Abstract

Since the October 7th Hamas attack and the ongoing war in Gaza, Israel faces a complex security landscape shaped by attacks from Iranian proxies across multiple theaters, including Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. Hezbollah joined the military campaign against Israel to divert its efforts from Gaza and show solidarity with Hamas. Similarly, Iranian-backed Houthi forces and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria have launched attacks against Israel. Israel aims to prevent a full-scale regional conflict through defensive measures and diplomatic efforts. However, recent escalations on the Israel-Lebanon border, driven by the end of high-intensity warfare in Gaza, stalled hostage negotiations, and prolonged displacement of Israeli citizens, have shifted focus to Lebanon. This intensified when a Hezbollah rocket attack killed 12 children in Majdal Shams, leading Israel to target Hezbollah leader Sayyed Fouad Ali Shukr.

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was also killed in Tehran, potentially by Israel, highlighting Israel’s operational reach. Despite these tactical successes, the entrenched leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah may remain unaffected. Israel’s targeted killing strategy aims to disrupt terrorist activities and boost morale, despite its contentious nature. The Axis of Resistance’s propaganda campaign threatens retaliation, illustrating psychological warfare’s role. As Israel and Hezbollah navigate this sensitive period, the likelihood of escalation remains high, influenced by internal Lebanese pressures, international calls for restraint, and broader Middle East dynamics.

Since the October 7th terror attack by Hamas and the ongoing war in Gaza, Israel has been facing a complex security landscape shaped by attacks from Iranian proxies across multiple theaters. These attacks span a diverse range of locations, including Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and even Iran itself, presenting a multi-front challenge to Israel.

When Hezbollah decided to join the military campaign against Israel, it set a primary objective: to challenge the IDF in northern Israel. This strategy aims to divert Israel’s military efforts away from the Gaza conflict and demonstrate solidarity with Hamas. Similarly, Houthi forces and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, all backed by Iran, have adopted comparable goals in their attacks against Israel.

In response, Israel has been working to navigate these tensions, with a focus on preventing the escalation into a full-scale regional conflict. This delicate balance involves both operational defensive measures and diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalation.

However, the situation has intensified recently in the Israel-Lebanon border area. Several factors have driven this escalation: The end of the high-intensity phase of the war in the Gaza Strip, the lack of progress in negotiations for the return of Israeli hostages, and the prolonged displacement of Israeli citizens in the northern regions—now exceeding 300 days. These developments have culminated in a pronounced shift of strategic focus towards the Lebanon front, where the stakes continue to rise.

While signs of increasing tension had been apparent in recent weeks, the situation reached a critical juncture when a rocket attack by Hezbollah resulted in the death of 12 children in Majdal Shams, a Druze town in the Golan Heights. This incident is part of a broader pattern of Hezbollah attacks that has already claimed the lives of more than 40 Israelis since hostilities intensified in the northern regions of Israel.

According to Dr. Eitan Azani, the acting director of ICT, the situation compelled Israel to adopt a more aggressive response strategy. This prompted Israel’s decision to target Sayyed Fouad Ali Shukr, one of Hezbollah’s most prominent military leaders, in one of the organization’s headquarters in the Dahieh area of Beirut.

Following Shukr’s death, Hezbollah officially lauded him as a “great fighting leader, the dear and beloved brother, Sayyid Fouad Shukr (Sayyid Mohsen)… whom they proudly present as a” great martyr on the path to liberate Al-Quds.” The organization also highlighted his extensive contributions over the years: Sayyed Fouad Ali Shukr was a foundational figure in Hezbollah, playing a crucial role in organizing the early Islamic Resistance groups in Lebanon. Throughout the 1980s and beyond, he was instrumental in the resistance against Israel, notably during significant confrontations. As Hezbollah’s first central military commander, Shukr strategically guided operations against Israeli forces and extended support to Muslims globally, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early 1990s. He was a key planner in major conflicts, such as the July 2006 war, and continued to lead operations against various adversaries. Shukr also held influential positions within Hezbollah’s central councils, contributing to the organization’s strategic decisions until he died in 2024, marking him as a significant figure in the movement’s history and ongoing struggle.^[1] This formal statement, coupled with indications that he oversaw Hezbollah’s accurate missile project, underscores the magnitude of his killing and the significant operational consequences for Hezbollah.

In the hours following the killing of Sayyid Fouad Shukr, news emerged that Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh had been killed in an IRGC hideout apartment in Tehran by an unknown assailant. Haniyeh had been in Iran to attend the inauguration of the newly elected Iranian president and had met with the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei just hours before his death. 

Suppose Israel was involved (though it remains unconfirmed) in targeting Ismail Haniyeh. In that case, it holds dual psychological significance: it demonstrates Israel’s intelligence and operational success in targeting the senior leadership of Hamas, and it signifies the implications of an assassination occurring on Iranian soil.

Dr. Michael Barak, senior researcher and head of the Palestinian Terrorism Desk at the ICT, highlights that on the surface, Haniyeh is perceived as a moderate leader in Hamas. Still, he expressed support for the massacre of 7/10, encouraged violence against Israel in the West Bank, and continued to advocate for the destruction of the State of Israel.

