Seeking a soft revolution via a coalition of dissidents that rejects clerical rule is a third option. A secular-oriented Iran would be less of a threat than one run by extremist clerics whose goal is to extend the Iranian Revolution to the region, Europe, and perhaps even to the world.

First published in Foreign Policy

Jay Solomon and Carol Lee, two widely respected reporters of The Wall Street Journal, wrote last week on Iran as both a nuclear threshold state and a rogue regime. On Feb. 13, Solomon and Lee said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sent a new letter to President Obama.

That letter was in response to one sent by President Barack Obama in October 2014 that linked progress in the nuclear talks with cooperation between Washington and Tehran against the Islamic State (also called ISIS). According to these journalists, an unnamed Iranian diplomat informed them that Obama had sent a letter that raised the possibility of what I would call an American-Iranian entente cordiale to counter the Islamic if a nuclear deal is secured. Khamenei was supposedly “respectful” but noncommittal on the Obama offer to cooperate against the Islamic State.

Congressional pushback against a bad deal in the bilateral nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington plus expected failure of the multilateral Geneva talks could invigorate Hill pressure on the administration for reversion to the prior international consensus of zero right to enrich uranium gas on Iranian soil and zero breakout time before Tehran can dash for the bomb before inspectors can detect its moves. During July 2014, moreover, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exclaimed that allowing Iran to have “any enrichment will trigger an arms race in the Middle East,” a signal that she favored the zero-enrichment option.

There also is growing support for tough measures against Iran in general. They include: ballistic missile constraints and zero collusion of Washington with Tehran in the fight against the Islamic State. Anticipate the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under the leadership of Chairman Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Ranking Member Bob Menendez (D-NJ) to hold hearings that put the heat on Team Obama for tying the nuclear talks to an informal alignment with Iran against ISIS.

Mainstream media will continue to expose the administration’s concessions to Iran, as in recent editorials of the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. In the context of strong pressure from the Hill, expect to find more advocacy for the idea of regime change from within, e.g., by explicitly recognizing Iranian dissidents in a broad coalition that rejects rule by the ayatollahs.

Iran as a Nuclear Threshold State and as a Revolutionary Rogue Regime

Nuclear threshold states include Brazil and Japan. They opt for nuclear-arms restraint despite significant nuclear capabilities. Although they presentchallenges, they are not rogue states; hence, there is less concern if their capabilities lead to acquisition of the bomb. They lack sufficient political toxicity.

Rogue regimes contain the lethal elements, which make the combination with being a threshold nuclear state so dangerous. Such regimes do not play by the rules of the international game. Three such principles are state sponsorship of international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and use of proxies to destabilize other nations. Iran is in violation of all three.

Iran uses state-sponsored terrorism and covert arms transfers to destabilize other nations near and far (Iran in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Morocco,Latin America, especially Argentina, and in the United States); Iran engages in proliferation of weapons technology to third parties (Iran and North Koreaproliferate with each other — uranium enrichment forplutonium reprocessing); and Tehran employs proxies to hide its covert takeover of other nations (Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and Iran’s Hezbollah in Lebanon).

On Feb 11, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade held a hearing, “State Sponsor of Terror: The Global Threat of Iran.” During the hearing, a bipartisan group of lawmakers expressed deep concern about Tehran’s sponsorship of terrorism.

Why is the Islamic Republic of Iran such a miscreant? It is because the regime is run by ayatollahs intent on spreading the virus of its 1979 Revolution in Iran while posing as a normal state with which we can do business. As former State Department official and now Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Ray Takeyh, states in the Sept-Oct 2012 issue of The National Interest, “The Islamic Republic is different from its revolutionary counterparts in that the ideology of its state is its religion.”

Because of this central role of religious-based ideology in the authoritarian nature of Iran, traditional means of influence based on national interest calculations have little prospect of success. Hence, increasingly scholars and policymakers are paying more attention to bringing about regime change from within spearheaded by dissidents to avoid a choice between bombing Iran and living with a nuclear-armed Iran. Ivan Sascha Sheehan, a specialist at the University of Baltimore “unpacks” this soft revolution approach and applies it to Iran.

In view of these ideological imperatives, the evolution of the current nuclear talks with Iran is instructive. They began in 2004 and 2005 with the EU-Three (France, Germany, and Britain) and were reinforced by six U.N. Security Council Resolutions that denied Iran to enrich uranium. The original goal of the multilateral approach was to deny Iran a capability to develop a military nuclear option. Talks now are mostly a bilateral negotiation between Tehran and Washington over the scope of Iran’s nuclear capability. “The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it,” according to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on Jan. 29, 2015, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Under the chair of Sen. McCain (R-Ariz.), also expect pushback-type hearings against concessions by the administration.

Iran’s ideological stance trumps national interest bargaining and succeeds in getting recognition of a supposed “right to enrich.” Tehran weakens the resolve of multilateral proposals, leaving current talks to be about such issues as how many enrichment centrifuges Iran can possess, e.g., from some 19,000 now to about 7,000, supposedly in a preliminary “deal” negotiated by Tehran and Washington, according to Israel Times of Jan. 31.

In summary, there is no need for cooperation with Iran against the Islamic State, and it is a recipe for expanding Tehran’s revolutionary toxicity to Iraq and Syria. Rather than choosing between bombing Iran and living with a nuclear armed Iran, there is a third way: encouraging a soft revolution in Iran via a coalition of like-minded dissidents. An Iran without the Islamist taint might be in the same category of states like Brazil and Japan, whose nuclear aims are not tarnished by extremist ideology.

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The clock is ticking. The handwriting is on the wall, the evidence is clear; no mystical clairvoyant capabilities are needed to see the future. No amount of wishful thinking or “politically correct” apologetics is going to change what is rapidly becoming an inevitable and obvious fact of our lives. The free and democratic countries of the world are in serious danger.

References:

1. BBC World News, 21 June 2004 – https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3827589.stm 
2. https://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040914-7.html  
3. https://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83107/graham-allison/how-to-stop-nuclear-terror.html 
4. Nicholas D. Kristof, N.Y. Times, August 11, 2004

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Over the past several years the international community has been faced with the issue of Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities. Many see Iranian nuclear weapons as a threat to the world’s peace and security, and as an undermining factor to the fragile strategic balance in the Middle East.

Despite Iran’s stated purpose for its nuclear program – civilian power generation – its persistent attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to develop the capability to launch long range ballistic missiles continually belie its official stand. Moreover, coupled with its extreme religious ideology and use of violence, its leaders’ public declarations about conducting a holy war (a Jihad) against the United States – the big Satan, and Israel – the small Satan, and its continuing support of terrorist organizations in the Iraqi, Lebanese and Palestinian theatres, its nuclear overtures are increasingly the main factors in the tension between Iran and the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program began in 1970 when it ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since that time its nuclear facilities have supposedly been under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There is evidence, however (some from IAEA’s own reports), that despite the IAEA’s alleged scrutiny Iran has repeatedly tried to develop capabilities to enrich uranium and to separate plutonium, essential for building nuclear devices. Additional reports recently published by the IAEA revealed that Iran is not willing to fulfill the NPT’s demands, and that it has tried to obtain centrifuges that carry out the enrichment process, allegations that United States and Israeli intelligence agencies have been making for several years. In the past ten years Iran has done everything within its power to deceive the international community and to conceal its build up of nuclear weapons to gain more time to achieve operational capabilities. Nevertheless, it is known that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is comprised of scores of secret sites spread throughout a vast territory, which are not under any international supervision, and some of which were built within military installations deep underground to protect them from the possibility of aerial attack.

