The Situation in the Sahel
Introduction
The Sahel region of Africa is experiencing serious security issues, political instability and humanitarian catastrophes, driven mainly by violent extremism, military juntas and climate pressures. Here are a few:
Burkina Faso: Captain Traoré calls Islam ‘moderate’ and condemns ‘extremists.
On July 16, the head of the military regime in Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, was in Yaagda, in the north of the country, where he gave a long speech to the Spiritual Forces (a local political group).[1] Without mentioning his name at all, he referred to the arrest of Imam Mohamed Ishaq Kindo and the protests that followed.[2]
In his speech, Ibrahim Traore claimed that a ‘minority of extremists’ was the problem in the country: “Extremists, you must come to your senses, the struggle continues,” he declared. “This is what led to terrorism. We will suspend them from preaching if they speak out of turn.” The ruler made it clear that Burkina Faso would never adopt the strict Islamic law of Sharia.[3]
For the Burkinabe head of state, ‘imperialism’ intends to use religion, and especially Islam, to ‘destroy’ the country. In recent months, Captain Ibrahim Traore has repeatedly stressed that the army is systematically finding copies of the Koran in dismantled terrorist bases. Ruler Traore seeks to repatriate Burkinabe citizens studying Sharia law abroad.
In order to do this, he declared that government funds would be made available to help imams who preach the “good word.” As for young Burkinabe students studying Islam in Arab countries, he announced the return to their country of between 800 and 1,000 students studying Sharia law in Saudi Arabia. According to him: “They are not studying a profession. I will return them, and anyone who does not return will no longer be Burkinabe,” meaning their citizenship will be revoked. [4]
From the end of June, any Burkinabe student wishing to study abroad must obtain approval from the Ministry of Higher Education to ensure that their studies meet the government’s priorities.
Sunni leaders quickly sided with Captain Traore following the military takeover in 2022. But for this Sunni community, the establishment of a day of customs and traditions on May 15 was seen as a real blow. The decree regulating prayers in public spaces was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Having established his authority, Captain Traore systematically dismantled his former supporters and he believed this power struggle could continue. After prohibiting some lectures by radical preachers, he threatened to punish other religious leaders “if they continued” their radical preaching.
Arab slavery in Africa: Ibrahim Traore breaks taboo and attacks radical Islam.
Ibrahim Traore, the president of Burkina Faso, wishes to destroy the taboo on this topic in historical memory. During a televised speech, Traore also referred to the historical link between Africa and the Arab-Muslim world.[5] He accused certain historical figures associated with this region of having participated in African slavery for several centuries, referring to a period of 1,000 years: “People came, first of all with the Arab-Muslim conquests, that’s more than a thousand years of slavery in Africa … and the last slave market closed; it was in the country in 1962. […] Men were castrated […] so that they would not be fathers of children.” These statements are part of a broader debate about external influences and the construction of cultural references in Burkina Faso.
Traore’s statement has angered several leading figures in the Arab-Muslim world. [6] One of Mauritania’s main imams responded in the Quds al-Arabi newspaper: “Traore’s statements are part of an attempt to divert attention from the internal challenges facing his country, by warning that the Burkinabe people, who are predominantly Muslim, will not accept what they see as an offense against Islam, and by calling on the president to distinguish between Arab and Islamic history, on the one hand, and contemporary ethnic and political conflicts within Burkina Faso, on the other.”
Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso… The catastrophic record of the completely useless Russian military forces in the Sahel
The coming to power of the military juntas in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso was accompanied by the expulsion of Western and UN forces, but the presence of the ‘African Corps’ (the successor to the Wagner Force) resulted in a serious security failure. [7] While seriously injuring citizens, the regimes lost widespread control to rebels and Islamists. The Russian military forces of the ‘Africa Corps’ suffered a number of military defeats and retreats on the ground in Mali that could cost them dearly in their partnerships in African countries.
After the assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group (PMC), Russia made a number of adjustments that serve the Kremlin and streamline control of the mercenary group now called Africa Corps.
