Abstract

This paper investigates the decline of France’s colonial influence in Africa, focusing on its extensive military involvement in the Sahel from the late 2000s through operations such as Sabre, Serval, Épervier, Takuba, and Barkhane. Despite initial optimism, France’s intervention aimed at combating radical Islamic terrorism and stabilizing the region ultimately led to deteriorating security conditions and a flourishing of extremist groups. The growing disillusionment among African nations, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, culminated in the expulsion of French forces after a series of military coups. Key insights from the book “De l’huile sur le feu: La France et la guerre contre le terrorisme en Afrique” highlight the strategic errors, such as the controversial use of armed drones and support for corrupt regimes, that contributed to the failure of these operations. The book also emphasizes how France’s actions were perceived as neo-colonial, exacerbating local tensions and jihadist recruitment, and undermining regional stability. This study explores the broader implications of France’s declining influence, including the rise of anti-French sentiment, the growing presence of Russian and Chinese interests in Africa, and the impact on France’s geopolitical standing. The paper argues for a reevaluation of France’s approach to its former colonies, advocating for a more equitable, respectful, and transparent engagement that aligns with the aspirations and sovereignty of African nations. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for shaping the future of Franco-African relations and addressing the complex challenges of contemporary geopolitics in the region.

Introduction

In the late 2000s, France launched a ‘war on radical Islamic terrorism’ in the Sahel with the aim of saving the countries from the radical Islamic threat. The war began with operations Sabre, and Serval and Épervier and ended with operations Takuba and Barkhane. It was the longest, most expensive and deepest military involvement of the French army since the Algerian war (1 November 1954 – 19 March 1962). 

The involvement of the French force promised much. Many in the Black Continent and in France believed that the force had the power to eradicate the extremist Islamic organizations, restore security to the residents and stabilize the government in the Sahel countries. Despite the military and technological superiority, the situation on the ground only worsened, security was not achieved, and the radical organizations prospered and flourished to the point of frustration and disappointment with the performance of the military force in African countries and France. The Sahel countries saw France and its Western partners as directly responsible for the cumulative failure and insecurity.^[1]

A recently released book, De l’huile sur le feu: La France et la guerre contre le terrorisme en Afrique (lightly translated: adding fuel to the fire – France’s war against terrorism in Africa),^[2]  highlights the French participation in the Sahel and the primary causes of the military setback that resulted in French withdrawal from those countries. I think it’s appropriate to insist on some of the book’s insights.

The book outlines the history of French military involvement by highlighting its methods and effects, most of which are unknown: the use of armed drones, reconstruction against the rebels, mistakes that were systematically denied, aid and support in the development of tools and military equipment for corrupt, clearly undemocratic regimes. In order to end the French army’s presence in the Sahel and all military intervention in Africa, it is important to emphasize that the author’s goal in carefully examining the ten years of operations conducted there was to raise awareness of the dire circumstances there.

According to the author, Operation Barkhane was a colossal failure that led to the expulsion and removal of the French army from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger after a series of military coups. Among the reasons that caused the most damage to France is: the use and assistance of the Tuareg tribes as auxiliaries and partners, who took advantage of the opportunity to gain points and a relative advantage against other local communities, to push them into the arms of the Islamic Jihad,^[3] or even the French categorical refusal to allow the Sahel countries to open negotiations to end hostilities with certain Islamist rebel groups, while violating their sovereignty. The security approach exacerbated the lack of food security, strengthened the social and identity gap on which jihad groups thrive, and allowed the latter to radicalize their ideology and means of action without slowing down their progress.^[4] Operation Barkhane was seen as another post-colonial shipping force to protect real economic interests of France. As this war was fought with little to no democratic oversight, France bears the primary blame for the secession. In light of the circumstances on the ground and the body of accumulating information, no public evaluation of this bankruptcy—which the French authorities still contest—was made. 

A Brief Historical Overview

Between January 2013, the date of the start of Operation Sarval in Mali, and November 2022, the end of Operation Barkhane (in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad), jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (ISIS) considerably expanded their geographic presence and their control over the local populations.

From northern Mali, the French military presence moved to central Mali, then Niger and Burkina Faso. The border areas of the Gulf of Guinea countries are under attack today, as well as terrorist attacks in the Ivory Coast, Benin, and Togo. If we add the multitude of non-jihadist armed groups (criminal organizations, arms dealers, drug dealers and smugglers), the situation is catastrophic and the number of victims among the citizens continues to grow and with it personal and economic insecurity.

For a long time, the French army and the authorities in France denied the deterioration of the security situation. They tended to explain that Operation Barkhane was intended to limit the damage.^[5] Indeed, the French military force severely hit the Islamist organizations mainly by ‘beheading’, i.e. targeted elimination/neutralization of leaders and commanders along with the killing of thousands of fighters from the various organizations. In fact, in these killing operations, the French army deepened the rift and the internal crisis and indirectly caused the radical groups to intensify the recruitment of fighters into their ranks.

In the Sahel, the French government, led by President Emmanuel Macron, acted in a paternalistic and rude manner. Supporting corrupt, unpopular, and occasionally illegitimate and discredited regimes with broad support or by implementing certain forms of “aid” that had the opposite effect on large segments of the population and opposition parties, effectively providing a windfall for the jihadists.

France regularly vetoed the search for a political solution in the form of negotiations with certain jihadist figures, when it seemed possible to return them to the normal political game. This was the wish expressed several times by society and politicians in Mali. The French refusal to allow internal negotiations and the possibility of national reconciliation, results in France being seen as directly responsible for the continuation of the fighting.

As in the American case, the weight of the ‘arms manufacturers’ lobby’ in France on the war effort is evident. According to the author, ‘military operations in Africa’ are important for the French military and military industry.

It is possible that this is one of the factors that explain France’s entry into the war in Mali and the Sahel. But it is not the only one and is not specific to the military operations that took place. The French army believes that an army ‘wears out’ if it is not used: it is necessary to train in real conditions to maintain a high level of competence and command. The French military believes it has an historical responsibility and ‘knowledge’ handed down from the colonial and neo-colonial periods, to maintain order and stability in its former colonies.

Several schools of thought within the French political class share these ideas. There are others who think that despite France’s economic might declining, the country may still maintain its ‘status’, leadership in the international community, and dominance in Europe by continuing its military presence in Africa.

Finally, French military actions in Africa are crucial to France’s ability to remain a top player among the nations that export the most weapons of mass destruction. Not because African countries affected by military interventions are big customers, but because the label is ‘Combat Proven’. It is a very important condition, even essential, for the sale of new equipment. For example, without the wars in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in 2013, France probably would not have succeeded in opening the export of Dassault Aviation’s Rafale aircraft.

According to the book, the French army’s war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a greater number of civilian casualties—considered collateral damage—than it did in the Sahel.

Yet they were the subject of an almost systematic concealment. The French military has a long tradition of ‘impunity’ in Africa. Whether it’s this boy killed by special forces in 2016, Malian soldiers killed while being held hostage in 2017, or this bombed wedding in Bounty, northern Mali in 2021, France has always maintained that it was only jihadists who were neutralized and sees the accusations as part from ‘Information War’.^[6]

The case of the Bounty is a prime example: the French army’s version was preserved, and supported by French members of parliament, even after the UN published a very comprehensive investigative report which completely discredited the French version. This report also questioned the targeting procedures of the French military in relation to international law, as France, like the US, conducts bombings based on a set of clues rather than actual identification fighters.

In Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal, they openly visit the French state and demand the departure of the French soldiers who, on patrols, were also seen engaging in alleged ‘police activities’ (searching people and houses, tearing up mattresses, interrogations, taking fingerprints and DNA, confiscating suspicious phones or motorcycles etc.), which is perceived by the public as evidence that the French African strategy of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local populations is only an illusion.

Monitoring the situation from a distance, through the ‘headlines’ produced by the French media, one gets the impression of the loss of French influence in Africa, or even the end of Françafrique.^[7] For over a century, beginning with colonial rule, and continuing through its political and economic network, France saw most of Africa as its domain; its geopolitical impact. African governments were installed and removed at the behest of France either through the operations of the intelligence services or through military intervention. Meanwhile, French companies dominated large areas of African economies, often devoted to the extraction and transportation of natural resources for Western industries. This pattern, known as Françafrique was the basis of political, economic and military power.

Is This Really the Case?

France is still massively present in Chad, where it supported the nepotism of the dynasty of the dictator Idriss Déby and his son as president (Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno), despite the massacres of the regime’s opponents.

There are still French military outposts in Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, and the Ivory Coast. France continues to retain substantial security collaboration (cooperation) with various public, Para public, and private entities. The public’s animosity for the French military is growing, and the military wants to be more covert.

France’s position in Africa has been severely damaged in recent years. An anti-French wave swept through some of the Sahel countries, a wave that removed the French military presence from those countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) and tore a deep rift in the countries’ bilateral relations with the former colonial power France. The vacuum left by France was quickly filled by Russia through the activation of the para-military company ‘Wagner force’. In those countries, the anti-neo-colonialism wave did not overlook the American military presence, which was also eliminated. ^[8] The US has struggled to maintain relations with African countries amid its growing ties to Russia and China.

Some African countries have expressed frustration with the US for ‘forcing issues’, such as democracy and human rights, which many see as hypocritical, given the US’s close ties to some autocratic leaders elsewhere. Russia, compared to the US, offers extensive security assistance without interfering in politics (without harming sovereignty), while strengthening local anti-colonial/Western sentiment, making it an attractive partner for military juntas who have seized power in places like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

France has several military bases in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Chad and Gabon. Rethinking the involvement in the Black Continent brings the decision makers in France to the need to reorganize and reduce the military force except in Djibouti.^[9]

The reduction of the military presence in West and Central Africa to a few hundred people is a new construction within the framework of renewed and discreet partnerships announced by President Emmanuel Macron after a long series of bitter disappointments in the Sahel countries. In order to meet the legitimate goals of these countries, France seeks to strengthen its cooperation with them while maintaining a less conspicuous presence and maintaining access to resources, personnel, and materials.

