Executive Summary

This article analyzes the current war between Israel, and Iran and Hezbollah through the prism of cognitive warfare: the campaign over public consciousness, perception of reality, and trust in institutions, and focuses on how this arena is changing in the era after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah, a figure who for years served as the “brand manager” of the Axis of Resistance, turned speeches into security, media, and emotional events that generated movements on the ground, continuous tension, and a significant cognitive effect both on his side and on the Israeli side. The article shows how, in his absence, the axis’s cognitive warfare is shifting from leader‑centric to digitally decentralized: less one speech that shapes the story, and more a constant flow of videos, Telegram messages, vague threats, and attempts to influence regional and international public opinion. In parallel, Israel and its partners are conducting their own influence effort: leaks, precise strike videos, exposure of lies and propaganda, and the cognitive arena is becoming multi‑directional, dense, and elusive. The main message of the article is that cognitive warfare is no longer an “internal” issue belonging only to the security establishment: it now crosses the boundaries of the army and the state and directly affects businesses, organizations, managers, and decision‑making processes at all levels, under its more familiar name for these sectors: “reputation management.”

1. Wars of the 202X: Not Only Borders, Also Minds

In the midst of the current war between Israel and Iran and its proxies, led by Hezbollah, the familiar landscape of rockets, drones, and deep strikes has gained an additional layer: the battle for consciousness. In parallel to barrages and targeted killings, a much quieter war is being waged, trying to shape what we think, feel, and believe about who is winning, who is weakening, and what is likely to happen tomorrow. Cognitive warfare is the arena in which the fight is not over territory but over minds. It deals with managing fear and hope, trust and doubt, images, videos, fragments of information, and recurring narratives. This is a war over the story: who is perceived as just, who is perceived as strong, who looks like they have survived, and who looks like they are on their way out. In this sense, the current war with Iran and Hezbollah takes place not only in the North and in distant arenas, but also on screens, in our social media feeds, and in our daily conversations. A simple example: after every significant round of strikes, almost always within hours, videos “from the other side” appear with rockets being launched, headquarters still standing, forces laughing.

Even if we know that some of the materials are edited, the very flow of them creates a feeling that the enemy is “still strong,” that the effort against it “is not really hurting them.” This is exactly where cognitive warfare overlays the partial picture we have.

2. Nasrallah: Not Only a Commander, but also a Brand Manager

To understand what is unique about the current war, we need to remember who was here until not long ago. Hassan Nasrallah, the assassinated leader, was for many years far more than just “the head of an organization.” He was the scriptwriter, narrator, and presenter of the “Axis of Resistance.” Every time he rose to speak, he turned a televised speech into a regional event: Lebanon paused, Israel listened, the Arab world followed, and the international media marked the date in their calendars. In his speeches he knew how to hold together several audiences at once: his fighters, who received a message of strength and steadfastness; the Lebanese public, which received a story that explains why the heavy price is “justified”; Israelis, who heard direct threats against Haifa, Tel Aviv, gas rigs, airports, and northern communities; and the Arab and international world, which saw in him a “symbol of resistance” to Israel and the West. For example, in previous rounds of conflict, he devoted entire segments of his speeches to describing what would happen “on the day the resistance decides to open all fronts”: how many rockets, on which cities, to what depth. The very detail, even if some of it was imaginary, made the threat more tangible. He did not speak only about “hitting Israel,” but about paralyzing ports, shutting down airports, harming tourism, causing brain drain, and scaring off investments, even if he did not always use explicit economic language.

3. What Nasrallah Did to Our Heads

When Nasrallah was on the scene, several recurring patterns of influence could be identified:

a. The speech as a “security event” – the Israeli security establishment would raise alert levels around certain speeches: adding forces in the North, reviewing escalation scenarios, and sometimes even adjusting civilian procedures (for example, canceling events near the border, changing home‑front guidelines). In other words, his words generated movement on the ground.

b. The speech as a “media event” – television and radio channels broadcast his words, sometimes live, followed immediately by panels of commentators. Every sentence he uttered was analyzed again and again: is he seriously threatening, is he signaling weakness. The Israeli public found itself watching the enemy not only through reports but directly through their screen.

c. The speech as an “emotional event” – some of the speeches were accompanied by battle stories, commemoration of “martyrs,” and a portrayal of a reality in which his side “stands alone against a monster.” This strengthened the sense of mission among his supporters but also shaped on the Israeli side the perception of a “stubborn rival” who does not break, even under military pressure. And no less important – time management. He liked to use phrases such as “we will respond, but not now.” Weeks‑long periods in which he hinted that “a response will come yet” created in Israel and in the region ongoing tension that required costly readiness, political and public attention, and constant media noise that did not allow a real “return to routine.” This is warfare over consciousness through time, not only through words.

4. The Current War: The Same Players, Without the Main Mouthpiece

This brings us to the current picture. Facing Israel now stands an entire system: Iran, Hezbollah on the Lebanese front, and additional proxies in other arenas. The fighting is both military and technological, both overt and covert. But one thing has changed: the man who held the central microphone is gone. Instead, we see:

a. New spokespeople in Hezbollah – voices less familiar to the Israeli and international public who deliver speeches, issue threats, and provide explanations, but have not yet succeeded in creating the same “screen grip.” Their speeches are translated and analyzed less frequently and create fewer “cognitive days” than in the past.

b. Amplification of Telegram channels and social networks – short “operational” messages, field videos, clips of rocket launches and impacts, posts by “men on the ground,” all these partially replace the leader’s speech. The enemy no longer speaks mainly from a television podium, but through digital posts.

c. A more prominent Iranian presence – senior Iranian officials speak in the name of the “Axis of Resistance,” present developments as part of a regional strategy, and try to entrench the narrative that Israel is “getting bogged down” and “the West is weakening.” But even they, at least at this stage, do not command Israeli public attention the way Nasrallah did.

