The assassination was certainly a major victory for Russian security forces – both politically and militarily[2]. Basayev has had a direct impact on Russia and the Russian government for over ten years. Thus, a powerful, clever and truly resourceful adversary had been eliminated. In addition to Basayev’s assassination, 739 militants, including 24 terrorist leaders were arrested. Over 70 militants and five faction leaders surrendered voluntarily to the federal authorities[3].

The political victory is situated in the fact that Basayev was not killed by members of an enemy Chechen faction, but rather by the Russian Special Forces in a carefully planned operation. This proved the capabilities of the Federal Security Forces to complete the list of Chechen leaders who were targeted by the Russian government five years prior to Basayev’s assassination on July 10, 2006. This list included the infamous terrorists Basayev, Hattab, Gelayev and Barayev. These terrorist leaders received direct political and financial support from international Islamist terrorist organizations. The other group of Chechen leaders, eliminated by Russian forces since the early 1990s, – Dudayev, Yandarbiyev, Maskhadov and Sadulayev – adhered to a separatist, guerilla warfare ideology and posed a lesser immediate terrorist threat to Russia[4].

Which terrorist leaders remain in North Caucasus? Firstly, Dokku Umarov, the so-called president of Ichkeria, a dangerous terrorist capable of conducting attacks against local civilian targets. Only two other prominent terrorist leaders, Rappani Halilov and Magas, remain at large in Chechnya. Suleiman Imurziyev, a.k.a. Hairullah, was killed by Russian-backed Chechen security forces prior to President Kadyrov’s inauguration on April 4, 2007.

It is important to note that the operation to assassinate Basayev allowed the Russian authorities to intervene in the attempt by Kadyrov’s security forces to seize complete control of counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya until all terrorist leaders would be either arrested or liquidated. In short, by assassinating Basayev, Russian security services regained the confidence and legitimacy to exercise their authority in Chechnya.

Despite the importance of this counter-terrorist operation, the assassination of Basayev did not play the main role in the resolution of the Chechen conflict. The issue is that, during the period of Chechnya’s de-facto independence, Chechen separatist leadership became ideologically divided. One part of the Chechen leadership believed that the chief goal of national liberation has been achieved and efforts need to be invested in the construction of the new sovereign Chechen state. The other group of leaders favored the principles of Islamic extremism and pursued to expand the influence of these principles through military means. Since the interwar period (1996 – 1999), Russian authorities successfully supported the nationalist side of the Chechen political spectrum against the Islamist elites and managed to prevent the latter from seizing political power.

Another important factor of shrinking Islamist activity in North Caucasus is the decreased flow of funds to radical Islamic organizations in Chechnya. In late 2006, Russian security forces obtained the secret archives of the international terrorist Abu Havs[5] – an Arab mercenary who acted as a middle man for Islamic charity organizations in Chechnya. The archives provided evidence that Chechen rebels received funding from Islamic communities in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Europe. According to the archive, the flow of funds to radical Islamic groups in Chechnya decreased in 2006. Reportedly, the late Abu Havs complained to his contacts that the flow of funds for insurgency in Chechnya subsided, as financing was being redirected to the Iraqi front. The shift of Saudi funding away from Chechnya is furthermore supported by Saudi Arabia’s recent pursuit of a closer relationship with Putin’s Russia, which may have been strengthened during Putin’s visit to the Gulf nations in March 2007.

Today, Chechen national elites have consolidated their position: Chechen leadership will seek to maximize their independence, while Chechnya will formally remain within the framework of the Russian Federation. Upon close analysis of authority structure in Chechnya, it is apparent that the Chechens themselves make the rules of the game. The internal policy remains under Chechen control. Furthermore, ambitions regarding foreign political influence seem to have been eliminated among other disastrous ramifications of the two recent wars.

