*This schedule is subject to change

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From the outbreak of the Aqsa intifada, Israeli security forces faced a new threat from Palestinian terrorist organizations, which started to use women to carry out suicide attacks on their behalf. According to Israeli security forces there were more than 20 cases in which women were involved in terror related activity against Israeli targets. The terrorist organizations behind the attacks aimed to exploit the advantages of dispatching females to carry out these attacks, using the assumption that a female was thought of as innocent and therefore would arouse less suspicion than a man. The use of a female also illustrated a tactical shift by Palestinian groups seeking to exploit the security forces’ hesitation to search Muslim women. While checks on Palestinian men at roadblocks and elsewhere were rigorous, there were fewer checks done on woman, hence illustrating a gap in security, which the terrorists exploited[i]. 

The first example of such a case was on 27 January 2002, when Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, dispatched Wafa Idris, to carry out the first suicide attack by a female Palestinian on Israeli citizens.  As a result of the attack, one Israeli elderly man, aged 81 was killed and over 100 people were injured, when the bomb that Idris was carrying exploded outside a shoe shop on Jaffa Street in Jerusalem, Israel[ii].  Amongst the casualties was Mark Sokolov from New York, USA, who had also been injured in the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center[iii]. To carry out the attack, Idris used a rucksack that contained a 10 kg (22lb) bomb. The bomb was made up of TNT explosives packed into pipes[iv].

On 31 January 2002, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades published a leaflet that claimed responsibility for the bombing[v]. They stated that the attack was in retaliation to Israel’s military actions. Israel declared Idris a suicide bomber on 9 February 2002[vi].

As a result of the investigations, the Israeli authorities stated they believed that Idris was sent to commit this suicide attack by Mohammed Hababa, a Tanzim operative and ambulance driver for the Palestinian Red Crescent. Authorities also believed Munzar Noor, a resident of the town of Anabta near Tulkarm, who also worked for the Red Crescent in Ramallah, helped to plan the attack. Noor was questioned by the Palestinian security services[vii].

The Palestinian Authority condemned the attack and requested the Palestinian people to suspend attacks on Israeli targets. They also requested the United States to send its envoy back to the Middle East to help with the situation[viii].

As a consequence of the attack, Palestinian woman were inspired by Idris and for the first time felt that they were able to participate in military resistance against Israel. During the symbolic funeral of Wafa Idris, a Palestinian woman from Tulkarm, West Bank, stated, “This woman will not be the last. We will all booby-trap our bodies and blow ourselves up in the Jews’ faces[ix].”

PROFILE

It was not certain whether or not Idris’s intentions were to blow herself up, or place the bomb and escape, but it was certain that her intentions were to kill as many Israeli civilians as she could[x]. Unlike other suicide bombers, Wafa had not left any “martyr videos” or messages[xi]. Her attack also signified the Palestinians’ growing desperation and willingness to utilize women for suicide attacks and a tactical shift by Palestinian militants to exploit Israeli security weaknesses.  Women had been previously not been viewed as suspicious as their male counterparts when crossing borders, and therefore were not searched with as much scrutiny and intensity as men[xii].

Wafa Idris, also known as Wafa Idrees, Shahanaz Al-Amouri, Shnaz Amuri, and Wafa’a Ali Idris was a Palestinian Muslim, born in the West Bank on 01 January 1975.  She came from a poor family. Her parents were refugees from Ramla, Israel, who took up residence in the Amari refugee camp, Ramallah. after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.  Since her father died when she was young, she lived in three rooms with her mother, a brother and his wife and five children.  As a child she failed at school and eventually dropped out.  However, later she became a nurse and began volunteering with the Red Crescent as a paramedic, in which she took great pride[xiii]. At 18 years old, she married a relative, who worked as a blacksmith, but he ultimately divorced her after his disappointment in her inability to conceive children[xiv].

Idris, trained as a nurse, volunteered at the Red Crescent Society, an affiliate of the International Red Cross.  It was through this work that she witnessed injuries caused by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and she too was hit three times by Israeli rubber-coated steel bullets as she tended to the injured. She became angry at the situation and threatened revenge; she stated to family members that she wanted to become a martyr[xv]. After the attack, there were some speculations by some family members that she was motivated by her anger at seeing many Palestinians wounded and killed during the 16-month-old conflict with Israel[xvi].

Idris was praised as a nationalist and feminist hero by many Arab nations; however, her bombing created debate over whether Islam permits women to carry out suicide missions[xvii]. Idris’s mother spoke out about the attack claiming that she was proud of her daughter and that she hopes other woman would copy her in the future. She described her daughter as a martyr and a “daughter of Palestine”, and speculated that Wafa might have become a suicide bomber as a result of all the injured people she tended to during the Intifada.  Her sister-in-law stated that for several weeks prior to the attack, Idris had become withdrawn[xviii]. All three of Wafa’s brothers are Fatah members, and two expressed their pride in their sister’s bombing, particularly because of her gender.  They were happy that their sister was the first female suicide bomber[xix].

Her sister-in-law recalled that Idris had become “withdrawn and morose” in the weeks before she carried out her attack.  Another relative stated that Wafa was happy when other individuals carried out attacks against Israelis and told that relative that she had one day wanted to carry out a similar attack.  According to a BBC correspondent, Wafa was already considered a heroine within Amari refuge camp, where she grew up.  A pregnant woman from the camp stated that she would also carry out a suicide attack if given the opportunity[xx]. More and more wealthy and educated women have begun to speak about dying for the Palestinian cause[xxi]. Even the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, had a memorial built in one of Baghdad’s main squares to honor Wafa[xxii].

