The second platform is the reliance on detection technology, a system familiar to every passenger checking-in at airports worldwide.

The Sept. 11, 2001 attack, followed by Richard Reid’s planned suicide mission (the ‘Shoe Bomber’), the latest plot to sabotage American aircraft departing from Heathrow airport (August 2006), as well as previous terrorist attacks such as the Pan-Am bombing (December 1988) and the ‘Nezar Hindawi’ case (April 1986), have raised the issue as to which platform offers the better capability and how airlines and countries can enhance aviation security, taking into account new tactics adopted by terrorists, such as suicide-missions or the potential to use the aircraft itself as a strategic agent in causing a mass-casualty attack, using the hijacked aircraft, whether it is a commercial jet or a crop-dusting plane and disseminating WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), such as chemical or biological agents.

Before discussing the issue of which of the platforms offers a better solution for the prevention of potential terrorist attacks, it is important to understand the existence of ‘Structural Discrepancy’ [1].

The term ‘Structural Discrepancy’, suggested by the author, is aimed at characterizing an actual reality of asymmetry between defensive technology compared to weaponry technology or, the arithmetical progress of security vs. geometric escalation of weapon technology.

One main explanation as to the basic conflict between offensive tactics and defensive technologies, a gap that best describes the structural discrepancy, is related to the fact that terrorism in general and aviation terrorism in particular have benefited from the initiative factor: they have the advantage of surprise, as stated by Jenkins: ‘Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime. The government cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time'[2].

This structural discrepancy highlights the assumption that it is unlikely that defensive technology can guarantee 100% success in preventing terrorist attacks at all times. As the detectors’ technology improves, so does the weaponry, but at a greater speed. The Austrian Glock 17 handgun, made of composite plastic, cannot be detected by traditional metal detectors. It can be taken apart, hidden professionally and, in most, cases may offer the potential terrorist an advantage in that it can easily be smuggled on board and offers the terrorist the opportunity to hijack an aircraft. The Glock-17 was the challenge that necessitated the development of sophisticated detectors that would replace the traditional X-ray detectors. The Semtex explosive, perhaps the favored explosive among terrorist groups, represented the offensive side’s advantage[3].

This endless cat-and-mouse game was demonstrated in the 11 September attack, where nineteen terrorists equipped with knives and box cutters, boarded four American jets, weapons which represented the triumph of simplicity over the supremacy of detection technology. If a determined attacker is intent on targeting an aircraft, he/she will finally achieve this objective, in part or totally. The question is how airlines and nations can minimize the chances of this happening? Furthermore, the final report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, prepared by Vice-President Al Gore, issued on 12 February 1997 (following the crash of the TWA 800 flight), has highlighted the fact that the FAA certification, as well as the security standards, were not updated following the emergence of new generations of explosives (mainly plastic), and the fact that the efficiency of the 1970s X-Ray detection technology was reduced to a degree which presented ‘security loopholes’ to the terrorists[4].

This situation requires an effective system capable of confronting the terrorists’ constant efforts to attack the aviation infrastructure, in general, and commercial aircraft, in particular.

This article will focus exclusively on civilian aircraft, taking into account two tactics adopted by terrorists:

1. Hijacking the aircraft and utilizing it as a flying missile, whilst perpetrating a suicide attack simultaneously.

2. Sabotaging the aircraft by smuggling a bomb on board either by the terrorist himself or using an unwitting passenger, a tactic which was adopted, for example, on 17 April 1986, when Nezar Hindawi planted a Semtex bomb on his fiancée, Ann Mary Murphy.

The article will emphasize the dilemma as to which of the two aforementioned security strategies offers a better solution in confronting terrorists’ plans to attack civilian aircraft.

Before analyzing case studies which could illuminate the challenges faced by decision-makers with regard to an effective security philosophy, the following table will emphasize the characteristics of the two platforms of aviation security: the reliance on the human factor (‘human eye detection’) and the machinery technology:

Human element vs. technological element:
A comparison overview

Focusing on the human eye detection platform may result in two opposite perspectives: FAA tests in 1978 showed that the operators failed to detect 13% of all inspected luggage, whilst in 1987, the failure rate increased to 20%. In other words, one out of five screened objects had the potential of containing explosives.

Not to mention the FAA tests in 1987, where screeners missed 20% of the potentially dangerous objects in its tests.

