Introduction

Rapid transformations in the international balance of power, accelerated technological innovation, and the proliferation of cross border digital communication networks have created a highly interconnected information environment characterized by limited regulatory oversight. The Internet, social media platforms, messaging applications, and digital ecosystems operate globally and largely beyond the effective centralized control of any single state or international authority.

Consequently, governance of the digital domain has become increasingly challenging for democratic states due to constitutional safeguards protecting civil liberties, fragmented regulatory frameworks, and structural dependence on multinational technology corporations that control critical digital infrastructure and global data ecosystems. These conditions have contributed to the emergence of a “Grey Zone”, in which the traditional boundaries separating civilian, political, and security domains have become progressively blurred, while competition over cognition, perception, and strategic narratives has assumed unprecedented significance. This transformation unfolds within a digital environment comprising approximately 5.35 billion Internet users (66% of the global population)and5.04 billion social media users (63%).^[1]

Within this evolving environment, Virtual Power, a concept associated with James F. Der Derian, has become a defining characteristic of contemporary conflict. It describes the capacity to exercise strategic influence through the control of information, narratives, and digital environments, thereby shaping perceptions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior often without the direct application of military force. In the digital era, power has increasingly shifted from the exclusive reliance on physical coercion toward the ability to influence information flows, visual imagery, and representations of reality.

Within this framework, non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations, integrate cognitive warfare, psychological operations, information manipulation, and cyber capabilities to project influence through social media platforms, digital ecosystems, and encrypted communication networks. This integration creates a significant asymmetric advantage, enabling such organizations to challenge states possessing superior military, technological, and economic capabilities while generating strategic effects that far exceed their tangible resources.^[2]

Cyberterrorism further expands these capabilities and, in certain cases, benefits from direct or indirect support provided by state actors. It encompasses the deliberate use of digital capabilities to compromise the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of information systems through Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, intrusions into edge devices and networks, exploitation of communication servers, and attacks against critical national infrastructure. Consequently, terrorist activity extends beyond cognitive influence into the realm of operational disruption, producing tangible economic losses, institutional paralysis, and functional degradation.

The strategic advantage enjoyed by terrorist organizations derives from persistent structural vulnerabilities within endpoint devices, the rapid expansion of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), and the resulting enlargement of potential attack surfaces. When combined with legacy technologies, inadequate cybersecurity practices, fragmented regulatory frameworks, and limited cooperation from major technology corporations, these conditions generate an environment of sustained vulnerability that can be systematically exploited by hostile actors.

Digital platforms likewise function as dual use environments, where legitimate civilian activity coexists with hostile influence operations. Engagement driven business models and algorithmic amplification mechanisms facilitate the rapid dissemination of extremist content, propaganda, and disinformation, thereby reinforcing recruitment processes, ideological radicalization, and influence operations across geographically dispersed audiences.

At the center of these dynamics lies an ongoing struggle over cognitive dominance, narrative construction, ideological legitimacy, and emotional mobilization through highly visual, algorithmically amplified digital content. In many instances, cognitive effects outweigh operational achievements, as viral dissemination itself becomes a primary instrument of strategic influence.^[3]

The digital environment offers additional operational advantages, including low operational costs, anonymity, attribution challenges, cross border reach, and immediate access to global audiences. The integration of cyber and cognitive operations further amplifies psychological effects, enabling relatively limited actions to escalate into large scale perceived crises through rapid viral dissemination.^[4]

Nevertheless, democratic states continue to face significant structural constraints, including legal ambiguities, inconsistent definitions of digital terrorism, constitutional protections of privacy, and comparatively slower institutional adaptation. Cooperation from major technology corporations remains incomplete because of commercial interests, regulatory complexities, and conflicting legal obligations, resulting in inconsistent enforcement across jurisdictions.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that includes strengthened international cooperation, harmonized definitions of digital terrorism, effective regulation of digital platforms, and enhanced corporate accountability. Equally important is the development of societal cognitive resilience through education, disinformation detection capabilities, real time situational awareness systems, and the integration of Artificial Intelligence based analytical tools.

In conclusion, terrorist virtual power derives from the combined exploitation of technological, regulatory, and cognitive vulnerabilities embedded within the global digital ecosystem. Without coordinated national and international responses, the asymmetric advantage enjoyed by non-state actors across the cyber and information domains is likely to persist and expand, with significant implications for democratic stability, national security, and public confidence.

The article examines the following thematic areas:

• Information Warfare
• Youth as a Strategic Target Population
• Virtual Power
• Global Governance and the Attention Economy
• Cyberterrorism
• Soft Power and Cognitive Warfare
• Conclusion

Information Warfare

Cognitive warfare has emerged as a defining dimension of contemporary conflict despite the absence of a universally accepted definition and the methodological challenges associated with assessing its effects and operational effectiveness. Most academic literature and military doctrine continue to conceptualize it as a component of information warfare, thereby limiting a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic interaction between offensive and defensive actors within the cognitive domain and the conditions necessary to achieve cognitive superiority.

In the digital era, strategic competition increasingly focuses on shaping perceptions, influencing beliefs, eroding institutional trust, and influencing decision making processes rather than relying exclusively on physical or kinetic force. Cognitive warfare seeks to manipulate, disrupt, or distort an adversary’s cognitive processes while simultaneously preserving the cognitive resilience and integrity of one’s own society. Its effectiveness is determined not merely by the dissemination of information but by its capacity to generate enduring changes in perception and behavior, weaken rational decision making, and progressively erode public confidence in institutions.

Within an environment characterized by information overload, disinformation, digital manipulation, and persistent competition over strategic narratives, cognitive resilience and informed decision making have become essential components of national security and strategic effectiveness. As states, terrorist organizations, digital platforms, media organizations, and transnational influence networks simultaneously compete within the global information environment, conventional military and technological superiority alone no longer guarantees strategic advantage. The ability to distinguish reliable information from manipulation and to make informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty has become a critical element of national power and security.^[5]

In recent years, terrorist organizations have progressively shifted their operational activities into the digital domain, fundamentally transforming the character of modern terrorism. Rather than relying primarily on territorial control, physical infrastructure, or face to face interaction, they exploit social media platforms, encrypted communication applications, and digital content distribution networks to establish a global, decentralized, and near real time operational environment. Consequently, terrorist activities have become considerably more difficult to detect, monitor, attribute, and disrupt than conventional kinetic operations.

The Islamic State (ISIS) exemplifies this transformation. Despite losing its territorial control in 2019, the organization evolved into a decentralized digital network frequently described as a “virtual caliphate.” Through Telegram and other digital platforms, it continued to disseminate propaganda, reinforce extremist ideological narratives, recruit supporters, and facilitate large scale online radicalization without requiring direct coordination from a centralized leadership. Empirical research indicates that a substantial proportion of radicalization during the past decade has occurred within these online ecosystems.^[6]

Simultaneously, lone actor terrorism has become increasingly significant. Individuals and small autonomous cells are frequently radicalized almost entirely through online extremist content, encrypted digital communities, and algorithmically amplified ideological narratives without formal organizational affiliation or conventional terrorist training. The attacks in Paris (2015), San Bernardino (2015), Berlin (2016), Manchester (2017), Surabaya (2018), and Christchurch (2019) demonstrate how digital propaganda and online extremist communities accelerate the transition from virtual radicalization to real world violence, illustrating the growing convergence between online influence activities and physical terrorist attacks.

The rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has further expanded these capabilities. Terrorist organizations increasingly exploit AI technologies to generate highly personalized disinformation, produce sophisticated synthetic media including deep fakes and automate propaganda campaigns on an unprecedented scale. These technologies substantially enhance audience segmentation, psychological influence, narrative dissemination, and the overall effectiveness of cognitive operations.

Collectively, these developments have widened the gap between the rapidly evolving threat environment and the response capacity of democratic states. Law enforcement and national security agencies continue to rely predominantly on conventional counterterrorism measures, including arrests, raids, and physical disruption, while radicalization, recruitment, and influence operations increasingly occur within algorithmically driven digital ecosystems. End to end encryption further constrains intelligence collection capabilities, while terrorist organizations continuously adapt and migrate across digital platforms faster than institutional responses can evolve.

From a broader strategic perspective, terrorism can no longer be understood solely as a physical manifestation of violence. It has evolved into a digitally enabled operational ecosystem in which narratives, algorithmic infrastructures, decentralized propaganda, and cognitive influence interact to generate strategic effects extending far beyond the physical battlefield. States that fail to adapt their national security doctrines, intelligence methodologies, and regulatory frameworks to this evolving environment are likely to remain at a persistent structural disadvantage against agile, networked, and decentralized adversaries for whom cognitive influence, narrative dominance, and information superiority have become strategic assets capable of rivaling and, in some circumstances, surpassing conventional military power.^[7]

Accordingly, a Europol assessment concluded that the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel in October 2023, together with the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, significantly intensified social polarization across European Union Member States. Terrorist organizations exploited this increasingly polarized environment to expand recruitment efforts, disseminate extremist propaganda, and encourage lone actor attacks. The report further documented the growing involvement of adolescents and minors in attack planning, propaganda production, and online incitement to violence. Vulnerable young people have become increasingly susceptible to terrorist recruitment, while many lone actors operate within virtual communities that normalize, reinforce, and encourage violent extremist behavior.^[8]

Simultaneously, terrorist organizations are rapidly integrating emerging technologies particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI) into propaganda dissemination, recruitment, operational planning, and efforts to evade law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Large Language Models (LLMs) and deep fake technologies facilitate the creation of fraudulent identities, highly personalized disinformation, and increasingly persuasive ideological narratives. These risks are further amplified by the widespread online availability of instructional material relating to 3D-printed weapons, unmanned aerial systems (drones), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and chemical agents.