Wafa Idris did not fit the typical profile for a martyr, as she was both secular and westernized.  Her friends and family described her as outwardly happy, however, that happiness might have been a mask for the loneliness and emotional turmoil she encountered[xxiii]. However, despite her apparent happiness and westernization, Idris was conditioned to militancy since the first Palestinian uprising against Israel.  During that time she attended many protests, began her volunteer work as a paramedic, and became affliated with Arafat’s Fatah faction[xxiv]. Wafa’s mother, Wasfiyeh, continued to state that she was not aware of any ties Idris had to any Palestinian militant group, despite the fact that her three brothers were Fatah members.  Her eldest brother, Khalil Idris, is a Fatah leader wanted by the Israelis and had previously spent 10 years in Israeli prison[xxv].

Wafa’s choice of location; the intersection of King George Street and Jaffa Road was the site of eight other bombings or shootings that killed 28 people, not including the attackers, in the last 16 months[xxvi].

ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is a group of West Bank militias linked to former Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat’s Fatah organization. The organization became known at the beginning of the 2000 Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada as a militant offshoot of the Fatah party. Al-Aqsa had no central leadership although they were ideologically loyal to Palestinian Authority (PA) President and Fatah party head Yassir Arafat until his death in November 2004. The group’s main aim was to attack Israeli military targets and settlers with hope of establishing a Palestinian state and driving out Israel from Gaza and the West Bank[xxvii].  The Martyrs Brigades was formed by Tanzim and other Fatah activists, in the Balata refugee section of Nablus, seeking to employ a more aggressive approach against Israel. Many of the group’s founders were graduates of the first intifada in 1987. The Brigades’ infrastructure, funds, leadership, and operatives derived from Fatah Tanzim in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and its main powerbases were located in Nablus and Ramallah[xxviii]. The group mainly operates from within the Gaza Strip but the group also planed and conducted attacks inside Israel and the West Bank. The group also has members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. According to the U.S. Department of State, the group has gained external aid from Iran, who exploited al-Aqsa’s lack of resources and formal leadership by providing funds and guidance to the members mostly through Hizballah facilitators[xxix].

Since their foundation, Fatah Tanzim and the Martyrs of al-Aqsa claimed responsibility for hundreds of terror attacks in which Israeli civilians were killed. Israeli authorities stated that since September 2000 the Fatah-linked groups have carried out more than 2,000 attacks and attempted attacks, including car bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and knife attacks. The Martyrs of al-Aqsa were involved in the vast majority of these attacks[xxx]. The members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades view the armed struggle as the only way to “liberate Palestine,” and considered terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians to be legitimate ways of serving their key national goals.  The group claimed that they, unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad, did not seek Israel’s destruction, but rather were interested in a peace process that lead to Israel’s full withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and provides for the right of return for Palestinian refugees.  When the group founded it stated it would target the Israel Defense Force soldiers and settlers residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the organizations tactics changed and in early 2002 it began to target a series of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israeli cities[xxxi]. This included the introduction of the first female Palestinian suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, on 27 January 2002.  One Israeli man, 81 was killed and 100 people were injured as a result of this attack[xxxii]. On 27 March 2002, the U.S. State Department designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization[xxxiii]. Israel, Canada, the EU and Japan also declared them a terrorist organization[xxxiv].

The ideology of the organization was illustrated in a poster that they published in the Palestinian newspaper “Al Hiya Al Jadida” soon after the group formed. The poster read: “The ten lean years of the peace process proved that the Zionist occupation which oppresses the heart of the Palestinian homeland and understands only the language of the gun, of fire, of the revolution and the bullets of the revolutionary fighters”. Unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades was at first, thought of as a secular, nationalist group, rather than an Islamic one. Therefore it was surprising when the group started carrying out suicide bombing attacks. Islamic motifs had been part of the “al-Aqsa” conflict from the beginning—the very name of the conflict was derived from the notion that Israel had plans to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque. Religious motifs were used extensively by Arafat in his diatribes against “Israeli occupation of Muslim holy places.”  Thus, having made Islam vs. Judaism a central tenet of the war, it was natural for Fatah to alter its own character to suit the rhetoric that had launched the conflict and kept it going[xxxv].

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades organizational structure was based on a loose network of cells in the main West Bank cities. These cells included “military units,” responsible for carrying out the attacks, and “security units” responsible for planning the attacks and overseeing the organization’s internal security. This included the kidnapping and killing of suspected collaborators. Due to its decentralized power structure, intelligence officials both in Israel and the US, have had difficulty identifying leaders of the organization[xxxvi]. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were not a “rogue militia” as Arafat had previously claimed. Rather its members and activities were financed by the Palestinian Authority, and its attacks were carried out with the knowledge and backing of Arafat’s inner circle.  The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades worked in close cooperation with other terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and many of its attacks have been carried out together with Hamas and Palestinan Islamic Jihad (PIJ). This cooperation included sharing of information and technical know-how, as well as the formation of combination cells. During the Second Intifada, the group’s ties weakened due to a growing rift between the movements’ leaders and the operational activists mainly due to arrests and eliminations of leading administrative officials of the Tanzim, whose activists were the most active terrorist element during the beginning of the intifada[xxxvii].