Born in the al-Shati refugee camp north of the Gaza Strip in 1962, Haniyeh, without a strong family background, ascended the Hamas hierarchy by managing the office of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (Hamas founder) between 1997 and 2004. He was twice appointed head of the political bureau of Hamas and established an extensive network of relations with state actors, particularly with Turkey, Qatar, and Iran, with whom he restored relations after the civil war in Syria. The close connection with Iran is best expressed in the formal reaction by the new Iranian President after Haniyeh’s death: “Today, Iran mourns its partner in sorrow and joy, the constant and proud companion of the path of resistance, the brave leader of the Palestinian resistance, the martyr of al-Quds, Haj Ismail Haniyeh. Yesterday, I raised his victorious hand, and today, I have to carry his coffin on my shoulders. The Islamic Republic of Iran will defend its territorial integrity, honor, and honor and make the terrorist invaders regret their cowardly action”^[3].

Over the years, Haniyeh has also forged close connections with non-state actors such as the Lebanese Hezbollah organization. The two organizations held more than 20 meetings (also with Iran) throughout 2022-2023, which underscores the frequency and depth of their discussions on resistance actions and objectives, highlighting their coordinated efforts.^[4]

Dr. Barak claims that in recent years, Haniyeh was also involved in fostering the establishment of an anti-Israeli ideological front together with the religious establishment in Egypt, al-Azhar Institute, headed by Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyib, and with Islamist movements such as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Afghan Taliban) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islamic Pakistan. He also distinguished himself as a successful Hamas financier, managing to raise substantial funds for his movement.

Dr. Barak argues that despite Haniyeh’s senior position, his elimination is only a tactical achievement and should not be seen as a factor influencing the continuation of the Hamas movement’s fighting, given the entrenched internal leadership in Gaza and its willingness to accept the dictates of the external leadership of Hamas fully. Simultaneously, the targeting sent a message to the Axis of resistance that Israel is not afraid of the consequences and is prepared for a multi-regional war if necessary.

Is Targeted Killing an effective tool?

Targeted killings have long been a cornerstone of Israel’s counter-terrorism strategy. Since its establishment, Israel has employed a variety of methods, including missile strikes and ground operations, across multiple geographic regions to carry out these operations. In some cases, Israel openly acknowledges these actions, while in others, it opts to maintain ambiguity regarding its involvement. Since October 7^th, Israel has taken responsibility for various targeted killings in both the Palestinian and Iran-Hezbollah arenas, making it a preferred strategy in the ongoing conflict.

According to Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, senior researcher and Head of the Global Far-right Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at the ICT, claims that the practice of targeted killings has evolved in response to changing terrorist threats, geopolitical developments, and advancements in military technology. These operations are designed to disrupt terrorist activities by compelling terrorists to go into hiding, making it challenging to replace eliminated leaders, demoralizing terrorist groups, minimizing collateral damage, and bolstering the morale of Israeli citizens impacted by terrorism. However, targeted killings remain a contentious issue. Critics contend that they circumvent legal processes, potentially glorify the deceased terrorists as martyrs, and attract international criticism. Consequently, each targeted killing requires thorough evaluation to weigh its immediate and long-term benefits and risks.

Initial Responses to Targeted Killings: The Dynamics of Psychological Warfare

The initial response from the Axis of resistance to the targeted killings of its officials was to launch a propaganda campaign threatening retaliation. Ms. Daniel Haberfeld, head of the Cyber-Terrorism Desk at ICT, notes that both the formal statements from Axis members, with Iran at the forefront, and the informal propaganda circulated on social media were directed and aimed to instill a fear of retaliation in Israel. 

Since October 7^th, there has been an increasing interconnectedness among various regional actors within the Axis of Resistance. This trend is apparent as numerous accounts on social media echo similar narratives and posts, indicating a coordinated effort to spread propaganda. Amidst the conflict, regional events consistently act as catalysts, igniting surges in online propaganda that either amplify existing narratives or give rise to new ones. In this instance, the message is clear: the killing of officials in major cities in Iran and Lebanon will not go unanswered.

Navigating the Challenges Ahead

The situation is highly sensitive; Israel and Hezbollah find themselves at a crossroads. Hezbollah faces a decision: either to engage in war or to find a way to remain within the realm of attritional warfare without significant escalation. This will include a response that wouldn’t necessitate a substantial reaction from Israel. Alternatively, Hezbollah might react as it deems appropriate without being deterred by threats of war.

Dr. Eitan Azani, the acting director of ICT, claims that both Hezbollah and Iran feel compelled to respond, potentially in a coordinated manner. Consequently, the likelihood of returning to the previous situation is relatively low, with escalation being a more probable outcome. Further complicating the situation are various factors: domestically, the Lebanese pressure Hezbollah to de-escalate the situation; internationally, powers such as the United States and France are advocating for restraint to prevent the conflict from expanding into a regional war. American assurances of defending Israel, if attacked are strategically aimed at influencing the decision-making processes of the involved parties. However, as additional members of the resistance axis become involved, the likelihood of escalation increases. 

^[1] Hezbollah Military Media. Telegram. 31.07. 24

^[2] Telegram. 31.07.24

^[3] Telegram 31.07.24

^[4] International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). (n.d.). ICT experts Q&A: Insights on the escalation on the northern front. Retrieved from https://ict.org.il/ict-experts-qa-insights-on-the-escalation-on-the-northern-front/

^[5] Telegram 31.07.24

The post At a Crossroads: Navigating the Multifaceted Threats from Terrorist Actors appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

The West Bank holds strategic importance for Israel, facing growing unrest due to the weakening Palestinian Authority (PA), economic decline, and incitement from militant groups. This situation has escalated tensions, motivating young Palestinians and PA security members to confront Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). This trend risks sparking a third intifada, threatening the stability of both the PA and Israeli cities, and requiring additional IDF and Shin Bet resources. Continuous counter-terrorism operations, enhanced security coordination with the PA, and comprehensive PA reforms are suggested to curb this escalation.