Thus Iran’s attempts to build nuclear bombs are tangible, and without international intervention, it seems that nothing will stop it from realizing its ambition. Furthermore, Iran’s support of terrorist organizations operating in different areas of the Middle East, Africa and Asia increases the fear that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, they could be transferred to these organizations. Therefore, it is in the international community’s best interest to do whatever it can to prevent a country with radical ideology and aspirations from putting its hands on the most destructive weapon ever built by man. At the moment there is consensus among the main actors in the international system – the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations – regarding the level of threat posed by Iran, were it to acquire nuclear weapons. It seems that the international community is reluctant, however, to join forces and to act firmly against Iran’s nuclear program.

During the last meeting held in Texas between US President George W. Bush and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon in April 2005, the latter asked President Bush to consider turning to the UN Security Council to increase the international pressure on Iran, through the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against it. At the meeting, Prime Minister Sharon presented Israeli intelligence reports indicating that Iran is only a few months away from the “point of no return” in its development of military nuclear capabilities, and argued that based on this information it was crucial to act quickly and decisively to thwart the Iranian nuclear weapons program. President Bush rejected the Israeli assessments and said that according to United States intelligence evaluations, Iran is still years away from obtaining nuclear capability and that the United States has no intention to attack Iran as long as diplomatic efforts are still ongoing. Russian President, Vladimir Putin has similarly acknowledged the scope of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program, noting that it could touch on Russia’s security interests. Nonetheless, in a statement he made during his visit to Israel at the end of April 2005, President Putin confirmed that the nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia would continue.

It is apparent therefore, that the actions being taken against Iran will not deviate from diplomatic boundaries and international sanctions. This kind of policy, combining international isolation, Security Council resolutions and economic and military sanctions can, at best, slow down Iran’s nuclear program, but at worst, it can also achieve the exact opposite. It can push Iran further to enhance its efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal.

The South African Model

A policy comprised of boycotts and international expulsion together with comprehensive sanctions, had already been attempted in the past, in a different context – against the Republic of South Africa and its apartheid regime – and one of its severe consequences was to encourage South Africa to develop nuclear bombs.

The international campaign against the apartheid regime began when the world’s opposition to the racist policy against the black majority reached its peak at the beginning of the 1970’s. The international concerns intensified after the riots in Soweto district in June 1976, when thousands of black students staged a demonstration against the racist policy of the apartheid regime, which resulted in the death of 23 blacks by the police forces. The campaign against South Africa consisted of several elements. In a series of UN Security Council resolutions, diplomatic isolation was imposed on South Africa. In addition, the Organization of African Unity and other international organizations decided to suspend South Africa’s membership.

For the diplomatic isolation to be effective, the UN also imposed economic and cultural sanctions on South Africa, prohibiting any type of commercial, cultural, sports and academic relations. Furthermore, an embargo on the supply of oil and petroleum products and a mandatory embargo on the provision of arms, technological knowledge and spare parts were also imposed.

The final step, which ultimately completed the international expulsion of South Africa and marked its denunciation from the international community, was nuclear isolation. Until the mid 1970’s, South Africa’s nuclear program, which was facilitated by American technology and fuel to run the nuclear reactors, was designated for civilian purposes only. When the United States recognized apartheid as a threat to the region’s stability, it decided to terminate its nuclear cooperation with South Africa. South Africa’s refusal to sign the NPT, which it viewed as a form of political blackmail, led to international consensus that South Africa’s nuclear program needed to be curbed at any cost, as stipulated by the NPT, and its membership in the IAEA was suspended.

These international actions, although not aimed directly against South Africa’s nuclear program, but rather, derived from the desire to put an end to the racist regime, led South African leaders to perceive that “the noose was tightening around their necks.” This perception by South Africa’s leaders, namely, of a total onslaught by the international community, albeit through non-violent means, brought on a sense of fear for South Africa’s national security. It was that perception, and, paradoxically, the international expulsion, boycotts, mandatory UN sanctions and regional and intra-state security deterioration, which consequently accelerated South Africa’s nuclear program and led to its development of nuclear devices.

In light of South Africa’s ostracization and its international and regional status, its leaders increasingly grew to espouse a policy of self-determination, based on a perception that the nation could only trust itself and that South Africa’s national security and sovereignty must not be dependent on other countries. Hence, the apartheid regime viewed the nuclear program as the basis for guaranteeing South Africa’s security and safeguarding the apartheid regime. Therefore, the South African government ordered the development of six nuclear bombs as part of a nuclear deterrence policy. The main goal of this policy was to prevent intervention of outside factors (states or international organizations) in South Africa’s internal affairs. The government’s position was that nuclear weapons would be used only in cases of clear and present danger to South Africa’s national security or its regime, and only when no other option existed.

From this moment on, substantial percentage of South Africa’s resources was invested in accelerating its development of nuclear weapons. A crucial component in its nuclear program was the ability to form a web of surreptitious ties with other countries that were willing and able to supply South Africa with essential products and help augment its nuclear program and military power. Secret nuclear cooperation was established with countries willing to risk breaching the mandatory international sanctions. With the help of disobedient states, such as Israel, South Africa began nuclear testing by the beginning of the 1980’s and in 1982 it completed its first nuclear bomb. This moment was of utmost importance for South Africa – it perceived its deployment of a nuclear device as guaranteeing its sovereignty and the survival of the apartheid regime, and it instilled the notion that henceforth, the probability of an outside threat to the regime’s survival was extremely low.

Ten years later, the Republic of South Africa made history in the nuclear era when its government voluntarily decided to stop the production of nuclear bombs and dismantle the country’s nuclear arsenal. It is essential to understand, however, that the reason for the dismantling of the nuclear bombs was fundamentally internal, and not directly due to its international isolation. Specifically, the decision to dismantle came in anticipation of the expected changes in government and the transfer of power to Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress; the concern that black leaders would possess nuclear bombs; the impending democratic reforms, and the desire to regain South Africa’s place in the international community. South Africa’s president at the time, F. W. De Klerk recognized that his country’s nuclear capability and attendant deterrence policy appeared needless and possibly posed an obstacle to the country’s return to the international arena. Nuclear disarmament symbolized South Africa’s shift from a nuclear power to a state committed to international conventions, and one that undertakes decisive efforts to curb the development and distribution of weapons of mass destruction, thus gaining a place of honor among the nations of the world.