According to the Israeli army, Brig. Gen. Fouad Shoubaki, the Palestinian Authority’s chief financial officer for military operations, was also responsible for financing the activity of the al-Aqsa Brigades in the Bethlehem region, transferring monthly salaries to the organization’s activists in the area. As a result of a raid on Arafat’s headquarters, a document was discovered addressed to Shoubaki’s office asking for money to build additional bombs, and to finance propaganda posters promoting suicide bombers[xxxviii]. Shoubaki was also involved in purchasing a cache of weapons stolen towards the end of the year 2000 from an IDF base in the area. These weapons were later used to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians in the vicinity of Jerusalem[xxxix]. In August 2001, Israeli authorities believed that Shoubaki visited Baghdad in order to coordinate positions with the Iraqi government, and in May 2001 he was present at a meeting in Moscow during which the draft for joint activities between Iran and the PA was agreed upon. Both Iraq and Iran grew increasingly involved in providing financial and military support to Palestinian groups since Arafat first declared the peace process at a dead end and returned to armed conflict. During the initial phase of the second intifada, then-Iraqi president Saddam Hussein announced that he would increase the sum offered to families of suicide bombings from $10,000 to $25,000, in order to encourage more young men to “choose the path of martyrdom[xl].”

Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah leader in the West Bank, was also believed to be the head of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.  He was arrested by Israeli forces in April 2002 for suspected involvement in the operation of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and for orchestrating terror attacks[xli]. Other elements of the Palestinian security apparatus also had significant influence on the Brigades and their activities. Many of the Brigades’ leaders were salaried members of the PA and its security forces. For example, Nasser Awais, a senior al-Aqsa commander, is a full-time employee of the Palestinian National Security Force. Mahmud Damrah, who was involved in organizing terror attacks perpetrated by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades was at the same time a commander in the presidential Force 17 in Ramallah. Nasser Abu Hamid, a senior member and founder of the al-Aqsa Brigades, who was arrested during Operation Defensive Shield, described how the Brigades were founded and how they chose Marwan Bargouti as their leader. According to Hamid, senior PA security service officials initially entreated him and his militants to join their services. Tawfik Tirawi, the head of General Intelligence on the West Bank, proposed that Nasser integrate all Brigade members into General Intelligence, and offered to pay their salaries. However, Nasser ultimately decided to Barghouti, given their prior acquaintance and Nasser’s feeling that Barghouti would be better able to facilitate the group’s activities. Nasser described the considerable military and financial assistance that they received from the outset from Barghouti, via the latter’s nephew Ahmed Barghouti. Nasser also provided details on the participation of members of the PA security services in attacks in Israel. Several bombs were regularly kept in a jeep that had been permanently parked at the Force 17 roadblock in Ramallah for use in case of an IDF incursion into Ramallah. Nasser saw Marwan Barghouti as both a supreme commander and a friend. In his words, the two of them planned their ascent into the Palestinian leadership when Barghouti made it clear that Nasser would advance along with him. Barghouti promised to build a special residential neighborhood for Nasser and his men and their families in the future. Nasser said that he was Barghouti’s closest adviser and was aware of the latter’s military activities, including the transfer of funds and war materiel to those who perpetrated attacks and assisting in the transport of suicide bombers[xlii].

Although the organization had a lack of a central leadership, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were not a “rogue militia” as Arafat claimed in the past. Rather its members, activities and attacks were financed out of Palestinian Authority assets, and its attacks were carried out with the knowledge and backing of Arafat’s inner circle. Whist Arafat may not have determined the target and timing of each individual attack, he decided the overall agenda. In an interview with USA Today on 14 March 2002, Maslama Thabet, another leader of the Brigades, described the group as an integral part of Fatah. “The truth is, we are Fatah itself, but we don’t operate under the name Fatah. We are the armed wing of the organization. We receive our instructions from Fatah. Our commander is Yassir Arafat himself[xliii].” Other leaders of the al-Aqsa Brigades insisted that, even though they held Arafat in high esteem, they did not take their orders regarding individual attacks from him. This was similar to the “opposition” Islamist groups prior to the outbreak of hostilities. These organizations, while not directly controlled by Arafat, were still dependent upon his willingness to leave their military capabilities intact. The role of the Martyrs of al-Aqsa Brigades in rebuilding Fatah’s popularity raised questions about Arafat’s power to restrain it. Many argued that any attempt by the Palestinian leader to rein in the militants, when they were the key to his popularity, would lead to a mutiny against his rule or to his assassination[xliv].

The Fatah groups enjoyed the overwhelming support of Arafat’s constituency, and he invested a great deal in keeping them armed and active, even while his civilian infrastructure languished for lack of funds and attention. While the degree to which Arafat controlled Tanzim and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades was still subject to debate, most analysts were in agreement that his control was much greater than he made it out to be[xlv].

For an in-depth analysis of women and suicide terrorism please view the following links:

Berko, Anat and Erez, Edna. “Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women’s Liberation or Oppression?’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. International Institute for Counter Terrorism website. Retrieved from https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/440/Default.aspx

Berko, Anat and Erez, Edna. “’Ordinary People’ and ‘Death Work’ – Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims.” Retrieved from International Institute for Counter Terrorism website. https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/441/Default.aspx

Beyler, Clara. “Female Suicide Bombers: An Update.” International Institute for Counter Terrorism website. https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/558/Default.aspx

Beyler, Clara. “Messengers of Death – Female Suicide Bombers.” International Institute for Counter Terrorism website. https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/94/Default.aspx

Fighel, Yoni. “Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide Bombers”. International Institute for Counter Terrorism website. https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/167/Def

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The one realm where Iran has made no attempt to disguise its ideological fervor is with regard to its implacable hatred of Israel. Iran remains committed to the proposition that Israel has no right to exist and that its destruction is a desideratum. The following statements, coming from the highest levels of authority in Teheran, give evidence of the ideological obsession which Iran has with Israel’s very existence:

“The government and people of Iran are of the opinion that the Israeli entity is false and artificial. In fact there is no nation named ‘Israel’…..The Zionists scraped together some people from all over the world and, based only on racism, brought about the Zionist regime by virtue of the conquest of Palestine.” (Pres. Ali Khameini addressing senior officers of the Iranian Air Force, Feb. 8, 1996 – Radio Teheran).