The situation in Chechnya is still best described as ”transitional”. Although stability is not the most striking characteristic of Chechnya, many positive developments have taken place[6]. The springboard for change has been constructed after Kremlin came to realize that the conflict could not be resolved by purely military methods. The term “Chechenization” emerged in Moscow to depict the need to allow Chechens to resolve their own inter-factional conflicts, while supporting the most favorable faction for Russia.

This policy is not new – in the past, Russian authorities supported Zavgayev, Labazanov and Gantamirov. Members of Yeltsin’s administration maintained connections with Dudayev. From time to time, Kremlin supported Maskhadov, who was regarded as an anti-Islamist and a trustworthy negotiator. Putin however, decided to refine the concept of Chechenization. Already in 2000, the former separatist Mufti, Ahmat-Haji Kadyrov, was pulled into the Russian sphere of influence. Kadyrov became the president of Chechnya in 2003. Ahmat-Hadji stated frankly that the war in Chechnya would not be over in at least twenty years, which was contrary to the numerous statements of Russian and Chechen officials regarding the swift resolution of the conflict. However, it was Kadyrov who managed to de-escalate the military conflict and to begin the cease fire negotiations. In addition, Kadyrov reportedly despised Basayev and his Wahhabist surroundings.

Following Ahmat Kadyrov’s assassination in May 2004, his son, Ramzan Kadyrov was nominated and finally inaugurated as Chechnya’s president in 2007[7].

In spite of his unscrupulous methods – from terror and corruption, to brutality and falsification of elections – even his fiercest critics find it difficult to argue with the scope of Ramzan Kadyrov’s achievements.

Firstly, and most importantly, the situation in Chechnya has improved considerably. Large scale stabilization projects are currently taking place in both economic and social realms. In this case, Kadyrov acts as a supervisor and a distributor of federal funds and other resources issued for the reconstruction of the republic. As a confidant of Moscow, Kadyrov is interested to stabilize the political and economic environments in Chechnya and to minimize the levels of corruption. His ratings among the Chechen population are rising steadily, in addition to the increase of confidence that he receives from officials in the Kremlin. It is furthermore noteworthy that Kadyrov employs “traditional” Chechen methods of control in the region. His is known for his contacts with separatist militants and for employing former militant leaders in key security posts. This allows Kadyrov formidable leverage in negotiations with the few remaining terrorist factions that operate in Chechnya.

Secondly, Kadyrov has managed to achieve military-political stabilization in Chechnya. It is safe to assert that Chechnya is becoming a model region for stabilization in North Caucasus. Kadyrov exercises tight control over regional decision making processes – his recent initiative to conduct special counter terrorist operations in the nearby republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Karadino-Balkharia should be understood in precisely this context. In point of fact, the majority of Chechen terrorists moved their operation bases out of Chechnya – where all their retreat routes have been cut off – into these adjacent republics. Many experts consider Kadyrov’s initiative as a feasible plan for large scale precision strikes against the remaining Chechen terrorist groups in North Caucasus.

The revival of civilian life is another deterring factor for separatist militants in Chechnya. Most militants have families and clan relatives. Seeing that the decision to continue the armed struggle becomes increasingly costly and unpopular in an environment of economic restoration, many of the militants choose to return to a civilian lifestyle.

Vladimir Putin recently signed an executive order to withdraw Defense Ministry and MIA personnel from Chechnya in 2007 – 2008. This development holds principal importance for Ramzan Kadyrov. Following the withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya, only the local security apparatus, which is loyal to Kadyrov, will remain in Chechnya. The Chechen president is confident that his own forces are capable of independently controlling the situation in the republic, and possibly in the whole region.

In order to become a fully functional leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov needs to fortify his authority with the economic component[8]. He aims to receive federal permission to command Chechnya’s fossil resources. If he succeeds in winning this dispute for economic sovereignty, even his most ardent opponents will have to accept Kadyrov’s leadership in Chechnya.