Iran’s Nuclear Program vs. South Africa’s Nuclear Program

When comparing Iran’s and South Africa’s nuclear programs, it is possible to identify a number of common denominators that could assist in understanding why Iran is capable of developing nuclear weapons and what might motivate it to do so. First, it is clear that both countries feared international intervention in their internal affairs. Furthermore, diplomatic isolation and economic and military sanctions could undoubtedly be considered boosting factors for the relevance of their nuclear programs. In addition, in both countries the human resources involved in the different aspects of developing nuclear weapons were extremely skilled and highly trained. A large portion of the scientists, engineers and technicians working in both countries’ nuclear programs gained their professional education in western countries or in countries with advanced nuclear capabilities – in South Africa’s case it was the United States, United Kingdom and Israel, and in Iran’s case it was Russia, China, Pakistan, North Korea, to a degree some of the EU countries and to a lesser degree even the United States. Both South Africa and Iran maintained a modern military industry employing sophisticated technologies in the developing and manufacturing stages. Despite their skilled manpower and advanced technologies, both countries abstained from setting ambitious goals for their nuclear industry and limited themselves to reachable objectives. This is the reason for the simple design and specifications of South Africa’s and Iran’s nuclear devices and for the relatively low development costs. Finally, despite the enormous efforts made by the international community to supervise South Africa’s and Iran’s nuclear facilities, both countries successfully deceived western intelligence agencies and established a clandestine network that provided the necessary equipment and knowledge to develop nuclear capability.

When investigating Iran’s recent nuclear program, it is impossible not to notice its resemblance to the South African model. It is incumbent, therefore, on the international community to learn the lessons derived from the South African model, and to do whatever is necessary to prevent Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. Clinging to the prevailing international policy, led by the United States and the EU, it is foreseeable that the world will eventually find itself dealing with Iran in an entirely different field with a completely different set of rules, including, most significantly, Iran’s possession of nuclear capability.

Although there is considerable resemblance between Iran’s and South Africa’s nuclear programs, one should bear in mind a crucial distinction. It is important to mention that South Africa’s nuclear program was conducted during, and to some extent because of, the Cold War and the fear of Soviet expansion into sub-equatorial Africa. This fear became even more germane after communist movements backed by the Soviet Union took control of Angola and Mozambique and over sixty five thousand Cuban and East German troops entered Angola. Because of the regional volatility, the two super-powers chose not to be directly involved in the region, but to use proxies to represent their interests instead, fearing that direct intervention might escalate the conflict into a global one. South Africa took advantage of the Super-powers’ and the rest of the world’s passiveness, and continued to develop its nuclear weapons. Nowadays, when the only Super-power left in the international system has declared a War on Terror and designated Iran as part of the Axis of Evil, there is a higher probability that the international community would be willing to take a less passive approach against Iran and would not tolerate its dilatory and concealment tactics.

Another aspect that should be considered by an international community intent on thwarting Iran’s nuclear program is the enormous power and public support held by the radical and conservative groups headed by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Hoseini Khamenei, as was recently demonstrated when his protégé, the hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as the new President of Iran. Every attempt made by the former President Ali Mohammad Khatami to resuscitate Iran’s failing economy, to instigate liberal reforms and to improve Iran’s relations with the Arab and western worlds, has encountered massive resistance, popular street demonstrations and use of force by the Iranian “Hard-Liners.”. Iran’s nuclear program is perceived by many, both in the leadership and in the public, as the ultimate safeguard to the regime’s sovereignty. Therefore, to maintain the government’s tenuous stability, former President Khatami has been extremely cautious with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, avoiding confrontations when possible with the radicals who are pressuring for the acquisition of nuclear capability. One of the most vocal and enthusiastic advocates of Iran’s nuclear program is Dr. Hassan Rowhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, who has a strong relationship with Khamenei. Dr. Rowhani, who also served as the chief nuclear negotiator, has repeatedly stated that Iran’s nuclear program is fundamental to the national interest, and that any military attack aimed at Iran’s nuclear facilities would motivate it to accelerate its nuclear program. It seems very unlikely that internal factors would convince Iranian leaders to relinquish their nuclear aspirations, as was the case in the South African model. Iran has gone too far and invested too much in its nuclear program to cave in now. The world should understand this and adopt a more aggressive approach.

What is the international community doing to stop Iran’s Nuclear Program?

Several countries are trying to impose international pressure on Iran, in the hope of prompting a discussion of Iran’s nuclear program at the UN Security Council. There is a danger, however, that this strategy may backfire. First, this pressure could prove inefficient when bringing this issue to the Security Council, as it might result in Russia or China using their right to veto any resolution against Iran. At the same time, the pressure could drive Iran to accelerate further its nuclear program because it would perceive such pressure as tightening the noose around its neck. One of the lessons that should be learned from the international sanctions imposed on South Africa is that in that situation countries were willing to violate the sanctions and to ignore the Security Council’s resolutions, to preserve their commercial and military relations with South Africa. Consequently, it took almost ten years for the sanctions imposed on South Africa to have the desired impact of forcing a change in that government’s racist policy. Even the international sanctions inflicted upon Iraq by the Security Council in 1990 proved toothless, since only few countries actually abided by them. The time factor is critical for the international community’s struggle against Iran, since Iran’s rapid development of its nuclear capabilities does not accord the international community the privilege to wait ten years – nor five years – for the effect of the sanctions, if imposed, to achieve the desired outcome.

Already today, Iran faces some limitations cast on it by the UN, the IAEA and others. The split within the international community, however, regarding the policy that should be adopted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons enables Iran to continue its nuclear aspirations and even to garner the support of Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, China, Germany and other countries. The declared policy of the “EU Three” – Germany, France and the UK – known also as the “Critical Dialogue”, aims to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program by deepening further the ties of cooperation with western countries and by offering incentives to Iran in various fields, in the hope that strengthened diplomatic and economic ties will convince Iran to give up its nuclear program. The United States’ policy led by President Bush, on the other hand, is sterner and tends to favour UN sanctions as a first but necessary step, although the US constantly states that it will not attack Iran, but rather that it will allow the “EU Three” to utilize existing diplomatic channels to their fullest.

The United States’ military campaigns against two of Iran’s neighboring countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the declaration made by President Bush that Iran is considered one of the Axis of Evil countries, have undoubtedly resulted in Iran’s decision not to yield to the international pressure and in the strengthening of the deterrence factions within its leadership. For example, the recent arms deal signed between United States and Israel to supply one hundred GBU-28 “Bunker Blaster” bombs to Israel received massive media coverage in Iran and increased speculation regarding a military attack by Israel. Moreover, it is likely that Iran, having observed the United States’ and the international community’s lack of readiness and unwillingness to act aggressively against North Korea, which recently publicized its nuclear weapon capabilities, feels emboldened to continue with its weapons drive. On the other hand, United States leaders were more than ready to invade Iraq and to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, knowing that Iraq did not have ready-to-use nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the eyes of the Iranian leaders, nuclear capability is an imperative element necessary to deter the international community, led by the United States, from taking military actions against Iran.

What Should be Done?

If the world does not want to find itself dealing with an Iran possessing nuclear weapons, as was the case with South Africa, lessons from the South African model must be learned, particularly in light of the risk that current international efforts aimed to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear capability may prove counterproductive.

