

The Barsalogho Massacre in Burkina Faso as a Mirror Image of the Security Deterioration in the Sahel

Dr. David Doukhan
September 2024

About the ICT

The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) is one of the leading academic institutes for counter-terrorism in the world. Using a multidisciplinary approach, the ICT work to facilitate international cooperation in the global struggle against terrorism.

As an independent think-do-tank, the ICT focuses on themes related to terrorism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, threat vulnerability, risk assessment, intelligence analysis, national security, and defense policy.

Serving as a joint forum for international policymakers and scholars, the ICT draws upon the experiences of a comprehensive and international network of individuals and organizations with unique expertise on terrorism and counter-terrorism research, public policy analysis and education.

In addition to publishing research papers, situation reports and academic publications for worldwide distribution, the ICT hosts a number of international seminars, workshops and conferences to discuss and educate followers on global and regional issues of security, defense, and public policy in order to better facilitate the exchange of perspectives, information and proposals for policy action.

Licensing & Distribution

ICT publications are published in an open-access format and are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License, which permits the non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

The Barsalogho Massacre in Burkina Faso as a Mirror Image of the Security Deterioration in the Sahel

Dr. David Doukhan

Abstract

This paper explores the massacre in Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, on August 24, 2024, orchestrated by the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). It details how JNIM exploited civilians forced by the Burkina Faso military to dig defensive trenches, only to become victims of a surprise attack. Bellingcat's investigation, which used satellite imagery, videos, and survivor testimonies, provides an in-depth account of the massacre, revealing that between 170 and 400 unarmed civilians were murdered, sparking accusations against the military for abandoning the predominantly Christian population. The paper discusses broader security challenges in the region, including the increasing dominance of Islamist groups, food insecurity, and the involvement of foreign actors like Russia through the Wagner Group. It further examines the implications for Burkina Faso's stability and the potential for dialogue or collective military action as solutions to the growing threat of Islamist militancy in the Sahel.

Keywords: Barsalogho Massacre; Burkina Faso; Al-Qaeda; Sahel security; Wagner Group; JNIM; Islamist terrorism.

Received: 15 September 2024 • Accepted: 15 September 2024.

The investigative website Bellingcat reveals that hundreds of civilians were murdered by an organization linked to Al Qaeda in a significant attack that took place on August 24, 2024, in Burkina Faso, in northwest Africa.¹

According to the website's revelation, which cross-referenced sources of information from satellite images, videos of the massacre, and testimonies of survivors, the massacre occurred as the local army forced the people to dig trenches to aid in the defense of Barsalogho town, a small town of 10,000 inhabitants, located 150 km from the capital Ouagadougou. According to the evidence, the army commanders stationed in the field forced the population to participate in the excavation work against their will. It is worthwhile to know that the JNIM (Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin) imposed a

¹ Barsalogho Massacre: How Defensive Trenches Became a Mass Grave. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2024/09/04/burkina-faso-barsalogho-massacre-attack-jihadi-militia-military-human-rights/?utm_source=twitter

Burkina Faso : comment Barsalogho a basculé dans l'horreur terroriste. <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1602774/politique/burkina-faso-comment-barsalogho-a-basculé-dans-lhorreur-terroriste/> ; <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/revue-de-presse-afrique/20240829-%C3%A0-la-une-retour-sur-le-drame-de-barsalogho>

siege on Barsalogho for almost two years.

As mentioned, the terrorist organization behind the attack is the JNIM, an organization affiliated with al-Qaeda, which also draws inspiration from the Islamic State organization. The organization maintains a permanent presence in parts of southeastern Mali and is also very active in Burkina Faso, where its men carried out the massacre.

According to Bellingcat's investigation, the Burkina Faso army, ruled by a military junta aligned with the Russian Axis, forced the residents of the town of Barsalogho to go out and dig protective trenches for its people. The residents who were busy digging trenches were unaware of the risk of an attack and were not armed.