At this time, the state of Mali is facing a critical security situation and is in uncertainty following coordinated attacks, unprecedented in their scope, including an ‘economic siege’ on the capital city of Makoua, by jihadists from the ‘Group in Support of Islam and Muslims’ (JNIM, an ally of Al-Qaeda) and the rebellion of the ‘Front for the Liberation of Azawad’ (ALF). The foreign force, the Russian ‘Africa Force’, which replaced the Western force with a French command (Barkhane), is very far from being an effective and reliable auxiliary force that can be relied on. After several retreats and the loss of soldiers and weapons, it looks more like a splintered reed. As a result of the attacks that began at the end of April this year by armed groups in several strategic cities in Mali, Russia’s reputation in Africa has taken a heavy blow. The image of mercenaries from the ‘African Corps’ has been severely damaged, especially after the broadcast of photos in which they are seen being escorted by rebels out of the city of Kidal. [8] This is a slap in the face to this ally of the junta in Mali and to the various military governments in the surrounding countries, mainly Burkina Faso and Niger. Remember, they established the AES (Alliance of Sahel States), broke away from the West and the African Economic Community ECOWAS, they chased French and U.S. military forces and relied on Russia and its mercenary force on its behalf. Which is a limited and thin force in its offensive capabilities, compared to the composition of the Western force and the offensive and intelligence capabilities of Barkhane and TAKUBA. The leaders of the AES nations thought that by using the Russian expeditionary army, they would be able to drive out the rebels and resolve the underlying internal issues that are causing the political unrest in the Sahel Alliance nations. [9]
By dispatching the Africa Force to Mali, the Russians have promised to uphold the junta’s authority, and they are in fact a member of the ruler’s guard. The Russian-Malian partnership includes the deployment of 2,500 troops, estimated to cost between $500 million and $900 million (514.72 billion CFA francs) since 2022, according to All Eyes on Wagner. By all accounts, a poor return on investment for a junta that, if it remains in power, is on the verge of collapse. [10]
For now, Russia is keen to show its determination to support the regime of ruler Assimi Goitta, but if the rebels continue to advance, Russia’s reputation could suffer another blow. The Africa Force has already reduced its commitments to fighting side by side with the Malian army, coordinating its withdrawal from Kidal with the leaders of the JNIM organization. [11]The hasty withdrawal of the Russian force from Kidal was more than a tactical failure; This was the result of a flawed partnership model that Russia had applied to several war-torn African countries. Unstable regimes in the Sahel had long sought security assistance without conditions on human rights or democratic governance, and Russia had built its regional modus operandi precisely on this commitment—an explicit commitment not to interfere in the internal political and social affairs of its partners. In Mali, this effectively meant total involvement limited solely to protecting the regime at the expense of national stability beyond Bamako.
Above all, according to numerous documents and investigations into the Russian presence in Mali, Russian mercenaries are accused of “widespread human rights violations and attacks against civilians, including mass atrocities, which have significantly contributed to the escalation of the brutality of the conflict,” according to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data).[12] Russian mercenaries are engaged in the sale of cheap weapons, abusing the local population, looting, raping and killing. In combat on the ground, they look pathetic with weapons that are not appropriate for the conditions of the field and battle. Their aggressive behavior towards the population actually increases the desire of the locals to join the ranks of organizations. Radical Islamic Jihad. The presence of the ‘African Corps’ shows that the force is concerned, beyond ensuring the survival of the juntas, with seizing natural resources (such as gold) rather than eradicating radical Islamic terrorism.[13]
Russia has managed to gain a foothold in the local population. In 2022, when the Malian government finally ended its cooperation with the West especially French forces, protesters waved Russian flags and banners praising Putin in the streets of Bamako. Russia has deployed a massive disinformation campaign on the local public to stoke hatred of neocolonialism, a theme it fuels and intensifies, and to erase any trace of cooperation with the West. [14]
The military, political and propaganda defeats could push other juntas to diversify their security providers. Recent events raise serious questions in Niger and Burkina Faso, where Russia also has a presence, albeit a more modest one. If the Russian intervention in Mali ends, this could have repercussions in both countries, where groups such as JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) pose an existential threat to the ruling military regimes.
Russian mercenaries in Mali: Why so few casualties?
The Russians are focusing their resources mainly on protecting the government and certain sensitive sites in Bamako.
The low casualty count stems from a simple mathematical reality: the Russians are outnumbered by the Malian army. According to several sources, between 1,500 and 2,000 Russian troops are currently deployed in Mali, compared to more than 13,000 troops in the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa). Naturally, the larger the presence of a force in a country, the more vulnerable it is to attack.