Later, in 2002 an inspection headed by the TSA was held at 32 airports. At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), screeners failed to detect simulated weapons in 41% of the cases, reaching the fourth highest percentage after Cincinnati airport (58%); Las Vegas (50%); Jacksonville (50%) and Sacramento (40%). Screeners at thirty two airports, which are considered the nation’s largest airports, failed to find simulated weapons in 24% of the tests [5].

The same thing occurred between October 2005 and January 2006 (four years after the 11 September attack), when security screeners at twenty one U.S. airports, failed to find bomb-making materials during governmental tests [6] .

Another negative characteristic regarding the human factor, is related to the high turnover rate of screeners (in some cases 100% a year at some airports), alongside a low salary (minimum wage) and poor supervision, which present a suitable climate for terrorists to target an aircraft. From May 1998 to April 1999, screener turnover at nineteen of the US largest airports reached an average annual rate of 126%. Five of these nineteen airports reported a turnover of 200%, and one airport (St. Louis) reported the enormous turnover of 425 % (!)

On the other hand, one cannot disregard the critical role of trained and motivated personnel who, as proven below, have succeeded in preventing terrorists from carrying out an aerial attack which, in at least one case, could have caused the killing of 375 passengers.

On 6 September, 1970, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) perpetrated one of the most daring attacks which, in the following decades, would affect the entire aviation industry: the Dawson Field affair.

The PFLP planned to hijack three Western airliners, including an El-Al Boeing 707, bound for New-York from Tel-Aviv.

The hero of this incident was, undoubtedly, the aircraft captain, Uri Bar-Lev. First, he succeeded in preventing the embarkation of two of the four terrorists (only Leila Khaled and Patrick Arguello succeeded in boarding, despite the security checks).

The security officer, who warned Bar-Lev of his suspicions regarding the two Senegalese passport holders, alerted Bar-Lev to the fact that ‘something was odd… I couldn’t tell exactly what, but something was wrong…causing Bar-Lev to re-check their passports’ [7]. Bar-Lev discovered that these two ‘passengers’, who had bought two first-class tickets and had checked in at the last minute, presented passports with consecutive numbers and, as a result, he refused permission for these passengers, who appeared to be two of the four terrorists, to board the Israeli airline.

Even if technology today is able to signal when two or more passports with consecutive numbers are presented and screened, it is important to remember that this event occurred more than thirty years ago, when such technology was not available, so that the human eye had to replace the technology which, as mentioned above, was unavailable at that time.

The other case study which emphasizes the critical role of the human eye detection platform, relates to the Nezar Hindawi’ case (17 April 1986), when an Israeli security officer managed to foil a Syrian-Palestinian plot to sabotage an Israeli Jumbo aircraft bound for Tel-Aviv from New-York via London, using an Irish girl named Ann Mary Murphy, who was Nezar Hindawi’s fiancée.

Hindawi’s operators succeeded in installing 1.5 Kg. of Semtex explosives, equipped with a sophisticated timer, slipping through the British security checks at Heathrow airport. Following an interview held by the author with the security officer, he admitted that there were certain suspicious signs in Murphy’s behavior.

The security officer decided to re-check Murphy’s bag, and when he picked it up and walked ten to fifteen meters away from the check-in counter to the X-ray machine, he realized that the bag was too heavy for its size and weighed at least one and a half kilos more than it should have.

The fact is that without the Israeli security officer’s ‘gut feeling’, 375 passengers could have perished. It was not the technology that prevented this deadly attack from being carried out, but a well-trained and highly motivated security officer.

The role of the ‘human eye’ was, in fact, repeated during the September 11 attack. On that day, the leader, Muhammed Atta, arrived at Portland’s airport after buying two first-class tickets via the internet for the 6 a.m. U.S. AIR flight to Boston, with a connecting flight to Los Angeles. Michael Tuohey, the ticket agent who was manning the check-in counter at the time, admitted that a $2500 first-class ticket was not an everyday occurrence. In addition, he admitted to being troubled by the expression on Atta’s face:’…He had the most hateful and angry look. I had never felt like this before…I looked at him and thought : My God, I sense terrible anger…but I said to myself: if this man does not look like an Arab terrorist, nobody does… ‘ [8].