This report outlines the current security situation in Judea and Samaria, the demographics of the Palestinian population, and the significant rise in support for militant groups. It also highlights the efforts of various actors, including local organizations, Palestinian militant groups, and external supporters, to ignite the West Bank, alongside the IDF’s counter-terrorism efforts and the PA’s struggle to maintain order. The report concludes with the need for continued counter-terrorism activities and political processes to address the rising terror in the West Bank.

The following article is based on a think tank which its Members are: Dr. Michael Barak, Miri Eisin, Dr. Eitan Azani, Oz Noy, Shalom Ben Hanan, Moshe Levi, Ezra Saar.

Introduction

The West Bank holds significant strategic importance for the State of Israel in many respects. The weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the growing unrest in the West Bank due to the deteriorating economic situation, Hamas incitement, the IDF’s campaign to eradicate Hamas control in Gaza, and friction with settlers significantly increase the motivation of young people in the West Bank to confront IDF forces. This situation also encourages members of the PA’s security mechanisms to join the cycle of terror. This trend of escalation might spread to other West Bank cities. It could potentially lead to the outbreak of a third intifada, different from its predecessors, which would threaten both the stability of the PA and Israeli cities. Forming another front would draw additional IDF and Shin Bet forces, already needed to handle other combat arenas. Continuous Israeli counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank, strengthening security coordination with the PA, initiating the political process, and conducting a comprehensive reform in the PA might curb this trend.

This document seeks to provide a status report on the security situation in Judea and Samaria based on primary and secondary Arabic materials and insights from the think tank members at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) to optimally prepare for dealing with the existing threats in this region.

The West Bank comprises 11 districts: Jenin, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and al-Bireh, Bethlehem, Jericho, Tubas, Jerusalem, Tulkarm, Salfit, and Qalqilya. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in Ramallah, the Palestinian society in the West Bank numbered approximately 3,257,000 people in 2023 (98% Sunni Muslims, about 1.37% Christians of various denominations). Their findings indicate that most of the Palestinian population in the West Bank is young, with a growth rate of 2.1%. 35.2% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank are children (under 14), about 28.1% are teenagers and young adults (aged 15 to 29), and about 6.3% are over 60.^[1] This is significant since Palestinian terrorist organizations, led by Hamas, invest considerable efforts in recruiting a young audience in the West Bank through various means, including social media.

Support Rate for Hamas Among West Bank Residents

Notably, since the October 7 massacre, there has been an increase in the support rate for Hamas among West Bank residents, alongside a significant drop in support for the PA and its institutions. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian PSR Institute in March 2024, 71% of West Bank residents justified Hamas’s massacre in the Gaza periphery settlements; 64% of West Bank residents expressed support for Hamas’s rise to power in Gaza; 35% support Hamas compared to 12% who support Fatah, with 47% having no particular political preference; 63% also opposed the renewal of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the idea of a two-state solution under international and Arab sponsorship.^[3]

However, in later public opinion surveys by the same Palestinian polling institute, there was a trend of declining support for Hamas among West Bank residents, likely due to the IDF’s success in advancing in Gaza and the increasing distress of Gazans in light of Hamas’s entrenchment in its positions. For example, a public opinion poll from April 2024 indicated only 18% support for Hamas in the West Bank (see diagram).^[4]

Efforts to Ignite the West Bank

According to the ICT think tank, three leading players are identified as investing efforts in recruiting West Bank residents for terrorist activities to ignite the area: resident organizations without organizational affiliation; Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially Islamic Jihad and Hamas; and Iran and Hezbollah.

In Hamas’s leadership view, the West Bank constitutes Israel’s “soft underbelly,” partly due to its proximity to central Israeli settlements. In April 2021, Yahya Sinwar declared that the West Bank is considered the main battlefield of the Palestinians against Israel and called on West Bank youths to intensify terrorist activities against settlers and drive them out of the area.^[5] Saleh al-Arouri, a senior Hamas figure responsible for the West Bank file in the organization (eliminated by Israel after October 7), was prominent in recruiting West Bank residents for confrontation against Israel.^[6] Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters have been running incitement campaigns on social media, calling on West Bank youths to kill Jews, confront IDF forces, and fulfill the duty of jihad against Israel. For example, on May 16, 2024, Hamas published on social media the will of a Hamas member killed in an IDF counter-terrorism operation, calling on West Bank residents to join the armed struggle against Israel (see picture).^[7]

Iran is also carrying out a significant effort to ignite the West Bank. In August 2022, Hossein Salami, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, emphasized that the process of arming the Palestinians in the West Bank is underway.^[8] Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran, called a decade ago to arm the West Bank and, in other speeches, clarified that Israel’s power should be challenged through the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (see picture below).^[9] In July 2023, Ziyad al-Nakhalah (Secretary-General of the PIJ) stated in an interview with Iranian media that his organization is investing efforts in establishing armed groups, arming other Palestinian factions, and imparting knowledge of bomb assembly in the West Bank while coordinating with Iran. According to Ziyad al-Nakhalah, this arming is carried out through weapon smuggling into the West Bank and buying weapons from Israelis.^[10] There are also voices of criticism within the Palestinian Authority against Iranian subversion in the West Bank and its efforts to overthrow the Palestinian Authority through support for Hamas and PIJ.^[11]