In principle, France will keep only about 100 soldiers in Gabon (compared to 350 today), about 100 in Senegal (compared to 350), about 100 in the Ivory Coast (currently 600) and about 300 in Chad (currently 1,000).

It is important to consider that these decisions might alter if France undergoes a political upheaval following the most recent National Assembly elections.

Factually, this is a huge and historic decline. Until two years ago, in addition to about 1,600 troops pre-positioned in West Africa and Gabon, the former colonial power had more than 5,000 soldiers in the Sahel as part of the operation against the spread of the Barkhane jihadist organizations but the juntas that came to power in Mali (2022), Burkina Faso and Niger (2023), pushed the feet of the French mainly in favor of the new Russian partner.^[10]

Chad is the last country in the Sahel to host French soldiers on its territory. But, between the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Niger, Chad is now surrounded by countries that welcome and host, in various capacities, Russian paramilitary forces as a result of the reorganization of the Wagner group of Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was killed in a plane crash mysterious in August 2023.

In light of the situation, the French army does not rule out ‘uniting’ its bases with forces from the US or other European countries. The main defeat for this ambition is that the active war days of the French forces, which will be mainly engaged in providing intelligence, logistical and instructional assistance to the African forces, are over.

The other tools of Françafrique’s influence, intervention or control have not disappeared either, whether official or unofficial such as: soft power, French language, academia, the CFA franc currency, debt management, public development aid, various forms of cooperation, networks of certain companies, corruption.

In conclusion, the complete independence of the former French colonies will not come from the goodwill of the French authorities. It will only result from the mobilizations of the Africans themselves, and of French citizens against France’s policy in Africa which is carried out in their name without a real informed democratic debate.

The rejection of French policy in Africa is becoming more and more prominent, from Mali to Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia. These sentiments are not just rhetoric; they reflect a growing frustration with symbolic and tangible aspects of French influence, from colonial heritage to present-day policies, trade relations and military presence. The events in the Sahel and the wider ‘anti-French’ sentiments in Africa serve as a wake-up call for France to reassess its relations with its former colonies, to reorient its policies in a way that truly benefits the people of Africa and respects their sovereignty and aspirations. The situation highlights the urgent need for a more equitable, respectful and transparent approach to France’s involvement with its African partners.

As a researcher, I have no doubt, the insights from the book are instructive, enriching and stimulate the need for rethinking the subject.

The deterioration of France’s position in Africa stems from a combination of several factors, chief among them is the French military presence which was perceived as neo-colonialism (the concept of authoritarianism) and the complete disconnection from the national aspirations of the local population, the economic competition with China (China has become a major economic player in West Africa in recent years, it invests in projects of development and offers its own political and economic solutions to West African countries that allow China to establish its influence in the region, at the expense of France)^[11] and a lack of adaptation to the new challenges of the region in light of the dynamic developments and their consequences – France remained fixed in concepts whose time has passed and suffered from a lack of foresight. France still believed it was in the Cold War era, acting as ‘Africa’s policeman’, it did not see the globalization of Africa coming and continued to believe it was at home there.

 In my opinion, only a renewed in-depth analysis and in-depth understanding of these factors, which are essential for formulating policies and long-term development solutions adapted to the current situation, will, in some way, keep France relevant in West Africa with effective levers of influence. France’s loss of credibility in Africa is not only a problem for the Franco-African relationship. Considering its implications beyond Africa, the loss of influence threatens France’s position. The erosion of its image could affect its role in the European Union. Marginalization could result, weakening France’s voice on key international issues.

^[1] Five African countries participated in the French military force: Chad (where the command of the French military force is located), Mali (where the largest forces are present), Niger (where an air intelligence base was established), Burkina Faso (where the headquarters of the Special Operations Command), and Mauritania.

^[2] Raphaël Granvaud, De l’huile sur le feu. France and the war against terrorism in Africa

Éditions Lux, 2024, Montréal, 2024.

^[3] A phenomenon somewhat reminiscent of Israel’s reliance on the Christian phalanxes in Lebanon in the 80s of the 20th centuries and the demoralization that followed.

^[4] These harmful effects were further reinforced by foreign intervention associated with the French and international military presence. A similar case was observed after the Western interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Somalia in 2007, which strengthened the jihadist groups al-Taliban and al-Shabab, in addition to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq following the second American intervention in 2003. The French military presence served as a breeding ground for the propaganda of jihadist groups, who painted themselves as ‘resistance fighters’ against an ‘occupying army’, which was further strengthened by France’s support for authoritarian regimes.

^[5] Operation Barkhane receives minimal media coverage and almost no political discussion in France, as is often the case when it comes to overseas operations OPEX- Les opérations militaires extérieures de la France)) under the Fifth Republic.

^[6] UN investigation concludes French military airstrike killed Mali civilians

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088722

^[7] Françafrique – in international relations, France’s sphere of influence (pré carré – ‘backyard’) over former French colonies and also French-speaking Belgians in sub-Saharan Africa. The term is derived from the phrase France-Africa, which the first president of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, used in 1955 to describe his country’s close ties with France. This name was later pejoratively changed by Francois-Xavier Verschave (Verschave) in 1998 to criticize the allegedly corrupt and secretive activities of various Franco-African political, economic and military networks, also defined as French neocolonialism.

^[8] The US has been ordered to remove/evacuate its 1,000 troops stationed in Niger following the July 2023 coup and also about 75 troops from Chad. These troop cuts, which disabled a critical US counter-terrorism and drone base in Agadez, are hurting the gathering the intelligence in Niger, which is so essential in the war, Russian paramilitary forces entered the base after the American evacuation.

Niger moves to expel US forces from West African airbase

https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/niger-moves-to-expel-us-forces-from-west-african-airbase/157416.article

On the entry of the Russians into the base, see:

Russian troops enter base housing US military in Niger, US official says

https://www.voanews.com/a/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-in-niger-us-official-says-/7596313.html

^[9] En Afrique, décrue historique en vue pour l’armée française

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/06/17/en-afrique-decrue-historique-en-vue-pour-l-armee-francaise_6240888_3212.html

France to reduce troops in West and Central Africa to 600, say sources

https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240617-france-reduce-military-footprint-west-and-central-africa-600-troops-say-sources

https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20240618-france-to-reduce-military-presence-in-west-and-central-africa

The French base in Djibouti, which hosts 1,500 French soldiers, is not affected by the reduction of the military presence on the continent. France wants to maintain a strategic support point in this small country located opposite Yemen, at the exit of the Red Sea, in the Bab al-Mandab strait where a large part of world trade passes between Asia and the West.

^[10] Between 2013 and 2022, French military forces were involved in the Sahel as part of operations Serval (2013-2014) and Barkhane (2013-2022) alongside its local partners. France prevented the collapse of Mali, contributed to the rehabilitation of Mali’s armed forces and promoted the development and stabilization of the country. In the countries of the Sahel region, the French system responded to their needs to fight together against the threatening and spreading Islamic terrorism.

In 2013, a French military force was hastily deployed in Mali, at the request of the Malian authorities, in order to stop the attack of armed terrorist groups that were rapidly moving towards the capital city of Macao. France’s direct intervention prevented the collapse of the country and the takeover of the country by jihadist groups.

France then resolutely committed to the fight against armed terrorist groups in support of the armed forces of the Sahel countries whose restructuring and consolidation it supported, with the European Union and the international community. The UN mission (MINUSMA) ensured the protection of local populations and worked for the political settlement of the crisis in Mali.

During the year 2022, the necessary conditions for the continuation of French military involvement alongside Malian forces were no longer met. As a result, the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron announced on February 17, 2022, in agreement and in coordination with the African and European partners, the redefinition of the Barkan force missions outside the territory of Mali. This maneuver ended with the handover of Gao base on August 15, 2022. The President of the Republic made the decision to end Operation Barkhane in the Sahel during his speech on November 9, 2022.

^[11] The Chinese control around 20% of the economy of the former French province representing French-speaking Africa, while France represents only 4.2%.

The post The Decline of the Colonial Empire: France’s Declining Position in Africa appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

This paper addresses the deteriorating internal security situation in Burkina Faso, attributed to escalating attacks by radical Islamic organizations across several regions. It traces the crisis’s roots to political instability following the 2014 ousting of President Blaise Compaoré and the spread of jihadist influence from neighboring Mali. The analysis highlights how jihadist groups have gained local support by providing essential services and imposing strict Sharia laws, creating a complex socio-economic and security dilemma for the local population.

The study examines the Burkinabe state’s military response, including controversial tactics and the establishment of paramilitary militias, and their impact on civilians. It also covers the humanitarian crisis, marked by significant displacement and the urgent need for assistance, amidst the backdrop of increasing terrorist attacks and a complex attribution of responsibility.

Concluding with an overview of regional implications, particularly the Liptako-Gourma Treaty among Sahel countries, the paper underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism and humanitarian support. It aims to provide insight into Burkina Faso’s security challenges, offering perspectives on potential solutions in the Sahel’s broader geopolitical and humanitarian landscape.

Introduction

The internal security situation in Burkina Faso is deteriorating, mainly in the Sahel, Center-North, North Boucle du Mouhoun, and Eastern regions. Attacks by radical Islamic organizations have become a frightening and bloody routine.