The Chechen president’s rapidly increasing political weight could be explained by a number of factors, including his relative youth. Kadyrov is a versatile politician: sometimes he acts as an Islamic leader, sometimes as an elegant technocrat. Some Chechens see him as his father’s successor, others view him as the most powerful chief of his clan, and yet others consider Ramzan Kadyrov a gangster.

However, the Chechen society does not readily accept the culture of autocracy. Kadyrov’s absolutist pretensions are irritating to those Chechens who did not support the separatists during the two wars. They are upset with Russia’s decision to support their former enemy.

Although externally Kremlin’s position seems homogeneous, it is clear that not everyone in Moscow is excited about supporting the Chechen leader. Russia’s “siloviki” treat him with distrust. Basayev’s assassination was conducted without the involvement of Kadyrov’s men – an insinuation that the FSB are not dependent on Kadyrov’s help in Chechnya. Furthermore, many officials in Kremlin are unhappy with Kadyrov’s course towards economic independence, his control of Chechnya’s budget and his pursuit of autonomy regarding Chechen natural resources.

Moscow seeks to keep Kadyrov’s power under control, which is the reason for Kremlin’s active support for constitutional institutions in Chechnya. Chechnya’s parliament members would be equally responsible to their president and to the federal party officials. Putin noted the importance of the Chechen parliament during his visit to the region following the 2005 parliamentary elections in Chechnya.

In spite of Kadyrov’s constant interference with Kremlin’s interests – statements about reemergence of Ingushetia, proposals of unification with Dagestan (in line with Basayev’s Islamic Caliphate ideology) and demands to limit federal authority in Chechnya – Vladimir Putin strongly prefers to include Kadyrov’s Chechnya into the Russian Federation.

In short, Kadyrov has accepted Russian rules of the political give and take. Chechnya remains part of the Russian Federation. Political developments in Chechnya are currently very similar to the ones in Moscow. In both places there are young, energetic leaders, growing authoritarianism, fabricated elections and half-baked adherence to human rights. In regard to these issues, it is safe to conclude that deep and meaningful reforms will take place in Chechnya only when such reforms will be conducted in the rest of the Russia. However, terrorists – especially the involvement of international terrorist organizations – has been substantially reduced in Chechnya since Shamil Basayev’s assassination.

Notes:

[1] Portnikov, V. (2007, April 13). Caucasus after Basayev (?????? ????? ???????). Retrieved from Freedom Radio (????? ???????): https://www.chechensociety.net/index.php?id_article=376 

[2] Patrushev, N. (2006, July 25). ??????? ????????: ?? ???????????? ? ?????? ? ???????????? ?????????????? ??????????. Retrieved from Nakanune.ru: https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/Nikolajj_Patrushev_My_stalkivaemsja 

[3] Falaleyev, M. (2006, August 3). Chechnya after Basayev (????? ????? ???????) . Retrieved from Rossiyskaya Gazeta: https://www.rg.ru/2006/08/03/ 

[4] Petrenko, T., & Brenner, A. (2006, July 11). ?????????? ??????? ?????????? ????. Retrieved from https://www.dw-world.com/dw/article/0,2144,2085788,00.html 

[5] Borisov, T. (2006, December 8). ?? ????? ????? ??? ????? – ??? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ? ????????? ?????????? ????????? ???????? ???????. Retrieved from Rossiyskaya Gazeta Nedelya Web site: https://www.rg.ru/2006/12/08/abuhavs-arhiv.html 

[6] Izlayev, A. (2007, April 13). ???? ??????? ?????????? – ????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. Retrieved from Politjournal.ru: https://www.politjournal.ru/index?action=Articles&dirid=98&tek=6021&issue=171 

[7] Talbi, K. (2007, April 5). Chechen strongman sworn in as president. Retrieved from Yahoo News : https://fe11.news.re3.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070405/ts_afp/russiachechnyapolitics_070405120633 

[8] Umarova, Z. (2007, March 26). ?????? ???????: ????????????? ??? ????. Retrieved from Rossiyskaya Gazeta (?????????? ??????): https://www.rambler.ru/news/russia/localauthorities/10019653.html 

The post Chechnya in 2007: Ramzan Kadyrov’s Domain appeared first on ICT.