However, the ticket agent decided, despite his ‘gut feeling’, to let Atta and his colleague, Abdul Aziz al-Mari, pass – mainly because of their bags which gave the impression that they were businessmen.

This evidence emphasizes the critical role of human inspection in observing suspicious behavior such as body-language. Suspicious answers resulting from questioning (known in Israel as the ‘profile system’), based on past incidents, clearly show that tragic results could have been foiled. These ‘suspicious signs’ cannot be detected efficiently by machinery. On the other hand, machinery does not suffer from fatigue, erosion, or short-memory relating to suspicious behavior, or from strikes caused by union policy.

However, the critical role of human inspection has certain limitations. Despite the Israeli experience, the ‘human factor’ does not produce 100% results. There have been cases where ‘passengers’ have succeeded in boarding an aircraft without a flight ticket (at least on one occasion during the 1990s, a journalist boarded an El-Al flight to Kenya, after bypassing security checks), or, when a mentally-ill male managed to reach the gate at Ben-Gurion Airport, one of the most secure airports worldwide, with a non-valid ticket, after being inspected by security personnel.

So each platform offers various advantages, as well as limitations, and the question is which of the platforms is preferable?

The answer probably lies between these two security viewpoints, by suggesting that only a calculated combination of human inspection and technology, will provide an appropriate answer to potential hijackers, suicide bombers or sabotage attempts. The success of Israeli security in preventing terrorists from targeting the most threatened airline worldwide (El Al Israel Airlines), is related to the security conception of focusing first and foremost on the passenger, and only then on his luggage, rather than almost exclusively on the luggage, as is the common practice in Western security procedures.

The Nezar Hindawi plot failed because something in Murphy’s behavior caused the Israeli security officer to re-examine her (after she had already been checked in a standard airport examination, which included an X-ray screening of her luggage). Bar-Lev’s decision not to let the two Senegalese passengers on board, was the result of their suspicious behaviour, which goaded the security personnel into alerting Bar-Lev, who decided not to let them board the El-Al aircraft and to summon the second security officer into the cockpit. Dan Issacharoff, former head of El-Al security, was quoted as saying that:…’The El-Al security system emphasizes the identification of people who could be a threat, rather than the detection of objects that could be used to hijack or destroy an airplane’ [9].

The reliance on technology has resulted in some ludicrous developments, such as United Airlines’ initiative to place a booth at the airport, where a computer would question the passengers as to whether they had been given anything to carry on board? The passenger (or terrorist) would then press either the ‘No’ button, or the ‘Yes’ button. Do they honestly believe that a potential terrorist would press the ‘Yes’ button, if he planned to hijack the aircraft or worse, blow it up in mid-air…? [10].

Whilst before the 11 September attack technology focused on the passengers’ luggage, a fact which led to the disaster, the focus now is on the passengers’ luggage, as well as on the passengers’ history. In other words, there has been a change in the thinking process. Technology should focus on the passenger as well, not only on the passenger’s luggage. Yet, as mentioned above, the human factor relating to security is vital in any future security concept. The Israeli experience clearly shows that the human eye, in combination with advanced technology, offers the best security platform, in comparison with other available security measures.

The task is how to combine these two platforms, and not which of them is preferable. The evidence clearly shows that some of the major aviation terrorist attacks could have been prevented, if a calculated combination of technology and ‘a human eye inspection’ had been adopted.

This viewpoint believes that the human eye without technology is a fantasy, but technology without the human eye is a catastrophe.

The post Aviation Security: The Human Eye vs. Detection Technology appeared first on ICT.

The President of the United States, G.W. Bush, has announced that his administration intends to declare the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization”, the Washington Post stated in August 20071.

The average newspaper reader would not have paid any extra attention to this development. However, the declaration left academic terrorism researchers perplexed, if not astonished.

In order to clarify this vital issue, it is important to shed light on the question of who is identified as a terrorist, or which politically-motivated group is identified as a terrorist group.

One important aspect of who should be termed a terrorist is the distinction between a violent act conducted by a state or its official army and a violent act derived from politically motivated ideology, which is aimed against civilians and conducted by individuals or sub-national groups.
The United States’ State Department uses the term ‘terrorism’ following Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d):
‘Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’ 2.
This definition makes a clear distinction between a violent act against civilians (otherwise it would be labeled as ‘guerrilla warfare’), which is conducted directly by an official authority such as the leadership of a state, and between an act conducted by sub-national groups or organizations.
However, the example of Iranian/Libyan terrorists blowing up Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland enforces the understanding that although terrorism is conducted by sub-national groups, it may be backed by a national government.

