TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Jihadi Forums: An Open Forum with Sheikh Abu Sa'ad Al-'Amili

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Jihadi forums are a main component of the Jihadi public relations and information-sharing system. The forums are also a crucial platform for spreading Al-Qaeda's doctrine, as well as that of other Jihadi organizations, for updating their collaborators with news relating to the various Jihadi fields, for recruiting new members and collaborators, etc.[1] In general, this medium has a strong influence in shaping the Jihadi discourse according to the forum members' viewpoint, their perception of the processes, etc. The forum members, who are committed to advancing the ideas of Jihad and who identify, to various degrees, with the Safafi-Jihadi credo, can be perceived as a "virtual imaginary community". As such, the directors of the Jihadi forums place considerable importance on strengthening their ties with the surfers.

One of the main measures designed to strengthen the ties between the Jihadi forums and their surfers is the provision of an open platform to registered surfers for a limited period of time (usually a few days). During this time, the surfers have the rare opportunity to pose questions on various issues directly to a senior Jihadi-Salafi sheikh who is a guest on the forum. After closing the platform, the

---

[1] There are many researches who point to the Jihadi organizations' success in identifying the enormous potential of the internet and the Jihadi forums, particularly as potential fruitful grounds for recruiting activists to their ranks. See for example: "Training Jihad activists via the internet", ICT's Jihadi websites Monitoring Group, April 24, 2009. http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Training_Jihad_Via_the_Internet.pdf

forum publishes an electronic booklet containing most of the surfers' questions and the sheikh's responses.[2]

The following document focuses on an "open meeting" with Sheikh Abu Sa'ad Al-'Amili, a Jihadi-Salafi sheikh whose real identity remains a secret.

The booklet is a compilation of all the surfers' questions for Sheikh Al-'Amili as well as his responses. The preface to the booklet states that, at this stage, it would be preferable for Al-'Amili's identity, as well as the identities of other Jihadi-Salafi writers, to remain unknown due to the enemies' attempts to track the Mujahideen and their collaborators.[3] In the booklet, Al-'Amili personally apologizes to one of the surfers for not being able to reveal himself, stating that he prefers to act under a cloak of secrecy in the interest of the Jihad.[4] However, it is known that, in the past he has written in the "Sada Al-Jihad" (Echo of Jihad) publication,[5] published by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), an institution that serves as the mouthpiece of the global Jihadi leadership. The Sheikh is also credited with a number of other published essays on Jihadi topics.[6]

---

[2] See for example such a meeting with Abu Abdullah Al-Maqdisi who served as a senior officer in the Sharia committee of the Lebanese Jihadi-Salafi organization "Fatah al-Islam". http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Open_Forum_Abu_Abdullah_Al-Maqdisi.pdf
See also the meeting with Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi who is believed to be the father of the Jihadi-Salafi movement in Jordan and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's mentor: http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Open_Forum_Abu_Muhammad_Al-Maqdisi.pdf
[3] In this respect it also says that the Mujahideen themselves will operate secretly due to the thinning of their ranks because of imprisonment and death. Therefore it is vital to focus on building a new generation and leadership for Jihad. Abu Sa'ad Al-'Amili, *Educational Guidance and Observation: Questions Related to Movements and the Jihad,* "Shumukh Al-Islam" network, February 2010 pages 9-10.
[4] Ibid, page190.
[5] Ibid, page 39.
[6] For a list of all his publications, see the website of the Salafi-Jordanian Sheikh, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi :http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=c0cpu7jv

The Booklet "Educational Guidance and Observations: Questions Relating to Movements and to Jihad"

In November 2009, three prominent Jihadi forums – "Shumukh Al-Islam", "Atahadi" and "Al-Faloja" – provided an open platform where registered surfers could pose questions to Sheikh Al-'Amili. In the beginning of February 2010, the questions and the Skeikh's replies were published in a 198-page long booklet entitled: "Educational guidance and observation: Questions relating to movements and the Jihad".[7] The layout of the booklet is presented in the preface. The various issues addressed in the booklet are organized into six segments in order to make it easy for the reader to acquaint himself with the book and to find the answers to his questions. Sometimes, however, there are references to other unrelated topics. Following are the six segments:

1. **First segment: Questions on Jihad.**

   a. Jihad today and in the future.

   b. Preparations and obstacles relating to emergency recruitment.

   c. Safety measures.

   d. Financing sources.

   e. Arrest and imprisonment.