“The power of Islam will ultimately bring about the end of the usurpatory and rootless Zionist regime, which has forced its presence upon Palestinian land and which must be destroyed.” (Friday sermon delivered by Pres. Ali Khameini on Feb. 20, 1996 – Iranian News Agency – IRANA).

“When others talk about liberating Palestine they mean the ‘annexed’ territories of 1967, we mean all Palestinian Land…….Iran is the only country which is opposed to the basic existence of Israel” (Foreign Minister Velliati, Feb. 6, 1996 – interview in “Salaam”(.

It comes as no surprise, then, that one of Iran’s major policy goals is the wrecking of the Middle East peace process. An Arab World, which is overwhelmingly Moslem, at peace with Israel contradicts an essential pillar of Iranian ideology. To this end Iran has fomented terrorism, either in the West Bank and Gaza or on Israel’s northern border, in an attempt to bring about the collapse of the peace process.

Putting its creed into deed, Iran has been implicated in terror attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets throughout the world (i.e. the bombing of the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, the attempt on the life of Jewish communal leader Jaques Kimche in Istanbul in June 1993, and the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in July 1994(.

Iranian Embassies and Consulates are forward outposts for terrorist operations with numerous “attaches” coming and going in the weeks prior to and following bombings and assassinations. The Iranian diplomatic mail service, which is inviolable to search and seizure, is constantly used to ferry arms and explosives to operatives around the world. Recognition of official Iranian direction of terrorist activities was evidenced by the warrant for the arrest of Security Minister Falahian issued by German authorities. Falahian is suspected of having engineered the assassination of Iranian dissidents living in Germany in the early 1990’s.

In March 1996 a major shipment of arms and explosives destined for Iranian terrorists based in Germany was discovered at the Belgian port of Antwerp. Security sources indicate that the shipment was to be used in terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe.

Iran views Hizbullah as its spearhead in the battle against Israel. Hizbullah terrorists are almost in constant combat against IDF troops. The geographic location of Lebanon coupled with its political situation easily enables Iran to ship weaponry, with Syrian acquiescence, to Hizbullah units operating on Israel’s border. In January 1996 three Iranian trucks loaded with arms were intercepted by Turkish authorities on their way to Lebanon via Turkey and Syria.

Reliable reports indicate that since April 1996 thirty (30) Iranian planes loaded with ammunition and weapons have landed at Damascus airport. Their cargo, which included Sagger anti-tank missiles, long range Katyusha rockets and high explosive anti-tank mines, was subsequently transferred to Hizbullah forces in south Lebanon. Moreover, according to reports in El-Hiyatt (January 21, 1997) Syria and Iran continue to jointly coordinate Hizbullah’s current role and political future.

Iran was instrumental in the founding of Hizbullah and continues to fund its operations at a level of approximately 80 million dollars per year, which is to be increased in 1997 to 100 million dollars. Hizbullah terrorists are trained at Iranian military installations and close contact with the Hizbullah hierarchy is maintained by Teheran through its embassy in Beirut.

Iranian arms and money have not only bolstered Hizbullah’s combat readiness but have also left their imprint from an ideological point of view. Contrary to public statements made for the Western media, Hizbullah does not view its role as merely fighting Israeli forces in the Security Zone, rather Hizbullah is now committed to an unrelenting struggle against Israel. At a rally held on the last Friday of Ramadan Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nassrallah called upon the Palestinians to rekindle the Jihad against Israel, resume the suicide bombings and the Intifadah. Claiming that the current Palestinian leadership had “betrayed Palestine and Jerusalem” he stated that it is necessary now for a Palestinian “Islamabouli” (Anwar Sadat’s assassin) to step forward and for the Palestinians to “execute” their leaders.

The Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry

https://www.israel-mfa.gov.il gopher://israel-info.gov.il 

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The Islamic regime’s determination to continue supporting terrorism, frowned upon by the international community, has forced the Iranian Foreign Ministry to strive, under extreme international pressure, to offset the damage caused by this policy to Tehran’s economic and political ties. Iran does not deny its adherence to Khomeini’s “Islamic Revolutionary Ideology”, which supports all radical Islamic movements worldwide, but stresses that Iranian assistance is merely cultural, moral and humanitarian in nature. Tehran strongly denies any military and/or financial assistance to these movements. It must be emphasized that such denial is deeply imbedded in the Shi’ite tradition, in the principle of the “taqyy’a” (concealing the faith) which was used as a means of protection against the persecutors of the Shi’ite religion.

Iranian Terror Against Israel

Since the “Madrid Conference” in October 1991, Iran has been active in attempting to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East, on the grounds that it threatens to increase Iran’s political isolation in the region, and to limit its influence and harm its interests in Lebanon. This opposition lead Iran to strengthen its ties with those Palestinian organizations that oppose the peace process, such as “The Palestinian Islamic Jihad” (PIJ), Hamas and the various “Fronts”. Iran hoped that terrorist attacks carried out by the Palestinian organizations, together with those perpetrated by “Hizballah”, would hamper the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and undermine Yasser Arafat’s position. This goal concurs with the basic Iranian hostility towards Israel that originates from the regime’s Islamic religious ideology. Iran refuses to recognize Israel’s existence, and refers to Israel as “the occupation regime of al Quds”, and constantly calls for the destruction of Israel.