On the other hand, any violent action against civilian infrastructure directly and officially conducted by a sovereign state’s uniformed army is not defined as terrorist action and it does not matter whether other elements are involved.

This point was reinforced after by two Chinese fighters accidentally downed the accidental the British-owned Skymaster aircraft of Cathay Pacific Airways (23 June 1954) flying from Bangkok to Hong-Kong, causing the deaths of ten passengers onboard. Another case in point is the downing of the Israeli El-Al aircraft (27 July 1955) flying near the Greek-Bulgarian frontier by Bulgarian fighters, causing the death of all fifty eight passengers and crew onboard.

All these incidents are not classified as acts of terrorism. However, had the action been conducted by a sub-state group or by clandestine agents, it would have been categorized as terrorist action. This was the case when the United Kingdom decided to break off diplomatic relations with Syria after a Syrian leader was implicated in a plot to blow up an El-Al airliner in April 1986 (‘The Nezar Hindawi’ case).

This decision, – which was followed by other western countries – as well as the implementation of sanctions against Syria by the US, emphasizes the understanding that terrorism is not unique to sub-state groups. However, it may be state-sponsored. In such cases, supporting terrorism – by financing it, by providing logistical support or by hosting terrorist groups – does not reduce the responsibility of a national government. Yet, the state is not identified as ‘terrorist’; it may, however, be called a ‘terror sponsor’, as identified by the US State Department’s list, first formed in 1979 3.

This issue may open a new debate, with reference to some actions conducted by sovereign governments, such as the bombing of Dresden, Coventry, London and Hiroshima. These actions were deliberately aimed against non-combatants and unarmed people, a fact that raises the question as to whether these aforementioned incidents are considered ‘acts of terrorism’. It may be assumed that the brutal acts conducted by Pol Pot during the 1970s in Cambodia (and against his own people) are considered ‘terrorism’, according to Paul Wilkinson’s definition of terrorism: ‘Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends’4.

Still, actions conducted by officials or established military personnel, or actions conducted by a sovereign regime as an official policy, cannot be identified as terrorism, if one accepts the US State Department’s definition, emphasizing the action as conducted by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, but can rather be labeled as ‘genocide’ or crimes against humanity. This was the case of Slobodan Milosevic who was accused of crimes against humanity and genocide by the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, Milosevic died in custody in March 2006 before he was sentenced.

Hence, violent actions motivated by a political ideology are defined, in this case, not by the type of action but rather by the one who conducts it. The US State Department’s definition emphasizes the role of sub-national groups (or even individuals).

The vital distinction between a violent act conducted by individuals or a sub-national group, and a violent act conducted by an official regime, was an understanding that actually offered some kind of ‘immunity’ to nations when their army had conducted violent acts deliberately aimed against civilian infrastructure during undeclared war.

According to this understanding, the downing of the Iran-Air Airbus A-300 jet (flight 655) -by the American navy on 3 July 1988 over the Persian Gulf by the USS Vincennes, which caused the death of all 274 passengers and crew on board – is not considered a terrorist act. The jet was wrongly identified as a threatening target and was subsequently shot down by surface-to-air-missiles. It isn’t considered an act of terrorism, not only because of the wrong identification which may emphasize that the deliberate motive did not play a role – another element which is necessary in order to declare the act as terrorism-, but mainly due to the fact that the act was carried out by an official army.

The US intention to declare Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a specially designated global terrorist organization will certainly affect the Guard, but may also cause an upheaval: the revolution of the traditional understanding of who is a terrorist.

Were this intention to become an official statement, it would enable the US administration to launch wide economic sanctions against the Iranian leadership. Furthermore, America’s decision would have far-reaching consequences, since the traditional definition of terrorism, as emphasized by the US State Department, would have to be updated as to enable any future attack against civilians conducted by the official army of a sovereign state to be defined as a terrorist act – with all its implications.

