In light of the rapidly unfolding “Operation Rising Lion,” the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) has reached out to our experts and analysts to provide clarity on the evolving situation. These interviews aim to shed light on the broader context, underlying dynamics, security and political dimensions at play, offering grounded perspectives from leading experts who are closely monitoring the developments. Below, you’ll find key questions and responses that unpack the realities on the ground and what they may signal for the region moving forward.

Q1: What are Israel’s primary strategic objectives in “Operation Rising Lion”?

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin: “Israel has two main objectives in “Operation Rising Lion”: to demolish the Iranian nuclear program, by attacking the nuclear facilities, and in parallel to hit the most important scientists that led “the weaponization group”, that was responsible to assemble the bomb, when the developing process has been complete and to integrate it on the warhead of a ballistic missile, that will be the platform to carry it to its target.

The second goal is to demolish the ballistic missiles program, first since it was planned as the main platform to carry a nuclear warhead, and in addition, to reduce the risk on Israel’s residents. In regard of the missiles as a leading platform, the supreme commander of the IRGC and the commander of the IRGC’s Air force were responsible to develop and activate the ballistic missiles, their elimination reduced this activity.”

Mr. Naftali Granot: “The two main objectives, as stated by Israeli officials, are to delay the threats posed by the Iranian nuclear bomb. The second would be the destruction of military infrastructure, and surface-to-surface missiles and launchers which pose a great danger to Israel. These are the two main goals, and in my view Israel should keep it to these two goals and not expand it to a full blown war with Iran.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “The main objective is to eliminate Iranian efforts to achieve military nuclear capabilities and obstruct or block Iran’s ability to obtain or possess a nuclear weapon. Another aim is to significantly impair its ballistic missile capabilities. This will ensure that Iran cannot threaten the sovereignty of the State of Israel in the future.

However, I would like to emphasize that our conflict is not with the Iranian people but with the revolutionary dictatorship that has instigated the destruction of Israel. The Iranian populace is not the intended target of operations focused only on eliminating the threat to the state of Israel.”

Dr. Meir Javedanfar: “Israel’s most important strategic objective is to force the Iranian regime to sign a new nuclear agreement which president Trump has put on the table. The most notable part of this agreement calls for the dismantlement of Iran’s enrichment program. This would be of significant benefit to the security of the State of Israel. Because Iran’s enrichment program can also be used to manufacture a nuclear weapon. 

Israel’s second most important strategic objective is to deter Iran from the continuation of its anti-Israel policies. These center on the provision of weapons such as drones and missiles to Iran’s proxy groups which are then used against Israel. This is one of the main reasons why Israel has focused part of its attacks against Iran’s defense industrial complex, especially Iran’s missiles.”

Q2: What key factors or actions would be required for Israel to achieve these objectives in the current operational environment successfully?

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin: “Israel should deny Iran from enriching Uranium, in order not to enable them to advance to the final stage. In addition, attacking and demolishing the facilities of missile’s assembly will deny them from gaining more missiles that may endanger Israeli residents.”

Mr. Naftali Granot: “Continue for as long as it takes the aerial assault on nuclear sites and destruction of surface-to-surface missiles, including hopefully the Fordow nuclear site. To try and reach an agreement with Iran to stop the war.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “At the strategic level, we must remain focused on implementing a structured course of action that aligns with our strategic goals. Our military and security establishment’s accomplishments are excellent and praiseworthy, and I believe we must act decisively according to a plan to achieve the war’s objectives.

I will argue that currently, it appears that we are engaging with several components of the Iranian power structure rather than its military power alone. For example, the action targeting TV outlets and media platforms highlights a deficiency in the Islamic regime’s governing framework. It seeks to undermine the sense of safety and security that the regime is expected to offer its citizens.”

Dr. Meir Javedanfar: “Having precise intelligence about the location and whereabouts of Iran’s nuclear and military installations, especially its missile arsenal, is of great importance. So is the control of the skies of Iran, thus enabling Israel to carry out its strategic objectives there. This is especially true regarding the necessity to locate and destroy Iran’s missile arsenal, which has caused much damage to Israel.