Iran does not conceal its ties with the Palestinian organizations that oppose the political process, Hamas, the PIJ and Ahmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC. Furthermore, these organizations make public their connections and cooperation with Iran. Most of the Palestinian organizations that oppose the peace process participated in the “Conferences for the Support of the Uprising” organized by Tehran (4-6 December 1990; 19-22 October 1991).

During these highly publicized conferences, the leaders of the Palestinian organizations met with the top political echelons in Iran. A special committee headed by the Iranian Vice President in charge of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs, Attalla Maharjani was formed as a result of Tehran’s decision to provide the “Palestinian uprising” with financial, military, political and humanitarian. An Iranian “Fund for the Fallen Soldiers” give financial and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, in support of the “Jihad”. Within the framework of Iran’s efforts to instill its hostility towards Israel into the rest of the Muslim world, Khomeini declared the last Friday of the month of Ramadan as “al Quds Day”, to mark the Muslims’ aspirations to liberate Jerusalem.

In February 1996 at a meeting in Damascus with the leaders of the ten Palestinian opposition organizations, Iran’s Vice President, Habibi stressed the need to coordinate the struggle against Israel. Iran also justified the terrorist suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Ashkelon (25 February 1996) and described them as the answer to Israel’s “inhumane” policy towards the Palestinians.

Iranian Assistance To Palestinian Terror Organizations

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

The Palestinian organization most loyal to the Iranian revolutionary ideology is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In spite of it being a Sunni organization, the Iranian revolution sees in it an example to be followed. After the deportation of its leader, Fathi Shkaki, from the Gaza Strip, the ties between Iran and the organization have been strengthened, particularly in the field of Iranian military assistance. Instructors of the Guardians of the Revolution give regular military instruction courses to the organization’s activists from the Territories and abroad, as well as in the Hizballah camps in Lebanon and Iran. Iran also provides the organization’s activists with logistic support, including Iranian identitificatio papers.

As an example, a militant by the name of Khaled Zakkharana of Jenin, was given extensive military training in January 1995 at the Hizballah camp in the Baka’a Valley, as well as at the Guardians of the Revolution’s camp in Ba’albek, Lebanon. There he underwent advanced training in light weapons, the handling of mines and Lau anti-tank rockets. He was then infiltrated into the Territories to establish an extensive network in support of suicide bombings.

Iran also aided The PIJ in laying the groundwork for terrorist attacks abroad. At the beginning of 1996, the organization’s representative in Iran visited Turkey to prepare for the training in Iran of several of the organization’s activists. These activists were due to infiltrate back into Israel in order to carry out terrorist attacks. The Turkish security authorities arrested some of the PIJ militants and one of them, Khalil Itta, was arrested in Israel. Itta was one of nine PIJ militants who underwent training in Iran in the period of July – September 1995.

The Hamas

Since 1992, Iran has drawn closer to Hamas, which it perceives as the leading Islamic movement in the Territories. At the foundation of their relationship lies their common interest in the disruption of the political process, and their efforts to undermine the PLO. These common goals transcend the ideological variance between them due to religious differences between the Sunni Hamas and the Shi’ite Iran. These ties are manifest themselves in frequent high-level meetings between the two sides, and the relative importance of the Hamas rein Tehran. For example, a Hamas delegation headed by two top activists, Imad Alami (Chairman of the Internal Committee) and Mustapha Qanua (the representative in Syria) visited Iran in October 1995 and met with high ranking Iranian officials.

In addition to political ties, Iran also provides Hamas with military assistance. The movement’s activists train on a regular basis at the camps of Hizballah and the Guardians of the Revolution in Lebanon, as well as in Iran. This includes training for suicide attacks. Several Iranian-trained militants succeeded in infiltrating back into the Territories under Palestinian Authority control. Israel has arrested Hamas activists who admitted that they were trained by Iranian instructors in the Beka’a Valley, in Lebanon, and in Iran. The training included the use of light weapons, photography and sabotage.

Iran also gives Hamas financial assistance. In 1992, several million dollars were transferred to Hamas’ account, including money originating from the Iranian “Fund for the Fallen”, which grants assistance to victims of the “Palestinian Uprising”.

Assistance to Hizballah

The Hizballah organization is the spearhead for Iran in its use of terrorism in general, and in its fight against Israel in particular. The organization began its large-scale terror acts in 1982, when its militants blew up the American Embassy in Beirut, killing 61 people and wounding more than 120. Later, it was behind a series of terror attacks against Western targets, among them: the suicide bombing of the Marines Headquarters in Beirut (23 October 1983) and the French Military Headquarters in Beirut, in which 241 Americans and 56 French soldiers were killed. In the 1980s, Hizballah activists were involved in the kidnapping of Western citizens in Lebanon whom they held as hostages. In some cases, this was done on Iranian orders, for the purpose of obtaining economic or political concessions from Western governments, such as the release of Iranian or Lebanese terrorists imprisoned in Western Europe.