Burkina Faso, which means literally: ‘the country of honest/honest men’ (pays des hommes intégrés),^[1] is facing a very serious security internal crisis, like many of its neighbors, when Islamic armed groups conduct terrorist campaigns and kidnap people in its territory. It is noteworthy that about 40% of its territory is occupied by the Jihadists who imposed, in the territories they conquered, the strict Sharia laws on the local population.^[2]

The local population (about 24 million people) is ‘trapped’ between jihadist Islamic groups operating in the north and east and the military power of the country headed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré after he staged a military coup in September 2022.^[3]

The jihadist groups active in Burkina Faso are Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal al-Muslimin (JNIM Support Group for Islam and Muslims) and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS).

Historical Background

Burkina Faso is at the heart of a tremendous storm – between political/social disintegration and an unprecedented security disintegration. The country is now suffering from the jihadist virus, a plague that spread to it from neighboring Mali in 2012. It seems that the merciless fight against the extremist Islamic movements is a long-term struggle.

What are the Factors Behind the Situation?

2014 represents a turning point in the history of Burkina Faso. Blaise Compaoré, then the country’s president, announced, after 27 years in power, a constitutional reform project that would give him 15 more years as head of state (a very common phenomenon in Africa). Public protest for constitutional reform was not long in coming, and he was ousted on October 30, 2014, after three days of violent protests. Behind the victory of the public hid the specter of predicted uncertainty and instability – what will happen next? Alongside the country’s supreme judiciary, President Compaoré has established himself as a key player in negotiations and a mediator in West Africa. In the case of the 2012-2013 crisis in Mali, Compaoré positioned himself as the main interlocutor/mediator of Mali’s Tuareg communities and of certain jihadist groups (including Ansar al-Din Dayan and Iyad Ag Ghaly).

This situation motivated/promoted a specific ambition of Compaoré – his only goal was to protect the sovereignty of Burkina Faso at the expense of security in the Sahel. 

Compaoré communicates with the Islamist troops fighting in Mali on a regular basis in this particular situation.

The closeness between the jihadist groups in the Sahel/Mali and Compaoré, as well as the vacuum created after his removal, left the door wide open for the spread of Salafi ideology in Burkina Faso.

The Salafi Position

Positioning oneself as the provider of the different requirements that the citizen requires in regard to the absence of governance and the lack of official support in the periphery is the Salafi perspective (Salafi Islamists), represented by the various jihadist groups.

The position is often presented as an anti-government protest that promises the citizens an improvement in living conditions in almost every field. As an inherent part of the Salafi ideological platform, while assimilating the Salafi position among the population, the feelings of hatred and alienation of the citizens towards the state and its institutions are constantly being aroused.

Practically speaking, for example, the Islamist jihadists, in the territories they took over, expropriated the concessions for local gold and energy mines from foreign parties and returned the exploitation of the resources and their compensation to the residents, the people of Burkina Faso. In addition, the jihadist groups distribute to the population food such as corn, medicine […], a monthly salary of 600 dollars for those who work with them (three times the salary of a teacher) as well as a bonus of 600 dollars and 800 dollars for those who participate in the attacks. This is a series of temptations for the population that cannot be resisted. And thus, the Islamist organizations are ‘planting’ roots in the land of Burkina Faso.

As everyone is aware, there are no free meals. The bill is gradually making its way to this populace in the form of taxes that must be paid and the enforcement of harsh Sharia regulations.

Salafist prohibitions include those pertaining to alcohol, tobacco, full veiling, careful sermon listening, and more. Naturally, individuals who disobey the rules face harsh penalties, public humiliation, and occasionally even execution.^[4]

The State Response

The army of Burkina Faso, the FDS (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité), embarked on an operation known as ‘Operation de reconquête du territoire national’ in order to regain control of all parts of the country. 

The army claims that the ‘war on terror’ warrants the use of all means, even hurting innocent bystanders, restricting press freedom, and limiting the ability of professional unions, like the attorneys’ union, to take action.

Along with the national army, the VDP (Volontaires de défense pour la Patrie) was established, a paramilitary militia designed to help fight against armed extremist Islamic Jihad groups. The public response in favor of this militia is weak, and therefore, the authorities forcefully recruit it in blatant violation of basic civil rights. Arrests, executions, forced recruitment, and mysterious disappearances […] have been part of the public landscape ever since Captain Traore took power in September 2022. He rules his country with an iron fist and wants to silence any critical voice.^[5]

On April 20, 2023, Traoré, the president of the transitional government in Burkina Faso, officially signed the general mobilization order. According to the order for a year, the authorities have permission, in the name of national security, to take extraordinary measures against anyone who refuses to enlist. According to the order, any young man aged 18 or older who is physically fit may be called to enlist to participate in the war effort, specifically in the fight against jihadist organizations.^[6]

Terrorist Attacks and the Involvement of the Army

At the beginning of March of this year, massacres took place in eastern Burkina Faso. According to information gathered on the spot by an RFI (Radio France Internationale) team, they took place in the commune of Gayéri, near the border with Niger: videos show dozens of bodies of men, women and children. The problem is that it is difficult to determine who is responsible for the massacre: the armed Islamic groups or security forces of Burkina Faso. Survivors of the massacre speak and testify about elements from the BIR (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide) responsible for the massacre. These are rapid intervention battalions established in October 2023 by Traoré. The military ruler criticized the villagers for refusing to supply men to the VDP – and simply took revenge on the residents.^[7]

The massacres in March 2024 come after those of February 25 – a bloody day for the country: in Yatenga district, in northern Burkina, nearly 170 people were killed during coordinated attacks in three villages, Komsilga, Nodin and Soroe.^[8] On the same day, several dozen people were shot dead while praying in the mosque of Natiaboani, a village in the east of the country. On February 25, there was a massacre in the church in Essakane, in the north, with several dozen victims.^[9] This village is located not far from the borders of Mali and Niger, in an area where armed movements associated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State organization proliferate.

The massacres did not lead to any response from the government of Burkina Faso, apart from a press release by prosecutor Ouahigouya, which casts doubt on the estimated number of those murdered: “There is no evidence to confirm this figure of 170 people”. The prosecutor called for ‘caution pending the results of the investigation.’^[10] The involvement of army units in certain massacres contradicts the government’s narrative of ‘reconquest of national territory .’In the past five years, the war against radical Islamic organizations in Burkina Faso has left almost 20,000 dead and displaced more than 2 million in their country.^[11]

 Following the recent events in February 2024, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH – The International Federation for Human Rights) urgently called for the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry and the appointment of an independent UN expert on the human rights situation in Burkina Faso.^[12]

As of 2023, about 25% of all terrorist attack deaths worldwide have occurred in Burkina Faso, which is governed by a military junta headed by Captain Ibrahim Traore.

The death toll rose to 1,907 in 2023 from 1,135 in 2022, despite a drop in the number of attacks, according to the Sydney-based Institute for Economics & Peace’s Global Terrorism Index. Deaths from terrorism in the country have increased continuously every year since 2014, when no deaths were recorded, said the report published on March 1 this year. ^[13]

Deaths from terrorist attacks fell to 753 in Mali from 806 the previous year, while in Niger, they more than tripled to 468 from 193, according to the institute.

According to the report, al-Qaeda’s West African branch – Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal al-Muslimeen – continues to be the main perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso.

In a January 2024 report, Human Rights Watch accuses the Burkina Faso army of atrocities and the killing of at least 60 civilians since August 2023, some of whom were killed in drone strikes. The army, in its defense, explained that it attacked armed groups.^[14] Human Rights Watch claims that Islamist rebels, Burkina Faso’s security forces, and pro-government militias, the VDP, “are all responsible for grave abuses, which further degrade human rights and the humanitarian situation in Burkina Faso.”^[15] This chaotic situation seems appropriate for the ruling military junta because it causes the public opposition to it to be weak and ineffective.

The Humanitarian Crisis

According to a 2023 summary report from OCHA (the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Burkina Faso is facing a severe humanitarian disaster that might have a significant impact on its neighbors as well as pose a serious threat to the country’s ongoing existence.

From January to December 2023, the report states that approximately 2.9 million people received emergency humanitarian assistance thanks to the combined efforts of humanitarian partners. During this year, philanthropical/humanitarian air services were able to deliver more than 12,000 tons of food and 900 tons of non-food items, providing vital assistance to populations in hard-to-reach areas who are in dire need of support.” According to the government, more than 300,000 people returned to their places of origin during the year. In addition, through the efforts of the government and its humanitarian partners, 1,080 educational buildings were reopened, allowing 109,000 students to return to school. 2023 was nevertheless marked by many security events (1,699 from January to December 2023, according to the ACLED [Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project]), and more than 700,000 people have been recently displaced.^[16] These displacements and the vulnerability of entire communities undermine and intensify the security crisis, along with natural disasters such as floods, drought, and epidemics that increase the intensity of the crisis and the humanitarian needs in the country.^[17]

Conclusion

I will remind you that on September 16, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed the Liptako-Gourma Treaty, thereby establishing a new alliance between the three Sahel countries – the AES (Alliance des Etats du Sahel).^[18] In addition to dividing the same geographic region of the Sahel, the three neighboring countries are not only run by the military but face a common threat from spreading radical Islamic Jihad groups. This is the background to why Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger decided to unite their military forces to face the challenges they share. The three countries undertake to fight terrorism in all its forms and organized crime in the common space of the alliance and even assist its members in case of external attacks, against the background of threats heard from Western and African countries to intervene and restore democracy and the ousted presidents.

The jihadist danger that prevails mainly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso also threatens other countries in West Africa. The state of Benin, for example, suffered several deadly attacks in the north of the country. The progress of the jihadist groups indicates their intention to expand to the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

Given the fact that the alliance is solely dependent on the efforts and financial contributions of its three member nations, the collapse of one of those nations might bring down the alliance as a whole. The Western world and the neighboring African countries are boycotting these three countries due to the military coups that took place in them and the unwillingness of the military juntas to restore democracy to the countries. A possible collapse of Burkina Faso as a country will help the Islamic Jihadist groups first to complete the takeover of the entire country and expand from there towards the Gulf of Guinea.