2. **Second segment: The role of the Ulama and how they should be treated.**

3. **Third segment: Collaboration with the supporters of the governments and people in general.**

4. **Fourth segment: Jihad today and in the future in the Islamic world.**

   a. Al-Sham.

   b. Iraq.

---

[7] .http://www.shamikh.net/vb/showthread.php?t=58215, February 2nd 2010.

    c. Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    d. The Arabian Peninsula.

    e.   The Maghreb and the African Coast.

    f. Somalia and the Horn of Africa region.

    g. Egypt.

    h. Caucasia.

5. **Fifth segment: Today's Jihadi propaganda and its role.**

6. **Sixth segment: Various questions on Islamic religious traditional law.**

The Book's Binding

It should be noted that the booklet itself was published following the enormous media outcry over the terrorist attack perpetrated by Abu Dujana Al-Khorasani, a Jihadi activist and the supervisor of the former Jihadi "Al-Hisba" forum. Al-Khorasani blew himself up at the CIA base in Afghanistan on December 30th, 2009, resulting in the death of American CIA security personnel and of a Jordanian intelligence official. Due to the insistence of the Jihadi forums not to leave this event off their agenda, Al-'Amili saw fit to dedicate the booklet, first and foremost, to the memory of Abu Dujana Al-Khorasani, whom Al-'Amili calls the "Knight of the forums, the exceptional writer who aids Al-Qaeda, the Jihad and the Mujahideen".[8]

In the booklet, Al-'Amili praises Al-Khorasani's daring and wisdom, which allowed him to mislead the enemy forces, penetrate their lines and successfully attack them. The Sheikh explains that he believes Al-Khorasani represents a new type of warfare within Al-Qaeda and a new model of Al-Qaeda soldier.[9] In addition, the booklet is dedicated to the Mujahideen in Iraq, the Maghreb, Caucasia and the other Jihadi arenas, as well as to Al-Qaeda's leadership – Osama bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri – and to all the Jihad supporters, which include the Jihadi forums, such as "Shumukh Al-Islam", "Atahadi" and "Al-Faloja".[10]

The First segment: Questions about Jihad

The Legitimacy of Jihad

From the answers Al-'Amili gives regarding keeping the commandment of Jihad, it would seem that the Sheikh is trying to cast a positive light on those partaking in Jihad and to shatter the Mujahideen's negative image which is the result of

---

[8] Al-'Amili, "Educational Guidance and Observations", page 2.
[9] Ibid, pages 2-3.
[10] Ibid, pages 4-5.

suicide attacks that have killed many innocent people. For example, he writes: "*it should be remembered that the Mujahideen cancelled scores of Jihad attacks at the last moment in order to save the souls of innocents, even if they were part of the enemy, so long as they were not considered fighters*".[11]

Another example of his attempts to create a positive image is his explanation that the Mujahideen do not immediately kill their prisoners, but rather first give them the opportunity to convert to the true path. Moreover, he contends that Jihad must be waged against the enemies only after an attempt has been made to show them the true path. According to Al-'Amili explains that keeping the commandment of Jihad is first and foremost intended to protect the population's safety and to achieve security.[12]

At the same time, Al-'Amili stresses that Jihad is an individual duty, required of every Muslim due to the state of emergency in which the Muslims now find themselves. Al-'Amili's conviction in the duty of Jihad is demonstrated by the Sheikh's response to a question on the ruling regarding a Muslim who refuses or is too afraid to go on Jihad.[13] Al-'Amili strongly criticizes such actions and claims that looking for excuses for not leaving on Jihad is completely unacceptable: "*If every Muslim were to excuse himself then no Muslim would go on Jihad for Allah, and the enemy's control over us and our brothers in the open fronts would be strengthened and we would become slaves and our women chattel and our children servants and our money bounty for the infidels*".[14]

Al-'Amili explains that if one intends to keep the commandment of Jihad but is unable to do so owing to difficult circumstances, such as tight supervision and

---

[11] Ibid, page 13.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid, page 31.
[14] Ibid, page 32.

