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Global jihadi organizations managed to leverage the violent conflicts in Africa and direct them to serve their immediate and long-term goals. Africa experienced 25 state-based armed conflicts in 2019 – the highest in the continent since 1946[1]. Of the above, more than a third had IS and al-Qaeda identified groups involvement that was responsible for 56% of the violence against civilians in that year[2].

There are a few major marks that make up a central layer in understanding the development of global jihadism in Africa: the formation of AQIM in 2006, the Boko Haram pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda without having been formally accepted to the latter, the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011, the collapse of Libya in 2011, al-Shabbab joining al-Qaeda in 2012, al-Qaeda and allies taking over northern Mali in 2012 and the French military involvement in 2013, the Egyptian coup in 2013 when the military deposed Moursi. Having said that, it seems that the most significant change began in 2014 when IS entered Africa, which caused a major expansion of terrorism in the continent as well as terrorist activities emanating from the violent IS-al-Qaeda rivalry and competition for territories, resources, and influence.

Among global jihadi organizations, one can observe two trends that typify their African activity: (i) the search for territories: al-Qaeda and IS, whose vision is the formation of an Islamic Caliphate have found themselves, after their losses in the middle east (Iraq and Syria) and Asia, in a complex operational reality that requires them to focus on terrorism and guerilla warfare and constantly search for territories to establish themselves in. It is clear that when an opportunity to physically take over a territory presents itself, they will not hesitate to take it (especially IS) and Africa provides ample such opportunities. These days, al-Qaeda and IS control territories in Somalia, Nigeria (north east Nigeria and Lake Chad regions), Mali and Mozambique (Cabo Delgado district) and subjected the local population; (ii) the treatment of the local population: whereas al-Qaeda takes a pragmatic stand and tends to collaborate with the locals based on common interests IS takes an extreme and brutal approach and demands full compliance with Sharia law from the local population – a refusal is met with harsh punishment and violence.

The counter-terrorism activity led by the west (mostly France which is currently being phased out by Germany) together with the state militaries of the continent who are being affected by the phenomenon, has a significant influence on the terrorist organizations modus operandi in the continent. For example, al-Qaeda who used to perpetrate complex attacks on western targets changed its modus operandi to low intensity attacks on security forces (be it local. Regional or international).

The war on global jihad in Africa is becoming more complex these days for multiple reasons, such as the Domino Effect causing internal conflicts to spill over to neighboring countries, lack of cooperation among member states in the joint task forces due to narrow state interests, and more. Alongside that, changes in the western powers that are active in Africa’s strategy are taking place and emanate inter alia from the reduction of French military presence, increased Russian presence and caliber due to Wagner Force’s involvement, multiple organizations, and their online activity, the willingness to start a dialogue with the latter and more. It should be noted the involvement of the international community fluctuates, sometimes significantly, which leaves many countries alone and ill-equipped in the fight against terrorism and leads in many cases to negotiations with the terrorists and an acceptance of Sharia law in the territories under their control (e.g., in Mali).

[1] Thérèse Pettersson & Magnus O’berg, “Organized violence, 1989–2019,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 57(4), 2020, pp. 597–613. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343320934986

[2] Ibid

The post Processes and Trends of Global Jihad on the African Continent appeared first on ICT.

A new trend is emerging, mainly as a result of the drawdown of western forces, that can deploy assets, equipment, and training far from those of the African countries like Mali and Niger; this trend, somehow already seen with the Tuareg appeal, is that of forming alliances between government entities and non-state actors, and even of starting talks with jihadists groups. This pivotal shift finds its main motives in diminishing attention to the Sahel region in light of the Ukrainian Invasion and the fact that African countries alone do not possess the capabilities required to quash insurgencies with groups like IS and AQ with their experience and current capabilities.

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Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August, there has been an increase in attacks by
ISIS – K militants targeting Taliban members. ISIS – K is based largely in eastern Nangarhar province but the group has ramped up attacks across Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover. The rise in violence has raised the specter of a wider conflict between the two extremist groups.

ISIS – K will likely attempt to take advantage of the political instability and lack of counterterrorism
efforts following the U.S. withdrawal to challenge Taliban control. The potency of the ISIS threat is
undeniable and its immediate aim is to destabilize the Taliban and shatter the group’s image as a guardian of security. ISIS -K’s terror campaign in Afghanistan could be a clear indication that they are sending a message to the international community that they are far from being defeated, and that they are willing to further expand their footprint across Afghanistan.

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Throughout the latter quarter of 2021, online supporters of the Islamic State engaged in a campaign of incitement, calling on individuals to plan and execute individual-initiative (lone-wolf) attacks against western targets. While the campaign called for individual-initiative attacks in many western countries, supporters of ISIS emphasized incitement of attacks in the France and the United States. The actors continued this rhetoric throughout the latter part of the year, calling on supporters to take “revenge on the west during the holidays.”

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On 3 February 2022, the US president announced that the US has killed Ibrahim al-Quraishi, ISIS leader. The operation was executed by US special forces in Idlib in northwestern Syria. This elimination provides the Biden administration with an impressive achievement in the war on terror and bolsters his stature, especially in light of the approaching mid-term elections. The elimination also dealt a major blow to ISIS’ members’ morale as their “caliphate” is caliph-less. With that said, the elimination raises a few questions, the first of which pertains to al-Quraishi’s hideout in Idlib.

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