From this perspective, Iran operates to flood the West Bank with weapons and explosives through various smuggling routes across the Middle East, utilizing intelligence agents, militia members, and criminal gangs. These smuggling operations are primarily conducted through Jordan, from where the weapons are transferred to the West Bank via Israeli Bedouins.^[13] According to data from the Israel Police in the Judea district, in 2023 alone, 381 weapons were seized in the Judea region, 153 of which were smuggled through the border with Jordan, and 16 smuggling attempts were thwarted by Israeli security forces. In the first half of 2024, approximately 200 weapons were seized.^[14] Zaher Jabarin, a senior Hamas official and the successor of Saleh al-Arouri as the leader of the organization in the West Bank, pointed to another source of smuggling. According to him, M16 rifles reach the West Bank after being purchased from IDF soldiers who stole them from military bases.^[15]

Signs of Escalating Security in the West Bank

According to Shin Bet data, 2023 was characterized by a significant escalation in the West Bank in all parameters, which worsened since October 7. According to the data, 3,436 terrorist attacks were carried out in Judea and Samaria and the Green Line in 2023. 4,584 Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, 345 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and 171 Palestinians in the Green Line were arrested for involvement in terrorist activities.^[16]From January to May 2024, 120 significant terrorist attacks were carried out, and 470 significant terrorist attacks were thwarted (see graphs below).^[17] From January to May 2024, 1,460 terrorists were arrested in Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem.^[18]

The think tank team points out that the source of terrorist activity in the West Bank in recent years has been the refugee camps, especially Nur al-Shams (east of Tulkarm), where the violence rate is estimated at over 70%, with the Islamic Jihad playing a significant role in efforts to ignite the Judea and Samaria area. Since 2022, the PIJ has strengthened its position by adopting a new strategy that involves assisting small groups of local armed men, primarily in the northern West Bank. It should be noted that one of the phenomena that have developed mainly in the refugee camps is the emergence of local “battalions,” which usually include activists from several organizations, including PIJ, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and even Hamas, where organizational affiliation blurs while local affiliation strengthens significantly.

At least nine local militant groups can be identified as associated with and supported by the PIJ, headed by the Jenin Battalion (Katibat Jenin),^[19] the Nablus Battalion (Katibat Nablus), and the Tulkarm Battalion (Katibat Tulkarm) – areas where the PIJ had a foothold even before the Second Intifada. Six other groups associated with the PIJ operate with varying intensity in the West Bank: the Tubas Battalion, the Birqin Battalion, the Jericho Battalion, the Jaba Battalion, and the Qabatiya Battalion, where recruitment methods in the northern West Bank are conducted through close ties, friendships, and local identity, while in Hebron, there is a more classic recruitment pattern based on connections between security prisoners and field operatives in the southern West Bank.^[20]

The think tank team also emphasized that the PIJ significantly assists other Palestinian factions in the West Bank, such as “Lion’s Den” (Arin al-Aswad). This independent group numbered about 30 people with no organizational affiliation. It was established by a young Palestinian man in Nablus named Muhammad al-Azizi in July 2022, who previously belonged to the “Martyrs of the Al-Aqsa Brigades.” This group brought together young Palestinians frustrated by the impotence of the Palestinian leadership to solve political and economic problems, seeking to rise above political and ideological disputes within the Palestinian leadership and saw fit to confront IDF forces. It seems that this organization ceased operations in April 2024 due to IDF counter-terrorism activities, arrests made by the Palestinian Authority among their ranks, and the integration of some of its members into the Palestinian security mechanisms.^[21]

According to team members, the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades,” a prominent Palestinian faction in the West Bank indirectly affiliated with the Fatah movement, also receives assistance from the PIJ – a worrying trend in itself. This faction was founded with the outbreak of the Second Intifada on September 28, 2000, by Yasser Arafat (leader of the Palestinian Authority), who took part in terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. In 2007, Abu Mazen ordered the disbandment of this faction and the integration of its members into the Palestinian Authority mechanisms to adhere to the political track with Israel. In 2021, after Operation Guardian of the Walls, the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades” renewed their activities and took an active part in the confrontation with IDF forces in the West Bank. Its structure is decentralized and consists of several armed groups operating in different areas of the West Bank, including the Askar Battalion, the Amar Battalion, the Tulkarm “Rapid Response” Battalion, the Al-Samu Battalion, and the “Tall al-Fajr Battalion.” Since October 7, the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades” declared an open campaign against Israel throughout the West Bank. Their activities are focused on Jenin and Nablus.^[22] It can be noted that in an interview conducted by several members of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades” in the largest refugee camp in the West Bank, “Balata Camp,” with a reporter from the inter-Arab daily “Asharq al-Awsat,” they revealed why they decided to join this group and renew the armed struggle against Israel. They pointed to their dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority’s conduct towards Israel, disappointment with the political process, the IDF’s military activities in the West Bank, and confrontations with settlers.^[23]

In the view of the team members, Hamas is also trying to establish itself in the West Bank, but not with much success due to the successful counter-terrorism activities of the IDF, which help reduce the ability of West Bank Arabs to carry out attacks. Between March 2023 and September 2023, Hamas operated in the western part of Jenin under the “Al-Ayyash Battalion.” Between 2022 and April 2023, it operated in Jericho under the “Aqabat Jabr Battalion.” Suleiman Basharat, director of the Palestinian research center “Yabous” in Ramallah, also shares this assessment and claims that Hamas is unable to establish itself in the West Bank due to the successful counter-terrorism activities of the IDF to destroy its infrastructure there.^[24] According to the think tank team, IDF activities in the West Bank also managed to prevent recruitment efforts of Israeli Arabs by the residents of the former.