Israel also needs the diplomatic and military backing of the United States, who is our greatest ally. If the United States joins the war, then that would be even better for the State of Israel. Having the world’s strongest superpower on our side would be a tremendous force multiplier in our favor.

It would boost Israel’s diplomatic standing against Iran in the International Community if the government of Israel ends the war in Gaza. This would significantly improve our standing in places such as Europe and with moderate countries in the Middle East”

Q3: As “Operation Rising Lion” unfolds, what options does Iran have for countering Israel’s actions?

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin: “Iran’s counter measures can combine some activities, most of them are already implemented:

• To launch ballistic missiles and “kamikaze” UAVs to selected targets in Israel – most of the UAVs were neutralized without causing a real damage.
• To carry out cyber attacks on critical infrastructures – this activity is implemented, but our cyber security systems succeed in denying most of them
• To make any effort to target a senior/ex- senior person
• The Iranian parliament calls for the supreme leader to withdraw from the NPT. If that happens , Iran can advance in its nuclear program without any foreign inspections.”

Mr. Naftali Granot: “Their response would be to drag Israel into a prolonged war, which is bad news for Israel. Israel cannot sustain for a prolonged period of time such a war. So the main option for the Iranians looking forward is to continue the war in order to exhaust the Israeli population, and to cause economic damage to Israel. They cannot actually block the Israeli continued assault on Iran.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “Undoubtedly, the Iranians will persist in utilizing their missile arsenal and launching capabilities. Furthermore, they will continue operating inside the cognitive domain to cultivate the perception that they remain steadfast and are responding with harsh countermeasures. Given the significant damage to the command structure of the Revolutionary Guards and the loss of its nuclear scientists, Iran will certainly seek alternative methods to uphold its pride and develop a substitute ballistic system.”

Dr. Meir Javedanfar: “The Iranian regime can continue to fire missiles and drones at the state of Israel. As the recent missile attack against residential areas in Tel Aviv and the Soroka hospital in Be’er Sheva illustrates, Iran’s missiles can still be very deadly. The Iranian regime could also target Jewish and Israeli communities abroad with terrorist attacks.”

Q4: How might Iran adjust its strategy moving forward?

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin: “If Iran will have to “surrender” and negotiate with the US administration on a new “nuclear deal” that will deny its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, they will have to agree, but after a period of time of a couple of years they will renew their efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, since for the Iranians it is a matter of national pride.”

Mr. Naftali Granot: “We should take into consideration that Iran might launch terror attacks against Israeli interests and facilities abroad. This is an option that has not been executed yet because it takes time to launch such terror operations. This is on one hand. On the other hand, it doesn’t take more than a few missile attacks per day, of several missiles, in order to create a situation that Israelis are locked in the shelters and that this continues for a long period of time.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “To address this subject matter, it is essential to analyze the Iranian approach retrospectively. This perspective will facilitate examining their potential courses of action and the implications for their balance of deterrence. It is important to note that Iranians demonstrate patience and employ deception as a strategic element. This strategy originated primarily during the Iran-Iraq War.

We have to remember that the Iranian leadership holds a divine-messianic worldview that aligns with a revolutionary ethos. As a result, Iran will engage in covert operations and possibly subterfuge to fulfill its ambitions.”

Dr. Meir Javedanfar: “In 2013, Supreme Leader Khamenei described himself as “a revolutionary, not a diplomat.” This is an accurate description. His anti-American and anti-Israeli revolutionary zeal is and will always be an important part of his character. Even during these difficult times.  

As long as Ayatollah Khamenei is in charge, I do not expect much change in Iran’s current strategy, which centers on its unwillingness to show compromise.”

Q5: Given ongoing speculation about potential U.S. involvement, how would American intervention shift Iran’s military and strategic approach in this conflict?

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin: “American intervention can put an end to the current nuclear program, they’re the only ones who can demolish Fordaw enrichment facility , that the IAF cannot do by its own means. That will be a signal to Iran’s regime that they must give up and get back to the negotiating table. On the other hand, Iran, and its backed Iranian militias in Iraq may try to launch lethal attacks on American garrisons in the Middle East as a “pay back”.”