Boycotts, isolation and sanctions are important steps but would not suffice to stop Iran’s nuclear program. On one hand, the international community in general, and the EU in particular, must understand that only forceful policy combined with aggressive action could prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capability. The Iranian regime on the other hand, ought to understand that the days when countries were willing to turn a blind eye towards Iran’s continuing support of terrorist organizations, its involvement in Lebanon’s internal affairs, its funding of Hizballah, and its public threats against the United States and Israel, are over. The world must convey an austere and decisive message aimed to prevent Iran from obtaining the capability to attack severely another country, as it has repeatedly threatened to do on previous occasions.

Every action that would be concluded in the diplomatic channels and the economic and military sanctions might be ineffective and even dangerous. Until the sanctions and the deliberations would be finalized, Iran would probably have at least one nuclear bomb ready for deployment, making it far more dangerous for the international community to act with force against Iran. The international community must be willing to take a risk and to use aerial forces launching cruise missile and “smart bombs” against strategic targets in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s leaders must be convinced that the threat they face now is different from any other threat that they have ever previously confronted. They must be made fully aware of the consequences of their nuclear ambitions and forced to bear in mind that the international community would do whatever is in its power to foil Iran’s nuclear program.

The international community should present Iran with a plan composed of series of incremental steps and a fixed timetable, premised on the understanding that Iran must give up its nuclear program, or face an aggressive international reaction. These incremental steps would allow the international community to gain the necessary international legitimacy essential for any military action against Iran, should it not comply with the world’s demands. The first step should be taken by the IAEA’s Board of Governors in their next meeting in September 2005. If Iran would not agree to give free access to IAEA’s inspectors, to show more transparency and to reveal all its nuclear facilities, and if the negotiations between the “EU Three” and Iran would fail, the Board of Governors must agree to take this matter immediately to the UN Security Council. The second step should include a Security Council resolution imposing limited sanctions on Iran and a defined time schedule to “correct” the situation in a face-saving manner. A fixed timetable is crucial at this point, because Iran had showed in the past its ability to deceive the international community by moving some of its nuclear installations to secret places. The nature of these sanctions would focus on technological, military and commercial cooperation as well as on diplomatic relations, and in ninety days the Security Council would reconvene to review the situation. If Iran would continue to develop nuclear weapons and would not obey the Security Council’s resolution, total isolation should be forced on Iran and it would be defined as a pariah state. The United States and EU would supervise the implementation of this isolation, and if there would be evidence that Iran’s nuclear program didn’t come to a full stop, the international community, led by the United States, would have the permission to use any means necessary to terminate the dispute over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, including massive missile strike and aerial bombardment.

Nowadays, the general opinion among the radical and conservative circles in Iran is that nuclear weapons are the sole element that can guarantee Iran’s survival and the continuation of its Islamic regime. The international steps outlined above should convey a clear message to the Iranian government that it would be wise to understand that the likely consequence that it faces if it continues with its nuclear ambitions is the risk of an attack against those nuclear installations and probably the collapse of the Islamic regime. To that end, the international community must present to Iran’s leaders clearly and unequivocally the economic and diplomatic benefits that Iran would gain from relinquishing its nuclear program, including international assistance, re-establishment of commercial relations with the West and the opening of Iran’s markets to foreign investments. Taking a page from the South African model, only if the light at the end of the tunnel is shown to Iran, can rationality overcome radicalism and the Iranian government may begin to accord greater value to the other option, namely, economic vitality at the cost of renouncing its nuclear program. Once Iran’s leaders would be certain that the international community is determined to act and to deploy all the necessary means against it, they would also realize that the development of nuclear weapons would also risk the end of the Islamic regime.

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Just a Matter of Time

Nuclear Terrorism

Chemical Terrorism

Biological Terrorism

How to Respond

The post Non-Conventional Terrorism: Chemical, Nuclear, and Biological appeared first on ICT.

*The writer is Additional Secretary (ret.), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai.

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The likelihood of economic sanctions persuading the Iranian leadership to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons is very low; the record of economic sanctions is not good: long-standing international sanctions remain in place against North Korea, Ivory Coast, and Somalia without noticeable effects on their policies; embargoes against Serbia and Libya ended, as with Iraq, only after military intervention forced change.

After long refusing to negotiate about its nuclear program, Iran has reversed itself. Talks with American and European representatives are scheduled to begin on 13 April in Ankara, Turkey. Still, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is skeptical about the outcome. Questioning the regime’s claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, she has vowed that the United States is “determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” Her skepticism echoes that of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s, which in November 2011 reported the Iranian program was consistent with the development of nuclear explosives. The preeminent though unresolved question remains: what to do if Iran refuses to change its nuclear course.

Sensible observers agree that a nuclear Iran would be a geo-political nightmare. President Obama has affirmed as well that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would be “unacceptable.” A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a mortal threat to Israel, would enlarge its toolbox as a sponsor of terrorism, and prompt other states also to go nuclear. But opinions differ about how soon Iran will have the capability to produce a bomb and what must be done to stop it.

Despite three years of urging by the Obama administration the Iranians have refused to curb their program. Their centrifuges continue to spin out enriched uranium without pause. The growing volume of material can easily be further enriched to bomb-quality standards in a matter of months.

Recently tightened economic sanctions by the United States and others have goaded Iranian leaders to agree to the talks. But based both on Iran’s past behavior and the historical ineffectiveness of sanctions, the chances that non-military pressure will alter the regime’s behavior seem slim to none.

Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the ayatollah-run regime has never ceased its hostility to the United States. Outright belligerency began in November of that year when Islamist students took over the U.S. embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. Two years later, Iranian-backed terrorists struck twice at American targets in Lebanon. In April 1983 they bombed the American embassy in Beirut, and in October the U.S. military barracks there, killing 244 servicemen.

During the past decade, Iranian-backed forces have been responsible for numerous American battlefield casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Iran’s provision of arms and training to Hamas and Hezbollah has fueled the group’s terrorist activities against Israel, America’s principal ally in the Middle East.) While the United States may not consider itself at war with Iran, Iranian behavior hardly suggests the reverse is true.

Any hope for a successful outcome of the upcoming negotiations lies in the supposition that the Iranian leadership will be sensible and yield to further pressure short of military intervention. Here the administration offers mixed messages. Contrary to Secretary Clinton’s skepticism, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seems to hold a more sanguine view of the regime’s sensibility. The Iranian regime “is a rational actor,” he said. This implies that Iran would permit verification that its program is not weapons-bound rather than suffer further diplomatic and economic pressure. But expecting sanctions to force policy change is improbable by any historical measure.

Examples abound. The United States and others have sustained an embargo against Cuba for more than fifty years. Most Arab countries have maintained a boycott of Israel since its establishment in 1948. The United Nations imposed a decade-long embargo on Iraq that ended only after Saddam Hussein’s regime suffered military defeat in 2003. At most, those sanctions caused some shortages and inconvenience, though in no instance a change of policy. Efforts elsewhere to influence behavior by diplomatic or economic pressure have proved equally futile. Long-standing international sanctions remain in place against North Korea, Ivory Coast, and Somalia without noticeable effects on their policies. Embargoes against Serbia and Libya ended, as with Iraq, only after military intervention forced change.