Summary – Current Situation

In conclusion, the think tank members believe that the northern West Bank is undergoing increasing escalation, partly due to the involvement of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Iran, which aim to create an additional front against Israel. The Palestinian Authority’s policy of containment and avoidance of friction with Palestinian factions and its failed attempts to persuade armed groups to lay down their weapons (except for the “Lion’s Den” group) are expressions of the Palestinian Authority’s weakness in the West Bank. Even when the Palestinian Authority carries out actual arrests of terrorist operatives, the indictments against them are weak and result in their release. Overall, the cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority has a marginal impact on the situation. This raises the question of who should enforce order and security in the West Bank: an improved and significantly reformed Palestinian Authority, a new Palestinian power, Israel, or an international force? For now, it seems that only the continuation of counter-terrorism activities by the IDF and measures to prevent arms smuggling into the West Bank by Israeli security bodies can help curb the rising terrorism in the West Bank, alongside the renewal of the political process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which can provide hope and a political horizon.

The think tank believes it is crucial to foster the creation of a tolerant ideological climate to ensure long-term and stable peace with the Palestinians. This can be achieved through reforming the Palestinian Authority’s education system by removing negative references to Israel from its textbooks. The think tank further believes that Gulf states, such as the United Arab Emirates, can contribute their knowledge acquired over the years in leading a de-radicalization program for young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and in fostering a moderate ideological climate. The Israeli academia has a vital role in nurturing the ties between the peoples.

^[1] The head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reviews the situation of Palestinians at the end of 2023, on the eve of the beginning of the year 2024 (in Arabic), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics mechanism. 31.12.2023. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=4675

^[2]  WAFA Agency. https://info.wafa.ps/userfiles/image/WestBank.jpg

^[3] “Public Opinion Poll No (91)”, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), March 20, 2024.

https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2091%20English%20press%20release%2020%20March%202024.pdf

^[4] “Arab Barometer: Palestinian Perception of Governance (Report III)”, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), April 22, 2024.

https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/AB8%20Palestine%20Report%203%20English%20version%2022April%202024.pdf

^[5]  Al-Sinwar: “The West Bank is the main battlefield” (in Arabic), Palestine – Al Jazeera. 2.5.2022. https://www.facebook.com/AJA.Palestine/videos/698413387947458/

^[6]  Sapir Lipkin, “The Number 2 in Hamas, the Architect of Terror in the West Bank | This is Saleh Al-Arouri who was killed in Beirut,” N12, 2.1.2024. https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/2024_q1/Article-0263109080bcc81027.htm

^[7]  Telegram “The Will of the Martyr Adnan Samara” (in Arabic), (affiliated with Hamas), 16.5.2024.

^[8]  Al-Salami: “The process of arming the West Bank is currently underway, just as Gaza was armed” (in Arabic), Al-Mayadeen, 21.8.2022. https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/سلامي:-عملية-تسليح-الضفة-تجري-حاليا-مثلما-تسلحت-غزة

^[9]  “Mr. Ali Khamenei: Arming the Palestinian resistance in Gaza… and also the West Bank” (in Arabic), Al-Mayadeen, 24.7.2014. https://www.almayadeen.net/news/السيد-علي-خامنئي–تسليح-المقاومة-الفلسطينية-في-غزة–والضفة-أ

^[10]  Al-Nakhalah: “We are working to form combat brigades in the West Bank and all Palestinian cities” (in Arabic), Mehr News, 2.7.2023. https://ar.mehrnews.com/news/1934576/النخالة-نعمل-على-تشكيل-كتائب-مقاتلة-في-الضفة-الغربية-وكافة-المدن

^[11] “The Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement against Iran: Undermining the Palestinian Authority and Jordanian rule through its proxies Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Muslim Brotherhood,” MEMRI, 16.5.2024. https://www.memri.org/webaxy/item?6128

^[12] Imam Khamenei, “The West Bank is the key to defeating the enemy” (in Arabic, no date), Khamenei. https://arabic.khamenei.ir/news/7486

^[13] Haaretz, “Iran smuggles weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank through secret routes across the Middle East,” 9.4.2024. https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2024-04-09/ty-article/0000018e-c390-dc93-adce-eff06daa0000

^[14] Hanan Grayevand, “We must not lose: The battle against weapon smuggling from Jordan,” Israel Hayom, 7.6.2024. https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/defense/article/15878554

^[15] Zaher Jabarin to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “The resistance can manage a war of attrition in Gaza” (in Arabic), Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 14.5.24. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/زاهر-جبارين-لـالعربي-الجديد-المقاومة-قادرة-على-إدارة-حرب-استنزاف