Financial Assistance

Iran provides financial assistance on a large scale to Hizballah, reaching, according to some estimates, millions of dollars a year. They also give tactical assistance in terror attacks against Israel, through the Guardians of the Revolution units posted in the Baka’a Valley. The Hizballah General Secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, made public Iranian support in an interview given to al-Wast (11 March 1996), where he stated that his organization receives financial and political assistance to continue, in his words, “the legitimate struggle against Israel”.

Weapons and Ammunition

Iran has been Hizballah’s main weapons supplier since its establishment. Iranian assistance includes a wide range of weapons and ammunition, such as mortars, Sagger anti-tank rockets, mines, explosives and small arms. As far as is known, the largest arms consignment sent by Iran to Lebanon was in February/March 1992 in the wake of the incidents between Israel and the Hizballah. Since then, there have been no significant arms consignments dispatched by air, probably due to Syrian objection. However, six trucks carrying arms from Iran to Lebanon, were apprehended in Turkey in mid- January 1996. Thus it can be assumed that Iran is now making extensive use of the land route to transfer arms to Hizballah.

Training

Iranian assistance to Hizballah in this field is mostly advice and supervision of the Hizballah’s training program, since the basic instruction is carried out by the organization’s militants themselves. The Guardians of the Revolution (more explicitly the training arm of the al-Quds Forces) provides higher level training in Iran mainly at the al-Quds Force training base “Imam Ali” in northern Tehran). These include courses for officers, company commanders, commandos, and courses in communications and powered-gliders.

Elimination Of Opposition Activists

Since the Islamic regime came into power in 1979, it has consistently acted to eliminate Iranian opposition activists outside the country and has invested considerable intelligence efforts in surveillance and tracking-down of anyone conceived as a threat to the regime. Examples of this activity became glaringly obvious in the wake of the following trials in which Iran was implicated:

* The liquidation of Iran’s former Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, an opposition activist (6 Aug. 91) in France. The investigation of this incident led to the arrest of three Iranians (including a diplomat), who probably belonged to the Iranian Intelligence Department. The trial exposed the involvement of various Iranian bodies (the Ministry of Communication, Diplomatic representatives, commercial companies, “Iran Air”) – all of which assisted in the liquidation. One of the accused was sentenced to life imprisonment, another was given a 10-year prison sentence, and the diplomat was acquitted owing to lack of evidence and returned to Iran.

* The Liquidation of high ranking activists belonging to Iran’s Democratic Kurdish Party (17 Sept. 92) at the Mikonos restaurant in Berlin. This operation was carried out by a squad composed of Hizballah and Iranian intelligence operatives, headed by a member of the Islamic Students Association in Germany Khat’m Dara’abi, who apparently was employed by the Iranian Intelligence Department as the liaison between the Iranian Consulate in Berlin and the hit team. Dara’abi and four other Shi’ite activists were arrested by the German police. German security officials stressed the involvement of Iranian Intelligence and the Guards of the Islamic Revolution in the affair.

The latter affair has resurfaced recently due to the German Federal Prosecution’s decision to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Minister of Iranian Intelligence, Falahian, as the official who ordered the liquidation of the opposition members. It would appear that the grounds for this far-reaching decision (which has significant implications for the relations between the two countries) was the testimony given at the trial, which revealed the depth of Falahian’s involvement.

Since Rasfanjani rise to power in 1989, scores of Iranian opposition members have been liquidated worldwide, among them:

* Abed al-Rahman Kadmalo, General Secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (13 July 89);
* Khat’m Rajui Hamjahdin Hilek (in Switzerland, 24 April 90);
* Mahmad Hassin Nakadi, the Italian representative of the National Opposition Council – the umbrella organization of the Iranian regime’s Opposition (16 March 93).

Liquidation of Opposition members in 1994 includes the killing in Turkey of a Section Head of Iran’s Democratic Kurdish Party (on 4 January) and another assassination in Rumania (15 Nov.)

In 1996 the Iran regime continued to act against the Opposition worldwide, particularly against their main centers in Iraq and Turkey. One example is the assassination (on 20 February, 96) in Istanbul of two activists from Mujahedin-e Khalq by Iranian intelligence agents and the assassination of another Mujahedin-e Khalq activist in Baghdad (7 March 96), which the organization claims was carried out by the Iranian intelligence. There has been a rise in the volume of Iranian efforts to increase intelligence capabilities in the Kurdish district in Iraq, in order to direct subversive activity, inter alia, against opposition targets there.

As a rule, Iran, in an effort to improve its relations with the West and to appear in a more positive light, refrains from carrying out terror attacks in Western Europe. However, should an occasion presents itself, Iran does not hesitate to rise to the occasion – mostly through deniable emissaries, to prevent the attacks being traced directly to Iraq. For proof one need look no farther than the explosive device intercepted on an Iranian vessel on its way from Iran to Antwerp port (14 March ’96). This explosive charge, addressed to a shop with Iranian intelligence connections in Germany, and ready for activation, was probably intended for a future terror attack against Iranian opposition members or Israeli/Jewish targets in Europe.

The Rushdie Affair

Within the framework of Iranian terror, it is worth mentioning the obsessive and unrelenting pursuit and incitement campaign which Iran is conducting against the writer Salman Rushdie (author of “Satanic Verses”), whom they perceive to be the symbol of the degradation of Islamic values. Notable is Khomeini’s ruling (February 89) which permits the shedding of his blood and calls for his liquidation. The Iranians are continuing to persecute Rushdie in spite of the strong criticism voiced by the West against them, which continues to overshadow any improvement in relations between the West and Iran. The Iranians have placed a large reward on Rushdie’s head and their intelligence mechanism has spared no efforts in trying to locate him, as well as trying to prevent the distribution of his book by eliminating publishers and translators. On 11 July 93, Hitushi Igrashi, who translated the book into Japanese, was murdered. And in Norway William Negraad, the local publisher of “Satanic Verses”, was badly injured (11 Oct.93). In spite of Iranian pragmatic officials’ efforts to find a solution to the “Rushdie Affair” by giving him a written commitment that he would not be harmed, the religious establishment insists on adhering to Khomeini’s ruling and refuses any compromise.