Investigations conducted across European Union Member States during 2023 revealed that several individuals arrested on terrorism related charges were interconnected through online communication networks that provided access to extremist propaganda, operational guidance, and attack related resources. Many self-radicalized offenders acted without direct organizational command or formal membership but remained embedded within digital communities that promoted extremist ideologies and facilitated their translation into real world violence. Younger users were frequently attracted by the visual appeal, symbolism, and emotional resonance of online propaganda rather than by its ideological substance, thereby contributing to the normalization and legitimization of extremist violence.

A separate Europol study examined the online propaganda strategies employed by Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State (IS), and their affiliated organizations. The analysis identified a long term evolution in jihadist information warfare, emphasizing continuous adaptation to technological innovation, geopolitical developments, and the preservation of cognitive resilience during periods of organizational disruption and strategic pressure.

The study concluded that jihadist propaganda has evolved from relatively static messaging into a dynamic system of information warfare (iWar) that integrates ideological doctrine, decentralized dissemination networks, and emerging digital technologies. Alongside official media outlets, extensive ecosystems of informal online supporters function as strategic force multipliers, expanding message dissemination, reinforcing ideological narratives, and accelerating processes of online radicalization.

The research further documented a transition from hierarchical organizational structures toward decentralized, network based operational models. This transformation became particularly evident following the decapitation of Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, when propaganda production increasingly shifted to regional affiliates and autonomous online supporter networks. Concurrently, the Islamic State maintained a global propaganda infrastructure despite the loss of its territorial caliphate. Through extensive use of infographics, visual media, audio recordings, and digital publications, the organization projected institutional continuity, operational resilience, and the narrative of an enduring global jihad.

Overall, the study demonstrates that jihadist propaganda has evolved into a comprehensive digital ecosystem composed of official media channels, informal dissemination networks, and virtual communities that facilitate radicalization while, in certain cases, providing both ideological justification and operational inspiration for lone actors. Consequently, the distinction between the physical battlefield and the digital cognitive domain has become increasingly indistinct.

The study identified five principal findings:

1. A structural transition from hierarchical organizations to decentralized, adaptive, and network based operational architectures.
2. The transformation of propaganda into a multilayered digital ecosystem integrating ideology, emerging technologies, and global dissemination infrastructures.
3. The increasing convergence of physical terrorism and cognitive warfare within cyberspace.
4. The emergence of narrative dominance as a critical strategic capability.
5. The expanding influence of digital communities and informal dissemination networks in terrorist radicalization and recruitment.

The study demonstrates that contemporary terrorist organizations now operate as integrated digital ecosystems in which narrative construction, technological platforms, and cognitive influence function as mutually reinforcing components of the modern battlespace. Countering these evolving threats therefore requires a transition from conventional security paradigms toward a comprehensive digital security doctrine that recognizes the information and cognitive domains as primary arenas of strategic competition.^[9]

Additional research examining approximately 20,000 pro ISIS online accounts further illustrates the speed with which terrorist organizations have adapted to the digital environment. It conceptualizes jihadist propaganda as a dynamic, multilayered ecosystem comprising digital platforms, communication channels, online communities, algorithmic architectures, and enabling technologies. Rather than functioning as a one way communication mechanism, propaganda operates as an adaptive influence ecosystem sustained through continuous interaction among an ideological core, decentralized supporter networks, and technological infrastructures that amplify, personalize, and disseminate messages across diverse target audiences.

A particularly illustrative example is the Islamic State (ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which systematically exploited social media platforms most notably Twitter to disseminate propaganda, reinforce extremist ideological narratives, and recruit supporters worldwide. Through coordinated dissemination strategies and an extensive online support ecosystem, the organization generated strategic influence far exceeding its material capabilities. Carefully curated visual content portraying extreme violence was deliberately designed to maximize psychological impact, audience engagement, and viral dissemination, while social media platforms simultaneously functioned as mechanisms for recruitment, ideological reinforcement, and the encouragement of lone-actor terrorist attacks.^[10]

Collectively, these findings demonstrate that contemporary terrorist organizations no longer regard the digital environment merely as a communication platform but as a primary operational domain in which recruitment, radicalization, operational coordination, and cognitive influence converge into a single strategic ecosystem.

Youth as a Strategic Target Population

Contemporary research consistently demonstrates that young adults constitute the most active demographic within social media and digital information ecosystems. Individuals aged 18–29 engage with social networking and video sharing platforms at significantly higher rates than older age groups. Platform penetration is particularly pronounced across Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and Reddit. For example, approximately 80% of individuals aged 18–29 report using Instagram.^[11]

Pronounced intergenerational disparities are likewise evident in patterns of daily platform use. Individuals aged 18–29 exhibit substantially higher levels of engagement with platforms such as YouTube and TikTok. Approximately 50% report using TikTok on a daily basis, compared with only 5% of individuals aged 65 years and older. These trends indicate that digital platforms have become the primary environment for communication, information consumption, and cognitive development among younger generations.

The strategic significance of this trend lies in the central role that algorithm driven platforms now play in shaping political attitudes, collective narratives, and processes of radicalization. The dominance of short form video content, viral dissemination, and algorithmic recommendation systems has granted social media unprecedented influence over public discourse, perception formation, identity construction, and ideological socialization.

Generation Z represents the first generation to mature within an environment in which smartphones, social media, and continuous digital connectivity are no longer perceived as technological innovations but as integral components of everyday life. Within this context, the digital domain functions not merely as a communication medium but as a broader socio cognitive ecosystem, where identity formation, social belonging, and worldview development are increasingly mediated through algorithms, virtual communities, and virally disseminated content.

Platform algorithms continuously monitor behavioral patterns, user preferences, and emotional responses in order to maximize engagement and prolong screen exposure. Consequently, digital environments are increasingly optimized for the rapid dissemination, amplification, and normalization of narratives, including extremist content, within youth oriented online communities.

The Islamic State (IS) was among the first terrorist organizations to recognize this strategic transformation and systematically exploit its operational potential. Between 2014 and 2018, during the period of its territorial control in Syria and Iraq, the organization recruited thousands of foreign fighters, including large numbers of young individuals from Western countries, through social media platforms, professionally produced propaganda videos, and highly targeted digital messaging campaigns.

The organization also incorporated emerging technologies, including generative Artificial Intelligence (AI), encrypted communications, cryptocurrencies, and anonymous digital infrastructures, into its operational toolkit. Simultaneously, it actively promoted lone actor terrorism in Western countries through online propaganda, virtual ideological indoctrination, and remote operational encouragement.

Following its territorial defeat in 2019, the Islamic State (IS) strategically redirected its activities toward digital environments in which younger generations increasingly construct identity, social belonging, and ideological affiliation. Its supporters systematically infiltrated gaming platforms, encrypted messaging applications, social media feeds, and virtual communities, exploiting memes, popular music trends, short form video, and the distinctive communication culture of Generation Z.

This transformation contributed to the emergence of a “Virtual Caliphate” a digitally enabled influence ecosystem sustained through algorithmic amplification, cultural adaptation, and social mimicry. Extremist messaging is increasingly embedded within content that closely resembles mainstream digital culture, rendering it less detectable by moderation systems while enhancing its social acceptability and capacity for diffusion.

More broadly, terrorist communication strategies have evolved from overt ideological messaging toward cultural integration within digital ecosystems. Extremist propaganda is increasingly embedded in humor, visual aesthetics, gaming environments, and viral media formats, thereby blurring the boundaries between entertainment, identity formation, and ideological radicalization. Consequently, youth culture itself has become an effective vehicle for extremist recruitment and cognitive influence.

Empirical evidence collected by Western law enforcement agencies reinforces this trend. During the first half of 2026, minors accounted for approximately 42% of terrorism related investigations across Europe and North America, representing a threefold increase compared with 2021. This development coincided with declining counterterrorism capacity, insufficient resources devoted to online prevention, and the rapid evolution of digital platform ecosystems and algorithmic recommendation systems.^[12]

The emerging generation of jihadists has matured within a fully digital environment, enabling not only passive exposure to extremist content but also active participation in the production, adaptation, and dissemination of terrorist propaganda.

Consequently, social media platforms and broader online ecosystems have become central instruments for radicalization, recruitment, and ideological mobilization. The concept of the “weaponization of media narratives” captures this transformation, whereby the production and dissemination of narratives become instruments of cognitive warfare. In certain contexts, narrative influence has assumed greater strategic significance than the direct application of physical violence.^[13]

Over the past three decades, extremist organizations have increasingly relied upon the Internet as their primary operational domain. Platforms such as Discord, Instagram, Roblox, and TikTok now function as initial points of exposure to extremist narratives among minors and young adults.

Discord facilitates semi encrypted, community based communication through dedicated servers and private channels, whereas Roblox combines immersive gaming with interactive social environments. Instagram and TikTok, by contrast, rely extensively on algorithm driven recommendation systems designed to maximize the viral dissemination of emotionally engaging visual content.

The strategic implication is that contemporary extremist ecosystems are no longer confined to dedicated websites or closed online forums. Instead, they increasingly operate within mainstream entertainment platforms, gaming environments, and social media infrastructures, where gradual exposure, ideological normalization, and cognitive influence can develop incrementally over time.

These digital ecosystems facilitate not only the consumption of extremist material but also its creation, adaptation, and dissemination from within the platforms themselves. Academic research and security assessments have devoted particular attention to younger age groups especially individuals under the age of 25 who have consistently been identified as particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment efforts conducted by extremist and terrorist organizations.

For example, during the peak operational period of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), numerous documented cases involved minors under the age of 18 who attempted either to travel abroad to join the organization or to carry out ideologically inspired acts of violence within their countries of residence.