At the same time, Russian leadership openly stated concerns that such a coalition could be misused by a number of western states, mainly the US, to implement policies aimed against sovereign nations deemed detrimental to America’s national interests. Some Russian observers point to the statement by Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who asserted that countries, which refrain from public condemnation of terrorism and even actively support some terrorist organizations, should be isolated from the counter-terrorist coalition. In his statement, Henry Kissinger referred primarily to Iran, Iraq and Syria – countries that have a long history of favorable economic, political and cultural relations with Russia. In this respect and in light of its role as an active member of the counter-terrorist coalition, Moscow acts according to its interests and objectives, while it tries to avoid becoming what some Russian officials call a “passive instrument in the struggle of the West against international terrorism”.[iii]

The geopolitical position of the Russian Federation (RF) in the Middle East should be analyzed in the context of Moscow’s renewed global approach to foreign policy, which is likely to be maintained by Vladimir Putin’s successor, Dmitry Medvedev[iv]. This approach is expressed in Russia’s active attempts to establish a multi-polar international environment, in the framework of an increasing, multifaceted confrontation with the United States. These attempts occur on various levels of the political and economic spheres with the purpose of asserting Russia’s role as an influential player in global international affairs.

One of the methods employed by Moscow in materializing its foreign policy goals is strengthening bilateral relations with countries in the Muslim world, and more specifically with Iran. The latter is regarded as a key player in the region – in recent years, Iran and Russia have developed strong bilateral cooperation[v].

It is evident that today Russia and Iran are active economic partners. In this context, observers tend to specify military contracts (such as the November 13, 1991 agreement in which Russia was to provide technical assistance for Iran’s production of T-72 tanks and BMP-2 personnel carriers; the supply of some 40 units of aviation materiel in 2001-2005; as well as the 2006 agreement to sell 29 Tor M-1 anti-aircraft complexes and C-300 PMY-1 rocket systems[vi]) totaling around $5 billion. The latest of these military contracts signified a fundamental shift in Russia’s policy, as in 1995 President Yeltsin complied with Washington’s request to halt military supplies to Teheran. This is accentuated by the fact that recent military sales to Iran are not a product of economic necessity. Whereas a decade ago – following Yeltsin’s default – the Kremlin was practically bankrupt and in desperate need of additional sources of funding, today Russia boasts a surplus of some $480 billion in national gold and hard currency reserves[vii].

Observers also note the Iranian nuclear project in Busheir, where Russia is directly involved in construction and fuel supply projects totaling over $1 billion[viii]. In addition to cooperating on nuclear issues, Russian franchises operate in the Iranian energy sector – “Gazprom” is conducting the development of the South Pars gas project with investments worth over $700 million[ix]; “Lukoil” is making attempts to establish itself on the local market[x]; and “Technopromexport” is responsible for developing 10% of the Iranian energy production capacity[xi]. Russia also cooperates with Iran in the sphere of space launches and even the banking system. The yearly scope of trade relations with Iran is in excess of $1.5 billion. In addition, Russia has reasonable basis to assume that any military escalation connected to Iran would entail considerable financial benefits, as it would undoubtedly lead to an increase in fossil fuel prices. In this context, Russia’s statements in opposition to UN economic sanctions directed at Iran are understandable, and even anticipated[xii].

Despite Russia’s official position of strict non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran, there exists an opposing point of view that overtly justifies Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This position is presented by Vladislav Inozemtzev[xiii]:

“In whatever extent we regard Iran’s nuclear and military ambitions, we must not forget that no state can be confident in its security as long as the United States openly declares it as an enemy of the “civilized world”. This is why Iran’s nuclear pursuit is understandable and, moreover, it does not contradict their international obligations.”