One of few presumptive exceptions was the peaceful dissolution of South Africa’s apartheid policy in 1994. World pressure on the country helped move its white population to support suffrage for all citizens. But South Africa’s democratic electoral structure, though limited largely to whites, had long been in place and not comparable to Iran’s Islamist-dominated authoritarian system. The ruling mullahs are no more likely to yield to economic pressure than have the North Koreans.

Sanctioned countries generally establish backchannels to receive food, fuel, and other necessities. Iran’s economy is reportedly suffering because of pressures from the West, but the country hardly needs secret channels to sustain a flow of essential goods. Russia, China, and others maintain very public commercial relations despite American protestation.

What exactly will the United States do if Iran remains unwilling to open its facilities for full inspection and provide the evidence called for by the West? If Obama and Clinton’s promises of prevention are genuine, the only option will be to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities. But despite those promises, the administration’s actions bespeak hesitancy. Emphasizing uncertainty of success and the condemnation that an attack might provoke, the government has counseled Israel to refrain from military action at this point.

Which raises the question whether at any point these caveats would be less salient. And when, if ever, the administration would see them as less of an obstacle to armed intervention.

* Leonard A. Cole, an expert on bioterrorism and on terror medicine, teaches at Rutgers University and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

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Some nations already see the environment as almost equal in importance to military, diplomatic, information and economic power. Each of these “instruments of power” is used as a tool to achieve national security goals by various nations. As the environment gains in importance worldwide, environmental warfare will take its place beside military warfare, economic warfare, and information warfare. Turning and turning in the widening gyre,
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned . . .

W. B. Yeats, The Second Coming

Environmental Warfare and its Implications
Both policymakers and military planners of many nations are likely to face the threat of environmental warfare in the near future. It has many attributes that make it a preferred method of warfare. Generally, it is cost-effective and requires no advanced weapons systems. If advanced systems are available, they can be used to enhance weapons effectiveness or increase options. Treaties are unlikely to hinder the operations of many states. As a general rule, environmental attacks will be conducted primarily by aerospace forces. Aircraft will be the preferred means to attack dams, plants, and facilities. Aircraft will be used to disseminate aerosols against crops and other resources. Space will become an environmental battlefield.

Despite these depressing conclusions, there is hope, as demonstrated by the ACSC environmental warfare team. Military officers from four nations with histories of conflict and environmental friction were able to gaze soberly at the future. The team unreservingly identified the dangers before the world. This cooperation by military professionals suggests that political cooperation is also possible. Political action could eventually create international conditions that would make the use of environmental warfare, by anyone, unacceptable.

It has been said that the reason that 1984 was not like 1984 was because Orwell provided an appalling caution about how the future might be. ACSC’s environmental warfare research project results should be considered both a warning to military planners and a plea to policymakers for action. The cooperative effort shown by the team members indicates the stars are not fixed. Environmental warfare need not become the scourge of the future. International resolve and sincere desire to avoid the peril, however, are indispensable.

In the shape of its still-developing modes of destruction, the world today threatens unprecedented risks and insecurities. More and more, it looks very much like the anarchic world prophesied by the poet Yeats, a world in which virtually everything exudes violence–the newspapers, “civilization,” the very face of humankind. Terrorism, of course, is an important element of this violence, and–in the future– terrorism could even take a variety of nuclear forms.

Yet, despite a steadily expanding literature on counterterrorism, including the threat of nuclear terrorism, little of real value has been produced for the benefit of policymakers on the “front lines.” To correct this very portentous deficiency, scholars should soon begin to understand that effective strategies for preventing nuclear terror must be extrapolated from more generic strategies of counterterrorism. Moreover, the development of these more general strategies is itself contingent upon a willingness and capacity to ask the right questions.

Before identifying these questions, it should be understood that insurgent groups, in seeking to undertake acts of nuclear terror, would require access to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage facilities. Should such groups seek to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, they would require both special nuclear materials and the expertise to convert these materials into bombs or radiological weapons. Both requirements are now well within the range of certain terrorist organizations, especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The questions that need to be asked are mostly conceptual in nature and can produce a fuller understanding of the risk calculations of terrorist organizations. They focus, therefore, upon those factors that are most likely to affect such calculations. Until we can understand the particular terrorist stance on situational risk-taking, and the vital differences between terrorist groups on this stance, we will not be able to identify a promising policy for prevention and control.

These questions need to be asked by all those who would now fashion an effective strategy of counter nuclear terrorism for the United States. Here it should also be noted that such a strategy would be entirely consistent with the expectations of international law. From the standpoint of these particular expectations, any use of nuclear explosives or radiation by a terrorist group would represent a serious violation of the laws of war. These laws have been brought to bear upon nonstate actors in world politics by Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and by the two 1917 protocols to these conventions.

Is there a particular ordering of preferences that is common to many or to all terrorist groups, or is there significant variation from one group to another? If it can be determined that many or all terrorist groups actually share a basic hierarchy of wants, a general strategy of counter nuclear terrorist operations can begin to be shaped. Alternatively, if significant variations in preference orderings can be detected between terrorist groups, myriad strategies of an individually tailored nature will have to be identified.

Some of these strategies may include proactive measures, known in law as expressions of anticipatory self-defense. Such measures would be rooted jurisprudentially in the 1837 Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion in Upper Canada against British rule. Here, then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self-defense that did not require actual attack. Military preemption of a threat could be judged permissible so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”

Are there particular preferences that tend to occupy the highest positions in the preference hierarchies of terrorist groups, and how might these preferences be effectively obstructed? In this connection, it is especially important to examine the widely held assumption that terrorists, like states/countries, are most anxious to avoid negative physical sanctions. In fact, a great deal of sophisticated conceptual analysis and experimental evidence now indicates that such sanctions are apt to be especially ineffective in certain circumstances and may even prove markedly counterproductive.

To what extent, if any, would the obstruction of terrorist group preferences prove offensive to some of our principal national values as Americans? In this case, we must be concerned about the very real possibility that effective counter nuclear terrorist measures might be starkly injurious to social justice and civil liberties. Here, the people and their government must first decide whether the prospective benefits of proposed anti-terrorist legislation/activity are great enough to outweigh the prospective costs. This sort of decision is already current concerning controversy over The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.

To what extent, if any, are the risk calculations of terrorists affected by geographic dispersion, and intermingling with other states, either friendly or hostile to this country? Because terrorist groups do not occupy space/territory in the manner of states/countries, they are normally not susceptible to usual threats of deterrence. How, then, might effective counter nucleterrorism be reconciled withe reality of terrorist geographic dispersion?

To what extent, if any, might the decisional calculi of terrorist groups be receptive to positive cues or sanctions as opposed to negative ones, and, exactly, which rewards seem to warrant serious consideration? This, of course, is a most sensitive question, as we don’t wish to violate the longstanding peremptory principle of law known formally as Nullum crimen sine poena, “No crime without a punishment.” At the same time, we need to weigh the value of this principle against that of saving lives, perhaps even tens of thousands of lives. It will not be an easy equilibrium to determine. (The generic imperative to punish crimes was reaffirmed at Principle I of the Nuremberg Principles in 1946: “Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment.” This obligation applies especially to crimes of terrorism.)