Concurrently, as the threat landscape expanded in both scale and complexity, security and law enforcement agencies across the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) identified a growing number of minors exhibiting extremist ideological affiliations. In several instances, these individuals were also involved in the planning, facilitation, or execution of violent extremist activities.

Research further indicates that minors and young adults should no longer be regarded solely as passive target audiences. Increasingly, they function as active participants within online extremist ecosystems by producing and disseminating violent content, administering closed digital communities, recruiting new participants, facilitating radicalization processes, and, in certain cases, directly perpetrating terrorist attacks. This strategic vulnerability stems from the fact that younger generations are digital natives whose identities, social affiliations, and political perceptions are increasingly shaped within algorithm driven online environments. Consequently, they constitute not merely a high risk population but a strategic target population for terrorist organizations seeking to achieve long term cognitive influence, ideological mobilization, and sustained strategic impact.

Member states of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance have reported a growing proportion of minors and young adults involved in terrorism related investigations in recent years. In several instances, individuals initially investigated as juveniles remained under sustained intelligence and law enforcement monitoring into adulthood due to their continued adherence to violent extremist ideologies.

Investigating minors engaged in violent extremist activity presents significant operational, legal, and intelligence challenges. These individuals frequently demonstrate advanced digital literacy, extensive cross platform engagement, and a high degree of technological adaptability. They also migrate rapidly across online environments, including platforms that have not traditionally been incorporated into formal threat taxonomies or intelligence risk assessment frameworks.

Moreover, the contemporary digital environment enables continuous, real time interaction with peer networks and adult extremist actors, facilitating sustained exposure to, consumption of, and dissemination of extremist content. Such activities increasingly occur through encrypted communication channels, anonymized networks, and digital platforms characterized by limited visibility and restricted lawful access for intelligence and law enforcement authorities.

Accordingly, the digital domain has evolved into a primary cognitive and operational battlespace for ideological influence, recruitment, and radicalization. This transformation requires the continuous adaptation of national security doctrines, investigative authorities, and law enforcement frameworks to address network centric and algorithmically mediated threats.^[14]

Failure to prioritize the cognitive domain as a core component of national security may result in significant strategic degradation and the gradual emergence of systemic security risks. Empirical research, public opinion surveys, and computational discourse analyses indicate that following the Hamas terrorist attack of 7 October 2023, the organization successfully disseminated its narrative across segments of the global information ecosystem, particularly among younger audiences within Western digital environments.

This narrative was framed around concepts such as “resistance to occupation” and “liberation discourse” and was reinforced through selective amplification, semantic reframing, and, in certain instances, the denial or minimization of the violence perpetrated during the attack.

These dynamics were reflected in observable shifts in public opinion across the United States and Europe, including increased engagement with high visibility political slogans such as “From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will Be Free.” The slogan became established as a recurring semantic node within the broader competition over narratives across social media platforms and public discourse.

Within segments of academic, activist, and digital discourse, Israel is increasingly interpreted through post-colonial theoretical frameworks and models of structural power analysis. Within this discourse, Zionism is at times reframed not merely as a nationalist movement but also as a socio political project associated with settler colonial theory.

Within this interpretive framework, the Israeli Palestinian conflict is increasingly portrayed as a structurally asymmetric relationship of power rather than as either a conventional interstate conflict or an asymmetric armed conflict. Accordingly, Israel is positioned as the dominant sovereign actor, whereas the Palestinians are portrayed as operating under conditions of structural control and constrained political autonomy.

The strategic impact of large scale virtual influence operations is further illustrated by empirical survey findings. A 2024 study reported that only approximately 5% of the U.S. population regarded Hamas’s actions on 7 October as acceptable. Nevertheless, approximately 22% considered the organization’s motivations to be legitimate or at least partially justified.^[15]

Additional evidence emerged in November 2025, when members of the Oxford Union an independent student led debating society and an influential institution within British academic discourse approved a motion asserting that Israel constitutes a greater regional threat than Iran.

This followed an earlier resolution adopted by the same institution (278 votes to 59) describing Israel as an “apartheid state responsible for genocide.” Collectively, these developments illustrate the increasing normalization of contested geopolitical narratives within influential epistemic communities, particularly among demographic groups disproportionately represented within the future political, media, and academic leadership of Western societies.^[16]

Public perceptions of the conflict also differ substantially across age cohorts. Adults under the age of 30 are significantly more likely than older generations to regard Hamas’s rationale for armed violence as legitimate. They likewise express comparatively greater sympathy toward the Palestinian cause than toward Israel.

Among respondents aged 18–29, approximately one third indicated that Hamas possessed at least partially legitimate grounds for armed action, including 12% who considered such actions fully justified and an additional 22% who regarded them as partially justified.^[17]

A large scale computational discourse analysis of YouTube content conducted between October 2023 and January 2024 examined approximately 253,925 Spanish language comments posted following the 7 October terrorist attack. The study identified a statistically significant correlation between media framing and shifts in public perceptions, while also documenting increased pro-Palestinian sentiment and growing criticism of Israel. Researchers attributed these changes to the structural effects of narrative construction and platform mediated dissemination within algorithmically governed digital ecosystems.

The study further applied Agenda Setting Theory, which posits that media systems do not directly determine public opinion but instead shape the salience of issues by influencing what audiences perceive as worthy of attention. Within this framework, media institutions construct public agendas through selective amplification, control of visibility, and the prioritization of competing narratives.

In the context of armed conflict, terrorism, and information warfare, both traditional media and digital platforms actively shape perceptual reality by determining which events receive prominence, which actors are humanized or dehumanized, and which narratives are algorithmically amplified or marginalized.

In the digital era, Agenda Setting Theory extends beyond traditional editorial gatekeeping to encompass platform based socio technical ecosystems such as YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and X. Within these environments, public agendas are shaped not only by journalists but also by algorithmic recommendation systems, influencer networks, online communities, and coordinated influence campaigns conducted by both state and non-state actors.^[18]

One study analyzed hundreds of thousands of online discussions across Reddit, Telegram, and X following the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack. It examined the emergence of polarized narratives, coordinated propaganda campaigns, and systematic efforts to shape public opinion. The findings demonstrated that the conflict unfolded not only on the physical battlefield but also within the digital battlespace, where social media platforms became central arenas for contesting legitimacy, cognition, and global narratives.

The dataset comprised approximately 125,000 Telegram messages, approximately 2,000 X posts, and nearly 2 million Reddit comments. Telegram primarily facilitated the rapid dissemination of information within ideologically driven, and in some cases encrypted, communities. X functioned as a highly responsive real time communication platform, whereas Reddit enabled longer and more deliberative ideological discussions.

The analysis identified severe narrative polarization as the defining characteristic of online discourse. Political movements, ideological activists, and external actors promoted competing and frequently contradictory narratives designed to shape perceptions of legitimacy, victimhood, moral responsibility, and the interpretation of events.

The researchers also examined the relationship between discourse themes and emotional intensity (Sentiment Topic Prevalence Relationship). Their findings identified patterns consistent with coordinated influence operations, propaganda campaigns, and cognitive manipulation. The study concluded that, in contemporary geopolitical conflicts, social media platforms function not merely as communication channels but as integral components of the operational battlespace. Control over narrative framing, dissemination velocity, and emotional content has become a strategic asset influencing both public opinion and international legitimacy.^[19]

A subsequent study examined the cognitive warfare dimension of the Israel Hamas conflict between October 2023 and mid-2025. It identified the Israeli Palestinian conflict as one of the world’s most polarized geopolitical disputes and concluded that the escalation of hostilities in October 2023 substantially intensified information warfare across digital platforms. The study further argued that social media platforms function not as passive communication channels but as active instruments for narrative construction, message amplification, propaganda dissemination, and the shaping of collective emotional responses.^[20]

The study analyzed more than 187,000 Telegram messages, approximately 2.1 million Reddit comments, and a representative sample of X posts. Two principal patterns emerged. First, online discourse consistently exhibited high levels of negative emotion, particularly concerning civilian casualties, moral responsibility, and alleged war crimes. Second, humanitarian framing including content relating to children, refugees, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure was strongly associated with political identification, collective solidarity, and calls for collective action.

A central contribution of the study lies in demonstrating that emotion has become a primary mechanism for structuring public discourse and mobilizing political participation. The authors emphasize the concept of Affective Publics, referring to digitally networked communities that mobilize primarily around shared emotional experiences including anger, fear, empathy, solidarity, trauma, and hope rather than around ideology, factual consensus, or conventional political interests.

Within this framework, emotional identification becomes a primary driver of information diffusion and public opinion formation. In the context of information and cognitive warfare:

• Emotions constitute strategic resources.
• Narratives are deliberately constructed to generate immediate emotional identification.
• Images, videos, and personal testimonies frequently exert greater cognitive influence than rational argumentation or factual evidence.
• Visual portrayals of injured children, large scale destruction, hostages, or civilian casualties function as powerful emotional triggers rather than merely as informational content.
• Collective emotions have the capacity to mobilize public protests, political campaigns, fundraising initiatives, ideological radicalization, and, in certain circumstances, violent extremism.
• State and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, deliberately seek to cultivate global affective publics aligned with their preferred strategic narratives.
• Political competition increasingly revolves not only around controlling information but also around shaping collective emotional experience.
• Success within the information domain increasingly depends upon generating emotional engagement, sustaining public attention, and fostering long term identification.