In this manner, through the sales of military equipment and the signing of energy-related treaties, Russia seeks to reestablish influence vis-à-vis its former Soviet-era clients in the Middle East, including Algeria, Syria and Iran. According to some observers, Russia tacitly supports Iran’s aspirations to become a counterbalance to the United States in the Islamic world[xiv] – a role that the Iranian regime has aspired to achieve since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. These factors contribute to the risk involved in US-Iranian confrontation. An actual American or Israeli attack on Iranian targets and blockade of the Straits of Hormuz would lead to considerable disruptions of fossil fuel supplies and record oil prices. Needless to say that Russia would receive grandiose benefits not only from a global hysteria in oil demand, but also from a sharp rise in anti-American sentiment in the Mashreq and Maghreb that is bound to emerge following any military action against Iran. Although, hypothetically, military defeat of the Iranian regime may become detrimental to Russian interest in the region, it is evident that Russia would reap tremendous short-term economic and political benefits from any acute escalation in US-Iranian hostility.

Russia’s implication in the formative processes of the new system of international relations defines its active role in Middle Eastern affairs. Today, the Middle East remains vital for the realization of Russia’s interests in the southern part of its post-Soviet territories. Following the disintegration of the USSR, developments in the international arena have brought Russia, the Central Asian countries and many Middle Eastern nations into a sphere of shared geo-political and military-strategic interests. Russia remains vitally concerned with the developments beyond its southern borders, as the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East are characterized by general instability, a zeitgeist of separatist movements, and high levels of economic and political interdependency.

During the last decades of the 20th century, terrorism and extremism became inseparable companions of Middle Eastern politics and substantially widened the scope of both potential and ongoing conflicts in the region. In this light, achieving stability of the developing political and strategic situation in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, including regions in direct proximity to the CIS – as well as the goal of establishing enduring Russian influence – all remain paramount to understanding Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. Russian leadership clearly realizes that by obtaining these goals, it will help neutralize fragmentation and degenerative processes inside Russia and within the wider borders of the post-Soviet geopolitical zone.

In addition, the Middle East remains important for Russia as a principal supplier of natural resources, a major hub of international communications and a lucrative market for Russian goods and services. In this respect, Moscow’s long term interests also include Russian involvement in economic development of Middle Eastern nations in the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Many Russian officials are convinced that the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in light of the reemerging Palestinian intifada and the practical impasse of the peace process, is empowering various radical Islamic organizations on the Middle Eastern political proscenium[xv]. Furthermore, these Islamist organizations and their surrounding political conditions reflect emerging international systemic processes and serve as painful points of contention for both regional and world powers.

In this regard, it is apparent that Russia’s close relationship with Iran has an ineluctable impact on Moscow’s position vis-à-vis Hezbollah, especially if we consider that Hezbollah remains a client of both Iran and Syria. Taking a hostile stance to Hezbollah, as well as declaring Hezbollah a terrorist entity, would therefore contradict the general line of Russian foreign policy in the region.

According to Russian observers, Hezbollah acts concurrently as the prominent Lebanese political party, a major Shiite social and humanitarian organization and an organized military force. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 is viewed as a kind of victory for Hezbollah and elevated the organization to the status of a regional player. Hezbollah is thus considered to possess real capacity to influence both internal Lebanese politics and regional affairs in general. Furthermore, Hezbollah is viewed as having the potential to become a major regional player in the foreseeable future. This viewpoint is reflective of Russia’s tendency to support Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a political organization[xvi].

Expository of this perspective is Moscow’s reaction to the summer 2006 War in Lebanon[xvii]. On July 12, 2006 Russian leadership issued a statement in which it took an equivocal position regarding the sides in the conflict. While it expressed general concern regarding the sudden escalation and armed confrontations on the Israel-Lebanon border and called for the rapid return of kidnapped Israeli soldiers, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) urged Israel to avoid utilizing disproportional force, or destroying the civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. Moscow appealed to Israel to resolve all disputes through entirely diplomatic channels, while highlighting the necessity to release Lebanese prisoners. In the same spirit, the statement lacked any mention of Hezbollah in connection to the unfolding military operations.