repression by the local regime, then one must not let go of this intention. Rather, one must find alternative ways to help the Jihad, such as by becoming active in the fields of Da'awa and education. Al-'Amili gives the Internet as an example of a tool that can help fulfill the Jihad commandment since it enables one to establish ties with others who have the same goals, which will eventually lead to the creation of a social network that can aid and advise its members in the field of Da'awa for Jihad.[15]

The Jihad Fronts

Al-'Amili lists the various Jihad fronts and claims that every Mujahideen must choose for himself which front he wishes to join. However, he categorizes them in order of importance:

a. Iraq – Al-'Amili explains that the Mujahideen who go to the Iraq Jihadi front can accumulate a great deal of military and technical knowledge, which they can then pass on to those in their country of origin upon returning. They can also find refuge in Iraq and can train in the many camps established there.

b. Somalia – Al-'Amili believes that Somalia is strategically situated. It is also a good front since a large part of the country is already controlled by the Mujahideen. Furthermore, Mujahideen who go to Somalia can use the numerous training camps scattered across the country and can acquire great technical and military experience.

c. The Islamic Maghreb – According Al-'Amili, this front is suitable for Muslims living in the Maghreb region for a number of reasons, such as the similar dialect, the resemblance in customs and skin color, the ease with which one

---

[15] Ibid, page 46.

may traveling between the various regions, the ability to remain there safely and erect training camps, etc.[16]

Al-'Amili writes positively about the possibility of opening additional Jihad fronts to wear down the enemy. However, he explains that doing so is contingent upon the existence of a suitable infrastructure, the necessary organizational and material capability, and sufficient Mujahideen to participate. At the same time, he emphasizes that Mujahideen must maintain self-control in the event of a defeat on the battlefield and must not discontinue the struggle against the enemy, or else "*there will be serious ramifications on the morale of the rest of the brothers in the region and a weakening of the intention to carry out future Jihad operations*".[17]

Al-'Amili **believes that the various Jihad fronts should not be viewed as separate local campaigns that are limited to one area, but rather as one large campaign in which the Mujahideen members are committed to each other and provide each other with military and technical aid**. Al-'Amili gives the example of "*the brothers in Iraq, who stand alongside their brothers in Afghanistan. They exported technologies and experts on urban warfare and on assembling explosives and mines. This brought about a big qualitative change in the Afghan arena. This was also the case on the Somalia front – brothers went there from Iraq. They strengthened the ranks of the Mujahideen and we witnessed the benefit of this aid in the Mujahideen's takeover of many areas. We have recently heard of the decision and preparations of the brothers in Somalia to send squadrons of Mujahideen to strengthen the ranks of their brothers in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. We can imagine what the effect of this*

---

[16] Ibid, page 37.
[17] Ibid, page 45.

declaration had on the enemy's morale as well as on the souls of our brothers in Yemen".[18]

Al-'Amili asks the Mujahideen to familiarize themselves with current events, both in the internal and international arenas, i.e. Islamic countries and enemy countries. According to the Sheikh, doing so will allow them to become knowledgeable and to formulate insights on "*the games played by the enemy*", which will in turn allow them to thwart the enemy's plans.[19] In another response, Al-'Amili expresses his support for creating confusion about the intentions of the Jihad organizations. Al-'Amili explains that this will help wear the enemy down. It will also mislead the enemy as to what the Mujahideen's target is, which will allow the Mujahideen to perpetrate a successful attack against another target.[20]

Germany

Al-'Amili presents Germany as a belligerent country that acts against the Mujahideen and the Islamic religion. Therefore, he supports the Jihad against it. Al-'Amili also enumerates a number of additional reasons that justify the Jihad against Germany:

1. Germany's continued military presence in Afghanistan, despite German politicians' declarations of intentions to reduce and eventually withdraw their troops.

2. The German democracy, laws and respect for human rights are rife with hypocrisy and lies with regards to the Muslim minority in the country. The Muslims are perceived as cheap labor in Germany, there to serve the country's materialistic interests.

---

[18] Ibid, page 45.
[19] Ibid, page 41.
[20] Ibid, page 119.

3. The demonstrations of racism by German youth towards the Muslims in the country, in addition to the calls for the deportation of the Muslim foreigners by many political parties and radical organizations in Germany.