Accordingly, the concept of Affective Publics demonstrates that emotions, ideology, beliefs, and rational judgment collectively shape the interpretation of political reality. Platforms such as Facebook and X provide the communicative infrastructures through which users develop emotional identification with distant conflicts by means of continuous exposure to images, videos, eyewitness testimony, and real time narratives. Consequently, networked publics increasingly emerge through shared emotional experiences rather than direct personal involvement. This dynamic establishes collective affect as a central mechanism driving narrative dissemination, political mobilization, and public opinion formation. More broadly, the concept illustrates how social media platforms have evolved into integrated ecosystems of cognitive and political influence, in which collective emotions play a decisive role in shaping global public opinion in real time.^[21]

Virtual Power

In the digital era, virtual power has become a defining dimension of asymmetric conflict and strategic competition among states, terrorist organizations, and other non-state actors. The information, cognitive, and digital domains no longer serve merely as supporting elements of kinetic warfare. They have evolved into independent strategic theaters capable of shaping political legitimacy, public perception, and international decision making. In many cases, dominance within the information environment is as strategically important as success on the physical battlefield.

Against this backdrop, terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State have systematically integrated digital influence operations into their broader strategic doctrines. By exploiting social media platforms, encrypted communications, and interconnected digital ecosystems, they seek to shape global narratives, mobilize political and emotional support, and influence perceptions of legitimacy among domestic and international audiences. Their messaging is commonly framed through internationally resonant narratives such as “resistance to occupation,” “anti-colonial struggle,” and “national liberation.” These narratives allow them to project influence well beyond their operational theaters and compete for cognitive dominance within the global information environment.

The information ecosystem surrounding the Israel–Hamas conflict illustrates this transformation. It extends far beyond conventional online activism and has evolved into a sophisticated information warfare environment. Over the past decade, this battlespace has incorporated AI-generated synthetic content, coordinated cross platform influence campaigns, and the strategic use of humanitarian narratives for cognitive and psychological influence. Intelligence reporting published in September 2025 documented a substantial increase in the use of deepfakes, synthetic identities, and algorithmic manipulation techniques across contemporary conflicts.[22]

Within this environment, highly charged terms such as genocide acquire strategic significance through hashtags and coordinated digital campaigns. Hashtags no longer function solely as indexing tools. They operate as framing mechanisms that shape public discourse, influence interpretation, and structure political debate. In doing so, they help construct the cognitive frameworks through which audiences understand events and, in some cases, encourage collective action both online and offline.[23]

Democratic states, by contrast, continue to concentrate primarily on the kinetic, legal, and security dimensions of counterterrorism, including attack prevention, disruption of terrorist infrastructures, counter financing measures, and documentation of violence against civilians. Although these efforts remain essential, the cognitive domain is not always treated as an independent strategic theater. This asymmetry enables hostile actors to operate continuously within the information environment, influence media agendas, shape public opinion, and challenge perceptions of legitimacy.

The challenge is particularly acute for democratic societies, which must balance freedom of expression, political pluralism, and open information environments with the need to counter incitement, radicalization, disinformation, and terrorist propaganda. Consequently, debates surrounding concepts such as colonialism, apartheid, and genocide increasingly unfold within global information ecosystems where extremist actors often employ more coherent and effective narrative framing strategies than state institutions.

One visible consequence of this cognitive competition is the documented rise in anti-Semitic incidents across Western countries. These developments include intensified online hostility, increased harassment and violence against Jewish individuals and communities, expanding social exclusion campaigns, and a growing erosion of the distinction between legitimate political criticism and collective delegitimization. Together, these trends demonstrate that power in the information age depends increasingly on the ability to shape perceptions of legitimacy, identity, morality, and victimhood rather than on military or technological superiority alone.

More broadly, social media platforms have become core infrastructures of the global information ecosystem. They facilitate agenda setting, narrative diffusion, and the formation of transnational digital communities while simultaneously providing fertile environments for propaganda, networked mobilization, identity construction, and ideological radicalization. Organizations such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda were among the first to operationalize sophisticated models of digital strategic communication. Through professional media production, virality driven dissemination, audience segmentation, and systematic exploitation of algorithmic amplification, they extended their influence far beyond the kinetic battlefield. These methods have subsequently been adopted and adapted by numerous terrorist organizations, extremist movements, and other non-state actors.

Accordingly, contemporary counterterrorism increasingly reflects a systemic contest over narratives, legitimacy, public perception, and control of the information environment rather than solely over territory or military capabilities. The ability to shape public opinion, structure collective interpretations of reality, and establish narrative legitimacy has become a critical strategic asset, making virtual power a decisive component of contemporary conflict.

This evolution is reflected in the emergence of a global jihadist propaganda matrix. Radical Islamist propagandists disseminate a powerful victimhood revenge narrative that spreads rapidly across digital platforms. For example, the Gaza war is framed as a Western supported genocidal campaign against Islam, reinforcing a perceived moral obligation for jihadist action while portraying passivity as complicity. This narrative creates a hybrid mobilization model that combines anti-colonial, anti-Semitic, and pan-Islamist themes with rapid algorithm driven dissemination.[24]

TikTok provides a particularly illustrative example. Despite its formal zero-tolerance policy toward terrorist and extremist content, recent studies indicate that jihadist material continues to circulate by exploiting recommendation algorithms, platform specific cultural practices, and the consumption patterns of younger users. In response to moderation efforts, supporters of jihadist organizations have developed increasingly sophisticated communication strategies that evade detection, maximize algorithmic visibility, and introduce extremist narratives through indirect, incremental, and often covert methods.[25]

Among the most prominent techniques identified in the literature are:

• Audio Camouflage – Manipulating audio files or metadata (e.g., timestamps, location, authorship, or technical identifiers) without altering the core content. Popular soundtracks are often used to conceal extremist messaging and reduce the likelihood of algorithmic detection.
• Meme Infiltration – Embedding ideological narratives within humor, popular culture, memes, and platform native communication to increase accessibility and resonance among younger audiences.
• Blurred Intent – Using visual distortion, selective editing, and partial obfuscation to disguise violent or extremist material.
• Emoji Codes – Employing emojis, coded symbols, and in-group language to communicate ideological messages without explicitly violating platform policies.
• Bait and Switch – Presenting content as entertaining or trend based before gradually introducing extremist narratives after user engagement has been established.

Collectively, these techniques produce a form of “everyday extremism,” in which radical messaging is embedded within the linguistic, visual, and cultural norms of digital platforms. This convergence blurs the boundaries between entertainment, online subcultures, and extremist propaganda. It also exposes structural limitations in algorithmic moderation, platform governance, and state regulatory frameworks designed to counter online radicalization.

The strategic effectiveness of these methods is reflected in empirical research. A UK survey of university students from diverse religious backgrounds found that nearly one quarter were aware of incidents in which Jewish students had been targeted because of their identity. One in five respondents stated that they would avoid, or refuse to share accommodation with, a Jewish student. In one documented case, a student housing group publicly declared on social media: “We have only one rule: no Zionists in the flat.” The study also found widespread indifference toward antisemitism. Approximately 25% of respondents reported little or no concern that Jewish students might feel unable to express their identity freely on campus.[26]

A separate survey of U.S. university students examining attitudes toward pro-Palestinian campus protests produced similarly concerning findings:[27]

• 55% reported pro-Palestinian demonstrations on their campus.
• 65% supported the protests (36% strongly; 29% somewhat).
• 31% identified TikTok as their primary source of information about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
• More than one third of supporters accepted violence or hate related rhetoric.
• More than half reported sympathy with, or identification with, Hamas.
• 10% expressed negative attitudes toward Jews.
• 9% believed Israel has no right to exist, while 19% remained uncertain.

Respondents frequently justified these views through narratives referring to “70 years of genocide,” claims that Israel could not invoke self-defense because of civilian casualties, and assertions that Palestinians bore no responsibility for the conflict.

A cross sectional study of Belgian youth similarly found that highly graphic jihadist material particularly beheading videos was the most frequently consumed extremist content (36%). By comparison, ideological publications attracted only 10–11% of participants but were associated with significantly higher levels of cognitive radicalization.[28]

The radicalization trajectory of the Tsarnaev brothers, perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, illustrates this dynamic.[29] Both were educated in the United States and reportedly consumed material published in Al-Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire, which promoted the doctrine of “open-source jihad”. They were also alleged to have relied on the article “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” when constructing the explosive devices used in the attack.[30]

These findings underscore the strategic significance of virtual power. Within contemporary security and law enforcement doctrine, virtual power refers to the ability to exploit cyberspace, digital technologies, information systems, and online infrastructures to achieve intelligence, security, and strategic objectives. The concept expands traditional notions of power beyond physical military force to include control over information flows, cognitive influence, cyber capabilities, digital intelligence collection, and dominance within communication and technological ecosystems.[31]

The implications extend well beyond conflict zones. Virtual influence increasingly penetrates universities and younger demographic cohorts that constitute the future political, media, and intellectual elites of democratic societies. Consequently, states and law enforcement agencies must strengthen their capabilities in the virtual domain. This requires developing advanced countermeasures to disrupt terrorist influence operations, limit their penetration into public and academic discourse, and reduce their ability to shape narratives, perceptions, and cognitive frameworks among future decision makers.

In an era of rapid digital transformation, virtual power has become a fundamental component of contemporary counterterrorism and national security. It is defined by the capacity to monitor, analyze, and influence the digital environment through cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, data analytics, information technologies, and global communication networks. Its strategic importance derives from the dual use nature of these technologies. Terrorist organizations exploit them to disseminate extremist ideologies, recruit supporters, coordinate operations, and conduct cognitive warfare. States, in turn, employ the same capabilities for intelligence collection, threat monitoring, disruption, and counter influence operations.

Virtual Power enables states to operate within the same digital ecosystems exploited by terrorist organizations, extending security operations beyond territorial boundaries. It facilitates the global identification, monitoring, and tracking of emerging threats while improving operational efficiency in terms of time, personnel, and resources compared with conventional security measures.

Its principal advantage lies in its proactive operational capability. Virtual Power supports the early detection of radicalization, the identification of influence networks, the analysis of extremist content, and timely intervention before threats materialize. It also constrains terrorist activity across digital platforms by identifying suspicious behavior, mapping dissemination patterns, and deploying counter narratives to disrupt extremist propaganda.