Terror against Western Targets

During the 1980s, Iranian and pro-Iranian agencies were involved in the planning and execution of attacks against Western targets, particularly in Lebanon. In the context of opposition to Western Influence, the Islamic Jihad and Hizballah, under instructions from Iran, carried out a series of attacks against Western representatives. Among them:

* The bombing of the French army barracks in Beirut (15 April 83)
* The bombing of the Marines headquarters in Beirut (26 Oct.83)
* The car bomb that exploded near the American embassy in Beirut (20 Sept. 84).

During the latter half of the 1980s, the Iranians directed the handling of the Western hostages, including the negotiations for their release, via special emissaries. These emissaries acted as mediators between the various Lebanese groups holding the hostages (such as Ahmad Ma’aniya) and the Iranian government, which conducted the negotiations. Iranian bartered the release of citizens of Western countries being held in Lebanon in return for the release of Iranian or Lebanese activists arrested for involvement in terrorist activity in Western Europe. Since the release of the last Western hostage (mid 92), Iran and its emissaries have avoided carrying out terror attacks on Western targets. It is also possible that Iran was behind the attempt to disrupt the “Madrid Conference” (Oct. 91) by executing several terror attacks during the Conference against the citizens and interests of the countries taking part in the Conference.

Examples of these activities:

* 28 October, 91 An explosive device blew up the car of an American sergeant in Turkey. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.
* 29 October, 91 A rocket was fired at the American Embassy in Beirut and caused slight damage. A front organization calling itself “The Revolutionary Arab Forces” claimed responsibility for the attack in protest against the Peace Process.
* 30 October, 91 A rocket was fired at the Spanish Consulate in Zidon. There were no casualties.
* 17 March, 92 A car bomb was discovered next to the American Consulate in Istanbul.

Iranian Agencies Involved in Terror

Intelligence Agency

This agency, headed by Hajet al-Aslam Ali Falahian, is the leading body in the “Exportation of the Revolution” policy, the direction of terrorist activity, the and elimination of the opponents of the regime. His deputy, Mustapha Fur Mahmadi is responsible for all the Intelligence Agency activities outside Iran, the assistance to the Palestinian organizations and the Hizballah, and the directing of terrorist activity against Israel and Western targets, as well as widespread subversive activity in Muslim countries. Operating within the framework of the Intelligence Agency is a department that centralizes the terrorist activity against opposition targets. The Intelligence Agency has several branches worldwide. Among the most prominent are: the one in Lebanon, whose main purpose is to disrupt the peace process; the branch in Sudan, which assists in subversive activity in North Africa; and the branch in Germany which centralizes the activity against the opposition organizations.

Guards of the Revolution

A major Iranian issue is the need to obscure Iran’s involvement in terrorism and cover up the activities of the Intelligence Agency and the Guards of the Revolution outside Iran. In many Iranian embassies, the number of staff is much larger than required by the diplomatic needs of the host countries, a situation that occasionally leads to the discovery of illegal activity and the deportation of those involved. In 95-96, Iranian “diplomats” were deported from Germany, Norway and Turkey. Iranian embassies usually serve as a base and hiding place for Iranian and other activists involved in terrorism. In certain instances, the Guards of the Revolution appointed ambassadors highly experienced in subversive activity in Lebanon:

* Kamal Magid (until 94 Ambassador to Sudan);
* Ahmad Destmelshian (Ambassador to Jordan)
* Etzar-Mahmad Fur (head of Bureau for Iranian Interests in Egypt);
* Hassin Nikhnan (Ambassador to Iraq).

“The Department for Islamic and Arab Movements” in the Guards of the Revolution is responsible for developing ties with the various Muslim movements, and providing them with financial and organizational assistance. In turn it is understood that the activists of these movements will assist Iran in various capacities.

“al-Quds” Force

The “al-Quds” is a branch of the Guards of the Revolution skilled in training and instructing Islamic organizations at Lebanese camps (under the Hizballah’s control) and camps in Iran. “Al-Quds” members are known to be present in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Sudan and Iraq. One such training camp is the Ahmad Ali camp in Northern Tehran where training is given to Hizballah and Palestinian activists.

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There are apparently hundreds of activists in Sudan from the Middle East and Africa, who receive military training in order to return to their countries, carry out attacks, and create anarchy with the intention of taking over their country’s institutions and instituting an Islamic regime.

The Sudanese involvement in terror manifested itself, inter alia, by involving Iranian activists in the attempted terror attacks in crowded New York centers in the beginning of 1993. Within this framework, we must point out that:

• The head of the terror squad which planned the showcase attack in New York, Sidik Ibrahim Ali, as well as other members of the squad, were Sudanese.
   
• Several arrested terrorists confessed to their interrogators that they were trained at Sudanese terrorist camps by Iranian revolutionaries and Hizballah activists from Lebanon.
   
• It is also possible that the activists who were arrested were supposed to receive operational assistance from Sudanese diplomats at the U.N. Building in New York.