The Islamist terrorists arrived in the town on motorcycles and pickup trucks (4X4) and found hundreds of residents outside the inhabited area busy digging. Three different videos showing the terrorists executing the residents and throwing the bodies into the trenches they dug were uploaded to social networks. Bellingcat investigators were able to locate the videos and verify the identities of some of the murderers. Two videos taken by the attackers and seen by Le Monde Afrique show piles of blood-soaked bodies lying in a ditch, surrounded by dozens of jihadists shooting, some executing the men who tried to escape, at point blank. Burkina Faso army soldiers appear to have withdrawn from the town to more protected positions near the road leading to the capital. The terrorists raided the houses of the town and executed many of its residents on the church grounds. The residents blame the army for abandoning them to their fate, among other things, due to being part of the Catholic Christian minority in the country.

The terrorist organization JNIM claims to have killed in action 300 'collaborators and aides to the army.' Still, a Bellingcat investigation revealed that the murderers were not armed and did not belong to any militia. According to various sources, between 170 and 400 people were murdered in the Barsalogho massacre, one of the worst committed in West Africa in recent years.

Despite the massacre and the abandonment of the residents by the army, it does not seem that the ruling military junta will be overthrown.

The ruler, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who made the fight against the radical Islamic terrorist groups a top priority, saw that he was powerless to stop the wave of violence that plagued Burkina Faso. This is despite the massive recruitment of volunteers and increased forced recruitment. The month of August 2024 was bloody. Specifically, on the 9th of the month, during which a convoy of military vehicles supplying Diapaga commune in the east of the country was attacked, more than 100 soldiers were killed in an ambush.² On the 25th of the month in Kounla commune, in the West of the country, about 30 people were massacred in the church.³

2 Massacre in Burkina. See the link: <https://international.la-croix.com/fr/monde/massacre-de-masse-au-burkina-le-bilan-salourdit-encore-des-centaines-de-morts>

3 Burkina Faso: 26 civilians killed in a terrorist attack in Kounla

The presence and violent activities of Islamist armed groups are increasingly affecting the Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, Est, Nord, and Sahel regions of Burkina Faso. However, the influence of such groups can also be seen in other parts of the country.

Since 2019, Burkina Faso has become the focus of violence by armed groups in the central Sahel region. These groups (Ansarul Islam, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara), sub-state, control almost 40% of the territory of Burkina Faso,⁴ which poses significant challenges to the ruling military junta and humanitarian aid operations. Food insecurity continues to increase due to several factors: lack of personal security, decreased agricultural production in some districts, inflation, and price increases. The food blockades of access roads and roads by the armed groups in about 26 cities restricted the movement of about 800,000 people and their access to basic services. From 2019 until the beginning of 2024, over two million people were displaced from their homes. It should be mentioned that the country also hosts close to 50,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Mali.

In 2014, when millions of Burkina Faso citizens ended the 27-year rule of Blaise Compaoré by forcing him to resign, observers and analysts called the event West Africa's version of the Arab Spring. The following year, continued protests across the country prompted an elite force to initiate a military coup against the interim government. When Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was elected president in the 2015 elections, hopeful crowds chanted: 'Nothing will ever be the way it was' (rien ne sera plus comme avant). They didn't know/ imagine what was going to happen.

What began as a rebellion in neighboring Mali by nomadic tribes, the Tuareg, who were marginalized in 2012, has spread to the entire Sahel region while taking advantage of deep rifts and tensions between communities and tribes. In areas that were under the control of various armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS, strict Sharia laws were enforced, which created state instability and civil insecurity.

In Burkina Faso, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is mainly present.

According to a UN report, almost 1 in every four people in Burkina Faso, a country of about 20 million people, needed emergency humanitarian assistance. An estimated 4.7 million people have been displaced due to insecurity.⁵

Recent data shows that Burkina Faso has replaced Mali as the epicenter of the Sahel crisis.⁶

<https://fr.africanews.com/2024/08/29/burkina-faso-26-civils-tues-dans-une-attaque-terroriste-a-kounla/>

4 See the link: <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/burkina-faso#>

5 See the link: https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230406_acaps_briefing_note_burkina_faso_conflict_induced_displacement.pdf

6 How Burkina Faso Became the Epicenter of Conflict in the Sahel. <https://acleddata.com/2022/03/11/how-burkina-faso-became-the-epicenter-of-conflict-in-the-sahel-al-jazeera/>

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the country leads in the statistics of attacks. For example, last year, a total of 1,315 incidents of organized political violence were recorded in Burkina, including attacks and violence against civilians. In comparison to the 2020 figures, this represents a double increase. The number of casualties exceeded that of Mali in the last three years. The level of activism of radical Islamic terrorism in Burkina Faso is not comparable to any of the neighboring countries - citing from the report: "The level of militancy [in Burkina Faso] is not comparable to any of the neighboring countries."