Above all, the Russians do not occupy the same role within the military structure. Their mission is mainly to support the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), not to replace them. Malian soldiers remain at the front in most operations and in a large number of forward positions.
The Malian army soldiers who are at the front are those who are located in high-risk areas, and the ‘African Corps’ elements are located behind, that is, in the background. This is to manage communications and handle the analysis of data sent by drones. For this reason, the majority of the hostages are also Malian army personnel, as are the majority of the men killed on the front lines.
At the same time, the Russian military forces, the mercenaries of the ‘African Corps’ are not immune to death on the battlefield. Several of them have been killed during operations carried out in northern and central Mali in recent years. These figures are difficult to verify, as neither the MKO nor Moscow officially report their losses. Another factor to consider is combat experience. Unlike soldiers from the Malian army, the Russian fighters are veterans who have participated in several conflicts around the world.
Furthermore, the Russian soldiers frequently possess more advanced weaponry and protective gear, which might lessen their direct vulnerability to ground-based rebel fire.
In actuality, there are two distinct forces involved in war and combat.
There is the army, and there are paramilitary forces that are primarily very experienced professional mercenaries. As mentioned above, these are people who have served in several international theaters of operation and come to Mali with this rich experience, which allows them to quickly deal with jihadist attacks or, at the very least, fight off any attack that may be encountered. Their mastery of combat techniques, the resources at their disposal, including armored vehicles, drones and aircraft, for example, can explain why they have much greater coverage than the Malian army.
Finally, there is the issue of strategic choices. With limited manpower, the Russians will primarily focus their resources on protecting sensitive sites and operations deemed most important, often leaving Malian forces with the responsibility of holding the ground for the long term.
Niger’s army is powerless against jihadists.
Three years after General Abdouramane Tchiani took office in a coup on July 26, 2023, Niger is still experiencing instability. In the Tillabéry region, the epicenter of violence in the west of the country, Jihadist attacks are increasing and continue to claim many lives, both soldiers and civilians. [15] Thousands of people have been forced to flee their villages, leading to a severe humanitarian crisis in the region. [16]
The Tillabéri region in western Niger serves as a major operational hub and deadly launch pad for the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), enabling cross-border expansion and major military offensives across the Mali-Niger border region. The region is strategically important for the Islamist rebels, who benefit from porous cross-border mobility with Mali and Burkina Faso, allowing for the smooth movement of fighters, weapons and supply lines. The region serves as a central geographic hub from which ISSP launches large-scale coordinated attacks on state security positions, such as historic bases in In-Ates and Banibangou. The Tillabéri region functions as an intermediate base surrounding the eastern flank of Niger’s capital, Niamey, and gradually isolates key regional cities through economic strangulation and roadblocks.
Today, attacks against defense and security forces, as well as civilians, are significantly more frequent and violent than three years ago. The deterioration of the security situation is noticeable and accelerating. In the past, even in the shadow of personal insecurity, life was better for residents: weekly markets operated as usual, and supplies were regular. Today, entire villages have been displaced, schools are closed, and the death toll is endless.
According to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data), the Tillabéri region remains the epicenter of clashes between JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. [17] This rivalry has resulted in a record number of casualties among military personnel and civilians alike. Almost 1,200 deaths were recorded in 2025, the highest death toll in the central Sahel region. [18]
Certain measures taken by the military authorities (Nigerien Armed Forces -FAN), which is struggling to fight the two organizations, such as the closure of weekly markets and restrictions on movement in some sensitive areas, contribute to increasing the precarious situation of populations already severely affected by insecurity. Residents often have no choice but to abandon their villages and seek refuge in relatively safe settlements, where they live in extremely difficult conditions. They stay in makeshift shelters subject to weather conditions and engage in casual work to survive. Even obtaining drinking water is a problem.
The hopes of the local population are diminishing with each attack, despite promises to restore security given by the military authorities. [19] The last major attack recorded in the Tillabéri region dates back to July 17. It claimed the lives of 16 soldiers. [20]
FLA releases video of some 200 Malian army soldiers taken prisoner.