Not less representative of Russia’s policy was Moscow’s position in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War. Decisively refusing to participate in the formation of the UNIFIL military contingent, Russia resorted to deploying military regiments of “humanitarian character”. According to the former RF Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov, Russia’s refusal to send a contingent as part of a UNIFIL force complies with the UN mandate in Lebanon, as the mandate’s intention to disarm Hezbollah presents a practically impossible task[xviii]. This point of view was echoed by the Russian senator M. Margelov[xix]:

“The Humanitarian character of the mission is an optimal form of presence of Russian forces in the Region … clearly, our presence in Lebanon – a trusted partner in the region – is important not only from a humanitarian or military, but also from a political point of reference. Our forces have not been tasked to disarm Hezbollah, or to conduct any sort of military operations that may threaten the lives of Russian servicemen.”

It is thus evident that Hezbollah’s place within the course of Russia’s foreign policy interests in the Middle East is determined by complex tactical and strategic considerations. According to Russian officials, the RF maintains contact with Hezbollah[xx]. The Lebanese organization, in turn, willingly pursues connections with Moscow thereby invoking heated interest towards Russia’s position with regard to the Middle East peace process. With this in mind, it is noteworthy that with over a million Russian-speaking Israeli citizens, Russia enjoys a modest level of influence on the internal political life in Israel. Combined with its tested ties with Syria and Lebanon, Moscow’s affect on Israeli politics produces considerable leverage vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s position with regard to focal aspects of the political situation in the Middle East. In this respect, Russian diplomats highlight their role in convincing Syria and Iran to reduce support of radical organizations that acted against the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians in the late 1990s. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.V. Posuvaluk conducted a number of meetings with Hassan Nassrallah in this context. In addition, high-ranking representatives of the Russian MFA met with Hezbollah leadership in 2000-2001 in order to discuss the release of prisoners held in Israel and Lebanon as part of an effort to diffuse tensions in the region[xxi].

According to Russian sources, Moscow considers Hezbollah as having realistic chances of becoming a formidable political force – not only in Lebanon, but in the whole Middle East in general[xxii]. In this perspective, Hezbollah could represent the interests of both the Shiite minorities, and of the Sunni majority; and Moscow has made efforts to establish relations with Hezbollah. Russian analysts believe that contacts with Hezbollah create interest towards and awareness of Russia’s opinion in the region. Similar considerations are behind Russia’s involvement with Iran, Syria and Lebanon, which, according to Russian politicians, serve as a launch pad for constructive cooperation with many other Arab nations. In other words, Moscow harbors hopes that by maintaining reciprocal relations with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, it will gain sufficient political capital in order to entrench its positions in the Middle East and gain leverage in the context of regional political dialogue.

The post Russia’s Policy vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah appeared first on ICT.

From a symbolic perspective, Maskhadov’s death resembles the capture of Saddam Hussein by the American forces in Iraq. However, many analysts hold the opinion that his death will not have a profound affect on the overall scheme of events in Chechnya.

Aslan Maskhadov possessed two important aspects that separated him from the other Chechnyan separatist leaders who became famous during the first and the second Chechnyan wars. Firstly, he served as a high-ranking career military officer in the Soviet army. Secondly, Maskhadov was a realistic individual whose political involvement was not rooted in the radical nationalist and religious ideas that were popular in the ex-USSR republics in the beginning of 1990’s. On the contrary, his actions were fueled by his own will to establish a strong and independent Chechnyan republic.