^[1]‘Proud of their integrity’ for more on the subject, see, in French at the link: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/107260/politique/pourquoi-le-burkina-est-il-le-pays-des-hommes-int-gres/

^[2] In Burkina Faso, the jihadists intensify their asphyxiation strategy in the cities of the North and the East

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/09/07/au-burkina-faso-les-djihadistes-intensifient-leur-strategie-d-asphyxie-des-villes-du-nord-et- de-l-est_6140529_3212.html

^[3] Eight months after the military putsch that ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré on January 24, 2022, Burkina Faso experienced a new coup. On September 30, 2022, army units rebelled against Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaugu Damiba. Demiba finally agreed on October 2 to resign before going into exile in Togo. He has since been replaced by captain Ibrahim Traoré.

^[4] Douce Sophie, “Au Burkina Faso, la dégradation de la situation sécurité gagne du terrain,” Le Monde (15.5.2019).

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/02/18/au-burkina-faso-la-degradation-de-la-situation-securitaire-gagne-du-terrain_5424915_3212.html

^[5]    Un climat de peur s’est imposé au Burkina Faso

https://www.dw.com/fr/burkina-faso-climat-de-peur/a-68496583

^[6]    In Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré decrees general mobilization

https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1436057/politique/au-burkina-faso-ibrahim-traore-decrete-la-mobilisation-generale/

^[7] Burkina Faso/Forces armées nationales : Cinq Bataillons d’intervention rapide created

^[8]    Burkina Faso: a new massacre in the province of Komondjari in the east of the country

https://www.msn.com/fr-fr/actualite/monde/burkina-faso-un-nouveau-massacre-dans-la-province-de-la-komondjari-%C3%A0-lest-du-pays /ar-BB1jjyga

Around 170 ‘executed’ in three Burkina Faso villages, public prosecutor says

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/04/africa/dozens-executed-three-burkina-faso-villages-intl/index.html

^[9] See the link: https://www.la-croix.com/international/burkina-faso-des-dizaines-de-morts-dans-l-attaque-dune-mosquee-20240226

^[10]    See the link: https://burkina24.com/2024/03/02/plusieurs-personnes-tuees-dans-le-yatenga-la-justice-lance-un-appel-a-temoignages/

^[11] Burkina Faso: 20,000 dead and more than 2 million displaced since the start of the war

https://www.humanite.fr/monde/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-20-000-morts-et-plus-de-2-millions-de-deplaces-depuis-le-debut-de-la- guerre

^[12] Spiral of violence in Burkina Faso: the FIDH demands the end of impunity

https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/spirale-de-violence-au-burkina-faso-la-fidh-demande-la-fin-de-limpunite

^[13]    See the link: https://intellivoire.net/le-burkina-faso-a-enregistre-un-deces-sur-quatre-du-au-terrorisme-en-2023

^[14]    Burkina Faso: Drone Strikes on Civilians Apparent War Crimes

https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/25/burkina-faso-drone-strikes-civilians-apparent-war-crimes

^[15] Burkina Faso: Abductions Used to Crack Down on Dissent

https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/27/burkina-faso-abductions-used-crack-down-dissent

^[16] The Sahel: A Deadly New Era in the Decades-Long Conflict

See the link: https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sahel/

^[17] For more information on the report’s data, see: Rapport de situation – Burkina Faso – February 21, 2024

https://reports.unocha.org/fr/country/burkina-faso/

^[18] Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso sign Sahel security pact

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/

The post Is Burkina Faso Facing Collapse? appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

This paper analyzes the dissolution of the G5 Sahel alliance, a regional cooperative framework established in 2014 to address security challenges and development policies in West Africa. The departure of Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023, following Mali’s exit in 2022, prompted the disbanding of the alliance, underscoring the complexities of interstate cooperation in combating terrorism and radical Islam in Africa. It delves into the G5 Sahel’s objectives, its attempts at fostering economic growth, security, and regional development, and the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force aimed at combating Islamic terrorism and organized crime. The paper critically examines the internal disagreements, economic dependencies, and the overwhelming influence of external actors, notably France, which contributed to the perception of the initiative as a neo-colonial enterprise, culminating in its eventual failure. Additionally, it discusses the impact of political instability, military coups, and the lack of international support on the efficacy of the alliance. The analysis concludes by reflecting on the lessons learned from the G5 Sahel experience for future military cooperation efforts in Africa, highlighting the potential for new forms of cooperation that are more tailored to the specific challenges of the Sahel region.

The post The G5 Sahel: The End of the Road appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

This study examines the expanding operations of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition, in central and southern Mali and northern Burkina Faso. Through detailed analysis of recent sophisticated attacks by the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), a key JNIM faction, the paper reveals JNIM’s enhanced tactical capabilities and strategic intent to extend its influence. It highlights the coalition’s tactical innovation, including significant assaults and use of suicide bombings, which underline the growing challenge JNIM poses to regional security and the efficacy of state and international response mechanisms. The research also explores the socio-political impact of JNIM’s activities on local communities, the ongoing conflict with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the dynamics of regional military strategies against jihadist threats. The evolving tactics of JNIM, alongside its recruitment and propaganda efforts, are critically analyzed to assess future threats and propose countermeasures. By consolidating insights into JNIM’s operational expansion and its implications, this paper contributes to understanding the complexities of counter-terrorism in the Sahel, highlighting the urgent need for effective strategies to combat the growing jihadist insurgency.

The post JNIM (Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin) Continues to Expand in Mali and Burkina Faso appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the link between organized crime and jihadist terrorism in the Sahel area and the wider Mediterranean in the light of European intervention. To this end, several examples, case studies, and data on the phenomenon will be offered to highlight how this link is marked and essential, as well as the need to understand it in depth and address it transnationally in a coordinated manner to deal with it effectively. This paper is mainly based on draft work, which is essential, as well as critical research work on primary and secondary sources. In particular, the author wants to highlight some critical issues of European action in different structural and operational areas concerning the terrorist threat and European missions in the Sahel.

In the course of the discussion, several problems and shortcomings emerged regarding EU intervention in the Sahelian area, especially in the management of migratory flows, the rights of migrants, and the way development programs are implemented in African partner countries. The limitations encountered relate primarily to the difficulty of analyzing and synthesizing a wide variety of sources and data and to the author’s specific knowledge that does not allow for the analysis of significant dynamics relevant to the area under study (e.g., gender dynamics). In conclusion, there is a need for international actors to reconsider some of their strategies so that a new strategic plan for the area can be put in place to address the real causes of its underdevelopment and its social problems concerning the proliferation of armed militias, criminal networks, and jihadist groups.

The post Europe in the Sahel: An Analysis of the European Counter-Terrorism Structure Between Past and Present to Understand its Actions appeared first on ICT.

Abstract

This paper critically examines the escalating issue of violent Islamic extremism in Africa, spotlighting the significant rise in terrorist activities by groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Drawing on a July 2022 report from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), it underscores the continent’s transformation into a fertile ground for extremist activities. The study reveals a grim reality where extremism thrives amid rising military regimes, complicating counterterrorism efforts. The analysis delves into the root causes fueling the surge in radical Islamic terrorism, encompassing environmental, socio-economic, and political instabilities. It also highlights the growing sophistication of these terror groups, particularly in their use of advanced technologies. A critical assessment of the international community’s response is presented, with a focus on the roles of the African Union, the United Nations, and Western nations, pointing out the need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach that goes beyond mere military action. The paper advocates for a multifaceted strategy to combat radical Islam in Africa. This approach should not only encompass security measures but also prioritize socio-economic empowerment, improved governance, and human rights advocacy. Addressing these foundational issues is deemed essential for effectively curbing the spread of terrorism and ensuring long-term stability on the continent.

Introduction

The African continent has become a central hotbed of violent Islamic extremism, with a significant increase in terrorist attacks on the continent in recent years. The peak of extremism is expressed in the violent struggle between many radical Islamic terrorist organizations operating under the umbrella organizations of radical Islam on the continent: ISIS and al-Qaeda and many countries on the continent and even between the organizations themselves.

In July 2022, the International Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT) published a joint research article with an in-depth review of the development of global jihad on the African continent under the title: “Processes and trends in global jihad on the African continent.”^[1] The comprehensive article extensively reviewed the processes and trends in the Black Continent and stated that the African continent has become the fertile turf of the radical Islamic organizations and the area of contention, over the spheres of influence between the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, To prevent these dangerous trends, comprehensive solutions including African countries as well as Western countries are required. To prevent the spread of radical Islam, a revolution in the governing culture practiced in the continent’s countries, a culture based on the principle of tribal loyalty and tainted by corruption, with the desire to strengthen governance and democracy, which are important and central tools in the toolbox for combating Islamic terrorism, is needed.

A year has gone; have there been any changes? What has changed? Unfortunately, not much, on the contrary, nothing has changed, and the situation has only gotten worse, precisely in the countries where the radical Islamic organizations ‘flourish’ and the regimes have turned into military regimes, military juntas, which cut ties with the West and removed from their territory the Western forces that were sent in the past to help them curb the spread of the radical organizations.

It can be stated that the danger facing the African continent from the spread of Islamic organizations has only increased and threatens to engulf more countries, such as those located in the Gulf of Guinea, and as a result the danger to the Western world is increasing.

As mentioned, everyone now agrees that Africa is now the epicenter of global radical Islamic terrorism. For reference, half of the victims killed last year by terrorist acts are in sub-Saharan Africa.^[2] The violent Militant Islamists in Africa continue to focus on 5 arenas: the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique and North Africa.^[3]

Regardless, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates remain widespread, persistent and active in other parts of the world with varying levels of activity.

The Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for more deaths from terrorism in 2022 than both South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa combined.^[4] The African continent, despite the extensive deployment of initiatives to combat Islamic terrorism in recent years, remains an arena for the rise of international jihad. According to a study by the African Center for Strategic Studies conducted by Dr. Claudia Piper Cruz, published in February 2023, violence related to militant Islamist groups in Africa increased sharply, by 22% during 2022, with 6,859 incidents. This is a new record of extreme violence, and it has more than doubled since 2019.^[5]

Deaths in the Sahel accounted for 43% of the global total in 2022, compared to only 1% in 2007. Of particular concern are Burkina Faso and Mali, which accounted for 73% of terrorist deaths in the Sahel in 2022 and 52% of all deaths from terrorism in sub- Saharan Africa. Both countries recorded a significant increase in terrorism, with deaths in Burkina Faso increasing by 50% to 1,135 and in Mali by 56% to 944. Attacks in these countries are also becoming more deadly, with the number of deaths per attack increasing by 48% from 2021. Most attacks in these countries are attributed to unknown jihadists even though both ISIS and JNIM operate in these countries. The escalation of violence in Burkina Faso has also spread to neighboring countries, with Togo and Benin recording their worst GTI (Global Terrorism Index) scores.

Undoubtedly, the data shows that the increase in Islamic terrorism in the Sahel was dramatic, increasing by over 2,000% in the last 15 years. Furthermore, the political situation in the Sahel, the military coups, adds to this increase, with 7 coup attempts since 2021, of which 6 were successful (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea Conakry, Sudan and Gabon).

The causes of the flourishing of radical Islamic organizations and terrorism

The basic motivations for the flourishing of radical Islamic terrorism in the Black Continent are complex and systemic, including poor utilization of water sources, severe drought, food shortages, ethnic polarization, strong population growth, serious diseases, external interventions by economic powers with narrow interests, geopolitical competition, pastoral conflict,^[6] the growth of a transnational radical Salafi-Islamic ideology, weak and corrupt governments, lack of governance, weak armies that usually show loyalty to the ruler, poorly-equipped and properly trained armies in which low- motivated fighters serve, etc.

Most radical Islamic terrorist activity occurs along borders where government control is loose and weak. The extremist and violent Islamic groups often find refuge in remote and isolated border areas, where state authority is weak or non-existent, as an example the border triangle of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, a refuge area known as Liptako- Gourma, where logistical bases are bases for launching attacks – The center of gravity of terrorism throughout the Sahel.

Significantly, out of the 830 million people facing food insecurity in the world, 58% live in the 20 countries most affected by terrorism located specifically in Africa. In addition to the complexity, I described above. One must consider the numerous criminal organizations that are increasingly portraying themselves as Islamic rebels, who are involved in the smuggling of people, goods, illegal drugs, and drugs, and who tend to join Islamic jihadist organizations, causing violent attacks to be attributed in part to non-Jihadists.

Regardless of the African continent, in reference to the increase in global terrorism, at a round table held at the United Nations, the representative of Interpol, the international criminal police agency, stated that terrorism related to extreme right-wing and racist ideology has increased 50-fold in the last decade, especially in Europe, North America and parts of Central Asia.^[7]

It is possible to identify other trends that facilitate the spread of terrorism in all its forms in the world: the deterioration of security in certain countries of the world and its regional consequences. Terrorist organizations have become more sophisticated and have greater access to advanced technology, which widens the range of risks and makes them a serious concern in the form of the use of drones, drones, and access to AI (artificial intelligence) which helps to develop new avenues in planning effective and targeted terrorist activity.

Undoubtedly, if the Western world wants to live, it must unite, more than ever, in the fight against the spread of terrorism and not only in the aspect of military alliances and the establishment of ad hoc joint forces for a focused war on terrorism, but also in the aspects of de-radicalization of populations that live or have lived under a radical Islamic regime (changing the DNA of the population is requested- it’s a long process) and exercising soft power such as: dealing with a more equitable distribution of the state’s resources, maintaining human rights, fair judgment, rehabilitation vital infrastructures to improve the population’s quality of life (energy, education, health and transportation), employment solutions to reduce rising unemployment and the like.

As mentioned, the continent of Africa has become the main battlefield of terrorism, with a significant increase in the number of groups active on the continent, a fact that directly causes a massive wave of refugees that hits the already collapsing African countries and knocks on the gates of Europe where several countries fail to deal with Muslim and other minorities.^[8]

In Africa, in many parts of the continent, from Burkina Faso to Chad, from Mali through Sudan, Somalia in Central Africa and all the way to Mozambique, we are still dealing with the spread of radical Islam and the consequences of the extremist organizations being armed with weapons from the warehouses of the Libyan army.^[9]

This reality turns certain areas in Africa, into a new focus of violent extremism, with consequences that also extend to neighboring sub-regions. Therefore, the response to this threat goes beyond the borders of Africa and requires an integrated approach involving all stakeholders, including countries outside the African continent.

Takeover by radical Islamic groups – modus operandi

The presence of the jihadist organizations is reflected in their control over territories in the center and north of Mali, northern Burkina Faso, the area of the three borders, Liptako-Gorma and the Lake Chad basin. Jihadist organizations’, such as the ‘Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and the Islamic State’ – JNIM, numbering about 15,000 fighters, managed in the last decade to take root and develop an ecosystem that deals more with agro- Pastoral. These jihadists act as they did in Algeria in the 1990s: occupying areas they describe as ‘liberated’, threatening and assassinating official state officials and police forces to impose a new political and religious order (Islamic courts settle local disputes on according to Sharia law).

The jihadist groups managed to take over and manage several territories, where schools were opened under their complete control and to secure income from taxes collected from the population – income needed to fight the central government and the Western enemy that supports it. For the most part, they harness the local populations to the radical Islamic vision by force. Their approach is to champion local goals (such as land distribution and inter-communal conflict resolution) and return the local communities to their land. The attractiveness of the jihadist groups depends on the intelligent and efficient management of the settlement strategy that guarantees life. As in Algeria in the 1990s and in the state of Borno in Nigeria, they demand that the local population sever all ties with the security forces and the official state mechanisms, if not, they will receive retaliatory actions and revenge. In exchange for their loyalty, the jihadist groups allow local populations to violate the prohibitions imposed by the authorities regarding hunting in protected areas, fishing, trans humanization, gold mining and allow them to collect taxes on animals.

These ways of operating, which guarantee income and food, attract many people who are willing to join jihadist groups if they create profitable activities, for example: highway robbers who the jihadists explain to them that their actions are blessed and have religious significance.

Jihad organizations offer protection and personal security to citizens in their spheres of influence. Like in the Mafia, once you are a full member of the organization, no one dares to mess with you.

Widespread phenomena of poverty, marginalization and socio-economic exclusion of entire populations, who are not connected to the government, on a tribal/ethnic background, create an environment that helps the radical organizations recruit new fighters and establish their governmental hold in these areas. Against the background of the lack of governance and the lack of personal security for the populations in the periphery, the radical organizations claim to replace the government and provide the residents with protection, education on the chapters of Islam and judgment according to Islamic law (Sharia), employment and everything that the state does not provide in its accountability as basic services to the citizen. The process of radicalization or transition to it is fast. Men tend to follow their friends; they are influenced by their actions and stories. Women, mostly married, will follow their husbands and children Those who are born will one hundred percent be fighters of Islamic Jihad because in this framework they will grow up and according to the values of a Jihadist society they will be educated.^[10]

The Islamic terrorist organizations work on the burning consciousness of the population in the context of the involvement of foreign armies on the country’s soil. It is now clear that the intervention of foreign military dispatch forces, French or others, to fight the jihadist groups is not the solution, this is a fact, and this is how it is presented by them. To them, on the contrary, this foreign presence inflames the determination of the jihadists and undermines the credibility of the governments of the countries concerned, who are accused of weakness and incompetence and are forced to call on foreign armies to protect their populations.

In addition, there are other triggers that play a decisive role in the decision or the turning point of some people to go to violent extremism or join the radical groups. These triggers include anger, frustration and alienation resulting from human rights violations, acts of violence committed by official security forces, ethnic or religious discrimination, inter-communal conflicts or deep socio-economic frustrations.

The war against the spread of radical Islam

Violent Islamic extremism in Africa and its spread to other regions of the continent such as South Africa and the Gulf of Guinea is therefore a great challenge for all African countries and the entire world.

As in any war, the condition for success in it lies, in my opinion (know the enemy), in understanding the root causes that help the rise of radical Islamic extremism, studying the history of fighting them, drawing lessons from it, and implementing a holistic plan suitable for each country and its characteristics and the entire continent.

It seems to me that the key to success lies in the combination of security and development measures, as well as the promotion of justice, inclusion and respect for human rights. A combination of African and other forces may curb the rise of Islamic extremists on the continent. It may be easier for Africans to band together and unite in this task than to coordinate the interests of Russia, China, the US and France on the continent, interests that are often at odds.

Efforts over the past two decades by governments and regional and international organizations, including the African Union (AU), to suppress and contain radical Islamic extremist groups have failed. Africa’s struggle with radical Islamic terrorism seems to indicate that the responses of the European Union and its member states are not commensurate with the nature of a threat that is not new.