The video, which combines several separate clips, lasts almost 11 minutes. It shows dozens of Malian soldiers in civilian clothes, sitting side by side in the sand, in front of a stretched canvas.[21] Their exact number: 208, according to the FLA (Front de libération de l’Azawad), the soldiers captured at the end of April in Kidal, and then again in July, during the attack on the Anéfis camp and the ambush of a military convoy in Tabrichat, between Anéfis and Gao. Several of them appear on the screen, indicating their names and personal numbers. Most of them belong to the army. Some are police or gendarmes.
The first person to speak dates the recording to July 28 and notes that several prisoners, whose names he mentions, are not being filmed because they are ‘in a medical center’. The soldiers claim that they are being treated well. One of them makes harsh remarks against the ruling ‘junta’ in Bamako – remarks clearly dictated by his captors – and several others call on the authorities to ‘think about them’ and find a ‘peaceful solution’ so that they can be reunited with their families.
The separatists have already held around 20 soldiers, who were captured during various attacks between September 2023 and July 2024. According to a member of the FLN, these prisoners, who are in long-term detention, are being held ‘in another area’. Several leaders of the separatist group claim that the release of the video is intended to reassure families by providing news about their loved ones, while the transitional authorities are not taking steps to secure their release.
This video is being released in a particular context: on July 18, at least eighteen soldiers were executed after surrendering after an ambush of a military convoy in Tabrichat by the FLA and their Islamist partners from the JNIM. Chilling images have been circulated, notably identifying Hamza Ag Iyad, the son of JNIM leader Iyad Ag Ghaly. [22]The FLA claims that only the jihadist group carried out these executions and that its prisoners are treated in accordance with international humanitarian law.
On July 29, the human rights organization Amnesty International defined these executions as “war crimes” and called on the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) and the Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), which claimed responsibility for the Tabrichat ambush, to punish those responsible. A week earlier, on July 23, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the alleged torture and killings of dozens of Malian army soldiers who surrendered to FLA separatists and JNIM jihadists, and called for a thorough and independent investigation.
In addition, still in the Kidal region, the Malian army has carried out a series of airstrikes in recent days which, according to the local human rights organization CD-DPA, have caused civilian casualties. On the night of July 28-29, drone strikes in Talahandak killed at least three people and injured six, all of them Nigerien nationals. The health center in Talahandak was also destroyed. On the following night, from July 29 to July 30, army drones targeted Ikharabane, near Tinzaouatène. CD-DPA reports six deaths and about twenty injuries, all of them gold miners of Chadian origin. and Nigeria.
In a statement, the Malian army claimed responsibility for the destruction of several groups of people affiliated with the JNIM-FLA terrorist coalition on the outskirts of the city of Tessalit in the Kidal region.
David Doukhan Ph.D.
9.8.2026
[1] In Burkina Faso, ‘Forces vives’ is a political and sociological term used to describe the active and organized sectors of civil society. It refers to a broad coalition of stakeholders outside the traditional governance apparatus.
Who makes up the Forces Vives? In the context of Burkina Faso, this group typically includes: Civil society organizations (CSOs): human rights groups, non-governmental organizations, and community organizations. Trade unions: labor organizations representing various professional sectors. Religious and traditional leaders: clergy and community elders. Political parties: opposition groups and political coalitions. Youth and professional organizations: student groups and trade unions.
What is their role? The ‘Forces vives’ represent the collective voice of the people in political dialogue, national debates, and transitional governance. Historically, they have played a crucial role in times of political crisis (such as coups or transitions of power) by demanding accountability, participating in drafting transitional charters, and organizing protests or strikes to influence government policies. Recent context in recent years, relations between the military government of Captain Ibrahim Traore and civil society have become very limited. The government has increased regulations and dispersed dozens of civil society groups and NGOs, making it difficult for the broader ‘forces of life’ to act independently or criticize the government. At the same time, pro-government factions of the ‘forces of life’ have frequently held rallies to express support for the military transition.
[2] Prominent Sunni preacher Imam Mohamed Ishaq Kindo was arrested by Burkina Faso’s military authorities on May 26, 2026, after publicly criticizing a government bill aimed at regulating religious freedoms. The draft legislation, presented by the ruling military junta, seeks to limit the establishment of places of worship in public institutions, curb noise pollution from religious activities and prevent religious hate speech. Imam Kindou denounced these restrictions, warning authorities against crossing the line in religious practices, which led to his arrest on the eve of the Eid al-Adha holiday. His arrest sparked protests in Ouagadougou, leading authorities to disperse the crowds, detain nearly 100 of his supporters for “citizenship training” and temporarily close the main Sunni Mosque in the capital.