Despite its considerable strategic potential, the ability of democratic states to fully exploit Virtual Power remains constrained. Significant gaps persist between its theoretical potential and practical implementation. Technological, legal, regulatory, and organizational limitations, combined with growing dependence on multinational technology corporations that control critical digital infrastructure, global data ecosystems, and online platforms, continue to restrict state capabilities. Meanwhile, the digital environment evolves far more rapidly than governmental institutions can adapt. This imbalance provides terrorist organizations with a persistent asymmetric advantage, enabling them to exploit the virtual domain with a level of operational agility and cognitive effectiveness that often exceeds the response capacity of state institutions.[32]

Accordingly, Virtual Power should be understood not merely as the technological capacity to influence digital information environments, but as the strategic ability to shape cognition, emotions, perceptions, and behavior. Within this framework, emotions become operational instruments of Virtual Power, capable of shaping strategic narratives, influencing political behavior, mobilizing collective action, and ultimately transforming the cognitive battlespace.

Global Governance and the Attention Economy

Western governments increasingly recognize that countering radicalization, extremist propaganda, disinformation, and cognitive warfare cannot rely solely on intelligence, investigative, law enforcement, and technological tools. In response, multi stakeholder coalitions have emerged, bringing together governments, academia, research institutions, international organizations, technology companies, and media organizations to counter digital terrorism, prevent online radicalization, reduce extremist content, and disrupt influence and disinformation campaigns conducted by terrorist organizations and hostile states.

At the same time, policymakers increasingly acknowledge that digital threats arise not only from extremist content itself but also from the algorithmic mechanisms that distribute, amplify, and recommend it. Social media platforms are not neutral communication channels. They operate through recommendation algorithms, virality mechanisms, and the attention economy, all designed to maximize user engagement, viewing time, sharing behavior, and interaction. These systems continuously analyze behavioral signals including views, likes, comments, searches, and dwell time and prioritize content most likely to generate sustained emotional engagement.

As a result, extremist, polarizing, and emotionally charged content enjoys a structural advantage because it elicits fear, anger, outrage, empathy, or shock. Such emotions significantly increase sharing and virality. Consequently, algorithms often amplify provocative content even without any ideological intent on the part of the platforms. The outcome is a systemic bias in which emotionally extreme content receives broader and faster exposure than balanced or nuanced information.

This dynamic reflects the economic logic of the attention economy. Digital platforms generate value by capturing and retaining user attention, which is monetized through targeted advertising. Recommendation systems are therefore optimized to maximize watch time, click through rates, shares, comments, and user retention. Algorithms systematically prioritize content predicted to generate the highest engagement, thereby increasing overall platform activity.[33]

TikTok illustrates the scale of this model. Approximately 34 million videos are uploaded to the platform each day. User attention has become a commercial asset, while advertising is increasingly embedded within apparently organic content. The economic significance of this model is reflected in the fact that global spending on social media advertising exceeded $200 billion in 2025.[34]

To manage billions of interactions, platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, and X rely on sophisticated recommendation systems that determine which content individual users encounter. By regulating exposure across different content categories, these algorithms shape the allocation of attention and its conversion into economic value. They also create feedback loops, engagement with emotionally stimulating content increases the likelihood of receiving similar recommendations. Over time, users are progressively exposed to more emotionally intense and polarized material. Technically, these processes are driven by ranking functions that estimate the probability of user engagement and prioritize content accordingly.

Terrorist organizations have adapted their communication strategies to this algorithmic environment. Rather than relying primarily on lengthy ideological publications, they increasingly produce short form, visual, emotionally engaging, and highly shareable content tailored to platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Telegram, and X. Short videos, dramatic imagery, emotionally evocative music, hashtags, edited clips, and content presented as authentic or grassroots enable extremist actors to reach large audiences rapidly and at minimal cost.

Recommendation systems may also generate echo chambers and radicalization loops, repeatedly exposing users to content that reinforces existing beliefs while limiting exposure to competing viewpoints. Individuals who engage with extremist or emotionally charged material are more likely to receive recommendations for progressively more radical content. Consequently, algorithms may unintentionally accelerate ideological radicalization.

This phenomenon has been empirically examined through the YouTube “radicalization pipeline” hypothesis. Researchers analyzed 330,925 videos from 349 channels representing different levels of ideological extremity, together with more than 72 million user comments. The findings revealed a consistent pattern of gradual movement from relatively moderate content toward increasingly polarized and extremist material, supporting the existence of progressive rather than random exposure pathways.

The study also examined YouTube’s recommendation architecture by analyzing more than two million video and channel recommendations collected between May and July 2019. The findings demonstrated that recommendation algorithms play a central role in shaping exposure by creating indirect pathways between different content environments. They also contribute to a broader digital ecosystem in which interconnected actors, platforms, and recommendation systems jointly influence information flows and user behavior. Within this ecosystem, exposure to extremist content frequently develops gradually through algorithmic recommendations rather than through deliberate user choice.[35]

A central mechanism of cognitive warfare is the construction of attentional scaffolds, particularly hostile attentional scaffolds. These digital architectures are specifically designed to capture, direct, and sustain attention through recommendation algorithms, infinite scrolling, emotionally driven engagement mechanisms, and the unpredictable delivery of highly engaging content that encourages users to continue scrolling and remain on the platform. As noted, algorithms preferentially amplify content most likely to provoke anger, fear, outrage, shock, or emotional identification. Emotion, attention, and cognitive influence therefore become mutually reinforcing processes. Through emotional contagion and online moral outrage, negative emotions spread rapidly across social networks, shaping collective attitudes, intensifying polarization, and amplifying influence operations. Consequently, social media platforms have evolved from information distribution systems into powerful instruments of cognitive influence capable of shaping perceptions, narratives, and patterns of thought at scale.[36]

Accordingly, algorithmic recommendation systems have become a powerful force multiplier of virtual power. They enable terrorist organizations and extremist actors to reach global audiences, generate large scale emotional engagement, shape political and cognitive narratives, facilitate recruitment and radicalization, and influence international public opinion at a scale and speed once achievable primarily by states or major media organizations.

The contemporary digital environment is no longer governed primarily by states. Instead, it is largely controlled by private technology companies and platforms such as X, Meta, YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram. These corporations control content distribution, recommendation algorithms, data infrastructures, and content moderation systems. Consequently, states cannot effectively address terrorism, incitement, extremism, or disinformation without the cooperation of companies that ultimately determine whether content is removed, restricted, demoted, or amplified.

In response to growing public and regulatory pressure, technology companies have assumed a more active role in countering online terrorism. A leading example is the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), established in 2017 by Facebook, YouTube, Microsoft, and Twitter to combat Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content (TVEC). The initiative created a shared database of digital hashes, enabling rapid identification and removal of previously identified terrorist material. GIFCT subsequently evolved into an independent non-profit organization that includes governments, international organizations, academia, and civil society, reflecting a broader shift toward multi stakeholder global governance in counterterrorism.[37]

A fundamental challenge remains the scale problem of the Internet. Billions of posts, videos, images, and messages are uploaded daily, making comprehensive human moderation impossible. At this scale, statistically rare events become routine. As one Twitter representative observed, “an event with a one in a million probability occurs 500 times a day.”[38] This illustrates how platform scale transforms statistical anomalies into operational realities.

Accordingly, governments and technology companies increasingly rely on Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and Automated Decision Making (ADM) systems. These technologies process vast datasets in real time, detect suspicious patterns, analyze content, and automatically remove material, limit distribution, suspend accounts, or refer cases for human review. Algorithmic decision making has therefore become a core mechanism of digital governance.

More broadly, counterterrorism has evolved into an algorithmic and cognitive contest. Control over the digital environment is exercised not only through legislation or law enforcement but also through ranking, recommendation, and filtering systems that determine which content is amplified, suppressed, or removed. In this sense, technology companies and their algorithms have become influential actors in national security, political communication, and the construction of public discourse.

At the same time, these companies face increasing scrutiny from governments, regulators, and security agencies. A central concern is the inconsistent enforcement of moderation policies. Platform algorithms also tend to prioritize emotionally engaging and polarizing content because it maximizes user engagement and advertising revenue. This creates an inherent structural conflict between commercial incentives and the public interest in limiting extremist propaganda and disinformation.

These concerns have strengthened the concept of digital sovereignty. Digital sovereignty refers to a state’s capacity to exercise effective control over its digital environment, including critical infrastructure, data flows, cloud services, digital platforms, and the legal and regulatory frameworks governing them. Its objective is to reduce strategic dependence on multinational technology companies while ensuring that information governance, cybersecurity, privacy, and digital regulation remain consistent with national interests, democratic values, and domestic law.

Achieving digital sovereignty, however, remains difficult. Democratic states face constitutional protections for fundamental rights and freedom of expression, fragmented regulatory authority, and significant dependence on multinational corporations that control much of the world’s digital infrastructure and data. These constraints are particularly evident with global platforms operating simultaneously across multiple jurisdictions, thereby limiting the regulatory reach of any single state.

To address these challenges, the European Union has developed an extensive regulatory framework designed to strengthen European digital sovereignty, increase platform transparency and accountability, reduce dependence on major technology companies, and enhance the protection of privacy, cybersecurity, democratic resilience, and data governance.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of competing models of digital sovereignty remains uncertain. A comprehensive review of 271 peer reviewed studies concluded that no existing model successfully balances robust regulation with the flexibility required to accommodate rapid technological innovation and continuous social, economic, and geopolitical change. The findings suggest that digital sovereignty cannot be achieved through regulation, state control, or market mechanisms alone.[39]

Its effectiveness instead depends on balancing national security, technological innovation, fundamental rights, international cooperation, and institutional adaptability. This challenge has become even more complex with the emergence of generative artificial intelligence, which enables the rapid production of deepfakes, automated influence campaigns, and sophisticated disinformation operations that significantly expand the scope of cognitive warfare.