It is well known that states have been involved in violent action against civilians all over the world. The clear separation between an act conducted by a state as an official policy, and an act conducted by sub-national organizations, would become irrelevant, as would the US term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’. Additionally, this issue may affect states which are in constant confrontation with terrorists.

Should the Bush administration carry out its intention of declaring Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a terrorist group, how would Israel defend a violent attack against a Lebanese airport or Arab airliners, as occurred on 28 December 1968?

Therefore, the US intention should be carefully examined and considered, weighing, not only its economic implications or America’s interests, but also academic and historical aspects.

The post Iran’s Revolutionary Unit as a Terrorist Entity appeared first on ICT.

“No threat is more serious to aviation than man-portable air defense systems”

Colin Powell, US Secretary of State

The USA TODAY on-line newspaper (5 January 2008), reported that three Boeing 767 jets flying between New York and California will be equipped with laser anti-missile systems, developed by BAE[1].

This news brief may reflect that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, aviation terrorism remains a significant threat requiring modern protection measures.

Laser anti-missile technology represents an attempt to create airline defense systems in order to counter both present and future threats. This subject is presented below with the discussion of two airborne counter-measure systems:

The first of these is a flare system, aimed at confronting first generation MANPADS, such as the Russian “Strela” missiles, most commonly used by terrorists. First generation “Strela” MANPADS were used against a civilian aircraft in November 2002, when two missiles were launched at the Israeli “Arkia” Boeing 757 airliner in Mombasa, Kenya.

A prominent example of the flare system is the Israeli ELTA–IAI ‘Flight Guard’, aimed at confronting first-generation MANPADS. This system is based on confusing the missile’s heat-seeking sensor, which causes the missile to seek the flare rather than the aircraft itself. Flare technology is widely utilized by the Israeli Air Force in helicopters and fighter jet planes.
Notwithstanding the widespread availability of this technology, however, such systems have not been installed on the entire Israeli air fleet due to various economic, bureaucratic and operational considerations.

The traditional approach to airline defense facilitates reactionary solutions that are installed after the incident, rather than focusing on pro-active responses to emerging threats.

Wayne Gretzky, the famous Hockey player, was quoted saying that, “most players skate to the place where the washer is. I skate to the place where the washer will be…” .

This quote presents an interesting analogy with the second type of countermeasure systems, which are based on Laser technology. These systems, including the Israeli ‘Britening’ (RAFAEL), BAE’s JetEye and Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, represent an attempt to minimize the gap in the evolution of offensive tactics (advanced MANPADS) and defensive measures (airborne countermeasure systems). Laser defense technology is designed to confront current-generation MANPADS, and to anticipate missiles that will be developed in the near-future. More specifically, Laser countermeasures would defend against second generation, anti-flare, missiles, such as the US “Stinger”. The United States transferred an estimated 750 “Stinger” units to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, in support of their struggle against the Soviet Union. These missiles were used to shoot down over 100 Soviet aircraft[2]. Some of these “Stinger” missiles remain in Afghanistan and are suspected to have fallen into the hands of Al Qaeda.

Another advanced missile is the Russian-made SA-14/16 “Igla”. Similar to the “Stinger”, these missiles have the capacity to overcome flares, and, in some cases, to target other parts of the aircraft.

These MANPADS are at the focus of the designers of Laser countermeasure systems, often named DIRCM (Directed Infra-Red Counter Measure). DIRCM systems utilize a Laser beam that diverts the missile from its flight path by jamming its detection sensors.

After the introduction of the two types of countermeasure technologies, the following paragraphs will focus on discussing the adaptation of a suitable defensive approach and choosing an appropriate airborne defense system.

One approach focuses on sky security, emphasizing that the defense system should be installed on the civilian aircraft itself, while the other approach concentrates on ground security, stressing the importance of installing countermeasure systems in the vicinity of airports.

Sky Security

Proponents of the sky security approach argue that installing airborne counter measure systems will offer defense against both first and second generation MANPADS. The aircraft are seen as a preferred target by terrorists[3], thereby necessitating advanced protection measures. Airborne countermeasures thus should be employed to prevent successful terrorist attacks on civilian aircraft, especially in light of the symbolism attributed to Israeli airliners.

This thinking encouraged decision makers to recommend the installation of flare systems, such as the Israeli Flight Guard, which, despite its proven technological and operative advantages, is yet to be installed on the entire Israeli fleet. In addition, Laser systems, aimed at confronting second generation threats, have been recommended for protecting Israeli civilian aircraft.