Mr. Naftali Granot: “There is definitely a difference if Iran is facing Israel, or Iran is facing both Israel and the United States with all its military might. So for the Iranians, the American intervention, military intervention, is very significant. So the only way for the Iranians to respond to it is to try to expand by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, and the other option is to actually launch an attack against oil facilities of American allies in the region, meaning Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other countries like Qatar and so on. But that would definitely be a severe escalation of the war and I think that Iran will try to avoid it for as much as possible, because they will understand that they will have to face the full might of the American assault.

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I think that American involvement will increase dramatically the pressure on Iran. The moment that Iran feels that there is a danger for the stability of the regime, they come to an agreement. American intervention will be a significant increase of that pressure.

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Without American intervention, we might be in a situation that this war – even if we achieve our two main objectives of destroying most of the nuclear sites, including Fordow, and the infrastructure for the surface-to-surface missiles – will become a prolonged war, which is not in the interest of Israel. That’s a very dangerous situation.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “Given the seriousness of the situation in both defense and offense, I sincerely hope that the administration in Washington will support us. Neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program will influence not only the conflict between Iran and Israel but also the broader global geopolitical landscape. To date, Iran operates in a hybrid manner, employing both overt and covert strategies while obscuring its true aims from the international community.”

Dr. Meir Javedanfar: “If the United States joins the war against the Iranian regime, then we could see attacks against tankers and ships in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. But overall, the losses that Iran would suffer would be tremendous. This is something that is greatly worrying Iran’s leadership. The U.S joining Israel attacks against Iran would place tremendous pressure within the regime on Ayatollah Khamenei.”

Q6: Is diplomacy a viable way to end the conflict?

Mr. Naftali Granot: “There is no other way. One needs to realize that the knowledge of how to develop a nuclear program has existed already for many years – there is no other way to stop it.”

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: “At the strategic level, the military campaign should support diplomatic agreements that align with our war objectives. However, we must remember that the primary goal is to eliminate nuclear and missile launching capabilities to prevent Iran from establishing new infrastructure. At the same time, it is necessary to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon through diplomatic means. Additionally, military action must serve as a preliminary step since the Iranians have chosen to elevate themselves to a nuclear threshold state. To change this approach and mindset, a comprehensive retaliatory system is essential to deter future ambitions.”

Interviews above were conducted on June 18 and 19, 2025.

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Q7: What do you think was the primary driver of the ceasefire for both Israel and Iran?

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: The United States played a key role in the ceasefire agreement for reasons aligned with President Trump’s perspective. However, considering the blows Iran has suffered, it seems Iran has benefited from the ceasefire. At a glance, it appears that this is the remuneration Israel is paying in return for the president’s decision to engage in a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

My closing remark is that the ceasefire exemplifies the ‘Balance of Power’ paradigm, illustrating alliances and defense pacts between states and superpowers to maintain equilibrium against their adversaries.

LTC (Res.) Uri Ben Yaakov: For Iran, one of the primary drivers behind agreeing to a ceasefire was the fear of regime change. Leadership in Tehran recognized that continued conflict, especially in the face of the devastating strikes on military infrastructure, nuclear site, and notably the strike on the Evin Prison holding political prisoners, risked provoking an irreversible escalation and destabilization of the Islamic Republic. The timing and intensity of these attacks, along with the mounting pressures of an existential threat, may have forced Iran to halt hostilities in order to preserve its internal cohesion and avoid catastrophic losses.

On Israel’s side, the motivation to accept a ceasefire was rooted in achieving core objectives, while limiting further escalation and falling into a prolonged war of attrition. Israel had significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, achieving the original objectives set out in “Operation Rising Lion.”

Q8: Having reached a ceasefire agreement regarding the current conflict, but understanding that the knowledge for how to develop the Iranian nuclear program still exists, nuclear diplomacy may be necessary. What are the necessary conditions for involved parties to come to an agreement? What would Israel demand? What would Iran demand? Is an agreement even possible?