^[16] “Annual Summary,” Israel Security Agency, 1.1.2024. https://shabak.gov.il/media/zpledoyg/2023-דוח-חיצוני-סיכום-שנה.pdf

^[17] “Monthly Reports,” Israel Security Agency, January – May 2024. For example, May 2024 report: https://shabak.gov.il/media/alueae1q/דוח-2024-מאי-עברית.pdf

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] “The Jenin Battalion began operating in the Jenin refugee camp in May 2021, led by Jamil al-Amouri (a former member of the PIJ military wing, Saraya al-Quds, who was eliminated by Israel). It managed to recruit dozens of young people based on local connections. In an interview with the inter-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, the thirty-year-old leader of the Jenin Battalion said he decided to join armed activities against IDF forces due to the loss of hope for a better future, the continued Israeli aggression, and the understanding that Israel has no intention of implementing the two-state solution.” Baha Malhem, “A new generation of armed men in the West Bank warns of an imminent explosion” (in Arabic), Asharq al-Awsat, 29.5.2024. https://aawsat.com/arabic-and-international/قضايا-في-العمق/تحقيقات-جديد-جيل-من-المسلحين-في-الضفة-الغربية-ينذر-بانفجار-قريب/4352526

^[20] According to the ICT Research Fellows Forum.

^[21] “Washington imposed sanctions on it.. What is the Arin al-Aswad group?” (in Arabic), Al-Hurra, 7.6.2024. https://www.alhurra.com/arabic-and-international/2024/06/07/فرضت-واشنطن-عليها-عقوبات-ما-هي-مجموعة-عرين-الأسود؟

^[22]  “President Arafat had credit for the establishment, and after sixteen years of its dissolution.. what do you want to know about the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades?” Arabic Post, 18.12.2023. https://arabicpost.net/منوعات/18/12/2023/كتائب-شهداء-الأقصى/

^[23] Baha Malhem, “A new generation of armed men in the West Bank warns of an imminent explosion” (in Arabic), Asharq Al-Awsat, 29.5.2024.

^[24]  Khalil Musa, “Israel is chasing Hamas in the West Bank,” Independent Arabia, 9.5.2024. https://www.independentarabia.com/node/576266/سياسة/تقارير/إسرائيل-تلاحق-حماس-في-الضفة-الغربية

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The massacre of 12 Druze children and dozens of wounded in Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights required a powerful response from Israel, following months of a war of attrition waged by Hezbollah against northern Israel, without any provocation from Israel, in solidarity and support for the brutal war initiated by Hamas in Gaza.
In this context, it should be emphasized that the “serious concerns” of the international community about the possibility of war against Lebanon, with the potential for regional war, has not led it to any significant steps to stop Hezbollah’s aggression, despite the organization’s violations of 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
The Israeli response was a targeted assassination of the highest-ranking military figure in Hezbollah to date, Fuad Shukr, a member of the organization’s Military Jihad Council. According to Israeli sources, he was personally responsible for the massacre of the children in Majdal Shams and is also responsible for Hezbollah’s strategic precision missile project.
The assassination was carried out from the air in the Dahiya district, Hezbollah’s stronghold in the heart of Beirut. It should be noted that in recent days, there have been reports that the United States demanded/requested that Israel not attack major cities in Lebanon, certainly not in the heart of Beirut.
In my opinion, the Israeli decision to attack specifically in Beirut was not only due to its symbolism, but by choosing the target, Fuad Shukr, it tied both him and the organization as instigators of terrorism against the United States, due to his involvement in the severe attack on American Marines in Beirut in 1983.
Personally, I think Shukr should have been eliminated a few months ago in a quiet operation without an Israeli signature. The target of the response to the massacre of the children of Majdal Shams should have been a significant attack on one of Hezbollah’s strategic military sites, to be visible in Lebanon and the entire Arab world, similar to what Israel did against the Yemeni port of Hodeida a few weeks ago, as retaliation for the Houthis’ continues aggression, by air and by sea, against Israel.
Less than 24 hours later, the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran was reported. It is significant and symbolic that the assassination was carried out in Tehran and its timing, close to the inauguration ceremony of the new Iranian president. A few hours before his assassination, likely at a secure facility of the Revolutionary Guards, Haniyeh met personally with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. This certainly embarrasses the Iranian regime.
At this early stage of events, I assess that the response to both incidents will be limited, as none of the parties are interested in a full-scale war. The Iranians also need to prove that Israel, which did not take responsibility for Haniyeh’s assassination, is behind the attack in Tehran. It will be interesting to see what the reaction of Turkish President Erdogan, Haniyeh’s friend, will be.
It should also be emphasized the statement of General Lloyd Austin, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, that the United States will help Israel defend itself if a full-scale war breaks out with Lebanon. Not coincidentally, it was reported that the U.S. naval battle group in the Persian Gulf had improved its positions.

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Abstract

Since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has engaged in a war of attrition against Israel on the northern front, aiming to divert Israeli forces from Gaza. Despite both sides’ stated reluctance for full-scale war, recent escalations have heightened tensions. This report delves into the ongoing conflict, analyzing Hezbollah’s strategic objectives, operational constraints, and the broader geopolitical implications. Expert insights reveal that while Hezbollah was surprised by the timing of Hamas’s attack, its deeper coordination with Hamas and Iran underscores a complex and fragile regional dynamic. The report also examines Hezbollah’s response strategy, Iran’s strategic patience, and the critical juncture facing all involved parties, with the potential for either resolution or escalation into regional conflict.