Incessant attacks by violent Islamic extremist organizations have reached an unprecedented dimension in Africa. Organizations such as: Boko Haram, al-Shabab in Somalia (al-Shabaab) and Mozambique (Al-Shabab), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the activities of the Islamic State (ISWAP) and the branch of the Sinai Peninsula (Sinai Province) form the platform The center of radical Islamic terrorism on the continent and the main source of death for thousands of innocent people. Their influence crosses borders, some of them have absolute control over the territory and in remote territories where they have established quasi-states on the way to the dream of the Islamic Caliphate. All of these continue to exist and flourish despite several measures taken such as: the Algiers action plan to prevent and combat terrorism (2002) and the African Anti-Terrorism Act (2011) which were designed to contain the activity of violent extremist groups on the continent. The prevailing argument shows that the African Union (AU) initiated legislation and recording protocols to contain and deal with radical Islamic terrorism on the continent, but it does not, the African Union, does not have the ability to enforce the legislation and the necessary war on terror. If we take a deeper look at what is happening and judge by the concepts of cost-benefit, we will conclude that the member states of the African community prefer to cooperate with parties and organizations in plans to fight terrorism and against the spread of radical Islam, a cooperation that sometimes causes contradiction and cultural and other clashes between the locals and the external parties who join in to help.

African Union (AU) activities

Historical reminder, in response to concerns made in the late 1990s of the twentieth century, long before the September 11, 2001, attacks the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the ‘Algiers Declaration’ for the Prevention and Fight against Terrorism between the 12 July 14, 1999. This text, now 24 years old, noted the “scope and severity of the phenomenon” and the “dangers it represents to the stability and security of countries”. The African leaders expressed their determination to eliminate terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations”.^[11]

The African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU, developed an action plan for the prevention and fight against terrorism that was signed in September 2002 in Algiers (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism). This program aims to implement the ‘Algiers Convention’ by enhancing cross-border cooperation through policing and surveillance. The goal was twofold: symbolically to demonstrate the African continent’s commitment to the ‘global war on terrorism’ and in fact to give official validity to the AU in the context of the ‘Algiers Convention’ which discussed the prevention and fight against terrorism from 1999.^[12]

Furthermore, as part of the implementation of the 2002 plan, the ACSRT African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism was established in Algiers in 2004.

The overarching mission of the ACSRT is to conduct research and research on terrorism and develop strategic policy, operational and training mechanisms in the context of international and continental legal tools to strengthen the capacity of the African Union and its member states to prevent and fight terrorism in Africa. The goal is for the center to function as a center of research excellence in issues related to preventing and fighting terrorism in Africa. As a structure of the African Union Commission, the Center is supposed to contribute to and strengthen the African Union’s ability to address issues related to the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa with the goal of eliminating the threat posed by terrorism to peace, security, stability and development in Africa. To this end, the center conducts research and research on terrorism. Also, the center maintains a database, collection and information center, studies and analyzes on terrorism and terrorist groups. The center also seeks to build counter-terrorism capacity in the member states and therefore develops training programs and packages and runs training sessions, workshops, meetings and symposiums with the assistance of countless stakeholders’ partners. The ACSRT also provides a platform and forum for interaction and cooperation between Member States and regional mechanisms. The Center plays an important role in guiding the AU’s counter-terrorism efforts and works collaboratively with several regional and international partners to ensure coherence and coordinated efforts against terrorism on the continent.^[13]

In 2011, the Model Anti-Terrorism Law was enacted, which established the definition of terrorist offenses, including money laundering and financing of terrorist organizations, hostage-taking and acts of sabotage.^[14]

The African Union has carried out various operations to support peace and fight against the spread of radical Islamic terrorism, such as: the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007;^[15] The regional cooperation initiative to eliminate the LRA (The Lord’s Resistance Army) in Uganda. The European Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) is a major supporter of the African Union, which coordinates combating bodies against Islamic terrorism in combination with regional economic development, such as: the multinational joint task force against Boko Haram The MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force),^[16] the G5 Sahel joint force in 2017,^[17] and more recently, the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).^[18]

In some cases, these efforts led to the liberation of territories from violent Islamic extremists to their weakening and containment of the situation. Despite the European Union’s commitment to assistance and the deployment of considerable material, financial and human resources, Islamic terrorism and violence are worsening and spreading in Africa, with terrible immediate and long-term ramifications for the continent and its people.

Fighting the spread of radical Islam in the continent – approaches

The spread of the radical Islamic threat and its intensification reveals two main gaps in the response in Africa.

The existing approaches, as a rule, do not address the roots of the problem that allow the radical groups to flourish and expand their spheres of influence.

On the one hand, the persistence of the phenomenon can be attributed to a complex cocktail based on one main ingredient: deep governance problems, which no one is really addressing. The vacuum created due to the lack of governance draws into it groups/tribes with a character and a desire for separatism, local Islamic groups and international terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda who impose their patronage on the local groups, improve their means of warfare and guarantee the financing clause, and in this way succeed in obtaining a foothold foot in Africa, to establish themselves in areas where a wide flexibility for growth and expansion of the areas of influence and action is also guaranteed, despite the military efforts to thwart their actions.

According to the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSRT), the increase in the activity of these extremist Islamic groups is supported by the ‘constant increase in their capacity’, an increase resulting from the construction of a trained and equipped military force that enjoys the broad support of a relatively alienated population, and their ability and willingness to fight the state’s security forces, often successfully high.

On the other hand, the regional and continental responses, including international support, remain largely reactive and military, cryo-kinetic, and do not place enough emphasis on sustainable and preventive measures that address the roots of the problem.

One of the reasons for this may be that such long-term strategies depend on stable and strong governance structures, which are sorely lacking in regions and countries affected by radical Islamic terrorism.

African countries face enormous challenges in fighting the spread of radical Islam. The lack of political courage, national consensus and in the face of weak, degenerate and corrupt institutional structures as well as the lack of resources creates an imbalance between the web of threats and the national or integrated response and thus personal and regional insecurity is fostered and growing.

The world’s involvement in Africa in the fight against Islamic terrorism

African countries are not marching alone in their war against the expansion and spread of radical Islamic organizations. The following data will demonstrate how involved the world, as governments, actors, and the UN organization, is in Africa.

United Nations (UN)

The UN currently has 6 active missions on the African continent:

1. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with 17,753 soldiers.
2. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with 18,486 troops.
3. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) with 17,430 soldiers.
4. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with 17,954 soldiers.
5. United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) with 3,156 personnel.
6. The sixth mission, that of the United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), consisting of a total of 469 personnel, including 20 soldiers and 2 policemen, is not intended for combat.

In total, there are 75,248 UN personnel engaged in peace operations in Africa.

The organization most committed to the fight against Islamic jihadists is MINUSMA, which was created by Security Council Resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013, to support the political process and secure Mali.

The mandate of MINUSMA was reaffirmed by the adoption of resolution 2164 in June 25, 2014, which emphasizes priority tasks such as security, stabilization and protection of civilians, support for national political dialogue and national reconciliation, as well as support for the restoration of state authority throughout the country, the rehabilitation of the security sector in Mali, promotion of human rights and their protection and humanitarian aid.^[19]As of February 2023, the MINUSMA personnel deployed in the field number about 17,430 soldiers, of which 11,739 are soldiers, 1,601 police, 3,384 civilians, 504 managers and 202 volunteers. However, this force was unable to prevent the security situation from deteriorating, leading to successive military coups in 2020 and 2021.

United States

The United States has provided nearly $8 billion in defense sector assistance since fiscal year 2019. Its partners in Africa include Libya and the West African littoral states. Over the past two decades, U.S. counterterrorism efforts across Africa have focused primarily on training and mentoring African partners, programs, training designed to build the capabilities of African armies and security forces. The US has also regularly supported France’s efforts in the Sahel, providing logistical support and assistance Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for French military interventions against terrorism since the start of Operation Serval in 2013 (and later Operation Barkhane).

After the Tongo Tongo ambush in 2017, in which four American soldiers were killed alongside five soldiers from the Niger army as well as interpreters, many questions were asked about the usefulness of the physical presence of American soldiers in the Sahel (boots on the ground).^[20] In addition, the deterioration of France’s relations with Mali and Burkina Faso in recent years has complicated US counter-terrorism efforts. An American drone base is under construction in Agadez in northern Niger, at a cost of 110 million dollars.^[21] The US maintains an archipelago of bases in North and West Africa as part of its broader security efforts in the region.

France

France, the former colonial country, is the main Western partner in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism in Africa. France signed cultural, technical and military cooperation agreements and defense agreements with most of its former colonies when gaining independence in 1960.

France experienced and has experienced in recent years a sharp decline in its shares among the Sahel countries in favor of competing powers, primarily Russia.

Between 2013 and 2022, the French armed forces operated in the Sahel as part of operations ‘Serval’ (2013-2014) and ‘Barkhane’ (2014-2022), and Takuba vigorously and lost over 50 fighters, a fact that influenced French public opinion which demanded explanations from the French government as to the necessity of the war, and for the presence of French fighters on the battlefield. After more than 9 years of military presence in Mali, France has been ordered by the Malian authorities to leave the country without delay. Last January, Burkina Faso also requested the departure of the special forces of Operation Saber based in Ouagadougou, the capital of the country.

However, France has several military bases established over decades, from the end of the colonial era in the 60s to the 20th century as follows:^[22]

• 400 fighters have been in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, since 2011, in an operational center for regional cooperation. The EFS (éléments français du Sénégal) are located at Camp Frédéric Geille in Ouakam as well as Camp Protet in the military port of Dakar.
• 950 soldiers are at the French operational base in the Ivory Coast, after the signing of a security partnership signed in 2012 between Paris and Abidjan and after the end of the peacekeeping ‘Operation Licorne’ (2002-2015).
• 1,500 soldiers, the largest military force outside French territory, are in Djibouti, with which a new defense agreement has existed since 2014. The military facility serves as a training ground for special forces who also contribute to the fight against piracy in the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa.
• 350 men are stationed in Gabon, where France signed defense agreements with the country’s independence in 1960, which were renewed in 2011 between Paris and Libreville.

On October 5, 2023, France announced that the withdrawal of the 1,500 French soldiers in Niger would be completed by the end of 2023.