Dr. Doron Itzchakov:  My basic notion is that we should learn from past events regarding international agreements and their enforcement practices. Undoubtedly, international accords mitigate the likelihood of future conflicts on a global scale. Moreover, it is essential to emphasize that any military campaign, regardless of its effectiveness, must conclude with an accord among the involved parties.

Israel must ensure that any upcoming nuclear agreement addresses all issues relevant to its national security. If the negotiating countries prioritize their own interests and overlook Israel’s security concerns, it could pose a challenge if Israel is absent from the negotiations.

It is essential to point out that Iran’s intent to annihilate the State of Israel remains unchanged; hence, no negotiating party can adequately represent Israel’s interests on its behalf. An illustration of this is Iran’s unwillingness to compromise on essential elements, like the ongoing development of its ballistic system and the oversight of its enriched uranium stores, which are not designated for civilian purposes.

Another problematic aspect is the lack of transparency and Iran’s dual approach in diplomatic matters. An agreement can be reached if these issues are adequately addressed for Israel. The final deal should effectively prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

LTC (Res.) Uri Ben Yaakov: From Israel’s perspective, a nuclear agreement may be a necessary prerequisite for guaranteeing a full and permanent ceasefire. Any such future nuclear agreement must be grounded in firm, verifiable conditions to ensure it meaningfully constrains Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For Israel, a few fundamental requirements stand out – without them, we risk repeating the same problems that emerged from the previous nuclear agreement.

First, there must be strict and comprehensive oversight mechanisms. This includes both control and enforcement to ensure that Iran is not only prevented from developing nuclear weapons, but also from advancing long-range missile capabilities. The agreement must clearly prohibit such activity. Second, the duration of the agreement must extend well beyond the insufficient 10-year framework of the past. A minimum term of 20 years is essential, with an indefinite duration being the preferred outcome, alongside the requirement that Iran relinquish enriched uranium so it is no longer within their control. This would significantly reduce Iran’s breakout capacity and increase the time needed to resume a weapons program.

From Israel’s perspective, any future diplomatic framework must prioritize long-term deterrence, full transparency, and irreversible limits on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. An agreement is possible – but only if these core conditions are non-negotiable.

Q9: Now that a tentative ceasefire agreement has been reached between Israel and Iran, how has the power balance of each actor changed in the regional arena?

Dr. Eitan Azani: In my view, the power balance has changed dramatically, not just regarding the Iranian front and its “Axis of Resistance,” but also in how Iran is now being dealt with by the international community. Israel is no longer facing Iran alone; it is supported by the U.S. and backed by some of the EU countries.

The level of deterrence between Israel and Iran has also shifted significantly. The broader Middle East has witnessed Israel’s capabilities, which exceeded prior assumptions. Israel did not only target the proxies, but went after the core: the leadership and infrastructure behind the proxy wars. Starting with October 7, 2023, regional actors have observed the gradual collapse of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” in the two years that followed, and understood that even amid internal strife, Israel has managed to respond effectively to external threats. Consequently, Israel’s position in the region has strengthened, while Iran’s influence has decreased significantly. 

Another major shift is the re-engagement of the U.S. in the Middle East as a leading actor. In a relatively short time, the U.S. was involved in the attack on the nuclear facilities and helped to bring about a ceasefire. Iran accepted it, because  of its  weak position – largely out of fear for regime stability. Iran has been exposed, its inability to defend itself from Israeli attacks, beyond just launching missiles at Israel, has been laid bare. There’s a vast difference between how Iran projects its power, and the reality on the ground today.

Looking ahead, new actors will likely gain more influence, including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, the U.S., and possibly a reconfigured Syria. Israel will remain central due to its deterrence capability. Another actor who will likely enter the arena and attempt to assert itself in the region is Turkey; using Syria as a platform to expand its influence.