4. Displays of hostility towards Muslims and their mosques.

As a result of these reasons, Al-'Amili concludes that the threats against Germany must continue and the ground must be prepared for carrying out additional terrorist attacks against the country. The dates of the execution of these attacks are to be decided by the perpetrators themselves. Furthermore, Al-'Amili explains that threats on their own have positive effects for the Mujahideen, due to their success in "*undermining the security of the Germans – the government and the people – without carrying out terrorist attacks*".[21]

Strategy

Al-'Amili is aware that the current confrontation with the infidels is being conducted on several different fronts, each one with its own characteristics. In the booklet, he details the **strategy** that must be adopted in the war against the infidels:

1. The Mujahideen forces must be rehabilitated and there must be no surrender to the West's threats.

2. The enemy's new modus operandi must be appropriated so that technological and material supremacy may be achieved. To accomplish this, Al-'Amili issues a special request, calling on those who support the Jihad to help by studying their close surroundings and by imitating the enemy's methods of operation in their institutions "*so that they will be able to provide their brothers with a*

---

[21] Ibid, page 15.

great service which will be above the enemy's knowledge, which cannot be obtained by the Mujahideen themselves, but only by their supporters".[22]

3. The Mujahideen must open a number of new fronts against the enemy in order to wear the enemy down and cause many casualties. New fighters will be able to join the expanded Jihad front and accelerate the global Jihad.

4. *The Mujahideen must find alternative bases, whether in their own countries or in the enemy's countries, to escape the enemy's ongoing chokehold and to increase the material and human capital.*[23]

All in all, Al-'Amili believes that global Jihad and regional Jihad are strongly connected and cannot be separated from one another. However, he also believes that regional Jihad, in its previous sense, is no longer effective as a result of the strong coordination between the Mujahideen's enemies that has been created within the framework of what is known as "the war against terrorism". According to the Sheikh, the existing reality requires a different kind of local Jihad. Nevertheless, he perceives regional Jihad as being an important tool for global Jihad, due to the influx of intelligence, material and manpower from the regional Jihadi arenas. In Al-'Amili's own words, "*The regional Jihad is the active hand that carries out global Jihad locally, and is considered by the leaders of the global Jihad to be very similar to their own cause and very appropriate for carrying out*

---

[22] Ibid, page 19.

[23] Ibid. See also pages 23-24. Al-'Amili points to the book written by Abu Musab Al-Suri (an important Al-Qaeda strategist imprisoned in Syria), "*Al-Da'awa Al-Islamiyya*", as an important asset and source for the Jihadi cells who wish to study how to successfully practice Jihad operations: "*there is no doubt that the Muslims need to read this book which is considered to be a comprehensive encyclopedia and a basic source for every successful Islamic Jihadi operation*", Ibid, page 14, According to him, the Sheikhs and the preachers are committed to distributing this book and teaching it according to the current reality, Ibid, page 15. In another place, Al-'Amili calls upon the Mujahideen to free Abu Musab Al-Suri by force or by an exchange of prisoners. Ibid, page 22.

the Islamic plan on their soil".[24] Al-'Amili contends that even in countries where it is difficult to carry out Jihadi activities for reasons such as the small number of activists or the local population's unwillingness to assist, training of Jihadi manpower must continue: "*Brothers, you should know that you are one of the global Jihad extensions – whether you like it or not – and there is no escape from fulfilling a role in this arena or from your being a part of these events, sooner or later* […]".[25]

Al-'Amili is convinced that the Jihadi campaign being waged against the Crusader and Zionist regimes is wearing down these regimes' power and is eroding their political and economic stability. "*Proof of this can be found in the series of defeats that they have experienced in every front against the global Jihad, led by the blessed Jihadi Al-Qaeda, whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and last but not least, in Somalia, and soon in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb*".[26]

Al-'Amili anticipates an American defeat and the disintegration of the states comprising it in the near future. Once disintegration commences, Al-'Amili predicts that an internal war will break out between the states for the little economic and military legacy that shall remain. Following this, "*her small and weak allies headed by our governments who abandoned Islam*" will be shunted to the sidelines and will be forced to cope on their own without outside help in their fight against the global Jihad. Al-'Amili also predicts a violent internal struggle for the water and oil sources. However, this struggle will not last long, as the Mujahideen will quickly take over.[27]

---

[24] Ibid, page 20.
[25] Ibid, page 41.
[26] Ibid, page 26.
[27] Ibid.