In Chad, there are close to a thousand fighters as part of EFT (Les éléments français au Tchad). The task assigned to them is to ensure the protection of French interests and its citizens living in the country. They also provide logistical and intelligence assistance to Chad’s armed forces, in accordance with the cooperation agreement signed between the two countries.

In Gabon, the French elements include a command echelon, a ground unit (the 6th Marine Infantry Regiment or 6th BIMA) located at Camp Charles de Gaulle in Libreville and an air unit located at Guy Pidoux Air Force Base.

Russia

Russia is strengthening its presence on the African continent in a very controversial way, mainly through the Wagner Group. Russia’s strategy in Africa is quite complex and dynamic, involving conglomerates of mineral mining, sales of illegal arms, and the deployment of paramilitary forces – mercenaries. In the framework of securing the interests of the state, the Russian government allows private and semi-state actors to support its goals by promoting their own interests. In the diamond mining, aluminum and energy sectors, for example: Lukoil, Alrosa (RUSAL), Rosatom and Gazprom are active throughout the African continent.^[23]

The Wagner force has a presence in Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar and Mozambique. There are other private military companies also active such as the Patriot group, which can be found in Burundi and the Central African Republic.^[24] Russia has strengthened its ties with the military regimes in power in Guinea and Mali, while playing the alternative power card in the face of the rise of jihadism in these countries.

Russia conducts an open competition on the African continent against the USA and France and it seems that currently it has the upper hand. In the last five years, from 2018 to 2022, Russia took the lead from China in the sale of foreign currency on the continent and is now the leader with a total market share of 26%, compared to 21% in the previous period, according to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in March 2023.^[25] This rate even rises to 40% if we include the Maghreb region, where Algeria has historically been a major client of company’s Russian weapons. China, for its part, saw its market share drop from 29% to 18% in the sub-region, dropping to second place, ahead of France (around 8%) and the US, 5%.^[26]

The continent of Africa as a playground for other players

The above, together with the governmental instability in several countries in Africa where military coups have taken place, shows that there is no constant pressure on the perpetrators of dangerous radical Islam. When military coups take place, the focus is diverted from the war on terror to other directions resulting from damage to the democratic axes and involvement, mainly verbal – issuing threats and resorting to an economic boycott, of the Western countries and African economic organizations such as the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) that demand to return the situation to the way it was before.

Beyond the internal African chaos, it seems that the involvement of external countries such as Russia, China, the USA, France and the European Union is more reminiscent of a geopolitical struggle for the control of spaces and resources, the results of which are not quite clear. As in other areas such as infrastructure, energy or mineral mining, the arms export competition Africa is at its peak (I detailed this in the discussion above about Russia). An economic-diplomatic struggle is taking place in which Russia sets the tone, and its activity has a negative effect, in my opinion, on the effectiveness of the joint struggle against radical Islam on the continent.

When there are many state actors, sometimes driven by geopolitical rivalries and state interests, their presence and degree of involvement in what is happening with changing powers in the African arena contributes not only to the persistence of security threats related to global jihadism, but also to the emergence of new challenges and risks for African countries.

The entry of paramilitary groups into the African arena, such as the Wagner Force, with direct consequences in the fields of mining and energy, calls into question the sovereignty of fragile states. If France has been accused by former colonies such as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso of neo-colonialism, what about those quasi-state forces that form alliances with local leaderships, providing them with protection and military aid in exchange for control of the mining of vital resources such as gold and pines or control of Energy infrastructures. In practice, we are simply witnessing the real occupation of countries by paramilitary groups acting on behalf of Russia in most cases.

This is the clear case of the Central African Republic (DRC) which is seen as a kind of property of the Wagner Group, a strategic subcontractor of Russia.^[27]

The capture of a state in this way illustrates and expresses a particularly harmful form of systemic governmental corruption, as a group of people acquires such a deep influence over a series of senior officials that the state institutions prefer the benefit of their private interests over the public good.

Under the guise of providing a response to the needs of security and reconstruction of the country, we are witnessing the return of authoritarian regimes in countries where the democratization process has begun to take root. This is reflected in military coups or the hardening of existing regimes. From August 2020 to the present, for example, 7 coups have occurred in French-speaking Africa in Mali, Chad, Guinea (Conakry), Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger, and Gabon. The return of a series of military coups in Africa undermines the use of multi-party elections as the only legitimate way to win political office.

It seems that this is part of a wider process of ‘Autocratization’ that has been observed in recent years in several countries and regions around the world. The military interventions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Guinea, Sudan reveal that Africa, despite attempts to assimilate the values of democracy, is not immune to this trend, the process emphasizes the fragility of the democratization processes taking place in Africa.

Some believe that the ‘chaos’ occurring in Africa confirms the basic correctness of Leon Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution:^[28] the former colonial nations cannot satisfy any of their most basic needs – freedom from imperialist oppression, access to land, democratic rights, jobs and social equality – under the leadership of some faction of the bourgeoisie the national at the same time. I do not believe that the working class in African countries, if they take the reins of power, will perform better than those of the bourgeoisie.

It can certainly be said that the African countries gained independence in the 60s of the last centuries, they gained political independence but not economic independence, the former colonial powers and the superpowers continue to dominate the economic field against the background of the natural wealth inherent in the African soil and its shores.

The military coups and governmental instability are a direct and central result, in my opinion, of the geopolitical competition between the great powers on African soil. The growing anti-French sentiment in West and Central Africa, for example, is accompanied by public protests, on behalf of the government and its pro-Russian institutions, the Russian flag is proudly raised, and French flags are trampled and burned. What happens is the conversion of one master into another, and this time the winner is the Russian master. The Russian success is due to the influence of the pro-Russian propaganda on the population. Whether it is France, the USA, Russia, China or other countries, they all use the communication channels at their disposal to influence and win the battle for public opinion and public consciousness. Satellite television and social networks are among the most current and widespread tools in Africa.

The hostility towards the Western powers in general and France in particular is led and motivated mainly by young Africans who are more aware of the international situation. Today, 62% of Africans are under the age of 30. With more than 200 million people between the ages of 15 and 24, Africa has the largest youth population in the world. With a population where hundreds of millions live on $2 a day, without electricity, running water, without health and education infrastructure alongside rising unemployment, it is no wonder that there is an aspiration for better conditions. This segment of the population was and remains very vulnerable on the one hand to extremism, violent extremism, recruitment to armed and jihadist gangs and on the other hand to the influences of external factors, as I explained above. The socio-economic disparities are high and result in the concentration of wealth among a small group of people. In all countries, 10% of the population receives 40% or more of the national income.^[29] Socio-economic inequality is reflected at the territorial level, with Gaps between capital cities and the rest of the country, between urban and rural areas, and in the case of coastal countries, between the coast and the interior of the country. The Sahel and the Lake Chad region best represent the disparities and dilemmas they produce. The local economy is relatively undeveloped, and people struggle to make a living. Thus, the radical Islamic terrorist organizations take advantage of the situation and direct their efforts to recruiting poor unemployed youth from disadvantaged backgrounds while promising a better life. Jihadist Islamic groups manage to exploit internal, economic, demographic, political and security fault lines to establish themselves. The jihadist groups bring a touch of justice and exploit a deep post-colonial resentment, as well as a rejection of corrupt and apathetic urban elites, shared by some of the youngest and most disadvantaged populations on the planet.

Military and security measures alone cannot fully and eliminate the terrorist threats in Africa. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria and others have a common denominator – they are fragile countries, some under the definition of ‘failed countries/states’.^[30] This means that the mechanisms of the central government are required to improve their efficiency and function, the restoration of national cohesion and the improvement of economic capabilities not only to enable governance and control in all parts of the country, but the improvement of national resilience, within the parameters I have mentioned, is required for the ongoing war against the spread of jihadist organizations if they wish to expand.

The support of the West and the European Union must prioritize non-military responses at the national, regional and continental level that address the roots of the problems and in this way prevent the emergence of new threats. No matter how much the West and the European Union invest in aid to African countries, success in the fight against The spread of radical Islamic groups depends on the establishment of proper and stable governance in countries that focus on the fight against poverty and on the equitable distribution of state resources – parameters that stand as a rock for separatists, extremists and rebels. Such initiatives, in the civil and economic sphere, can be carried out alongside the need to take kinetic measures to suppress gangs/radical groups as complementary actions that moderate the tension that the threats create in the country.

Summary

The obvious and inevitable question is, are African leaders willing and able to take the reins and do they have a burning political will to make bold decisions, to implement the established action frameworks and seek long-term solutions for the benefit of the countries on the continent.

Africa’s uncompromising fight against radical Islamic terrorism seems to indicate that the responses of the European Union and its member states are not commensurate with the nature of a threat that is not new.^[31] Strengthening the security capabilities of the African countries should be the ‘order of the hour’ and a guided necessity that will be reflected in the national priorities, while respecting the local partners and encouraging good governance practices and redistribution of the state’s resources. It should be honestly said that the international community, since the end of the era of colonialism, has been taking care of and investing astronomical sums in African countries to put get them on their feet and reduce their dependence on them, but it seems that this is a Sisyphean struggle without limits. Addressing the weaknesses that characterize the Black African countries should include building security and military capabilities, alongside economic and social capabilities. Huge budgets are required for this, it was done in the past, with funding and direct military involvement, but it was not successful – the threat of the radical Islamic groups was not stopped, it grew, while exacting huge prices from the population and it is spreading towards other countries.

The local efforts and the support from the outside of the Western world and the African Union are not sufficient now, they deserve some kind words but more than anything, a task-oriented joint effort and a paradigmatic change in the concept of action against radical Islam is required to uproot it from the continent.

Unfortunately, I believe that even in 2024, Africa will continue to experience wars, violence, drought, epidemics and a host of other shameful things (trouble, problems, breakdowns).