To what extent would the implementation of effective counter nuclear terrorist measures require special patterns of international cooperation, and how might such patterns be created? In principle, the surest path to success in averting nuclear terrorism against the United States lies in a unified opposition to terrorism by all states. Yet, for the foreseeable future, such opposition is assuredly not in the cards. We must, therefore, ask ourselves, what cooperative patterns between particular states can help to cope with the threat?

To what extent, if any, are the risk calculations of terrorists affected by their particular relations with “host” states? Because terrorist groups necessarily operate within the framework of states, the character of the relationship between “visitor” and “host” will affect the viability of counter nuclear terrorist measures. How, then, might our government exploit what is known about such relationships in curbing the threat of nuclear terrorism?

To what extent, if any, are the risk calculations of terrorist groups affected by alignments with states or with other terrorist groups? And how, therefore, can we use what we know about such effects to devise a productive counter nuclear terrorist program? For the United States today, this means special attention to prevailing alignments between radical Islamic groups and various Arab/Islamic states, and between such groups directly. Regarding interterrorist alignments in the Middle East, things are not always what they seem. PLO and Hamas, for example, are not adversaries in any meaningful sense (this notion is a fiction surrounding the so-called Middle East Peace Process), but distinct allies in all matters of consequence.

To what extent, if any, are the risk calculations of terrorist groups affected by the terrorist pattern of random and uninhibited violence? In asking this question, we acknowledge, among other things, that terrorism is a crime of both passion and of logic. Moreover, we may also acknowledge here that orientations to death of particular terrorist organizations can play a decisive role in their preferred forms of operation.

Consider, for example, a recent statement by Jamal Abdel Hamid Yussef, explaining operations of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, military wing of Hamas, Gaza: “Our suicide operations are a message . . . that our people love death. Our goal is to die for the sake of God, and if we live we want to humiliate Jews and trample on their necks.” Combined with access to nuclear weapons, such an orientation to death warrants very close examination.

To what extent, if any, are the risk calculations of terrorist groups affected by the degree to which their policies evoke sympathy and support from others? As almost all acts of terror are essentially propagandistic, it is important to understand their desired effects on selected publics in order to prevent escalation to a nuclear option.

Public authorities must also seek to prevent terrorist escalation to other “higher-order” forms of violence using chemical and/or biological weapons. Just as the prospect of nuclear terrorism is linked to the spread of nuclear weapons and technology among states, so is the risk of chemical/biological terrorism linked, inter alia, to the spread of CBW weapons and technology among states. There already erdsts a regime of international treaties, declarations and agreements designed to control chemical and biological weapons.

By considering these ten basic questions, scholars and policymakers can create the critical foundations of a counter nuclear terrorist strategy for the United States. As with all other adversarial groups, terrorists acquire a repertoire of behavior under the particular contingencies of reinforcement to which they are exposed. The task now is to understand this repertoire and to use it in order to inform pertinent preventive action.

In preparing for this task, both scholars and policymakers must understand that terror has an impact beyond incidence. Terror always has a distinct “quality,” a potentially decisive combination of venue and destructiveness that must be analyzed and anticipated. Linked to a particular species of fear, this quality of terror must represent a crucial variable in the war against terrorism.

Let us consider, in this connection, the qualitative difference between the actual Oklahoma City or World Trade Center bombings, and the potential lethal irradiation of tens of thousands of Oklahomans or New Yorkers, either by “small” nuclear explosions or by radiological contamination. Although it is certainly conceivable that a terrorist resort to higher-order nuclear destruction would prove to be counterproductive, this does not necessarily suggest a corresponding terrorist reluctance to undertake such an escalation. After all, if they are “logical” (rational), terrorists might not foresee such counter-productiveness, and if they are “passionate” (irrational) they might not care.

Writing about that species of fear that arises from tragedy, Aristotle emphasized that such fear “demands a person who suffers undeservedly” and that it must be felt by “one of ourselves.” This fear, or terror, has little or nothing to do with our private concern for an impending misfortune to others, but rather from our perceived resemblance to the victim. We feel terror on our own behalf; we fear that we may become the objects of commiseration.

Terror, in short, is fear referred back to ourselves. Naturally, therefore, the quality of this terror is at its highest point when this fear is especially acute and where suffering acutely is especially likely. And what could possibly create more acute fear of probable victimization than the threat of nuclear terrorism?

In seeking answers to our ten questions, scholars and policymakers will need, again and again, to ask an antecedent conceptual question: What, exactly, does the terrorist really hope to achieve? The answer? Above all, perhaps, the terrorist wishes to transform pain into power. This transformation is not always easy, as the correlation is not always proportionate. It is possible, at least on occasion, that inflicting the most excruciating and far reaching pain (the sort of pain that would be generated by nuclear terrorism) will inhibit terrorist power, while causing less overwhelming pain will enhance terrorist power.

The terrorist who seeks to transform pain into power has already learned from the torturer. He understands that pain, in order to be purposeful, must point fixedly toward death, but that it must not always actually kill. This is not to suggest, by any means, that terrorists do not seek to produce as many corpses as possible, but only that leaving live witnesses–live American witnesses, in our particular range of concern–is an essential part of the drama.

In the fashion of the torturer, the terrorist takes what is usually private and incommunicable, the pain contained within the boundaries of the sufferer’s own body, and uses it to affect the behavior of others. A grotesque form of theater that draws political power from the innermost depths of privacy, terrorism manipulates and amplifies pain within tindividual body for the express purpose of influenciothers who live outside that body. Violating the inviolable, it declares with unspeakable cruelty not only that no one is immune, but also that everyone’s most private horror can be made public.

The terrorist and his victims experience pain and power as opposites. As the victim’s suffering grows, so does the power of the terrorist. And as the power of the terrorist grows, so does the pain of his victims. For the bystanders, and this includes all Americans who are not directly involved in a particular terrorist attack, each infliction of pain is a mock execution, a reminder of American vulnerability and a denial of absolute Government power.

A terrorist escalation in the “quality” of terror could follow directly from a calculated correlation of pain and power. Terrorism intends to change a prospective victim’s general awareness that “All persons must die” to the more specific awareness: “I must die–and maybe soon.” Insofar as a resort to vastly more destructive forms of terror could hasten this change, the prospect of such resort should certainly be taken very seriously in this country.

The pain occasioned by terrorism, a pain that confers power upon the terrorist, begins within the private body, and then spills out more widely into the body politic. Wanting the two realms to become indistinguishable, the terrorist generally understands that it is certainly not enough that the victims feel pain. Rather, the pain must also be felt, vicariously but palpably, by all those who might still become victims in the future. When the pain has its origins in nuclear explosives or radioactivity, it is apt to be “felt” with special intensity.

There is one last point. In considering our ten essential questions, both scholars and policymakers should recall that terrorist selection of “quality” will be determined not only by calculating the expected effects upon victim populations, but also because of these expected effects upon the perpetrators. The “blooddimmed tide is loosed,” says Yeats, “and everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned.” From the start, all terrorists have accepted the idea of violence as purposeful in part because of its effect upon the perpetrator. Galvanized by what they have long described as a “battle of vengeance” (a term used frequently by Fatah), these terrorists have seen in their cowardly attacks not merely a way to influence victim populations, but also the Fanonian logic of “purifying” the victimizer.