The military ruler of Mali, Assimi Goïta, who offered his neighbor assistance in the fight, said that nothing would harm their firm determination to continue the joint fight against terrorism in the region within the recently established 'Confederation of Sahel States.'

In June of this year, Mali sent a small military force backed by the mercenaries of the Wagner Force to Burkina Faso to help the faltering army of Burkina Faso in fighting against the spread of radical Islamic organizations.⁷

The Wagner Force continues to operate in several African countries on behalf of the Kremlin under the new name Africa Corps.⁸ The force is under the command of Andrey Nikolayevich Troshev alias Sedoi. President Putin made the appointment on July 14, 2023.⁹

After the elimination of international partnerships, led by France and the US in curbing the spread of Islamic organizations, it is clear now that most of the military initiatives

7 Soldats maliens et Wagner au Burkina Faso : solidarité ou ingérence? <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240620-soldats-maliens-et-wagner-au-burkina-faso-solidarit%C3%A9-ou-ing%C3%A9rence>

8 Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa>

In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was killed after his private plane crashed about an hour after takeoff from Moscow. Prigozhin has coordinated Russia's activities in Africa since the Wagner group, mercenaries, began operating on the continent in 2017. The group became famous for its ability to place paramilitary forces in combat centers around the world, in conducting disinformation campaigns and in supporting influential political leaders - often against the West.

After Yevgeny Prigozhin's death, the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African countries that business would continue as usual—meaning that unofficial Russian boots on the ground would continue to operate in those regions.

The group's activities in Africa are now under the direct supervision of the Russian Ministry of Defense. As part of the change, the Ministry of Defense changed its name to the 'Africa Corps' and the manpower they aim to reach is about 20,000.

The choice of name is an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation/obfuscation to cover what has been obvious for a long time, Russian mercenaries in Africa serving the Kremlin.

History shows that Africa serves as a profitable arena for mercenaries due to various factors that include, among others: The high incidence of low-intensity conflicts which reduces the risks to the lives of mercenaries compared to full-scale wars like in Ukraine.

The continent's abundant natural resources that are ripe for exploitation.

Persistent political instability that allows mercenaries to act in violation of international law with relative impunity.

9 Andrei Troshev: who is Wagner mercenary Putin wants to replace Prigozhin? <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-veteran-mercenary-that-putin-proposed-command-wagner-2023-07-14/>

taken by the Sahel countries have failed in achieving their primary goal, to prevent the further spread of radical Islam and its establishment in their countries.

The rivalry and violence between the Islamic groups, based on their affiliation with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, was supposed to weaken and facilitate the work of the armies in curbing their expansion and reducing their capabilities. In practice, ignoring the political rationale behind the struggle of certain Islamic/separatist groups has made it difficult to determine the political goals that the military intervention should achieve. In other words, combat operations are supposed to serve political goals for the short and long term together; in their absence, war has no purpose. Furthermore, the countries of the Sahel region have also been affected by other crises such as drought, climate changes, local and regional emissions problems, the activity of criminal gangs, the involvement of foreign actors with a clear interest in the country's resources, etc.

The international players, mainly France and the USA, were thrown out of the arena and, in their place, entered at the invitation of the local rulers, Russia. It does so through the 'Wagner Force'/Africa Corps while intensifying the resentment and hostility towards the Western countries through social media, organizing massive demonstrations, and vigorous activity on social networks. The West is accused of neo-colonialism. The reliance on the establishment of regional advisory alliances and partnerships on behalf of Russia proved to be a bluff as the spread of radical organizations and terrorist attacks only intensified.