Against this background, Western states are increasingly moving toward stronger international cooperation and more coordinated regulation of global technology companies. Proposed measures include substantial financial penalties, regulatory sanctions, and direct pressure on platform business models when companies fail to address extremist propaganda, incitement, radicalization, and disinformation effectively. A growing policy consensus holds that as long as recommendation algorithms continue to profit from amplifying highly polarizing content, meaningful structural reform is unlikely. Consequently, influencing the economic incentives of digital platforms is increasingly viewed as one of the most effective mechanisms for reducing the indirect contribution of technology companies to terrorist and extremist influence in the global digital environment.

The Digital Services Act (DSA), the Terrorist Content Online (TCO) Regulation, and the Trusted Flaggers mechanism constitute one of the world’s most comprehensive regulatory frameworks for addressing illegal, terrorist, and extremist online content. Together, they seek to address a defining challenge of the digital era, the rapid dissemination of terrorist propaganda, extremist content, and disinformation across global platforms.[40]

The Trusted Flaggers mechanism establishes a structured system for identifying and reporting illegal or harmful content. Eligible entities include civil society organizations, academic institutions, child protection organizations, groups monitoring antisemitism, incitement, or extremism, specialized law enforcement units, and organizations cooperating with security authorities and Europol. Trusted Flagger status is granted only to organizations that satisfy professional and operational criteria established by EU or national regulators.

Reports submitted by Trusted Flaggers receive priority over ordinary user reports, enabling faster and more accurate moderation while reducing the burden created by millions of daily notifications. More broadly, the mechanism creates an institutional intermediary between governments and technology companies. It reflects a model of collaborative digitalgovernance, in which governments establish the regulatory framework, specialized organizations identify problematic content, and platforms implement enforcement measures.[41]

The Digital Services Act, progressively implemented since 2023–2024, introduced extensive obligations relating to content moderation, algorithmic transparency, systemic risk assessment, and user protection. Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) must conduct annual assessments addressing illegal content, disinformation, incitement, risks to democratic processes, and harms affecting minors. They must also provide qualified researchers with controlled access to data necessary for evaluating algorithmic recommendation and distribution systems.

A central component of the European framework is the Terrorist Content Online (TCO) Regulation, which requires platforms to remove terrorist content within one hour of receiving a valid removal order from a competent EU authority. This “one hour rule” reflects the recognition that terrorist content achieves its greatest viral reach during the initial hours following publication.[42]

The European model represents a significant departure from the previous system of limited platform accountability. It recognizes that major technology companies are not merely neutral intermediaries but actors with substantial political, social, and security influence. The framework also increases transparency by enabling external scrutiny of recommendation algorithms and content governance systems. Its effectiveness is reinforced by substantial enforcement powers, including administrative fines of up to 6% of a company’s global annual turnover for serious violations.[43]

Nevertheless, the growing economic power and transnational reach of major technology companies suggest that effective digital sovereignty may ultimately require more than corporate fines. It may also require mechanisms establishing personal accountability for senior executives and controlling shareholders who knowingly or systematically violate legal obligations governing digital platforms.

Since the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force, the European Union has progressively shifted from a model of voluntary compliance to one of active regulatory enforcement. A notable milestone was the €120 million fine imposed on X in 2025 for breaches relating to transparency obligations, researcher access, and information governance. As the first major enforcement action under the DSA, it demonstrated the European Union’s willingness to exercise its regulatory powers against major digital platforms.[44]

A second landmark case followed in May 2026, when the European Commission imposed a €200 million penalty on Temu after concluding that the company had failed to identify, assess, and adequately mitigate the systemic risks associated with illegal products offered through its online marketplace. Pursuant to Article 75 of the DSA, Temu was required to submit a corrective action plan by 28 August 2026, with continued noncompliance exposing the company to periodic penalty payments.[45]

This enforcement trajectory was further reinforced by the Commission’s decision to impose a €550 million fine on AliExpress for serious violations of the DSA. The sanction reflected the nature, duration, and gravity of the infringements, together with the scale of their impact on users across the European Union. In determining the amount of the fine, the Commission also considered mitigating factors, including the fact that the DSA constitutes a relatively new regulatory framework. Following the AliExpress decision, the cumulative value of financial penalties imposed under the DSA reached approximately €870 million, highlighting the European Union’s increasingly robust enforcement strategy and its determination to ensure effective compliance by major digital platforms.[46]

The European Commission has also initiated investigations into Meta and TikTok concerning algorithmic transparency, researcher access, content reporting systems, and the handling of illegal content. Preliminary findings indicate that Meta’s reporting mechanisms may be ineffective in addressing terrorist and extremist material.[47]

Despite these developments, enforcement remains focused primarily on transparency, systemic risk management, reporting obligations, researcher access, and algorithmic governance rather than on imposing direct liability for the mere presence of terrorist content. The European regulatory framework therefore remains in a period of institutional consolidation. Nevertheless, it clearly reflects a transition from industry self-regulation to formal supervision, robust enforcement, and significant financial sanctions with global implications.

Its long term effectiveness remains subject to empirical evaluation. European regulation has encouraged platforms to invest more heavily in moderation, transparency, and content removal. At the same time, terrorist and extremist actors have adapted by migrating to smaller platforms, encrypted services, closed communities, coded language, and other techniques that are more difficult to detect algorithmically. Automated detection also continues to face significant technological limitations, particularly the challenge of reducing false positives while maintaining effective enforcement.

The European Union does not represent the only model for regulating online content, but it is widely regarded as the most comprehensive and stringent. Comparable frameworks exist elsewhere, although generally with a narrower scope. In the United Kingdom, the Online Safety Act imposes broad obligations on digital platforms to remove harmful content and protect minors.[48] In Australia, the eSafety Commissioner framework authorizes regulators to require the removal of extremist and other harmful online content.[49]

The United States follows a markedly different approach. Although federal authorities cooperate closely with technology companies, direct regulation of online content remains comparatively limited. This reflects the strong constitutional protection of freedom of expression under the First Amendment, which restricts governmental authority to regulate political speech or compel content removal.

Regulation is further complicated by the economic power of major technology companies, many of which provide the digital infrastructure through which terrorist organizations exercise virtual power. Most leading platforms including Meta (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp), X, YouTube (Google), Reddit, Snapchat, Microsoft, Amazon, Discord, and Roblox are U.S. based.[50]

The strategic infrastructure of the global digital ecosystem is similarly concentrated within a small number of American corporations. Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud dominate cloud computing, while Google, Meta, and Amazon control much of the digital advertising market. Core search and video distribution infrastructures are likewise concentrated in U.S. firms. This concentration gives the United States a uniquely influential position within the architecture of global information flows.[51]

Rather than adopting the European model of binding regulation and substantial financial penalties, the United States has relied primarily on voluntary cooperation between technology companies and security agencies. While this collaborative approach has produced some operational successes, its effectiveness remains limited.

More broadly, the European framework reflects a fundamental shift in the legal and regulatory understanding of digital platforms. Rather than treating the Internet as a minimally regulated commercial space, the European Union increasingly views online platforms as critical infrastructures with significant social, political, and security responsibilities. This approach recognizes that the digital environment is not merely a medium for communication but also a strategic domain in which influence operations, cognitive warfare, extremist propaganda, and terrorist activities are conducted.

This evolving perspective extends beyond online propaganda and radicalization. As terrorist organizations increasingly exploit social media, digital infrastructures, and emerging technologies for recruitment, mobilization, and cognitive warfare, growing concern has also emerged regarding their potential use of cyberspace as a direct operational domain. This concern is reflected in the concept of cyber terrorism, the use of computer systems, communication networks, and digital technologies to attack critical infrastructure, generate fear, undermine public confidence, coerce political decision making, and advance ideological objectives through cyberspace.

Cyber Terrorism

As terrorist organizations increasingly exploit the digital domain, concern has grown that cyberspace may evolve from a tool of influence into a direct operational attack vector. This convergence of terrorism and cyberspace has given rise to the concept of cyber terrorism, defined by Dorothy E. Denning as:

 “Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.”^[52]

Despite increasing concern, classical cyber terrorism large scale cyberattacks causing widespread physical destruction or paralysis of critical infrastructure remains relatively rare. Most terrorist organizations continue to use cyberspace primarily for propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, encrypted communications, psychological operations, and cognitive warfare. Nevertheless, the growing digital dependence of critical infrastructure including energy, transportation, healthcare, banking, water, and communications has significantly expanded the potential attack surface. This risk is amplified by cooperation between terrorist organizations, hostile states such as Iran, and cybercriminal networks possessing advanced technical capabilities.

The strategic significance of this threat is reflected in reports issued by the Israeli State Comptroller, which cite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an example of a government institution that has been a persistent target of cyber operations conducted by hostile states, terrorist organizations, and independent hacking groups. According to the report, such cyber activities have been attributed, among others, to Iranian actors, Hezbollah, and Hamas.^[53]

The report further documents several major cyber incidents affecting the Ministry between 2020 and 2024. Following the outbreak of the October 2023 war, Israeli diplomatic missions worldwide experienced an approximately 500% increase in cyber incidents and intrusion attempts. These findings illustrate that cyberspace has become an active operational domain in which states and non-state actors simultaneously conduct espionage, disrupt government functions, compromise digital infrastructure, and influence national security.