Introduction

Since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has been engaged in an attrition war against Israel on the northern front. The organization’s primary goal has been to divert IDF forces to the north, thereby reducing their presence in the Gaza Strip conflict. In recent weeks, there are signs of escalation. While both sides clearly state that they do not want a war and understand the potential scope of a regional conflict, the situation has become very fragile.

The following analysis provides insight on the ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, focusing on recent escalations and their broader implications. By engaging with experts^[1], we aimed to understand the strategies, objectives, and fragility of the current situation.

Was Hezbollah Surprised by Hamas’s October 7^th attack?

In his speech on November 3, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah was caught off guard during the October 7 attack, attributing the incident solely to Hamas. “The remarkable and auspicious Al-Aqsa Flood Operation was entirely a product of Palestinian determination and execution, meticulously concealed from all, including the Gaza-based resistance factions, by its orchestrators. The operation’s unprecedented success was secured by the absolute secrecy surrounding it, which effectively leveraged the element of surprise.”^[2]

However, while Hezbollah and Iran may have lacked precise details about the operation’s exact timing, they cannot distance themselves from their active role in shaping the strategy, tactics, training, capabilities, and funding for the October 7th attack on Israel. One clear indication of this is the series of more than 20 meetings held between Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran throughout 2022-2023, which underscores the frequency and depth of their discussions on resistance actions and objectives, highlighting their coordinated efforts. 

The surprise likely lay in the timing of the attack, which also caught Hezbollah off guard. ICT experts estimate that Hezbollah had planned a similar attack through its Radwan Force with the intent of initiating a war with Israel.

Images: Hezbollah’s propaganda on Telegram: posters that emphasize its readiness to attack Israel northern border.

Why Hasn’t Hezbollah Engaged in a Full-Scale War on October 7th?

The primary reason Hezbollah did not engage in a full-scale war on October 7^th, is presumably due to the loss of the element of surprise, further undermined when Israel deployed substantial forces to the northern border with Lebanon. 

The Palestinians’ call for support and the necessity to demonstrate a presence led to a mutual understanding within Hezbollah and Iran: Hezbollah, along with other fronts such as the Houthis and the Shia militias in Iraq, must be involved in the conflict, even in a limited scope. Ultimately, this led to criticism within Hamas who advocated for more pro-active approach form their Shiite partners.

Since Hezbollah decided to join the military campaign against Israel, it has set a primary objective: to challenge the IDF in northern Israel and by that to reduce Israel’s military effort in Gaza and demonstrate what they perceive as “practical solidarity.”^[3]

Hezbollah officials have highlighted in many cases that the conflict in the north will end once the conflict with Hamas will ceases and Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip. They also emphasize this conflict as a broader holy religious war. Nasrallah described the battle as “a shining example of a holy struggle for the sake of Allah.”^[4] This is also highlighted when mentioning their fallen as martyrs “on the road to Jerusalem” which is presented in most of their propaganda as seen in the example below. 

Image: Telegram post by Hezbollah military media account. “Martyrs on the road to Jerusalem…”^[5]

In the operational sphere, Hezbollah held a significant asset before the conflict – the Radwan force stationed in the borders area with Israel, which included underground tunnels and observation posts for control. However, in eight months of limited conflict with Israel, they have lost this asset, making it more challenging for them to continue with their original plan to conquer the Galilee. Yet, they remain motivated after witnessing Hamas’s Nukhba success. In his speech on June 19, 2024, Nasrallah has highlighted that “the Israeli enemy fears that Hezbollah could invade Galilee. Hereby I say that this option is still on the table.”^[6]

Image: Picture from Hezbollah “Conquer the Galilee” Video.

What are Hezbollah’s Objectives and Strategy in the Current Conflict?

While Hezbollah continue to attack the north part of Israel, a central principle in its approach is maintaining a “response equation” to any Israeli offensive. This principle ensures that every Israeli attack is met with a measured and precise counterattack by Hezbollah, aiming to prevent broader escalation while maintaining control over the conflict. Within this framework, the organization has consistently targeted IDF military objectives. This response strategy is also emphasized in Nasrallah’s speeches. For instance, in his January 5th, 2024, speech, he stated, “The resistance targeted military objectives, officers, and soldiers, and any strikes on houses were responses to the enemy’s attacks on civilians”.^[7]

Hezbollah’s primary objectives are to divert forces from the war in Gaza and disrupt daily life in Israel without provoking a full-scale war with Lebanon. These goals have been partially achieved by evacuating the northern region of Israeli citizens and engaging Israeli forces in a limited conflict with minimal casualties.

To achieve these objectives, Hezbollah operates through a joint command center in Lebanon, where decisions are made in collaboration with senior figures in the resistance axis, both within Lebanon and Iran. 

Hezbollah is also continuously engaging in learning processes and adjusts its strategies accordingly. With this framework, Hezbollah employs various tactics, including various rockets (among them is the Burkan), anti-tank missiles (long range), Drones and other weaponry. The organization constantly evolves its operational patterns based on battlefield insights and situation assessments. For example, they have realized that drones can effectively bypass defense systems and reach their targets. Consequently, drones have become the weapon of choice in recent weeks.