It is safe to assume that most readers of this article will agree with the necessity to protect civilian aircraft, especially following attempts by terrorists to target passenger airliners. The reality of airline defense, however, shows a major discrepancy between theory and practice.

There has been some opposition to the sky-security approach, as in the case of American Airlines, claiming that the sky security perspective is “…Philosophically opposed”[4] to anti-missile technology on commercial planes. American Airlines management argued that the decision to install sky security systems should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis, thereby triggering the traditional question of “Who is going to pay for it?”

The costs are high indeed, as the American passenger fleet is estimated to comprise 6800 aircraft and each sky defense system costs between 0.5 and 1 million US dollars. This, however, is only part of the issue, since annual maintenance costs of the Laser systems are 300,000$ per aircraft.

In addition, airlines claim that installing such a system (usually at the bottom section of the aircraft) will cause extra drag and increase fuel consumption, especially at a time when the price of an oil barrel has exceeded 100$.

Yet, the high costs are not the entire problem. Even if such systems are installed, terrorists will continue to advance their technological capabilities, which would lead to an endless arms race. What would be the outcome of this arms race? Civilian aircraft would become heavily-armed flying ramparts, rather than being an enjoyable platform for passenger transportation.

In addition, we should not rule out the possibility that the mere presence of defense systems would present a unique challenge to terrorist groups and compel them to target passenger airliners. As an example, we can take the giant Airbus A-380 (carrying 500~ passengers). In the eyes of a determined terrorist, such a masterpiece of Western high-end technology is undoubtedly perceived as a primary target.

The sky security approach faced considerable opposition, not only from politicians, but also from the airlines, which claim that, statistically, MANPADS are merely a marginal tactic among other threats.
A research conducted by the author of this article shows a very different statistic. In this research, 198 cases of pure aviation terrorism attacks that took place in 1968-2004 were examined. Among the 198 incidents, 22 MANPADS cases were counted, causing the deaths of 658 persons; this is out of 5000 casualties resulting from terrorist attacks against civilian aircraft, including the attacks on September 11.
Can we really use a cost-benefit analysis proposed by some airlines in regard to saving human lives or protecting symbols of national interest?

Ground Security

The ground security approach argues that instead of arming the aircraft with countermeasure systems, it is more beneficial to invest in systems that detect and eliminate the threat from the ground. One example of the latter type of system is Raytheon’s Vigilant Eagle, which is designed to utilize a high-power microwave phased array pulse that scrambles the missiles’ electronics, thereby creating a protective dome around the airport. Another ground system is based on the High Energy Laser (HEL) technology. Instead of jamming or diverting the missile, this technology destroys the missile using its mega-energy laser beam which melts the missile warhead (this technology was at the core of an ambitious American – Israeli project named ‘Nautilus’, originally aimed at confronting ‘katyusha’ rockets launched from Lebanon). The HEL system is still in development and both above-described systems are yet to be installed.

According to media reports, ground security systems will be installed at Israel’s Ben-Gurion international airport. The adaptation of the ground-based countermeasures stems from the understanding that the aircraft faces its greatest threat during take-off and landing, as shoulder missiles are not effective against aircraft flying at an altitude of 33,000~39,000 feet.

Supporters of this approach argue that ground-based systems possess a number of significant advantages vis-à-vis airborne systems:

1. Ground systems are far less expensive than airborne systems. Costs are lower not only in terms of basic unit installation, but also in terms of maintenance, and airplane fuel consumption.
2. Airlines prefer to adopt ground-based systems rather than installing is on board of airplanes.
3. Ground systems do not infringe upon the normal travel experience of airline passengers, while sky security measures lower the perceived level of in-flight comfort.
4. It is unlikely that many airlines would be willing to install airborne counter-measure systems that cost $1 million per unit, especially when we take into account the poor financial records of airlines based in developing countries. On the other hand, it is highly probable that international airports will adopt ground systems as a mandatory counter-measure.

Which approach is predominant?

Proponents of the sky security argue for the adaptation of airborne countermeasures because these are currently available, while ground-activity platform are still in development. An additional argument for the sky security approach is the fact that international cooperation, especially regarding the necessity of confronting international terrorism, has been slow. Thus, the feasibility of implementing ground countermeasures at the international level remains distant.