The Sahel nations that are becoming entangled in the extremist Islamic quagmire need to change course. They need Western aid. On the other hand, if it is renewed in the future, Western aid must learn and conclude its past failures. These failures resulted, among other things, from double entendre (supporting dictatorial regimes, nepotism, and encouraging corruption), misunderstanding the importance of the social fabric and local traditions, respecting state sovereignty, and a host of other vital parameters.

It seems that the countries of the Sahel have recognized that their security destinies are intertwined and that a collective approach to security threats is required. This reality led to the formation of the 'Alliance of Sahel States (AES - Alliance of Sahel States) in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, countries ruled by military junta. The problem is that this state alliance is reluctant to cooperate with local bodies on the continent and Western elements demanding the return of democracy. For example, comprehensive cooperation between the AES and the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) operating against the Boko Haram organization and the ISWAP (the branch of the Islamic State in West Africa) in Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, and around the Lake Chad region, is necessary to create a military alternative/option to address the insecurity in this region and the Sahel.

Furthermore, coordinated and collective approaches by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States) are needed to respond to dynamic security threats effectively - but the opposition to the military regimes in the Sahel countries is effectively eroding the war

against the spread of radical Islam benefits the radical organizations.

Negotiations between the warring parties in the Sahel are also a possible political solution to the insecurity in the region. France strongly opposed this, and because of this, African leaders rose against her and rejoiced against her tough stance on the issue. The fact is that a decade of extensive military operations did not resolve the crisis in the Sahel.

From here, the inevitable question arises: can dialogue with the jihadists help in bringing peace or lowering the height of the flames?

As a rule, there is rarely a winner or a loser in today's complex wars. The longer the armed conflicts continue and gain intensity, the more they lose popularity. Financing at the taxpayer's expense and the number of losses in property and life become problematic. The fight against the spread of radical Islamic terrorism is no different.

The complexity of the fight against Islamic terrorism, its changing nature, and the severity of its consequences make it the internal dialogue, a tool in the state's toolbox in everything related to policy and strategic thinking.

As mentioned, one of the tools in that box, and not as a separate goal per se, is a call for internal dialogue and reconciliation between the warring parties within the country. Such a call was made in all Sahel countries struggling with the spread of radical Islamic organizations. The call was addressed to all the actors involved in the armed conflicts in the Sahel, including armed movements and rebel groups active in other countries, mainly in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

The leaders of the Sahel countries realized that despite the military aid of France, the USA, and other Western countries, Islamic terrorism cannot be defeated and that national reconciliation is a reasonable possibility. Dialogue with the rebels is essential, as mentioned, despite strong opposition from France in the past when its forces were at the forefront of the struggle. Everyone knows and is aware because dealing with the rising Islamic terrorism requires the application of multidimensional strategic and tactical approaches. Beyond using military force, dialogue and negotiations must be encouraged.

Between 1994 and 2004, Niger declared a ceasefire and signed an agreement between the warring parties in the country. Algeria and mediators from Burkina Faso mediated the agreement.¹⁰ In 2021, there were allegedly secret peace talks between the Burkina Faso government and the jihadists, which led to a fragile jihadist ceasefire. In 2015, a peace agreement was signed between the Malian government and the 'Coordination of Azawad Movements' (CMA), a coalition primarily composed of Tuareg rebels in the

¹⁰ In Niger, the authorities negotiate with the rebels of the FPL. <https://www.dw.com/fr/niger-fpl-n%C3%A9gociations/a-69987724>

northern region of Mali.¹¹ The goal of the peace agreement signed in 2015 was to promote a political settlement between the Malian government and the fighters of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).

The agreement broke the status quo between the elected government and the rebel groups and caused a renewal of the political process to resolve the conflict through negotiations.

On February 25, 2022, the President of Niger, Mohammed Bazoum, announced that he had released nine terrorists from prison to open a dialogue with the groups to which they belonged. Bazoum, who was ousted in a military coup on July 26, 2023, is not the first leader in the Sahel to test the option of dialogue with the rebels.

