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The First Iraqi Suicide Bombing -A hint of things to come?

Author: Published on: Published in: Commentaries
The recent explosion of an Iraqi car bomb north of Najaf apparently signals the next stage of the campaign in Iraq – the stage of the use of suicide attacks.

What is a suicide attack—or “Istishad (Martyrdom), as its proponents call it? A suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be implemented. Unlike other wartime activities, which involve great risk to soldiers in the combat, the perpetrator of a suicide attacks knows that if he does not kill himself during the attack – nothing happens. This of course requires a different state of mind from the point of view of the attacker. Unlike the Japanese Kamikaze, who had no way of returning back from their suicidal mission (due to lack of fuel in their planes), the suicide attacker who is not determined, prepared, indoctrinated, or threatened (with concrete risk to his family), could change his mind at the last minute and save his life by refraining from executing the attack.

The attack is carried out by activating explosives worn or carried by the terrorist in the form of a portable explosive charge, or planted in a vehicle he is driving.

Was the suicide attack in Iraq an act of terrorism? Not necessarily. The perpetrator was not a member of a terrorist organization. Nor was he acting on personal initiative, without any backup and support. In fact, the Iraqis confirmed that the perpetrator, Ali Nuamni, was a soldier in their army. Because the perpetrator was disguised as a civilian this act is in contradiction to the laws of war and international conventions. Thus, the attack in Iraq should be defined as a war crime and not necessarily as terrorism.

Suicide attacks constitute an additional stage in escalation with the clear intention of causing the maximum number of casualties and damage—even more importantly—of striking a blow to the morale or its civilian backers.

Suicide attacks are attractive to terrorist organizations—and as seen by the attack in Iraq, to states as well—as they offer them a variety of advantages:

* Suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage.

Although a suicide attack is a very primitive and simple attack, the use of suicide tactics guarantees that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location. This guarantees the maximum number of casualties. In this regard the suicide bomber is no more than a sophisticated bomb—a carrier that brings the explosive device to the right location and detonates it at the right time.

In a suicide attack, as soon as the terrorist has set off on his mission his success is virtually guaranteed. It is extremely difficult to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is on his way to the target; even if the security forces do succeed in stopping him before he reaches the intended target, he can still activate the charge and cause damage. (Thus the need for accurate intelligence concerning the plans of the terrorist organizations is crucial, and the use of preliminary offensive measures such as targeted killings of the perpetrators, their commanders, trainers, etc).

Planning and executing the escape route after any attack is usually one of the most complicated and problematic stages. Suicide attacks require no escape plan.

Since the perpetrator is killed during the course of the suicide attack, there is no fear of him being caught afterwards, being interrogated by the security forces and passing on information liable to endanger other activists.

* Suicide attacks attract wide media coverage. A suicide attack is a newsworthy event for the media as it indicates a display of great determination and inclination for self-sacrifice on the part of the perpetrator.

Saddam would like to complicate the American campaign as much as he can, causing as many casualties as possible, delaying their progress, creating fear within their army units. He also would like to force them to retaliate against the Iraqi civilian population, who from now on must be regarded as possible enemy attackers, even when they allegedly come to asking for help, or offering to surrender. The use of suicide attacks serve all these goals simultaneously. These attacks can be made even more lethal in the future, should the perpetrators arm themselves with non-conventional capabilities. It’s also possible that the Iraqis will start using such methods against American and Western interests and civilian targets around the world; or they may provoke others to do so.
In summary, the latest “fashion” in terrorism in the Middle East and other countries worldwide—the suicide attack—has now found expression in the Iraq campaign. Countering this phenomenon requires thorough understanding and the adoption of new regulations that will safeguard the lives of American and British soldiers in Iraq, and yet will avoid playing into the hands of Saddam by causing damage and casualties to an innocent Iraqi civilian population. In contending with this phenomenon one should bear in mind that the suicide attack is not the act of a lone lunatic or desperate terrorist who decides to attack as an act of revenge. Rather it is a well-planned operation, which demands extensive preparations, planning, and the involvement of a number of activists.