In principle, ground security systems do not face significant opposition, but this could be attributed to the fact that such systems are yet to be tested and installed.

Although the above resented arguments in favor of ground security measures seem more convincing vis-à-vis the sky security approach, a few issues remain:

Let’s take a hypothetical example of a ground countermeasure system installed at an international airport. Advanced MANPADS offer terrorist firing distance of a few miles. Would the ground defense measures be capable of covering such an extensive launch perimeter?

It seems that neither alternative provides full coverage from all threats and attends to the full range of considerations involved in protecting the international aviation industry from from advanced MANPADS.

The threat of MANPADS is clear and present in the two examples presented below:

Firstly, the “Wassenaar Arrangement”, conducted by a group of 33 governments in 2000, aimed at implementing measures to control export of MANPADS. In light of the fact that not all states participated in this conference, that MANPADS technology remains freely available and that the production of MANPADS are not limited to Western democratic states, there is considerable doubt regarding the effectiveness of the “Wassenaar Arrangement”.

Secondly, the Israeli attempt at conducting an international conference in Jerusalem in April 2006, aimed at elevating the awareness of the threat of MANPADS to the aviation industry. The effectiveness of this conference is also uncertain, as it was not attended by representatives of states hostile to Israel, such as North Korea and Iran (which produces the Misag-1 shoulder missile).

Is there a third approach?

Another perspective, which may become a combination of the sky security and ground activity approaches, is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). These aircraft will fly near the airport and will have the capability to detect, divert or even destroy incoming threats. This technology is used by the Israeli Air Force, for example, in the “Harpy” Aerial Vehicle.

This technology presents a significant cost-benefit advantage over others and has better chances of being adopted by all parties concerned, especially by governments and airlines. UAVs divert the threat from the aircraft itself, offering an on-the-shelf solution, and enable the aircraft to preserve its basic role in a comfortable manner. As opposed to the other countermeasure systems, UAVs are relatively effective, affordable, do not increase fuel consumption and limit passenger fear and antagonism that may be caused by sky security systems.

In conclusion, a combination of platforms should be utilized to provide a suitable answer against MANPADS. In light of the MANPADS threat, however, even adopting a single type of countermeasure approach is preferable than doing nothing.

Bearing in mind Colin Powell’s words, quoted at the beginning of this article, urgent actions should be taken before we will be facing another airborne disaster – while decision-makers talk, terrorists act.

Notes:

The post MANPADS Countermeasure: Sky Security vs. Ground Security appeared first on ICT.

The general tactic of aviation terrorism at that time, i.e., the late 1960s (excluding asylum seekers, which is not pure terrorism) up to the early 1980s, represented a similar modus: hijacking the aircraft, raising politically-oriented demands such as prisoner release alongside raising a political frustration, which offered the terrorists some amount of publicity, and finally releasing the hostages (either as a result of negotiation, or as a result of an armed assault on the aircraft, as was demonstrated at the Sabena hijacking (May 1972; the Air France hijacking to Entebbe (July 1976); the Lufthansa hijacking to Mogadishu (October 1977) etc.

From the terrorists perspective, the aircraft in most cases was used as a bargaining chip as well as raising the political issue as was emphasized by Leila Khaled’s hijackings: the first was the successful, TWA hijacking on December 1969, while the other (El-Al, 6 September 1970)although was foiled, emphasized Habash’s philosophy. In her autobiography, Khaled stated, in regard to the TWA hijacking, that…’ The objective was to free prisoners, and to bring the world’s attention to the Palestinian cause…Look, I had orders to seize the plane, not to blow it up. I am no Kamikaze pilot. I care about people. If I had wanted to blow up the plane, no one could have prevented me ‘.

Khaled’s and Arguello’s attempt to hijack the El-Al Boeing 707 flight 219 (6 September 1970) emphasized Khaled’s intentions, when it was discovered that the firing pins hand grenades were filed down, meaning that the intentional plan was that the grenades would not to explode. This fascinating fact reinforces Khaled’s constant argument that the order she received was not to blow up the jet while passengers were on board.