Preparations and Emergency Recruitment

According to Al-'Amili, a reawakening among Muslim youth is occurring, leading more Muslims to join the Jihadi campaign. Al-'Amili believes that the fight against the 'close enemy' precedes the fight against the 'far enemy'. Thus, he suggests that Muslims who identify with the global Jihad first concentrate their efforts on building an infrastructure and military power in their own countries, in preparation of confrontation with the local regimes. He explains that this is necessary because "*the following days will be difficult and the circumstances will be complicated. It is possible that the required preparations will not be possible. There is no escape from acting now, to acquire the vital experience needed for the coming confrontations* [...]".[28]

In the absence of the necessary infrastructure, such as training camps, in one's own country, it is permissible to leave for places where such infrastructure already exists. Once one has finished undergoing the appropriate training, one may then return to one's home country to continue with Jihadi activities there. Al-'Amili explains that the problem of crossing borders can easily be overcome. For example, he suggests using forged passports or crossing over in places where official documents or the presentation of passports are not required by the country: "*there is no escape from finding alternative ways and means of transit far from the official paths*".[29]

Al-'Amili also states that the youth engaged in combat should view themselves as the future leaders of the Jihad. As such, it is important that they acquire the necessary tools and knowledge on matters of military, security, organization, religion, and tradition that will assist them in future confrontations.[30]

---

[28] Ibid, pages 26-27.
[29] Ibid, page 28.
[30] Ibid page 27.

Tourism

Al-'Amili disapproves of Western tourists visiting Islamic countries because of the danger they pose to the Muslim nations, particularly Muslim women. In his opinion, their visits to Islamic countries do not stem from tourist motivations but rather from their desire to take advantage of the Muslims' wealth, to spy, and to prepare the ground for future occupation of the Muslim territories. The only ones who benefit from such tourism are the rulers who profit since they own the hotels where the tourists stay. As such, Al-'Amili demands that terrorist attacks be carried out against the tourists, not necessarily with the goal of killing them, but rather for the purposes of deterring future tourism to Muslim countries. Such attacks should be the responsibility of the Mujahideen's local leadership.[31]

Conditions for the existence of a Sharia Emirate

Al-'Amili expresses his deep satisfaction at the success of the Mujahideen in a number of Jihad arenas worldwide in advancing beyond the initial stage of establishing a group or movement to the stage where an Islamic state is established. Al-'Amili gives Afghanistan, the Caucasus, Iraq, and Somalia as examples of places where this second stage has been reached and Islamic Emirates have been established. Al-'Amili also says that, in other Jihad arenas, such as North Africa and particularly the Maghreb, great progress can be seen, while in other areas, such as South-East Asia, and particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, a large infrastructure for Jihad activities has been built. [32]

Al-'Amili explains that today's reality is one where there are few Sharia regimes and many corrupt "Muslim" governments, who act according to their own urges

[31] Ibid, page 29.
[32] Ibid, pages 17-18.

and are driven by their own narrow interests. Therefore, it is imperative that an alternative to these corrupt regimes be found. Al-'Amili suggests appointing an Islamic ruler who will fulfill all the required conditions for the establishment of Islamic emirates and for the implementation of Sharia law. By his side, there should be an advisory board, which will include a religious cleric, an economic expert, a political expert, a public relations expert and a military science expert.[33]

According to Al-'Amili, a clear distinction must be made between a caliph, who serves as the General Emir for all Muslims, and a local, special or temporary Emir, who is appointed by a group of Muslims in a specific area. An Emir must possess certain characteristics: *"Islam, masculinity, maturity, wisdom, justice, ability, wholeness, healthy instincts, (he must not have any physical defects which could prevent him from bearing the responsibility of the Emirates) and abstinence of lust towards it"*.[34] He adds that the Emirate as a whole must uphold two vital components: security and religious/Sharia knowledge.[35]

In one of the questions, Al-'Amili is asked to give his opinion on a hypothetical situation where two Emirs from different groups wish to control the same region. Al-'Amili responds that, in his opinion, the chances of such a situation occurring are slim, but, in the event that it may occur, much effort must be made to prevent this sort of situation, because it will be *"considered a civil war, a source of weakness and a reason for the loss of strength and capability for both sides, and in the end loss of the power of truth"*.[36]

---

[33] Ibid, page 31.
[34] Ibid, page 30.
[35] Ibid, page 31.
[36] Ibid, page 39.