Maskhadov was always inclined to solve all the political and military issues with Russia in a “calm and realistic” manner. He did not support the “all-out” war approach that some of the other separatist leaders adopted. During the years of the president Jokhar Dudayev, Maskhadov was a commander in the Chechnyan military forces. He became known in Russia in January 1995, when he headed the Chechnyan rebels in their defense of Groznyy. Later, Maskhadov took charge of all the Chechnyan military. In this position, Maskhadov did not only plan and execute military operations. He tried to find a political solution to the armed conflict, which he considered futile. Thus, Maskhadov quickly became the leader of the “moderate” forces in the republic. His willingness to make compromises with Moscow led Maskhadov to engage in conflicts with Dudayev as well as other Chechen leaders throughout his involvement in the separatist movement.

Over the course of the first Chechnyan campaign (1995), Maskhadov claimed no connection with such terrorist acts as the hospital hostage situation in Budenovsk (executed by Shamil Basayev), the raid on the town of Kizlyar (executed by Raduyev), or the attempt to assassinate the Russian general Anatoly Romanov. However, Maskhadov could not contradict the influence of Dudayev and other leaders. Eventually, he had to accept the fact that the Chechnyan conflict evolved from a military action for national liberation into a diversionary war that employs tactics of terrorism. It was not long before Maskhadov was claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks in Russia, giving his men orders to shoot Russian prisoners, and initiating the “action of vengeance” in Groznyy in 1996.

When president Dudayev was killed, Moscow initiated negotiations with Maskhadov. As a result of the Hassan-Yurt agreements that followed, Chechnya received substantial sovereignty. The war was over, and Chechnyans were faced with the task of rebuilding their ruined homes and reconstructing the damaged political infrastructure. In 1997, Maskhadov was elected president of the independent republic of Ichkeriya. This fact is probably the best example of the extent to which Chechnyan people were tired of the war. His election showed the intensity of the hopes and expectations that were laid upon “the man who made peace with Moscow”.

In spite of his military leadership skills, Maskhadov turned out to be a lousy politician. The conflicting interests of different separatist group leaders, such as Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev, overwhelmed him. After achieving his main goal – peace for his own people – he was not willing to engage in internal political conflicts, as he previously did with Dudayev. As a result, Ichkeriya was swept by a wave of crime and anarchy: public shootings, kidnappings, and slave trade became norms of everyday life. The social net and the centralized economic system were completely ruined. Political power was decided by the politician’s proximity to the primary source of finance, which kept flowing from the Russian budget between the years 1996 – 1999.

Maskhadov was not able to stop Chechnya’s descent into chaos. One could say that one of the critical moments of Maskhadov’s presidency was his conflict with Ahmad Kadirov, who was Chechnya’s head Mufti and later became Moscow’s envoy in Chechnya. Kadirov, who was not pleased with the extremist religious influence that foreign Arab interest groups had on Chechnyan people, assembled a group of opposers to Wahhabism. At a certain point, Maskhadov had to make the choice between Kadirov and the notorious Basayev. The latter planned a raid on Dagestan with the purpose of spreading the Wahhabi ideology to a wider region. Maskhadov preferred the military power under Basayev’s command to the Mufti who supported Russian policies.

In October 1999, Maskhadov achieved Kadyrov’s dismissal from the position of Mufti and even issued a death warrant for him. Kadyrov, on the other hand, pursued the support of Russian federal forces in his struggle with Maskhadov.

The second Chechnyan war proved to be far less successful for Aslan Maskhadov. The unity, which prevailed within the separatist command during the first war, was long gone. Although Maskhadov continued to call himself the leader of Chechnyan resistance, he only controlled parts of the rebel army. The Russian forces defeated most of the regular Chechnyan military already in spring of 2000. However, Maskhadov system of “national defense”, which is based on regional guerilla warfare, continues to operate to this day. According to Russian experts, Maskhadov’s system is what makes Chechnyan resistance so hard to suppress.

Maskhadov was forced into constant hiding while hoping that Moscow will eventually realize the ineffectiveness of fighting against guerilla cells and negotiate an agreement. This is why Maskhadov constantly insisted on the uselessness of armed conflict, threatened to increase the number of victims (including innocent civilians) and used his emissary in Europe, Ahmed Zakayev, as well as other representatives to initiate negotiations with Russia. Due to him being the elected president of Ichkerya, international mediators and Russian human rights groups viewed Maskhadov as the primary legitimate figure for such negotiations.