Cyber terrorism is inherently transnational. An attack may originate in one jurisdiction, pass through servers in others, and strike targets in a third country, making attribution and enforcement particularly difficult. Addressing such threats therefore requires cross border cooperation, joint investigations, extradition mechanisms, and coordinated digital evidence collection. This borderless nature also strengthens the relevance of universal jurisdiction, particularly for terrorism and other serious offenses threatening international security.

The principal international legal instrument governing cybercrime remains the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe.^[54] It provides a widely accepted framework for cybercrime investigations, digital evidence, and international cooperation. However, it neither defines cyber terrorism nor establishes a comprehensive legal regime specifically addressing this threat.^[55]

Its effectiveness is limited by the absence of several major cyber powers. Although 81 states had ratified the Convention by early 2026, Russia, China, and Iran remain outside its framework, limiting its universality and weakening international cooperation.^[56]

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN specialized agency for information and communication technologies, is a leading institution in global cyber governance.^[57] It promotes cybersecurity standards, regulatory cooperation, and capacity building, and publishes the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), which assesses national cybersecurity across legal, technical, organizational, and cooperative dimensions.^[58] With 194 member states and more than 1,000 participating organizations, its membership includes Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea.^[59]

This creates a notable institutional paradox: Russia, China, and Iran remain outside the Budapest Convention, the principal binding framework for international cybercrime cooperation, while actively participating in the ITU and influencing global cybersecurity policy. This asymmetry highlights a fundamental weakness in the international cyber governance architecture, as major cyber powers remain outside its primary legal regime while shaping policy through parallel institutions.

The war that began on 7 October 2023 illustrates the growing strategic importance of virtual power in asymmetric conflict. Despite Israel’s considerable technological, intelligence, and cyber capabilities, it has remained vulnerable to cyberattacks, demonstrating how non-state actors can use relatively inexpensive technologies to produce significant effects against a far more powerful adversary. Artificial intelligence, large language models (LLMs), and deepfake technologies have further lowered the barriers to large scale influence and cognitive operations.

Although terrorist organizations generally lack the advanced infrastructure and research capabilities of states, they increasingly exploit commercial markets, dark web ecosystems, leaked datasets, open source intelligence (OSINT), and readily available cyber tools. These resources enhance their offensive capabilities and progressively narrow the technological gap between state and non-state actors.

Cooperation between state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iran, and terrorist organizations substantially enhances terrorist capabilities by providing technical expertise, operational experience, and digital infrastructure. This cooperation strengthens sophisticated influence operations targeting democratic societies. Social media platforms are systematically used to shape public perceptions, intensify polarization, undermine trust in state institutions, and deepen social fragmentation. For example, a study of Facebook during the 2020 U.S. presidential election found that users were six times more likely to encounter content from low-credibility sources than from trusted ones.^[60]

The threat becomes significantly greater when cognitive warfare is combined with cyber terrorism. Such operations include Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, website defacement, hack and leak operations, doxing, and unauthorized access to information systems, data theft, and disruption of essential digital services. These techniques are often employed together, attackers first compromise systems, selectively leak sensitive information, and simultaneously expose personal data to maximize public pressure and psychological impact. The combination of technological disruption and cognitive influence amplifies public insecurity while complicating the response of democratic governments and law enforcement agencies.^[61]

This trend is reflected in a report issued by the Israeli National Cyber Directorate, which analyzed cyber activity following 7 October 2023.[62] During the Swords of Iron war, hostile cyber operations increasingly shifted from Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) to Computer Network Attack (CNA). Whereas CNE primarily supports espionage, intelligence collection, and covert access, CNA seeks immediate, visible effects through disruption and damage. Its objectives extend beyond technical interference to include psychological, cognitive, and economic impact on both civilian populations and state institutions.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, hostile cyber activity focused primarily on Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). Operations emphasized covert intelligence collection through phishing, credential theft, reconnaissance, and infiltration of government and civilian systems to identify technological and organizational vulnerabilities. Their primary objective was persistent access and long term intelligence advantage.

Following the outbreak of the war, however, cyber operations shifted toward Computer Network Attack (CNA). Attacks increasingly targeted government agencies, local authorities, media organizations, civil institutions, and private companies. They included Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, website defacement, hack and leak operations, disruption of essential digital services, and coordinated psychological messaging through online platforms. In many cases, cognitive and psychological impact became as important as the technical damage itself.[63]

During the Swords of Iron war, threat actors systematically targeted Internet facing infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities created by rapid digitalization, remote work, and expanded organizational connectivity. Security cameras and other network connected surveillance systems were compromised through default credentials and software vulnerabilities, enabling intelligence collection and lateral movement across organizational networks. Remote management interfaces were similarly exploited through stolen credentials, software flaws, and the absence of Multi Factor Authentication (MFA).[64]

Reports by the Israeli National Cyber Directorate identify weak configurations, default credentials, and inadequate implementation of Security by Design principles as recurring vulnerabilities. Compromised IoT devices have been used for intelligence collection, botnet creation, and large scale DDoS attacks. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) have likewise been exploited through weaknesses in authentication and authorization, enabling data theft, manipulation, and disruption of essential services.[65]

The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT)[66] has further enlarged the cyber-attack surface. Global IoT deployments reached approximately 22.3 billion devices in 2025 and are projected to increase to 38 billion connections by 2030. As connected devices become increasingly integrated into transportation, industry, smart cities, and government systems, cyber vulnerabilities continue to expand. Correspondingly, global cybercrime costs are projected to increase from USD 7.8 trillion in 2024 to USD 13.3 trillion by 2029.[67]

Collectively, these attack vectors demonstrate the growing convergence of cyber terrorism and cognitive warfare. By combining cyberattacks with intelligence collection, influence operations, and narrative manipulation, terrorist organizations amplify their impact far beyond technical disruption, eroding public trust, weakening institutional resilience, and threatening national security. This integration enables them to leverage virtual power to achieve strategic, political, cognitive, and operational effects without conventional military capabilities.

Soft Power and Cognitive Warfare

The concept of soft power was introduced by Joseph S. Nye, who distinguished among hard power, soft power, and smart power as complementary forms of influence in international relations.^[68]

Hard power relies on coercion or the threat of coercion, primarily through military and economic instruments. It seeks to alter behavior by imposing costs rather than securing voluntary consent. Soft power, by contrast, influences through attraction, legitimacy, and cultural or cognitive appeal. It shapes preferences by encouraging identification and voluntary acceptance rather than coercion. Smart power integrates both approaches, combining coercive capabilities with legitimacy building and indirect influence according to the strategic context.

In the digital era, soft power has become a major force multiplier of virtual power and cognitive warfare. Once associated primarily with states, it is increasingly exploited by terrorist organizations and other non-state actors to shape perceptions, build legitimacy, erode institutional trust, and mobilize emotions. Through social media, algorithmic amplification, visual content, and disinformation, these actors can influence public opinion, shape media agendas, and weaken social cohesion across borders at relatively low cost. The information environment has thus evolved into an independent strategic battlespace rather than merely supporting kinetic operations.^[69]

Cognitive warfare is a central instrument of virtual power, seeking not merely to influence the information people receive but to shape how they perceive reality, interpret events, and make decisions. It weaponized public opinion to influence government policy and undermine institutional stability by deepening polarization and eroding trust in the media, academia, research institutions, and professional experts.

Digital platforms provide the primary operational environment for these activities. Algorithms, viral dissemination, online communities, and emotionally charged content amplify extremist narratives, reinforce echo chambers, and exploit existing social divisions while reducing exposure to competing viewpoints.^[70]

Modern terrorist organizations increasingly regard the cognitive domain as strategically equivalent to the physical battlefield. Hamas illustrates how a terrorist organization can combine virtual power and soft power to influence international audiences and cultivate perceptions of legitimacy, including within Western societies that formally designate it as a terrorist organization. Through intensive use of social media, emotionally charged videos, imagery, and visual symbolism, Hamas has sought to portray itself, among segments of international audiences, as a legitimate resistance movement rather than solely as a terrorist organization.^[71]

The effectiveness of this strategy reflects a sophisticated understanding of digital media consumption. Young users of TikTok, Instagram, X, and Telegram are primarily exposed to short, emotionally engaging content that often bypasses fact checking and historical context. Terrorist organizations exploit hashtags, eyewitness footage, music, graphic design, and viral dissemination to reduce complex conflicts to simplified narratives of “oppressor versus oppressed.”

These campaigns are amplified through decentralized networks of influencers, ideological activists, student organizations, human rights groups, and online communities that often reinforce terrorist narratives without formal affiliation. Alternative accounts, user generated reposting, and decentralized distribution further enable organizations to circumvent platform restrictions and regulation.

A particularly effective technique is victimhood framing, in which images of destruction and civilian suffering are rapidly disseminated to generate emotional identification, public outrage, and political mobilization. In the real time media environment, visual content itself becomes a cognitive weapon. Organizations such as Hamas recognize that success in the information domain can generate diplomatic pressure, influence media agendas, stimulate mass protests, and undermine the legitimacy of military operations against them.

Cognitive warfare therefore extends beyond the battlefield. It relies on narrative control, emotional mobilization, and the strategic use of virtual power, demonstrating that shaping public opinion can produce effects comparable to those of kinetic operations.

Soft power is operationalized through technological, communicative, and psychological tools, including bots, fake accounts, troll networks, viral videos, edited imagery, and emotionally charged short form content. These techniques amplify selected narratives, simulate public support, deepen polarization, and delegitimize adversaries.

Disinformation campaigns reinforce these efforts through controlled leaks, selective disclosure, manipulated context, and misleading content disseminated by news websites, influencers, and alternative media. Their objective is to erode trust in governments, security institutions, and the military, and traditional media. Artificial intelligence further strengthens these capabilities through deepfakes, synthetic voices, and fabricated images that blur the distinction between authentic and manipulated information.