By the standards of contemporary international law, terrorists are known as host humani generis, common enemies of human kind. In the fashion of pirates, who were “to be hanged by the first persons into who hands they fall” (from the distinguished 18th century legal scholar Emmerich de Vatte), terrorists are international outlaws who fall within the scope of “universal jurisdiction.” On a tactical basis, however, the timely apprehension of terrorists before they “go nuclear”–before the “ceremony of innocence drowned”–is not an easy matter. To ensure that such apprehension can be accomplished, scholars and policymakers should address themselves immediately to the ten essential questions discussed above.

Dr. Louis Rene Beres is Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, and is the author of many books and articles dealing with nuclear terrorism.

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There are many similarities between the Iranian and North-Korean regimes. They are both repressive regimes headed by leaders whose personalities are questionable, they have been criticized by the West for human rights violations, are both on the State Department’s list of countries that support terrorism, their nuclear programs have sent ripples through the international arena and they were both listed in the infamous “Axis of Evil”. However, any comparison between the Iranian and North-Korean nuclear program and attempts to draw conclusions regarding possible scenarios for Iran must also take into account the grave differences between the countries’ ideological, economic, military and geopolitical situations.

For Pyongyang, nuclear weapons are a means to an end and a way to bring the US to the bargaining table, receive financial aid and political concessions and be removed from the list of countries that support terrorism. Indeed, Pyongyang had no qualms about announcing its intentions to develop nuclear weapons. Some even argue that it did so overtly specifically in order to draw American attention and force them into negotiations. Economically, following the end of the Cold War and the cessation of Soviet support, North Korea found itself in dire financial difficulty and there were even reports of food shortages and starvation. This situation was further exacerbated by sanctions that limited North Korean commerce. Unwilling to undergo regime change or concede reforms, Pyongyang had nothing much to offer the international community in negotiations, hence it needed a nuclear program in order to have bargaining leverage. Militarily, North-Korea has the fourth largest army in the world and a clear conventional advantage over South Korea; the few nuclear weapons North-Korea does posses do not seriously threaten Russia or China. Hence, nuclear weapons do not really add much to its strategic position. Since it is surrounded by Russia and China in the North, Japan in the East and South Korea in the South, Pyongyang does not really stand a chance at becoming a regional economic or military superpower, not unless it unites with South Korea. This demonstrates that North-Korea does not have any room to increase its influence in the region and hence does not need a nuclear program. In short, North Korea does not have much to gain from maintaining nuclear weapons, has much to gain from negotiating with the US and is in dire need of financial assistance. Furthermore, it has nothing else to offer the international community in exchange for concessions and does not have any strong ideological reasons for possessing nuclear weapons; thus it can afford to give them up.

Iran, on the other hand, is in a very different situation. Iran’s nuclear program is a goal within itself and not just a means to an end. Iran claims its nuclear program is only for civilian use, but its abundant oil reserves make that claim absurd. It seems highly unlikely that Iran, if it were to obtain nuclear weapons, would be willing to give them up. Economically, while Iran might not be an economic power, it is not nearly in such a dire situation as North Korea and the country is blessed with abundant natural resources of oil and natural gas, which should indicate that Iran has less of a need to use nuclear blackmail for financial gain. In fact, Iran also uses its oil in order to “buy” international favor and deters the international community with threats regarding oil supply. In terms of its international standing, by the early 21st century, Iran under the leadership of reformist Muhammad Khatami seemed to be warming its relations with the West under what Khatami termed “Dialogue between Civilizations”. If Iran wanted further concessions from the West, it would have been better off implementing reforms, not irritating the West by accelerating its nuclear program. Geopolitically, once the US neutralized Iran’s greatest regional enemy, Iraq, and toppled the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan thus creating a power vacuum, Iran has far greater influence in the region and with the help of a nuclear arsenal could become the leading regional power. Iran is already working to increase its influence in the Shiite regions of Iraq and the US has claimed that they supply weapons to the Shiite rebels. Syria has strategically aligned with Iran, Iranian-backed Hezbollah continues to gain power in Lebanon and only Turkey remains in Iran’s way. An Iranian nuclear weapon arsenal would vastly change the strategic balance between the two and greatly increase the Iranian sphere of influence. Ideologically, Iran’s stated goal of exporting the Islamic revolution and leading the Islamic world together with the wide range of support it provides various terrorists groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, would be vastly facilitated by a nuclear weapon, which would reduce the likelihood and scope of possible retaliation against Tehran. It should also be noted that Iran greatly accelerated its nuclear program under the leadership of President Ahmadenjad and his radical cohorts. If Iran is able to produce nuclear weapons, it would help these radical conservative elements solidify their leadership, galvanize the population around the country’s achievement and enable the leaders to avoid reforms. Most importantly, there is always the grave concern that, following his incessant denial of the Holocaust and speeches about erasing the Zionist entity off the map, Ahmadenjad might actually try and use nuclear weapons for that purpose, even at the price of Israeli or American retaliation. Indeed, Ahmadenjad constantly conveys his messianic and apocalyptic ideology, which includes preparing the stage for the return of the Mahdi – the hidden Imam. This is done by bringing chaos to the world – could using a nuclear bomb be part of that plan?

The events of the past few weeks suggest that the Bush administration has understood the differences between the two regimes and the fact that Iran would be very unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons, if it were able to produce them. Although it continues to deny any plans to attack Iran, the US recently sent the USS John C. Stennis to head a strike force deployed in the Persian Gulf along with many other vessels already stationed in the region. Bush’s blunt accusations against Iran for meddling in Iraq and supplying Shiite insurgents with weapons further builds the Bush administration’s case against Tehran. Over the past few weeks some senior figures in Iran have suggested it might be better to halt their nuclear program and negotiate with the international community. On the other hand, Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders have warned the US against attacking, conducted several exercises intended to demonstrate their resolve and capabilities and claimed they will strike back against American targets all over the world. They have also threatened to block the straights of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, where approximately 20% of the world’s oil supply passes. While the US will certainly prefer diplomatic dialogue with the Iranians, it is looking more and more like it will not hesitate to call the Iranian bluff and prevent Iran from reaching the nuclear “point of no return”. It might just come down to who blinks first.

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Coinciding with the first anniversary of the Pakistan Army’s commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad, there has been a fresh wave of jihadi terrorism in Pakistan, which has reversed the declining trend seen after the new Government headed by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani came to office in the last week of March, 2008.

2. This new wave started even before the first anniversary with the an Al Qaeda-admitted act of suicide terrorism outside the Danish Embassy in Islamabad on June 2, 2008. It has picked up momentum since then—–particularly since July 3, 2008, which marked the first anniversary of the siege of the Lal Masjid by the Pakistani security forces and ultimately led to the raid into the Lal Masjid.

3. This new wave has affected tribal as well as non-tribal areas, but the tribal areas more than non-tribal areas till now. In the tribal areas, it has affected the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which are directly controlled from Islamabad with the help of the Army, as well as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which is ruled by a coalition headed by the reputedly secular Awami National Party (ANP). The ANP has been trying to deal with the situation with the help of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military organisation of Pashtun tribals trained and supervised by the Army.