At another point in the booklet, Al-'Amili states that there is are no objections or rulings inhibiting Muslims who have sworn their loyalty to an Islamic Emirate such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, from holding in government or company positions in a country fighting against this Emirate. However, at the same time, they must ensure that, in doing so, the interests of the Islamic Emirate will not be harmed. Moreover, they must obey the Emirate's instructions. For example, "*if the Emirate requires soldiers from amongst the dissident regime (which is above Islam), then they must assist it with information and resources*".[37]

According to Al-'Amili, working within institutions of the dissident regime is considered Ribat and can assist the Islamic Emirates. However, if a Muslim is working within such institutions for personal or materialistic reasons, and the Emirate requires his professional help and services, then the Muslim must leave his position immediately and serve the Emirate in whatever manner it requires.[38]

The Ribat (encamping on the border) for Allah

Al-'Amili refers to the Ribat, which is considered to be a form of Jihad. The term means remaining on the borders of the enemy's territory for a certain period of time. It is intended to serve as an orientation base before embarking on Jihad against the enemy. Al-'Amili explains that a Muslim who adheres to Ribat will receive the same rewards as a Mujahid "*even if he dies in his bed*".[39] In the event that a Muslim performing Ribat cannot travel to regions with Jihad fronts, for reasons such as tight supervision and repression by the local regime, he must wait patiently, seek a way to emigrate, and, at the same time, uphold his faith and religion within the society where he lives.[40]

---

[37] Ibid, page 99.
[38] Ibid, page 100.
[39] Ibid, page 48.
[40] Ibid, page 48.

Al-'Amili stresses that it is the duty of all those who relocate to the border areas under the principle of Ribat to adhere to their original intention – emigration for Allah – and to prepare to leave for Jihad. If this intention changes during the Ribat period and one is there no longer for the good of Allah but rather for personal interests, such as strengthening one's body, then there is no longer any value in one's actions. Al-'Amili advises those who are interested in keeping the principle of Ribat to leave as a group rather than as individuals because, if they go collectively, the members of the group can provide each other with moral strength so that they do not break during a crisis.[41]

Safeguarding Field Security

Al-'Amili stresses the importance of secrecy, which he claims has its roots in Sharia. He says that disclosure of information relating to the Mujahideen must be reduced as much as possible so that the enemy will not be able to use it to the detriment of the Mujahideen.[42] Al-'Amili explains that there are go-betweens who act as middlemen between the Jihadi organizations and the potential recruits. They are spread out, but due to the intense intelligence activity carried out by the regimes and the many collaborators, they take strict precautions and are not in a hurry to expose themselves to those who express their desire to join the Jihad.[43]

Al-'Amili makes several suggestions on how to act in cases where Mujahideen have been influenced, for various reasons, by the enemy's propaganda, and have been persuaded to expose their secrets. According to the Sheikh, to prevent such a situation, the Jihadi leadership must act wisely and treat their recruits in a

---

[41] Ibid, page 49.
[42] Ibid, page 51.
[43] Ibid, page 50.

determined manner. The recruits must not be told any secrets or placed in any positions of a senior or sensitive nature. It is also recommended not to treat them with contempt, as this could result in feelings of revenge and envy, which could in turn encourage them to collaborate with the regime. Nevertheless, if strong suspicions arise that one of the Mujahideen intends to pass information on to the enemy or to spy on the Mujahideen and report their whereabouts to the enemy, they must be treated in accordance with the Sharia -in other words, they must be executed.[44]

Al-'Amili also suggests the Mujahideen not hurry to make contact with those Mujahideen who have only just been released from prison or who have received a pardon from the regime. They should first ensure that their loyalty is still to the Mujahideen and their former path. Moreover, Al-'Amili emphasizes that it is a duty to punish any Mujahid whose behavior potentially harms the security of the group. He gives the example of a Mujahid who speaks on the telephone about topics relating to the Jihad and as a result brings about the imprisonment of some of his comrades.[45] Furthermore, Al-'Amili contends that if there is any danger to the life of a Mujahid or of the exposure of their secrets, then it is permitted, and even obligatory, to kill those collaborators who are working for the regime. He acknowledges that such assassinations could be construed by the regime as incitement and could lead to a wave of arrests. therefore, the Mujahideen must be prepared for such a scenario.[46]