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: Scrutinizing the ‘Balance of Power’ between regional players and the transition of power necessitates a retrospective approach to defining the outcomes in any geopolitical landscape. However, the tentative ceasefire agreement also has additional implications for the countries’ ‘Balance of Deterrence.’ The balance of deterrence between Iran and Israel has shifted significantly in Israel’s favor due to “Operation Rising Lion,” Hezbollah’s divisive defeat, and the collapse of the Assad regime.

Furthermore, the war effectively disrupted Iran’s plan to conduct military confrontations far from its borders, especially near Israel. For the first time since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s border was infiltrated, and Iranian airspace was accessed by Israel’s Air Force, undermining the perception of security inside Iran and shifting the deterrence equilibrium between the two countries.

Nonetheless, there are additional factors that remain unclear at this stage, including the extent of the damage to the nuclear program and whether Iran has successfully hidden enriched uranium by transporting it to an alternative location.

Another query that arises is whether Iran will now pursue the development of a nuclear weapon after experiencing a significant setback to its security and national pride. In summary, the key question is how Israel intends to prevent any future military buildup by Iran and sustain an effective deterrence balance.

Q10: How do you see the situation with Iranian proxies developing moving forward?

Dr. Eitan Azani: Overall, most of the “Axis of Resistance” is now in survival mode. When Iran calls on them for support, they are largely unable to respond; neither Hezbollah, Hamas, nor the Shi’ite militias in Iraq can fully mobilize. Even the Houthis lack sufficient capabilities; their options remain mostly engaging in a war of attrition.

The regional landscape has changed significantly. In Lebanon, for example, with a new president and government and changing public sentiment, there is growing resistance to Hezbollah dragging the country into a wider conflict. In Syria, the situation is also shifting. The evolving situations suggest that the traditional dynamics of proxy warfare and basic conditions in some areas have dramatically changed, and may continue to do so.

Q11: How likely is it that Iran will be able to mobilize regional proxies, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Iraqi militias, in direct response to strikes on its territory, and what indicators should we monitor for such escalation?

Dr. Doron Itzchakov: The ongoing warfare and shifting political dynamics have created challenges for Iranian interests, deteriorating the alliances that once formed a formidable front against the State of Israel. Following a significant defeat of the “Axis of Resistance” and its affiliated militias, Israel seems to maintain strict control over their potential actions.

However, the Islamic regime’s course of action relies on the premise that the Houthis (Ansar Allah) may function as a substitute for generating a missile threat against Israel, now that Hezbollah’s ballistic capability is diminished.

My concluding remarks are that Iran is actively working to redirect militant efforts through Iraq and Jordan by smuggling weapons and explosives. However, despite Iran’s attempts to incite Iraqi militias to engage in further conflicts with Israel and the U.S., they currently seem hesitant to get involved. The American influence on the Iraqi establishment and the fear of potential American and Israeli retaliation against Iran and its affiliated militias are now key factors.

Dr. Eitan Azani: Most of Iranian proxies are currently unable or unwilling to respond decisively. The primary reason is a combination of weakened capabilities, local political pressures, and the visible collapse of Iran’s regional influence. 

The majority of Iran’s partners, Hezbollah, Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis, and Hamas, are currently focused on survival, rather than escalation. That said, the regional environment is highly fluid. No one can predict precisely how it will evolve in the short or long term. All actors,  especially those within the “Axis of Resistance,” are recalibrating and trying to rebuild military capabilities under new constraints. This will take a lot of time. 

Interviews above were conducted on June 24, 2025.

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Experts

Dr. Eitan Azani is the Acting Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Reichman University.

BG (Res.) Amnon Sofrin is a Research Fellow at the ICT, Former Commander, Combat Intelligence Corps, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and Former Head, Intelligence Directorate, Mossad.

LTC (Res.) Uri Ben Yaakov is the Chief Operations Officer (COO) of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Reichman University.

Mr. Naftali Granot is a Fellow at the ICT and the Former Deputy Director of Mossad.

Dr. Doron Itzchakov is a Research Fellow at the ICT.

Dr. Meir Javedanfar is a Research Fellow at the ICT and Lecturer, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy, Reichman University.