The former prime minister of Mali, Mokhtar Ouane, said: "More and more voices are rising in Mali and calling for dialogue with our brothers who have joined radical groups."¹² President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta did so, as did former Prime Minister of Burkina Faso Christophe Dabiré.¹³

In Mali, successive national discussions have reached a certain consensus on the need for dialogue with the jihadists. In December 2021, talks were announced but later postponed. A few months earlier, discreet negotiations with violent extremists temporarily reduced the pressure on the terrorist organizations JNIM and Ansar ul Islam stemming from the organization's February 2022 siege on the town of Djibo in Burkina Faso.¹⁴

At the beginning of February 2022, a 'peace conference' (la Conférence pour la paix dans le monde) was held in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania,¹⁵ with the participation

11 The comprehensive national dialogue in Mali, which was held in December 2019, in its conclusions, it is possible to emphasize the need to conduct a political dialogue with two leaders of al-Qaeda in the Sahel: Iyad Ag Ghaly, the emir of the JNIM, and one of his deputies, Hamadou Kouffa, a figure Fulani community, Emir 'Katiba Macina' and responsible for the expansion of the rebellion in the south of the country. In response, Iyad Ag Ghaly, but also his superior, the former emir of AQIM, Abd Malek Droukdel, announced publicly, as early as March 2020, their availability for dialogue, but they conditioned it on the departure of foreign military forces from the country. Droukdel was liquidated in June 2020.

12 In 2019, during negotiations called 'Dialogue inter-Maliens pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale' (Dialogue inter-Maliens pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale), key national figures met, mainly the then president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, the proposal for national reconciliation was again put on the table. Keita publicly admitted for the first time in 2019 that the government had made direct contact with Ag- Ghaly and Kouffa. Keita was ousted in August 2020, but the national negotiations following the coup as an idea of dialogue with violent groups at the national and local levels were preserved.

13 Réconciliation nationale: The Prime Minister launched the communal consultations. https://www.matd.gov.bf/accueil/actualites/details?tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=417&cHash=cc19966ecd6d1afebd08070c0e14dcb5

14 Siege of Djibo in Burkina Faso is a potential humanitarian disaster. <https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/04/siege-of-djibo-in-burkina-faso-is-a-potential-humanitarian-disaster/>

15 Nouakchott hosts the Conférence pour la paix dans le monde. <https://www.voaafrrique.com/a/nouakchott-abrite-la-conf%C3%A9rence-pour-la-paix-dans-le-monde/6435339.html>

of the heads of state of Mauritania and Niger. The conference was intended to fight traditional and religious leaders and discuss how to counter violent extremism. Mauritania's commitment to promoting this approach is based on its experience, which may inspire other countries in the Sahel.

Mauritania's experience, at the end of 2009, and after several years of deadly terrorist attacks and limited results from military responses, the Mauritanian authorities decided to deal with the causes of religious extremism in their country. They conducted an ideological dialogue with 70 jihadist detainees to understand the reasons for radicalization to reintegrate them into society. Another goal was the need to deter others from joining violent extremist groups.

Beginning in January 2010, after two weeks of discussions led by respected and well-known religious dignitaries at the invitation of the Mauritanian government, a consensus was reached on the non-violent ideal of jihad. As a result of these discussions, 47 (67%) of the detainees pledged to lay down their weapons and renounce radical ideas. They received presidential pardons or reduced sentences and access to grants to help them reintegrate economically and socially.¹⁶

The dialogue also had a broader social goal to stop the Salafist jihad from taking root in the country. This ideology advocates violence to impose a purist form of Islam. Mauritania's strategy to prevent radicalization also included vocational training for 'converts,' the students of the 'madrasas,' to help them exit and integrate into the labor market. This drastically reduced the recruitment of young people into jihadist groups and contributed to the successful multi-pronged approach that has prevented terrorist attacks since 2011.

The lessons of Mauritania also include some shortcomings, such as the cases where fighters/terrorists returned to the pattern of violence and moved to neighboring countries.

For the Sahel countries, this means that dialogue with jihadists requires a coordinated approach to avoid a displacement effect that could divert the problem of terrorism throughout the region. This is a considerable challenge since each country limits the dialogue offered to its citizens, and policy decisions are made in response to unique national dynamics.