Burkina Faso: Arrest of Influential Imam Exposes Regime Sensitivity to Religious Authority
Imam arrested in Burkina Faso after criticizing draft law on religious freedom
https://ifex.org/imam-arrested-in-burkina-faso-after-criticising-draft-law-on-religious-freedoms
[3] Traoré Declares Burkina Faso Will Not Adopt Sharia Law; Says Citizens Are Free to Practice Any Religion #pulsenigeria247
[4] Burkina Faso’s President Vows to Recall 800 Students on Sharia Scholarships, Prioritizes Engineering and Science
[5] https://www.instagram.com/p/Da-bDuYilKu/?hl=en
https://www.instagram.com/reel/Da70qdIIM5R
[6] MB statement commenting on the statements attributed to Burkina Faso’s President concerning Islam and slavery in Africa
[7] Russian-backed forces arrived in Mali in December 2021, mostly in the form of Wagner Group mercenaries. They were invited by Mali’s new president, Assimi Guetta, who seized power in a coup in May and quickly adopted a pro-Russian, anti-French stance.
[8] What the Mali Offensive Reveals About Russia’s Partnerships in Africa
[9] In early 2022, Guetta expelled French forces, leaving Russia to fill the security vacuum.
France, allies condemn ‘deployment’ of Russian Wagner mercenaries in Mali
[10] What role has Russia played in Mali’s security and the Sahel region?
[11] Malian official accuses Russian forces of ‘betrayal’ after Kidal
falls to rebels
[12] Africa Overview: July 2026
https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-july-2026
[13] Resource control over security: In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, Russian forces often prioritize securing gold-rich sites and transportation corridors, allowing them to amass vast mineral wealth. Reports suggest that Russia has extracted billions of dollars in gold profits from the continent since 2022, funneling these assets to help circumvent international sanctions and fund global operations. In Niger, a major global supplier of uranium, Russian state entities (Rosatom) are in talks with the military government to acquire mining concessions, further shifting the region’s economic dependence towards Russia.
How Russia’s MoD Secures and Exploits Sahel’s Strategic Minerals
[14] Lavrov falsely presents Russia as fighter against neocolonialism
[15] Coordinated Attacks in Tillabéri Region
https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/reports/niger-coordinated-attacks-in-tillaberi-region
[16] Global Humanitarian Overview 2026
https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2026/article/niger-4
[17] The main battleground between JNIM (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen) and ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province) is the central Sahel triangle – specifically converging areas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – along with expanding frontlines in the border regions of Benin and Nigeria. Key areas of competition Tillabéri and Dosso regions (Niger): serve as the main arena for parallel attacks and direct confrontations on the ground, as both groups push south towards the West African coast. Mali-Burkina Faso border corridor: The strategic core (including areas near Saba and northern Mali) where the two factions compete for ultimate regional dominance. Border areas Benin-Niger-Nigeria: porous borders such as the W-Arly-Pendjari and Tahoua/Dosso Park complexes, which serve as new logistical routes and operational bases. Both groups treat these intersecting spaces as open terrain, understanding that losing ground in places like Niger threatens their wider control in Mali and Burkina Faso. Internal conflicts between the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Islamic State-affiliated ISSP have intensified as they seek rear bases outside the central Sahel, directly affecting local civilian populations.
[18] Violence Against Civilians Surges in Niger’s Tillabéri Region
Africa Overview: July 2026
https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-july-2026
[19] Among the main reasons for the weakness of the Nigerien army is the expulsion of allies: the military junta has severed ties with Western counterterrorism partners, including France and the United States, thereby removing vital intelligence, air support and specialized training. Limited capacity of new partnerships: transitions from Western forces to alternative security providers such as Russia’s Africa Force have left a security vacuum and gaps in operational effectiveness.
[20] 16 soldiers killed, 23 injured in terror attack in west Niger
https://english.news.cn/africa/20260720/aa3785096b3548f58a31e87aa61eb509/c.html
[21] Tuareg rebels hold dozens of soldiers in Mali as prisoners
[22] Dozens of Malian soldiers have been killed after their military convoy was ambushed in northern Mali
At least 50 Malian soldiers killed in rebel-jihadist attack