Financing Sources

Al-'Amili states that taking over the funds belonging to the national banks and foreign non-Muslim banks is not only permitted, it is an obligation. This is

[44] Ibid, pages 51-52.
[45] Ibid, page 52.
[46] Ibid, page 54.

because these funds serve the enemies of Islam, helping them to strengthen their institutions in the war against the Mujahideen. These funds are also used to strengthen the corrupt Muslim regimes.[47] Furthermore, Al-'Amili permits looting the financial institutions of the ruling Muslim regimes. In doing so, they weaken the enemy and contribute to Jihad and the Mujahideen.[48] "*The banks and the financial institutions belonging to all the militant and occupying countries and all those who are in an alliance with them are to be considered legitimate targets for the Mujahideen. Everything taken over by the Mujahideen is considered loot*."[49] Al-'Amili states that this loot should be distributed to needy and poor Muslims since it is money which was stolen from the Muslims by the "tyrant" regimes. As these stolen funds cannot be returned to their owners amiably, the banks and financial institutions must be taken over by force or by other means.[50]

Al-'Amili states that fundraising continues to be the main tool aiding the Mujahideen. The West and the Mujahideen's enemies are attempting to "dry up" the Mujahideen's money sources as part of their war against terrorism. As a result, it would be best to camouflage financial activities. According to Al-'Amili, charitable organizations are a suitable cover for fundraising for the Mujahideen, as are commercial companies. Nevertheless, these measures are temporary and do not immediately strengthen the Mujahideen.[51] Al-'Amili also states that the Mujahideen should take the enemies' soldiers as prisoners with the goal of blackmailing the enemy or of carrying out prisoner exchange, in addition to the objective of damaging the enemy's morale.[52]

---

[47] Ibid, page 55.
[48] Ibid, pages 54, 61.
[49] Ibid, page 55.
[50] Ibid, page 56.
[51] Ibid, page 57.
[52] Ibid, page 101.

Elsewhere in the booklet, Al-'Amili speaks of the various types of Jihad and grades them. Al-'Amili explains that Jihad through money is not the same as Jihad of the soul and through fighting, which are of the highest level. Nevertheless, its importance should not be belittled and the families of the Mujahideen who are incarcerated in prison should be helped financially. Al-'Amili forbids taking money by force from rich or poor Muslims who do not support the ruling regime or collaborate with it. Instead, he suggests focusing on persuasion in order to convince them to donate money *"for the Lord"* *"and to give charity from their savings to aid Allah's religion"*.[53]

Imprisonment and Arrest

Al-'Amili presents a hypothetical situation where a Mujahid is taken prisoner by the enemy. If this Mujahid possess sensitive intelligence information, such as the names of his comrades, plans for future attacks, etc., and he fears that he may reveal this information due to his inability to endure the torture by his captors, he must try to force the enemy to kill him by harming the guards by detonating an explosive belt or using any other weapon available, such as a pistol or knife. If the Mujahid is killed, he will be declared a shahid.[54] In the event that the captured Mujahid does not possess sensitive information, and he knows he will be unable to reveal anything under torture, he must try to escape from prison after his interrogation.[55]

In response to one question, Al-'Amili explains that once one leaves to fulfill the commandment of Jihad, one must accept the possibility of falling into captivity

---

[53] Ibid, pages 58-59.
[54] Ibid, page 64.
[55] Ibid, page 65.

and being imprisoned, killed or deported.[56] According to the Sheikh, the prospect of imprisonment should not be frightening or intimidating. One can find a positive side to it, such as being distanced from the wickedness that exists outside the prison or undergoing an educational process.[57]

