms trade is a significant source of income for jihadist groups. They prefer to maintain or increase their stockpiles and enjoy other more profitable activities, such as kidnapping for ransom, taxing populations, and plundering local resources.
The experts conducted a comparative analysis of the weapons seized from different groups to understand the supply chains. The other actors use the same type of weapons within the same territory, whether from traders or local armies. The researchers did not identify supply chains between Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad groups that share the same ideology, such as ISGS and ISWAP, nor circles involving external actors.
The CAR research negates the argument of the military regimes in the Sahel countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), especially the statements of the leader of Burkina Faso Traore, who reports and receives military support for jihadist groups from abroad.
However, the research shows that the supply mechanism is only available in a small area. For example, weapons from Libya’s Gaddafi stockpiles, which were distributed in large quantities after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, represent only a small percentage – just 7% – of the weapons identified by the researchers. The study suggests that they only reached Liptako-Gourma in small numbers and were sold on local clandestine markets. Beyond its purely informative purpose, CAR’s expertise is to support local stakeholders, researchers, and criminal justice professionals in their work to curb the spread of the arms trade. This allows for monitoring the development of weapons stockpiles by jihadist groups. The revelations about the origins of jihadist weapons in the Sahel offer new perspectives for improving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in the region. By focusing on securing local arms arsenals and strengthening regional cooperation, Sahel countries can significantly reduce the operational capabilities of extremist Islamic groups.
The reality on the ground shows that radical Islamic armed groups thrive not because of external aid, but because of the vacuum left by authoritarian, disconnected, and sometimes complicit regimes. In some areas of the Sahel, residents still prefer jihadist ‘justice’ to military arbitrariness or police brutality. It seems that jihadism does not advance only with stolen Kalashnikovs: it advances on the fertile ground of abandonment, humiliation, resentment, and alienation. Nothing will change as long as governments continue to treat the crisis as a simple security issue and not as a breakdown of social cohesion.
[1] Ibrahim Traoré: Terror in the Sahel is Fed by Imperialists
https://www.afrik.com/ibrahim-traore-le-terrorisme-au-sahel-est-nourri-par-les-imperialistes
[2] On April 3, the commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Michael Langley testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Langley described Captain Traoré, the head of the ruling junta, as an enemy of US interests. Langley accused Traoré of using the gold reserves that he nationalized “to protect his junta.” General Langley was responding to a question from Senator Roger Wicker about corruption and bribery related to trade with China.
“General Langley’s Accusations Against Traoré: A Flashpoint in Africa’s Struggle for Sovereignty”
[3] Attaques meurtrières contre une base militaire et des villages au Burkina Faso : des dizaines de morts
[4] Les groupes terroristes intensify their attacks et s’emparent de Diapaga, à l’est
[5] Burkina Faso : Aperçu humanitaire (Avril 2025)
https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-apercu-humanitaire-avril-2025
[6] Conflict Armament Research (CAR) is a UK-based investigative organization that tracks the supply of conventional weapons, ammunition and related military equipment (such as improvised explosive devices) to conflict-affected areas. Established in 2011, CAR specializes in working with governments to uncover how weapons end up in war zones and in the hands of terrorists and rebel groups.
[7] A 2021 study by Amnesty International showed that Islamic terrorist organizations are equipped with Western weapons originating from France and Serbia. The Western weapons identified in photos and videos were captured by the rebels as loot in battles with the army and local militias. They include M02 Coyote heavy machine guns, manufactured by Zastava Arms in Serbia, M92 and M05 series rifles similar to the Kalashnikov, and the latest M05E3 assault rifle models.
Serbian Arms Used in Africa’s Sahel Conflict: Amnesty International
IS using state-of-the-art Serbian weaponry in the Sahel: Amnesty
https://www.newarab.com/news/using-serbian-weaponry-sahel-amnesty
Where do jihadist groups in the Sahel get their weapons?
https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250511-where-do-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-get-their-weapons
[8] Tableau de bord mensuel sur la crise du Liptako Gourma
https://dtm.iom.int/report-product-series/tableau-de-bord-mensuel-sur-la-crise-du-liptako-gourma
[9] Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger
Sahel dominates top 10 countries most impacted by terrorism
Data shows that Burkina Faso remains the most affected country, both in terms of deaths and attacks that have decreased Although, and decreased by 21 and 57 percent respectively, the country still accounts for a fifth of all terrorist deaths worldwide. Niger highlights how fragile progress in reducing terrorist deaths can be. In 2024, the country recorded the largest increase in terrorist deaths worldwide, rising by 94 percent to 930 total cases, reversing the improvement seen in 2022. Niger’s example shows that improvements in Burkina Faso are temporary.
[10] JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters
Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) is a violent radical Islamist group based in northern Nigeria, operating as a faction of the broader umbrella group commonly known as Boko Haram. In 2015, a faction within Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), which led to a split into two largely conflicting factions: JAS and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram (and its JAS faction) have been designated a terrorist entity. JAS carries out terrorist campaigns in northern Nigeria, including suicide bombings, kidnappings, attacks on civilians, and an insurgency against the Nigerian state. Despite counterterrorism and coordinated military operations by the Nigerian government and its regional partners against JAS, the group remains a persistent threat.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b196-jas-vs-iswap-war-boko-haram-splinters