Image: Hezbollah infographic marking 250 days of conflict.^[8]

It should be noted that, the mutual learning is constrained by the need to maintain secrecy. While the conflict persists, each side is careful not to reveal its secrets, ensuring that if the war escalates, they still hold strategic advantages. This applies to both defensive positions and offensive capabilities.

What are Hezbollah’s Constraints?

Hezbollah faces a complex set of constraints against its strong ideology. On one hand, the organization is committed to Shiite ideology and its allegiance to Iran. On the other hand, it must deal with internal pressure within Lebanon from both supporters and opponents to maintain political and social stability. 

In fact, Hezbollah’s status in Lebanon has been changing over the past years. They have constantly needed to explain their involvement with Iran and their military actions in Syria, which they tried to portray as efforts to “protect Lebanon against the Takfiris”. This has eventually led to a decrease in support from both the Shiite community and their political opponents. The 2020 Beirut explosion, which was blamed on the organization, and the recent economic crisis in Lebanon have further damaged their reputation. 

The recent conflict with Israel has also highlighted Lebanon’s complex sectarian nature and strengthened Hezbollah’s opposing bloc. This tension has been intensified by the damage in South Lebanon villages, further complicating the political landscape. Samir Geagea, leader of the Christian faction Lebanese Forces (LF) claimed that Hezbollah and Iran are leading Lebanon into dangerous territory and urged for diplomatic agreements with Israel: “If our goal is to protect southern Lebanon and Lebanese territory, then UN Resolution 1701 ensures this protection… the Lebanese army replaces Hezbollah in the south it would certainly secure the country.”^[9]

How Does Iran View the Situation?

For several years, Iran has been building the concept of a multi-front confrontation to surround Israel with enemies. Hezbollah is the central force in this strategy. However, currently, it seems that the goal is to keep sustained tension without reaching a full-scale escalation. This strategy focuses on strategic patience, aiming to maintain the current state without escalating the situation beyond its present level. This strategy is reflected in maintaining support for Hezbollah while limiting their actions. However, this does not diminish Iran’s ambition to eliminate Israel. Recently, Iran’s mission to the United Nations declared that if Israel initiates a “full-scale military aggression” in Lebanon against Hezbollah, it will result in an “obliterating war.”^[10]

What Could Bring About Escalation and What are the Challenges and Responses Needed from Israel?

We are approaching a critical juncture, recognized by decision-makers on both the Israeli, Lebanese, and Iranian sides, as well as in the international arena. There is a prevailing belief that Hezbollah and Israel, along with Lebanon, are nearing a decisive point. At this juncture, a choice will have to be made: to move towards an agreement or to engage in total war. If the path chosen is war, it has the potential to escalate into a regional conflict with unpredictable outcomes for all participants.

^[1] Dr. Eitan Azani, Dr. Amnon Sofrin, Col. (Res) Ronen Cohen, Dr. Michael Barak, Col (Res.) Miri Eisin, Mr. Tal Beeri. Ms. Daniel Haberfeld.

^[2] https://english.almanar.com.lb/1962919

^[3] https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/373211

^[4] https://english.almanar.com.lb/1962919

^[5] Telegram: الإعلام الحربي – التغطية الإخبارية

^[6] https://english.almanar.com.lb/2135927

^[7] https://english.almanar.com.lb/2018876

^[8] Telegram: الإعلام الحربي – التغطية الإخبارية

^[9] https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5033377-geagea-asharq-al-awsat-hezbollah-leading-lebanon-unknown-territory

^[10] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-un-mission-threatens-obliterating-war-if-israel-launches-lebanon-offensive/

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Over the past two years, Iran has developed a concept known as “unity of fronts,” under which Hezbollah, Hamas and other regional allies have pledged closer cooperation and mutual defense. Iran’s coordination with its regional proxies since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7 strongly suggests that the proxies are acting as part of an Iranian-organized strategic plan. Iran has denied involvement in planning the attack, but the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the slaughter in a televised address.

The Iranian decision on whether to expand the war in Gaza into a regional war will be influenced by two main factors: (1) The determination that Israel will demonstrate in the war in the Gaza Strip and its success in destroying Hamas infrastructure. (2) The level of threat that the US will create for Iran and its proxies. If the Biden administration hopes to prevent more fronts from opening, America’s threat to intervene has to be seen as credible by making clear, through words and deeds, that participation of Iran and its proxies in the conflict would elicit a strong U.S. response.

The post The War in Gaza From Local to Regional appeared first on ICT.

These incidents underscore the expanding threat posed by the Houthis and the potential for the Red Sea to become a new battleground in Iran’s proxy war against Israel. The pattern of attacks suggests a coordinated effort by Iran’s proxies, aligning with strategic actions since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023. Despite Iran’s official denials, the Supreme Leader’s public commendation of the attacks points to a tacit endorsement of these aggressive tactics. The situation highlights the growing concerns for Israel, Egypt, and the stability of the broader Middle East region.

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Given the continued intensification of the judicial overhaul to limit the justice system and law enforcement in Israel, along with the elimination of the “grounds of reasonableness,” one can expect a series of challenges – which are not a necessity but the product of political, sectoral, and personal whims – that are expected to negatively impact Israel’s National Security, restrict freedom of military action while providing ammunitions to those seeking evil (from terrorist organizations through state sponsors of terrorism to delegitimization organizations and international tribunals).

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