Therefore, countering suicide attacks requires a combination of factors: effective intelligence, proactive offensive operations, unique defensive measures and regulations, special training for identifying and neutralizing suicide attackers, and psychological instruction for soldiers who might face a suicide attack in order to “immunize” them from the psychological effects of this attack. And all of this must be done under the added constraint of not allowing Saddam to capitalize on the propaganda gains entailed by any perceived attack upon the civilian population. The difficulties involved show why the suicide attack has become the favorite method of terrorism in a region acutely conscious of the role of the media in regional conflicts.

author

Founder & Executive Director, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Ronald Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel Prof. Boaz Ganor is the Founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and the Ronald S. Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. He previously served for five years as Dean and ten years as Deputy Dean of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy at the IDC Herzliya.  Prof. Ganor serves as the Founding President of the International Academic Counter-Terrorism Community (ICTAC), an international association of academic institutions, experts, and researchers in fields related to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In 2019-2020, Prof. Ganor spent a sabbatical year as a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Australia; as an Adjunct Professor at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Stuart University, Australia; and as the Aaron and Cecile Goldman Visiting Israeli Professor and Israel Institute Fellow at Georgetown University, United States.  Prof. Ganor previously held positions at Stanford University, U.C. Berkeley, the Hoover Institution (Koret Distinguished Visiting Fellow), the Monterey Institute of International Studies, MIPT (The National Memorial for the Prevention of Terrorism), Hebrew University and Bar Ilan University. He was also a member of the International Advisory Team of the Manhattan Institute (CTCT) to the New York Police Department (NYPD). Prof. Ganor is a member of the International Advisory Council of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, The Republic of Singapore. He is also a co-founder of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), a partnership between the University of Pennsylvania, United States; the Interdisciplinary Center, Israel; King’s College, London; and the Regional Center on Conflict Prevention (RCCP), Jordan. Since 2014, Prof. Ganor has been a Member of the Executive Committee of the Academic Advisory to the Institute for the Study of Global Anti-Semitism and Policy (ISGAP).  Prof. Ganor has given briefings and/or testimonies to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), the Australian Parliament, the United States Congress, the US Army, the FBI, the US Department of Homeland Security, as well as numerous intelligence, security and police services throughout the world. He has given hundreds of guest lectures at top universities and research centers throughout the world including at Columbia University, Syracuse University, Georgetown University, the Wilson Center, RAND and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In 2001, Prof. Ganor was appointed as a Member of the Advisory Committee of the Israel National Security Council on Counter-Terrorism, and he has previously served as a Member of the Israeli Delegation to the Trilateral (American-Palestinian-Israeli) Committee for Monitoring Incitement to Violence and Terror. Prof. Ganor also advised the Israeli Delegation for Peace Negotiations with Jordan on Transportation Safety, the Israeli Counter-Terrorism Coordinator at the Prime Minister’s Office and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. In 1995, he was a consultant to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on his book “Fighting Terrorism – How democracies can defeat domestic and international terrorism”. Prof. Ganor has published numerous articles on terrorism and counter-terrorism. His book, "The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle – A Guide for Decision Makers" (Transaction Publishers, 2005), is used as a text book in universities worldwide and his book, “Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenges to the Liberal Democratic World” was published by Columbia University Press in 2015. He has published several articles in “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism”, “Terrorism and Political Violence”, “Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts”, Orbis and the International Law Studies. He is also the editor of "Countering Suicide Terrorism" (2001) and "Post-Modern Terrorism" (2006). He is the co-editor of “ISC 2005 – Security, Terrorism and Privacy in Information Society” (2005), "Trends in International Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism" (2007), "Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting" (2007), "Terrorism Informatics – Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security" (2008), and “The Global Impact of Terrorism” (2008). Prof. Ganor is a member of the Editorial Board of Springer Intelligence & Security Informatics (ISI) journal and a member of the Advisory Board of the International Counter-Terrorism Review (ICTR). Prof. Ganor has contributed book chapters for many publications, including to Oxford University Press, Routledge, Springer, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. Prof. Ganor chairs ICT's Annual World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, the world's leading international conference in the field of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. In addition, he co-directed numerous research projects for NATO and the Ministry of Public Security. Prof. Ganor is a frequent media and television commentator and has appeared on the BBC, CNN, CBS, ABC, the New York Times, the Guardian, The Wall Street Journal, the Jerusalem Post, Haaretz and many other Israeli and international publications.

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