The Dawson’s field incident, which took place 31 years before the September 11th attack, raises some critical issues regarding airlines’ and states’ attitude regarding aviation terrorism. Mainly due to the fact that even in the early 70’s, there was evidence (although aviation terrorism was in marginal numbers compared to hijackings) that the aircraft became the target itself, rather than just a bargaining chip. Perhaps the most known incident of the sabotage tactic, was carried out by the Palestinian terrorist Ahmed Jibril, leader of the PFLP-GC, who demonstrated his ability by sabotaging the aircraft in midair, in most cases using barometric detonators (Swissair sabotage, February 1970; El Al sabotage attempt, August 1972).

As it seems, the Dawson’s ‘quadrojacking’ incident, may be regarded as the seeds of the other September incident, this time by demonstrating the other tactic: abandoning ‘traditional’ tactics, such as hijacking and in some cases-sabotage, and adopting the ‘strategic agent’ modus, i.e., using the aircraft not as a bargaining chip, but rather using the hijacked jet as a flying missile and crashing it into selected targets, mainly target which symbolizes the ‘enemy’s’ icons.

A close look at databases and aviation terrorism events from September 1970 until September 2001 clearly shows a shifting mode regarding terrorist tactics: less hijackings’, more sabotaging or deliberate crashing, which is perhaps related to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism operating under a spiritual faith. Perhaps the first, and most well solid evidence, as to terrorists intentions of shifting the tactic from bargaining to crashing, was demonstrated in the Air France hijacking (December 1994) by the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), where it was discovered that the terrorist’s intentions were to crash an Airbus jet with the passengers on-board, over Paris, most likely into the Eiffel Tower. This solid evidence (unlike other incidents, where terrorists threats to crash the jet which were theoretically based assumptions, such as in the case of the TWA hijacking to Beirut in June 1985), clearly show that terrorists have abandon the traditional tactic and escalating the threat, with no appropriate defensive measures or preventive steps taken by Western authorities.

In September of 1970 four Western aircrafts were hijacked. All of them were blown up after releasing the passengers and crew. On September 2001, four American aircraft were hijacked and crashed into the selected targets with the passengers and crew on board. For 31 years decision makers could have done much more in order to elevate aviation security measures. From this point of view, it was not Bin Laden’s genius, but rather the world’s impotency by avoiding a multitude of signs. The Pan-Am disaster should have illuminated signs as to terrorists’ ability to overcome security measures (the Semtex bomb used in the Pan Am disaster could not be detected by traditional x-ray machinery, but only by advanced EDS [Explosive Detection System] such as InVision’s CTX serias and L-3 Examiner, which are now placed at airports). However, this was not the issue regarding the September 11th attack, but rather the simplicity of hijacking the jets. From this point of view, the September 11th attack was not a surprise, but rather an ‘escalation by nature’, or, rephrasing Clausewitz, proverb: ‘War is merely the continuation of policy by other means’

From this perspective, Habash’s ‘Quadrojacking’ of 1970 was supposed to be a wake-up call, which was ignored by decision makers.
The September 11th attack was another mile stone representing a new modus, using the aircraft as a strategic agent. By using the term ‘strategic agent’ the author refers to a possible use of a stolen/leased/hired aircraft for the purpose of spreading WMD. Again, signs were apparent when it was discovered that the September 11th terrorists were studying the possible use of crop dusters to spread biological or chemical agents.

This evidence, alongside the ‘disappearing jet’ from Angola, a Boeing 727 which disappeared from Luanda airport in Angola on 25 May 2003, raises concerns as to the possibility that the jet would find its way to a fanatical terrorist organization, which could easily convert the jet into a biological flying missile . The stolen or disappearing jet may emphasize again the change of modus: from a commercial fully-loaded passenger jet which is used for the purpose of negotiation, to a cargo or small private airplane which will be used as a strategic agent. Again, the potential use of WMD is not a theoretically-based assumption, but already an existing reality, as demonstrated by Shoko Asahara in 1995, attacking Tokyo’s underground with Sarin nerve gas. It is clear that these sorts of attacks are a possibility. The question is what decision makers are going to do about it.

The main point that should be emphasized is the need to focus on near-future threats, rather than past-traditional tactics. One may see a pattern regarding terrorists activities: escalating the threat, i.e. not just sabotaging the aircraft, as occurred in the Pan –Am disaster, but rather causing massive casualties by using the aircraft not as a target, but rather as a strategic agent.

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