In Mali, as is known, the military junta put an end to the agreement signed between the government and the rebels, an agreement known as the 'Algiers Accords' from 2015, while accusing other parties of not complying with the terms of the agreement, including Algeria, which Mali accuses of 'Taking unfriendly actions', the parties have been immersed in fighting ever since.¹⁷

16 Dialogue with jihadists: Mauritania offers lessons for the Sahel. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/dialogue-with-jihadists-mauritania-offers-lessons-for-the-sahel>

17 In June 2015, the agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali was signed, resulting from the process of peace

Nevertheless, the peace agreement can be replicated in other countries in the Sahel. For this purpose, political resolve/determination is needed, as well as the readiness to put it into practice as written.

On July 16, 2023, the head of the National State Security Agency (ANSE), Colonel Modibo Koné, visited Kidal, the former rebel stronghold, for a few hours.¹⁸ The latter spoke behind closed doors with members of the CMA (Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad). The meeting confirmed the assertion that Modibo Koné is now the contact man of President Assimi Goïta, who is looking for a way out of the conflict through an internal dialogue.

During this meeting, which took place without the presence of the media, the head of the National Security Agency of Mali gave several commitments and expressed the good faith of the Malian authorities regarding the stagnation of the situation. Koné's visit enabled the settlement of the CMA compensations suspended since January 2023 and the release of the CMA prisoners, including the nephew of the Secretary General of the 'Coordination of the Movements of Azawad.' This release was one of the conditions of the CMA before any meeting to end the impending crisis. This gesture implies the beginning of dialogue and even understanding between these signatory groups.¹⁹

The Sahel area illustrates some of the main political trends that characterize the development of the fight against Islamic terrorism in unstable regions prone to disasters and conflicts. The involvement of sophisticated and advanced foreign forces has no real ability to stop/prevent the spread of radical Islam in the Sahel. The Sahel reminds us that the fight against terrorism, in general, and radical Islam, in particular, is a sensitive field of action in which the political aspect is not absent. Therefore, to succeed in drastically reducing terrorism and instability in the region, the possible and effective alternative to effective actions against the spread of Islamic terrorism, in my opinion, is in the form of military cooperation between the AES and the MNJTF, the leadership of the AU/ECOWAS - as necessary, as well as the solution of the dialogue the internal alongside the policy and political options.

The deterioration of the security situation on the African continent, along with the crushing of democracy in several countries through military coups and the removal of the military forces of the West and the reduction of cooperation with them, as an advisory and assisting factor in curbing the spread of radical Islam, and the introduction

talks in Algeria, between the government of Mali and the armed groups in the north of the country. The agreement mainly stipulated the restoration of peace in Mali through continued decentralization (known as 'regionalization'), the creation of a reconstituted army incorporating the former signed armed groups, and specific economic development measures in the north of the country, all supported by an effort of dialogue, justice and national reconciliation.

18 Reprise de dialogue entre le gouvernement et les ex-rebelles : Modibo Koné, le nouvel interlocuteur d'Assimi Goïta auprès de la CMA? https://www.maliweb.net/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/reprise-de-dialogue-entre-le-gouvernement-et-les-ex-rebelles-modibo-kone-le-nouvel-interlocuteur-dassimi-goita-aupres-de-la-cma-3030149.html#google_vignette

19 Nord du Mali : revenir au dialogue. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/sahel/mali/314-nord-du-mali-revenir-au-dialogue>

of Russia in its place, conveys to the world that the danger of the collapse of more states on the African continent is closer than ever, a collapse that has clear and immediate consequences for the West and especially for European countries. The transition of countries in Africa to the category of 'failed countries' may have a 'domino effect' at the global regional and geo-strategic level that will be expressed in waves of refugees fleeing and seeking shelter, food, and security in neighboring countries, already failed, in countless attempts to immigrate to the already flooded European countries in waves of refugees from Africa, from Syria and Iraq and suffering from the strengthening of radical Islamic elements in their territory, as well as from the open struggle, across continents and oceans, between the USA and Russia and China for global hegemony.