State and non-state actors increasingly combine artificial intelligence, big data analytics, audience segmentation, and algorithmic targeting to deliver tailored ideological and emotional messages. Together, these technologies create an influence ecosystem in which virtual power serves as a strategic instrument for achieving political, security, and cognitive objectives with limited reliance on conventional military force.

The scale of this environment continues to expand. By April 2026, the number of internet users had reached approximately 6.12 billion (73.8% of the global population), while active social media identities totaled approximately 5.79 billion (69.9%). Because many users maintain multiple accounts, these figures represent user identities rather than unique individuals.[72]

At the same time, news consumption has shifted decisively from traditional media toward social media, video platforms, and news aggregators. Consumption of news through social media video increased from 52% in 2020 to 65% in 2025, while overall video consumption rose from 67% to 75%. This trend reflects both changing user preferences and deliberate platform design. Companies such as Facebook, Instagram, X, and Google increasingly prioritize video because it generates higher engagement and longer viewing times.[73]

The strategic implications of these dynamics are reflected in empirical research. A large scale study examining information diffusion on Twitter between 2006 and 2017 analyzed approximately 126,000 verified news stories shared by 3 million users through more than 4.5 million reposts.[74]

The findings demonstrated that false information spreads substantially faster than accurate information. Measured by Time to Virality, false content reached approximately 1,500 users six times faster than truthful content. Whereas accurate information required roughly six hours to reach a comparable audience, false information achieved similar exposure in approximately one hour.

False information also generated broader and deeper information cascades. Misinformation consistently spread through larger and more extensive sharing networks, with the largest false cascades extending eight network layers deeper than comparable truthful cascades.

Importantly, this advantage was driven not only by automated bots but also by human behavior. Users were significantly more likely to share information perceived as novel, surprising, or emotionally arousing. False content typically elicited fear, anger, or surprise, whereas truthful information generated more moderate emotional responses and therefore spread less extensively.

These findings are reinforced by a systematic review of 150 studies published between 2014 and 2024, which concluded that disinformation spreads approximately six times faster than accurate information. The review identified emotional engagement and algorithmic recommendation systems as the principal drivers of this accelerated diffusion.[75]

The review further identified several structural vulnerabilities that increase susceptibility to disinformation, including low digital literacy, political polarization, and declining trust in governments, traditional media, and public institutions. Together, these factors facilitate the rapid diffusion and long term entrenchment of false narratives.

From a national security perspective, disinformation undermines democratic processes, weakens social cohesion, and erodes public trust in state institutions. The rapid development of artificial intelligence and deep learning further magnifies this threat by enabling increasingly sophisticated synthetic media, including deepfakes that are difficult to detect and verify.

Finally, the review highlights the critical role of bots and fake accounts in expanding audience reach and accelerating information diffusion across social media ecosystems, thereby amplifying the strategic effectiveness of influence operations.

These findings are central to understanding influence operations, disinformation, and cognitive warfare. They demonstrate how states, terrorist organizations, and political actors exploit social media to shape narratives and public opinion at a speed and scale unattainable through traditional media.

Actors that effectively integrate virtual power into their strategic communication gain a significant cognitive advantage. For example, one study found that verified X accounts generated nearly three quarters of the 250 most viral false posts related to the Israel–Hamas war, highlighting the unintended role of platform verification in amplifying misleading content.[76]

Another study documented the rapid spread of disinformation immediately following the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack. Within three days, 14 false or unsubstantiated narratives accumulated approximately 22 million views across X, TikTok, and Instagram. Researchers identified 31,745 posts in English, French, German, and Italian containing conspiracy theories and disinformation.[77]

Among the dominant narratives was the claim that the Hamas attack was a “False Flag” operation allegedly orchestrated by Israel to justify military action and mobilize international support. Closely related narratives relied on terms such as “Psy Op,” suggesting that the conflict was a coordinated psychological operation, and “Staged,” alleging that images, videos, and eyewitness accounts had been fabricated for propaganda purposes. These narratives sought to undermine confidence in journalism, official institutions, and visual evidence.

Collectively, this content generated approximately 140,850 interactions, while use of the hashtag #FalseFlag increased by 462% between 3 and 9 October 2023, peaking on the day of the attack itself. These findings illustrate the speed with which conspiracy narratives spread during crises and the central role of social media in amplifying cognitive warfare.[78]

A separate study analyzed approximately 1.8 million posts published by 600,000 users between October 2023 and July 2024, including a qualitative examination of the 150 most widely shared posts. The findings showed that misinformation was disseminated not only by anonymous accounts but also by influencers, political activists, and ideological communities using conspiracy theories, anti-establishment narratives, and, in some cases, anti-Semitic stereotypes.

A recurring tactic involved misrepresenting credible journalism. Articles from mainstream media were selectively quoted or distorted to create the appearance of credibility while promoting false narratives. Network analysis demonstrated strong links between disinformation networks and content originating from established news organizations, which served as raw material for cognitive manipulation.[79]

A prominent example involved Jackson Hinkle, who misrepresented reporting by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz regarding the October 7 attack. Although Haaretz publicly rejected his claims within hours, Hinkle’s post exceeded 5 million views, whereas the correction reached only 2.6 million. This illustrates a central challenge of algorithmic information environments, corrections frequently fail to reach audiences already exposed to misinformation, allowing false narratives to persist despite rapid factual refutation.

The same study identified another widely circulated narrative claiming that most victims of the Hamas attack were Israeli soldiers rather than civilians, and that Israeli authorities had deliberately concealed this fact. This narrative sought to weaken the civilian victimhood framing of the attack and undermine Israel’s domestic and international legitimacy.

Social media influencers have consequently become important actors within contemporary virtual power ecosystems. Operating largely from jurisdictions with broad constitutional protection of speech, particularly the United States, many disseminate conspiracy theories, disinformation, and highly polarizing content. Terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah, have increasingly benefited from these informal amplification networks, which shape public perceptions without requiring direct organizational affiliation.

This trend is reflected in a study by the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) examining ten influential X accounts following the October 7 attack. During the four months preceding the attack, these accounts gained approximately one million followers; during the following four months, they gained an additional four million. The fastest growth was recorded by Ryan Dawson, Jackson Hinkle, and Sam Parker. The report further found that criticism, quote posts, and reposts frequently increased the visibility of extremist content rather than reducing it.[80]

Comparable findings were reported by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Center on Extremism, which identified a dramatic increase in engagement with five major influencers, including Jackson Hinkle, Lucas Gage, Jake Shields, Sam Parker, and CensoredMen. During the six months following October 7-2023, total engagement increased by more than 1,070%. Their content combined anti-Zionist rhetoric, anti-Semitic narratives, disinformation, and conspiracy theories, while simultaneously amplifying broader extremist networks.[81]

The digital era has transformed strategic competition. Power increasingly depends on shaping information, narratives, and public cognition. Consequently, soft power, virtual power, and cognitive warfare have become core strategic instruments, relying on digital platforms and algorithmic amplification rather than conventional military force. Unlike traditional propaganda, cognitive warfare shapes perceptions by exploiting polarization, disinformation, recommendation algorithms, and digital echo chambers while eroding trust in epistemic institutions. Research consistently shows that false information spreads faster and reaches wider audiences than factual corrections, especially during crises. Accordingly, the cognitive domain has become a strategic battlespace in which public trust, digital literacy, and epistemic resilience are essential to national security.

Conclusion

Synthesis of Key Findings

This study demonstrates that the digital and cognitive domains have become central theatres of contemporary conflict. Social media, artificial intelligence, and global digital networks have transformed the digital domain into a strategic environment exploited primarily by state sponsors of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and cybercriminals for cognitive warfare, cyber operations, information manipulation, intelligence collection, recruitment, financing, and other illicit activities

Structural Asymmetries

The digital ecosystem is a dual use environment where civilian infrastructures also serve hostile influence operations. Recommendation algorithms amplify emotionally engaging content, accelerating polarization, radicalization, and misinformation. These dynamics are reinforced by cybersecurity vulnerabilities, fragmented regulation, limited international coordination, and the persistent gap between the rapid spread of false information and the slower pace of correction.

The Strategic Role of Technology Companies

Technology companies have evolved from content intermediaries into influential actors shaping information visibility and public discourse. Their engagement driven business models inherently reward emotionally engaging content, reinforcing cognitive manipulation and polarization. Although regulatory frameworks such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) have strengthened corporate accountability, significant differences remain between the European and U.S. approaches to platform governance.

The DSA Model

The Digital Services Act (DSA) represents the European Union’s most comprehensive framework for digital sovereignty. It strengthens platform accountability through algorithmic transparency, systemic risk assessment, independent oversight, and substantial financial sanctions. By treating major platforms as systemic actors rather than neutral intermediaries, the DSA marks a significant shift in digital governance, although enforcement remains focused primarily on corporate entities.

From Corporate to Individual Accountability

The next stage of digital regulation may extend accountability to senior executives and controlling shareholders in cases of intentional misconduct, gross negligence, or persistent regulatory failures. Such a shift, however, will require clearer legal standards governing causation and responsibility in algorithmic decision making.

Policy Implications

The findings suggest four priorities: treating cognitive warfare, cyber operations, and information manipulation as a unified strategic domain; strengthening algorithmic transparency and enforcement, developing accountability frameworks that may extend beyond corporations, and enhancing international regulatory coordination. Long term resilience also requires intelligence cooperation, technological oversight, and improved digital literacy.

Key Takeaways

The digital environment has become a strategic domain of conflict. Algorithmic amplification, technological innovation, and regulatory fragmentation create persistent opportunities for hostile influence operations. Addressing these threats requires integrated regulation, updated legal frameworks, stronger accountability, and sustained investment in cognitive resilience. While the DSA is a significant milestone, it represents only an initial step toward effective global digital governance.

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