4. The NWFP was badly affected even last year. Of the 56 attacks of suicide terrorism during 2007, 23 were in the FATA, 21 in the NWFP, including four in the Swat Valley, nine in Punjab, two in Balochistan and one in Sindh. Of the 23 in the FATA, only two were in North Waziristan and one in the Bajaur Agency, where, according to the US, the terrorist infrastructure of Al Qaeda is located. The remaining 20 were in South Waziristan, where there are no confirmed reports of any Al Qaeda infrastructure. All the attacks in South Waziristan came from areas which are controlled by the Mehsuds. In the areas controlled by other tribes, there were no incidents of suicide terrorism. Two cantonments saw repeated suicide strikes— Rawalpindi (5), where the General Headquarters of the Army are located, and Kohat (3) in the NWFP where an Army cadet school is located.

5. The Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Pakistan has not so far come out with official statistics relating to suicide and non-suicide terrorism this year, but according to Hamid Mir, the highly-respected Pakistani journalist, who works for the GeoTV, a private TV channel,there have been 25 acts of suicide terrorism in Pakistan during the first six months of 2008, resulting in 332 fatalities. However, in his analysis carried by “News” of July 10,2008, he does not indicate how many of these incidents took place before the new Government came to office and how many thereafter. According to official figures released by the Interior Ministry at the end of last year, there were only four acts of suicide terrorism during the first six months of 2007. This shot up to 56 after the Lal Masjid raid. According to my collation, there were 17 acts of suicide terrorism this year before the Gilani Government came to office, and there have been only eight since then, but the number is showing an upward trend.

6. According to Hamid Mir, Afghanistan had 160 suicide bombings in 2007 with 836 people dead and it has had 76 suicide bombings in the first six months of 2008 with 466 dead. There were seven suicide attacks in Afghanistan in March 2008 compared to 17 in March 2007.There was a sudden increase in the attacks in June 2008 with 17 suicide bombings compared to just seven suicide bombings in June 2007. Suicide bombings slightly increased in areas close to the Iranian border. Kandahar and Helmand are close to Pakistan while Nimroz and Farah are close to Iran. There were 15 suicide attacks in Kandahar in 2008 compared to 26 in 2007. There were 15 suicide attacks in Helmand in 2008 compared to 22 in 2007. There were only three attacks in Nimroz in 2007 but eight attacks in the first six months of 2008. Farah is close to the Iranian border and had just five suicide attacks in 2007 but this province saw six suicide attacks in 2008. The increasing number of attacks in areas closer to the Iranian border than to the Pakistani border is intriguing and has thus far remained without a satisfactory explanation.

7 .In 2007, one saw acts of suicide terrorism as well as conventional attacks not involving suicide terrorism in the tribal areas. The conventional style attacks were more in the FATA than in the NWFP, except in the Swat Valley, which is the stronghold of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Mulla Fazlullah. Even though official statistics of conventional style attacks are not available, one can see that there has been an increase in conventional style attacks in other areas of the NWFP too. What one has been seeing is that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other jihadi groups in the tribal belt not associated with the TTP, have been emulating the tactics of the Taliban of Afghanistan, which consist of a mix of suicide terrorism and conventional guerilla-style attacks. An insurgency-like situation is developing in the tribal belt in the FATA and the NWFP, similar to the situation which has been prevalent in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

8. There has been a deterioration in the control exercised by the ANP-led Government, the army and the para-military forces in the NWFP. This weakening of control is evident in Peshawar too, where the Taliban and pro-Taliban groups are slowly nibbling at the outlying areas bordering the FATA. The worsening situation in the NWFP should be a matter of concern to the international community since many of the areas where Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission stores its nuclear waste are located there. If these sites come under the control of the jihadi terrorists, Al Qaeda’s search for a dirty bomb capability could be facilitated.

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The article could be viewed as a mere threat, which exploits numerous rumors from various sources. It may also be deliberate disinformation regarding al-Qa`idah’s possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Or it could be propaganda aimed at encouraging Islamists. Yet, this is the first time that such a threat has been made publicly by supporters of al-Qa`idah, at least by a figure who is known as close to the al-Qa`idah propaganda apparatus.

The short article is interesting in several aspects. Al-Qandahari writes about the American and Russian use of “dirty” weapons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. Yet, he does not even mention at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This may lead to the conclusion that the use of “dirty” weapons by al-Qa`idah should be a retaliation only against countries that have already used it.

The article is short and the usual “philosophical” elements typical of the writings of Islamist scholars against the United States or the West are missing.

To sum up, even though this may be a false alarm, it would seem to reflect another stage in the escalation in the tone of al-Qa`idah propaganda, and as such, could raise the expectations of Islamists for a “mega operation” against the United States or Russia.

Following is a translation of the article

The nuclear war is the solution for the destruction of the United States

Yes, you did read the title correctly. It is the only way to kill the maximum number of Americans. This is the nuclear terror, which Americans have never feared. In the Second World War, the United States used this weapon twice in three days due to the successful Japanese attack in Pearl Harbor. These days the United States is using the most violent and modern weapons to bomb innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, and totally support the Russian war against the Chechens. Not out of love of the Russians but out of hatred of the Muslims. 

The United States attacked Iraq using weapons that contaminated the lands and water by radiation for thousands of years. Furthermore, it used Uranium bombs to create maximum damage to the lands and human beings, so it could leave Muhammad’s Peninsula after turning it into a forbidden area that no one would consider visiting. Yet, it seems that the beasts of the White House have forgotten one very important fact – and we are very proud to note it – Al-Qa`idah. 

This is the organization that terrorized the core of the infidel West, and made from several youngsters, who own nothing but love for Allah and his messenger, a means to punish the sons of the bitches. Moreover, these youngsters demonstrated the finest example of leaving the materialist life. They could enjoy the good life, yet they ran away from it, wishing only what Allah could give them. They sold their souls to Allah, and he accepted them.

Eye for eye and tooth for tooth. If the Americans have bombs that no one else owns, Al-Qa`idah is stronger. It owns “dirty bombs” and “lethal viruses bombs”, which could cover the American cities with deadly diseases and turn this nation, which is “a professional in contempt for other nations,” into a crowd of contaminated and sick people. The coming days would prove that Qa`idat al-Jihad is capable with Allah’s help, of turning the United States into a lake of lethal radiation, that would seem as the last days of humanity. It would also prove that Al-Qa`idah is very popular all over the Islamic world. 

Yes, the United States and its allies would be destroyed, as a result of the misuse of their power against the weak. Their end is closer now, by the arms of the uprising youngsters, who while riding their horses, never step down but victorious or martyrs. In both cases this is their victory. 

Pray much for your victorious brothers and to Allah who is almighty. 

This is an announcement to all people, to enlighten only the believers. As to the deviates we ask Allah either to direct them or hurry in gathering their souls. As to our enemy – Allah will help us to defeat them. 

Allah is behind all intentions, and he is merciful. 

Abu Shihab al-Qandahari

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