^[1] See the link: https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/The-Spread-of-Radical-Islam-in-Africa- 1.pdf

^[2] For more on the subject, it is recommended: Global Terrorism Index (GTI); See the analysis of the Sahel region on pp. 60-70. See the link: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2023

^[3] Center d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, “Les décès provocés par la violence des Islamistes militants d’Afrique augmentent de près de l’Afrique,” Center d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique.)10.2.2023( https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/les-deces-provoques-par-la-violence-des-islamistes-militants- dafrique-augmentent-de-pres-de-50/

For the English version see the link: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist- violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/

^[4] The Sahel region: a vast area that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and includes the southern part of the Sahara, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea. The Sahel region is plagued by a myriad of conflicts and social unrest over poverty, drought and climate change. Due to its characteristics, the region has become a hotbed of radical Islamic terrorist organizations, and the scene of a struggle for influence and control involving France, the US, Germany and the European Union, the Gulf powers, Turkey, Russia and China, all seeking to profit from its vast mineral resources essential to modern industry.

^[5] Claudia Pfeifer Cruz, “Multilateral peace operations in 2022: Developments and trends,” SIPRI. 29.5.2023. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2023/multilateral-peace-operations-2022- developments-and-trends

^[6] Pastoralism is the oldest type of production system that survives and serves millions of people in dry lands of Africa. This system supports 20% of the population of Ethiopia and 85% of the total population in the Somalia region, almost 100% in the Sahel. The pastoral area is known for drought that affects the livelihood of people living there. Pastoral societies have survived for thousands of years within their conflict-sensitive system thanks to the traditional dispute settlement mechanisms they developed and maintained. A pastoral conflict equation erupts because the system enjoys a traditional practice of raiding herds of sheep and cattle fueling conflicts between different groups and tribes. However, pastoral conflicts these days are no longer limited to competition for pasture and water resources or raids on cattle herds. The pastoral conflict has become very complicated and can only be understood by the multiple variables that can provide explanations for the challenges prevailing in the production system and the political context and geographic location in which the system operates.

^[7] See the link: https://fr.africanews.com/2023/06/21/lafrique-est-le-point-chaud-du-terrorisme-dans-le- monde/

^[8] Like other regions of the world, Africa is faced with the violent spread of Salafi-Jihadiyah and with the political project of establishing Islamic emirates against the backdrop of the atrocities of post-colonial nation-states. Jihadist groups aim, in the long term, to replace the post-colonial state and political institutions with new organizations based on the application of Islamic law, Sharia, within the framework of an Islamic state or Islamic emirate.

^[9] Oil-rich Libya plunged into chaos after the NATO-backed uprising that toppled and killed longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. After the defeat of the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq in 2017, many of its foreign fighters fled to the North African country. To the collapse of the regime Libya had an influence on North and West Africa. It paved the way for tribes with separatist tendencies to take up arms and challenge the central government in Mali in 2012. For, many of the local tribes – including the Tuareg, had previously fought for Gaddafi in Libya and received military training. When he collapsed His regime, these fighters returned to their homeland in 4X4 all-terrain vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns and missile launchers, with an agenda to act in their country as well.

^[10] In the many territories under their control, the radical Islamist jihadists demonstrate a willingness to rule a new political and religious order. The death threats against anyone who cooperates with the state and its representatives and with Western elements illustrate how much the jihadist insurgency aspires to replace these ‘pagan states’ and run society according to a radical interpretation of Sharia law: wearing a veil for women, enrolling children in Koranic Salafi schools, Closing drinking establishments for local populations and more.

^[11] See the link: https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9544-1999_ahg_dec_132-142_xxxv_f.pdf; https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/protocole-lutte-contre-terrorisme-fr.pdf (in French) https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9544-1999_ahg_dec_132-142_xxxv_e.pdf (in English)

^[12] See the link: https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-anti-terrorism-plan-of-action.pdf

^[13] The African Center for Research and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was inaugurated in 2004 – headquarters in Algiers, Algeria. The institute was established as a research structure of the African Union Commission, in accordance with the protocol to the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism. The protocol gives the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the responsibility for implementing regional, continental and international counter- terrorism instruments as well as harmonizing, standardizing and coordinating continental efforts in preventing and fighting terrorism. For more information about the institute and its activities, see the link: https://caert.org.dz/

^[14] 14To      review   the        extensive            and       comprehensive    law,       see        the        link: https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/8313/african-model-law- E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0974928419901197 

^[15] The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been supporting the Somali government in the fight against al-Shabaab for 15 years. The deal was supposed to be completed in December 2021, and finally an agreement was reached on what appeared to be simply a name change and the extension of the existing mandate. The African Union (AU), the United Nations and the Government of Somalia decided that on 1 April AMISOM will be replaced by the ‘AU Transition Mission in Somalia’ (ATMIS). The new mission will operate until the end of 2024, after which all responsibilities will be transferred to the Somali security forces. Scope The strength of ATMIS: numbering about 18,000 soldiers, 1,000 policemen and 70 civilians strongly reflects the previous scope and a large part of its mandate.

^[16] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a coalition of the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad region. It includes forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Since 2014, it has been actively fighting Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP).

^[17] The G5 Sahel, established on February 16, 2014, in Nouakchott, Mauritania, is an organization that brings together 5 terrorism-stricken countries in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The G5 Sahel allowed the member states to unite their efforts in the fight against armed jihadists in the Sahel. After the end of Operation BARKHANE and French military cooperation in general, the Malian government announced on May 15, 2022, its withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, including its joint force, which raises serious doubts about the survival of this force, which has now become the G4. Of the five member countries, Mali has the largest GDP, although it was only $17.39 billion in 2020. Three of these countries (Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) are currently in political and military transition, i.e. after a military coup.

^[18] The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed on 15 July 2021 following the approval of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of Member States as a regional response to support the Republic of Mozambique in the fight against terrorism and acts of violent extremism. The SAMIM forces consist of forces from 8 countries: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, working in cooperation with the Armed Forces of Mozambique (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique – FADM) and other forces deployed in Cabo Delgado to fight terrorism and violent extremism. Since its deployment, SAMIM has recorded victories, including recapturing villages, displacing terrorists from their bases, and seizing weapons and munitions, helping to create a relatively safe environment for the transit of humanitarian aid. This mission is an example of sub-regional deployment in Africa with encouraging results.

^[19] See the link: https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/mission/minusma

^[20] The Tongo-Tongo ambush occurred on October 4, 2017, when a military motorized convoy of the American commandos and the Nigerien army returning from an intelligence gathering mission on the Islamic State on the Niger-Mali border, stopped in the village of Tongo-Tongo to replenish supplies, and left The village fell into a deadly ambush by a large force from the Sahara branch of the Islamic State, during which 4 American soldiers, 5 Nigerien soldiers and more than a dozen ISIS fighters were killed; the ambush might have ended in the destruction of the entire American-Nigerian convoy, had it not been for the arrival of fighter jets The French army at the last minute from neighboring Mali.

Haim Isarowitz, “The Shameful Affair in Niger: How Four Dead American Soldiers Succeeded in Entangling the US President,” Maariv (November 4, 2017). https://www.maariv.co.il/news/world/Article-607309

For more, see: Oct 2017 Niger ambush summary of investigation at the link: https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_niger/img/Oct-2017-Niger-Ambush-Summary-of-Investigation.pdf

^[21] See the link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452

^[22] Forces françaises en Afrique : de quelles bases l’armée dispose-t-elle encore?

See more details in the link: https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Forces-francaises-Afrique-quelles-bases- larmee-dispose-elle-encore-2023-02-28-1201257135

See also https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/cpdm7jg0yd2o

^[23] See the link: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-africa-energy-cooperation-challenges-and- prospects/

^[24] Molly Dunigan and Ben Connable, “Russian Mercenaries in Great-Power Competition: Strategic Supermen or Weak Link?” RAND. (9.3.2021) https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/03/russian-mercenaries-in-great-power-competition- strategic.html

^[25] Marion Douet, “Russia overtakes China as leading arms seller in sub-Saharan Africa,” Le Monde. (29.3.2023)https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/03/28/russia-overtakes-china-as-leading-arms- seller-in-sub-saharan-africa_6021018_124.html

^[26] Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebode, “Défis et bilan de la lutte contre le jihadisme en Afrique”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374261994_Defis_et_bilan_de_la_lutte_contre_le_djihadism e_en_Afrique

^[27] Joseph Siegle, “How Russia is pursuing state capture in Africa,” LSE.)21.3.2022( https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine- wagner-group; / Guido Lanfranchi, Kars de Bruijne, The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming? Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (June 2022). https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/The_Russians_are_coming_4eproef.pdf

^[28] To read Leon Trotsky’s article The Permanent Revolution, in Hebrew see the link: https://www.marxists.org/hebrew/Trotsky/1929/BP-Permanent.htm

^[29] Amandine Gnanguênon, Antonin Tisseron, “West Africa: structural fragilities, jihadist expansion and regional conflicts”, Politique étrangère Issue 2, April 2023, pages 123 to 134, p. 123-134.

See the link in French: https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2023-2-page-123.htm

See the link in English: https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2023-2-page-123.htm

^[30] A failed state is a sovereign state and body politic that has disintegrated to the point where the sovereign government no longer functions properly. This situation can also happen when the government loses the legitimacy of its existence because it does not perform its role properly – Accountability. For the country to have a stable government, the government must be both effective, and not lose the legitimacy of its existence. 1) The main characteristics of the failed state are loss of control over its territories, or monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force; 2) erosion of the legitimacy of the authority to make collective decisions; 3) Inability to provide public services; 4) Inability to interact with other countries as a member body of the international community.

^[31] See the link: https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/lapproche-africaine-de-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme- reste-inadaptee

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