However, both Maskhadov and his supporters were wrong. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was clear about his intention to spare no human or material resources for achieving complete victory in Chechnya. Moscow’s policy of assassinating key separatist leaders (Salman Raduyev, Hattab, Abu Al Walid, Ruslan Gelayev and Zelichman Yandarbiyev among others) erased the myth that Chechen rebels are invincible. In order to keep receiving funds from the Arab extremists, Maskhadov associated himself with many terrorist acts executed in Russia in 2004.

According to some observers, Maskhadov’s assassination could have serious ramifications for the destabilization of the Chechnyan conflict. His death unties the hands of many extremist separatists on the Chechnyan side, as well as some radical politicians in Moscow. The main problem is that Shamil Basayev, who took responsibility for the Beslan and Dubrovka terrorist acts, remains the only leader of the Chechen rebels.

Some observes hold the opinion that Maskhadov’s assassination benefits Moscow’s hard-line policy in the region. Thus, by removing the last “legitimate” figure in Chechnyan politics, Russia could gain more international support to deal with the remaining (clearly terrorist) separatist leaders.

The post The Assassination of Aslan Maskhadov appeared first on ICT.

From the onset of its post-Soviet attempts to achieve independence, the new secular government in Chechnyatook steps that indicated an aspiration to restore Islamic traditions. In this regard, during his initiation as Chechen president on November 9, 1991, retired Lieutenant-General of Soviet Air-Forces, Djohar Dudayev was sworn in holding a Koran in front of numerous representatives of Islamic religious institutions. During his inauguration ceremony, Dudayev promised to abide by and to protect the Islamic faith.

The Russian federal government’s efforts to establish martial law in Chechnya and to disarm the military branches of the National Chechen People’s Congress (????) resulted in an upsurge of Islamic sentiments among the local population and increasing usage of Islamic rhetoric by radical-nationalist elements in Chechnya. Setting aside their differences, the majority of Chechen factions amalgamated “around D. Dudayev as a symbol of national independence”, thereby considerably augmenting his political influence.

 Thus, for the first time in over 100 years, the Chechen government faced the question of establishing autonomous governance. Initially, the Chechen leadership contemplated an independent political entity – according to Dudayev, ”…a secular, constitutional state with equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all citizens.” was being formed in Chechnya. According to most analysts, Dudayev’s foundational plans did not include the formation of a theocracy.

However, the influence of what Dudayev called “religious belief as a foundation”, upon which “people could unite”, and a cultural-historical heritage that pertains to “majestic pages of the past, struggles against subjugators and immortal souls of great ancestors”, gradually began to tilt the scales in favor of declaring Islam as the national religion. Chechen Islamization was further accelerated by Grozny’s frustration that resulted from failure to achieve international recognition of Chechnyaas an independent entity. International refusal to support Chechen separatist aspirations made adherence to internationally accepted norms of governance redundant in the eyes of the Chechen leadership. Furthermore, the lack of recognition once again raised the issue of ideological and political vision of the Chechen system of governance. According to Cornell, “Chechnyawas under both internal and external pressure to increase the Islamic character of the state and of the struggle.” It was at that point in time – before the beginning of the First Chechen War in December 1994 – that the Chechen separatists established their first significant ties with Middle Eastern radical Islamists. Forces emerged from a number of Muslim countries that actively supported Dudayev’s line of separatism and of strengthening Islam’s integration into the Chechen society as an additional factor of political contention against Moscow. Groups of missionaries, who called themselves “preachers of Islam”, arrived in the North Caucasus from Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Libya. Many of these Arab fighters were Afghani veterans, whose incursion in Chechnya was sanctioned by the leadership of Al Qaeda and other Global Jihadi organizations.

The post Radical Islam in Chechnya appeared first on ICT.