Sudan, as a country bordering Egypt, serves as a convenient base for training Egyptian terrorists and as an exit base for attacks in Egypt. Interrogation of Egyptian terrorists returning from Afghanistan revealed that Khartoum is the main link in the planning stage of terror attacks against Egypt.

Sudan is an important factor in Iran’s strategy and serves as a bridgehead for the penetration of Iranian Fundamentalism into Africa. Co-operation between Iran and the regime of Omar el Bashir in Sudan commenced several years ago.

The military-political involvement of Teheran in Sudan became deeply entrenched during 1992. This involvement was noticeable in the signing of military and economic agreements between the two countries and included, inter alia, military and economic assistance within the framework of rehabilitating the Sudanese armed forces.

During 1993, Iran transferred arms to Fundamentalist groups in Sudan via the General Secretary of the Iranian-Sudanese Friendship Association – Amin Benani. With Benani’s blessing, the Sudanese army was armed and equipped with the sole purpose of strengthening it to deal with the rebels in Southern Sudan under the command of John Gering.

The assistance which Sudan gives to the various terror organizations, as well as its possible involvement in the attempted attacks in the U.S. in 1993, have caused the U.S. to include Sudan in the list of “countries supporting terrorism” and, as a result, to impose commercial and economic sanctions on it. This U.S. decision has encouraged a Sudanese effort to improve its international image and, at the same time, to bridge its impaired relations with Egypt and to deny all involvement in terror activity.

It is possible that the assistance given by Sudan to France in the extradition of Carlos, was intended to score points for the Sudanese in the West and to help them in removing their name from the list of “countries supporting terrorism”. A number of publications connect the release of two Iranians from a French prison at the beginning of 1994 to this affair Yhe two were jailed for murdering a member of the Iranian Opposition residing in Switzerland. It is claimed that their release ensured Iran’s tacit assistance in capturing Carlos in Sudan.

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30.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Deutsche Welle in Portuguese on the Gaza war.

30.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Deutsche Welle in German on the Gaza war.

26.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Channel 1 on the Gaza war (In Hebrew).

24.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Amichai Magen to IP Journal: “An alternative strategy for Gaza”.

17.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Amichai Magen to KAS: “Israel Must Develop an Alternative Strategy to Manage its Relationship with Hamas and PIJ”.

16.7.2014
Amb. Itzhak Levanon was mentioned in the Washington Post in the article: ‘As cease-fire with Hamas fails to take shape, Netanyahu says, ‘Our answer is fire’’ by Griffe Witte and William Booth. 

16.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Veja titled: “MORTO PARA PROTEGER” (In Portuguese).

15.7.2014
Adv. Ophir Falk was mentioned in the Jerusalem Post as the author of the article ‘Finish the Job’. 

15.7.2014
Interview with Brig. Gen. (Res.) Nitzan Nuriel to Ynet on Hamas’s UAV (In Hebrew).

14.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to El Imparcial titled: “La importancia de los ataques químicos del régimen sirio” (In Spanish).

13.7.2014
Op-ed by Dr. Hillel Avihai to Nrg about to the fall of Hamas (In Hebrew).

13.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Anat Berko to Channel 10 (In Hebrew).

11.7.2014
Dr. Shaul Shay mentioned in The Wall Street Journal in an article titled, “Amid Pressure, Israel Stands Firm on Options.”

10.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Bizportalabout operationProtective Edge (In Hebrew).

10.7.2014
Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Shalom Harari mentioned in an article by Middle East Eye titled “Abbas in firing line over security cooperation with Israel.”  

10.7.2014
Mr. Gadi Zohar quoted in an article by Los Angeles Times titled “Gaza flare-up brings all-too-familiar dread to Israelis, Palestinians.”  

10.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Ely Karmon to Le Point.fr about sraeli Offensive in Gaza: legitime defense or agression.

10.7.2014
Op-ed by Dan Diker to The Jerusalem Post titled “The World from Here: Dangerous comparisons”.

9.7.2014
Dr. Boaz Ganor mentioned in The Guardian in the article ” Israel claims to have foiled amphibious Palestinian assault” by Orlando Crowcroft.

8.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Shaul Shay in The Christian Science Monitor titled: “Despite reservist call-up, Israel sees ground offensive as last resort” 

7.7.2014 
Op-ed by Dr. Jonathan Fine to Maariv (In Hebrew)

6.7.2014
Interview with Dr. Shaul Shay in Deutsche Welle titled: “Intelligence official: Israel ‘trying to resolve conflict diplomatically'”

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The will of Assad’s forces to fight is still there, but they are struggling to combat the Syrian rebel’s gains until recently. It is believed that the al-Assad regime is desperate enough to use anything in its power to stay the ruling government, including use of any of its poisonous gases, as was the case this past March through May.

Besides the use of chemical warfare by the Syrian government there is a real and immediate threat that chemical weapons, agents or precursors could fall in the hands of terrorist organizations, be it Hezbollah (in which case the regime itself could be willing to provide them to its staunch ally), pro-Syrian Palestinian organizations, the Free Syrian Army and its local units or the various Islamist and jihadists factions like Jabha al-Nusra.

This report is the first part of an ICT project intended to evaluate the threat of proliferation of Syrian chemical weapons to local and regional terrorist organizations and beyond. The report includes information on the status of chemical weapons in Syria and their use updated to mid-June 2013 and an addendum presenting the main points of the United States and French intelligence communities’ evaluation concerning the August 21, 2013 chemical attacks in the suburbs of Damascus.

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The post New Battlefield, Old Laws: The Operationalization of the Law appeared first on ICT.

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