A typical example in the current campaign: after a targeted killing of a senior figure, within hours, we see revenge notices, old videos resurfacing, and vague threats of “a response at a time of our choosing,” but no single long speech that explains “what we learned,” “where we are going,” and “what we gained.” The feeling is one of a lot of noise, not of a single story.

5. How the Axis’s Cognitive Campaign Looks Now

The current cognitive campaign of Iran and Hezbollah consists of several concrete influence efforts, for example:

a. “We are still standing” videos – even after strikes on headquarters and weapons systems, videos are quickly published showing forces training, marching, launching from tunnels, or firing additional rockets. The message: “You tried to hurt us. You failed.” This is a way to reduce the cognitive effect of precision strikes.

b. Emphasizing damage to the Israeli home front – even if the actual damage is relatively limited, any video of a fire, infrastructure damage, or a hit on a vehicle is presented as a heavy blow. Captions and narration stress Israel’s “vulnerability” and the claim that “nowhere is safe anymore.” Exaggeration is part of warfare.

c. Attempting to influence international public opinion – this is done through rapid translation of materials into English, distribution on global platforms, and the use of slogans that plug into Western discourse (human rights, anti‑colonialism, struggle against “corporations and arms industries”). The message seeks to position Iran and Hezbollah on the side of “the oppressed,” not on the side of “terror instigators.”

In parallel, Israel and its partners are also engaged in influence: publishing documentation of precise strikes on commanders, presenting data about the decline in Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, highlighting the economic and security costs borne by the other side, and public exposure of the axis’s “lies and propaganda.” Here too, a single video showing a clean hit on a senior commander’s apartment building, combined with a message about “Hezbollah’s lack of transparency toward its citizens,” is designed to undermine their audience’s trust in its leadership.

6. Why Cognitive Effort Is Critically Important in the Current Campaign

In an age where almost every citizen carries a camera in their pocket and has access to the world, the importance of cognitive warfare is multiplied:

a. Internal stability – public trust in state institutions, the army, and leadership depends not only on results on the ground, but also on the feeling that a true picture is being presented, that there is a direction and control. A narrative of “confusion, lack of direction, denial” can damage motivation, willingness to sacrifice, and behavior in times of emergency.

b. External deterrence – how the enemy assesses us as strong, weak, impatient is influenced by what it sees and hears, not only by the dry numbers of forces. If the axis succeeds in convincing itself (and others) that Israel is “on the verge of collapse,” this can feed dangerous decisions by adversaries.

c. International arena – global public opinion, including politicians, media, and investors, is strongly shaped by narrative. Whoever succeeds in branding themselves as the “victim” and the other side as an “unrestrained aggressor” influences diplomatic pressure, aid, sanctions, and the room for maneuver of both Israel and Iran. In the current war, which involves more direct and ongoing friction with Iran and Hezbollah, the weight of cognitive warfare has grown: not only who “brought down more” on the battlefield, but who “wins in consciousness” among its own public, the enemy, and the world.

7. Why This Is Not Only the Security Establishment’s Business – But Also the Private and Business Sectors’

In the security establishment, they speak of cognitive warfare, and in the private and business sector, they speak of reputation management. In practice, however, it is the same arena: the struggle over how one is perceived, what people choose to believe, and whom they trust.

a. Markets and investments – a persistent narrative of “instability,” “endless escalation,” or a “state on the verge of collapse” can affect credit ratings, foreign‑investor decisions, risk insurance, and capital raising. We are not always dealing with facts; at times, it is a sense of risk fueled by cognitive warfare.

b. Consumer and employee behavior – fear, exhaustion, and a sense of “no future” influence consumption, recruitment, and loyalty to companies and brands. If cognitive campaigns succeed in creating the feeling that reality is “lost,” they also damage businesses’ ability to plan and grow.

c. Cyber and reputation – campaigns that combine cyberattacks, data leaks, and the spread of lies about companies (for example, claims that they are collaborating with “the enemy,” endangering civilians, or collapsing financially) can cause real damage to share value, customer trust, and international contracts. Cognitive warfare thus becomes, in practice, warfare over brands and corporations.

d. Business decision‑making – boards and management teams that rely only on “hard” data and ignore the nature of the cognitive campaign may miss the full picture. In contrast, those who understand how narratives are created, disseminated, and influence behavior can better assess risk and prepare in advance for cognitive overloads (waves of anxiety, online boycotts, public pressure).

Therefore, dealing with cognitive warfare is not only “the job of the IDF Spokesperson” or of “the intelligence community.” It must be part of the conversation among managers, communication professionals, cyber leaders, risk experts, business‑intelligence practitioners, and anyone whose decisions are influenced by how reality is perceived, not only by what actually happens.

8. Conclusion: The Axis Whispers, but the War Over Minds Is Louder Than Ever

Nasrallah’s absence has changed the sound of the “Axis of Resistance”: fewer strong, singular voices; more small voices scattered across the net. This weakens some of the dramatic effects his speeches had, but does not cancel the battle over consciousness; on the contrary, it has become more decentralized, digital, and elusive. Whether we are civilians, security professionals, decision-makers, media people, or business leaders, we are part of this battlefield, whether we like it or not. The rockets, drones, and operations continue to speak the language of force, but in parallel, the axis continues to whisper stories to us through the screens. The question is whether we will settle for merely listening or whether we will learn to identify, deconstruct, and confront this whisper before it decides for us what we think.