Second segment: The Ulama's role and how they should be treated

Al-'Amili agrees that the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia is a significant obstacle for the Mujahideen, inter alia, because it prevents the Muslim youth from moving from the Salafi thinking stage to the Jihadi-Salafi thinking stage. The Saudi Arabian royal family controls the religious establishment, which conducts itself according to the royal family's instructions, for example by deporting Ulama (clerics) whose religious rulings do not fall in line with the royal family's interests. Nevertheless, Al-'Amili explains that this Saudi policy will help the Mujahideen for two reasons:

a. *"The king is destroying the senior Ulama and the Sharia in stages, and the people's respect for them, whilst leaving those clerics who praise him and issue fatwas according to his wishes and which coincide with his anti-Sharia trends and the interests of his country. However, these clerics are losing their sanctity and credibility with the people"*.

b. *"This will help the Mujahideen to rise above the clerics and present themselves as an alternative, by their very safeguarding of Allah's Sharia and in the defense of the sanctity of his religion and thereafter help in convincing the people to remain with the Mujahideen or to aid them"*.[58]

---

[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid, page 68.

According to Al-'Amili, one of the many fronts the Jihadi-Salafi organizations need to address is the Ulama propaganda campaign being waged against the Mujahideen, which aims to de-legitimize them. As a result of this propaganda, the Mujahideen are obliged to delay the implementation of their plan and to explain to the people what the plan means "*so as to warn them from this kind of 'Ulama', to shake them off and seal their ears against their advice, which appears to be good on the outside, but is bad and corrupt on the inside*".[59]

Al-'Amili believes that the best way to expose the flaws of these Ulama is to continue to spread the Mujahideen's way, to help with the nation's problems in both deeds and words, and to stand by the side of the weak. Such aid will make it easier for the Mujahideen to reach the hearts of the people and to convince them of the rightness of their faith.[60] In addition, the Mujahideen must publish the biographies and the beliefs of those clerics who support the Mujahideen's path.[61]

Al-'Amili mentions another Ulama group, whom he defines as an intermediate group since it supports neither the Jihadi path nor the incumbent regime. Al-'Amili maintains that "*They are numerous and must be focused on. They must be drawn in and convinced and their sympathy won*". This can be done by publishing and spreading reports about the Mujahideen and essays written by Mujahideen which deal with subjects such as Sharia. According to the Sheikh, the means of dissemination such documents and messages vary from place to place, owing to the security and social limitations in different countries. However, overall, the internet appears to be the best means of distribution. In the event that the

---

[59] Ibid, page 69.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid, page 70.

Ulama do not have access to the internet, then printed material and tapes should be sent to them either directly or indirectly.[62]

Al-'Amili believes that the Ulama who act against the Mujahideen – whom he calls the "*Wicked Ulama*" – should be included amongst the enemies of Islam. The tyrant regimes use these Ulama to present the Mujahideen in a negative light and to set the public against them. Al-'Amili therefore calls on the Mujahideen and their supporters to seek ways to undermine the credibility of these Ulama in the eyes of the people and to expose their lies.[63] In one of his responses, he claims that a preacher in a mosque who expresses support for the regime and its policies should be considered "*a collaborator and a soldier of the tyrant and his regime*". The preacher must be classified as a criminal who acts against Allah's Sharia and converts it to the laws of the tyrant ruler. Al-'Amili warns "*The brothers must avoid praying in mosques where there are such preachers, particularly during Friday sermons and festivals and they should look instead for small mosques even if they are empty*".[64]

Al-'Amili explains that the tyrant regimes fear the use of the principle of *takfir* and they therefore enlist the Ulama to defend their policies and paint them in a Sharia light, so that they will be accepted by the people.

He believes that a person is considered a Muslim if two conditions are met: (a) he recites the Shahada and (b) both his parents are Muslims. If his heart and deeds do not deny Islam and he does not act against Islam, then the **law of takfir** cannot be applied to him. Al-'Amili explains that there are many religious clerics who are afraid to use the principle of takfir because they fear that they will be

---

[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid, page 72.
[64] Ibid, page 80.

accused of terrorism and that they will be prosecuted, which will result in their imprisonment.[65]

Al-'Amili states elsewhere in the booklet that the Ulama should be recruited to the cause of Jihad by persuasion and preaching, and not by force or through intimidation.[66]

Third segment: The attitude towards the regime's collaborators and the various ethnic groups

The attitude toward the regime's collaborators

Al-'Amili is amazed at the ignorance demonstrated by the collaborators and the soldiers who are in the service of the Muslim regimes with regard to the real nature of their masters: "*Don't these collaborators see that they are being led astray by the tyrants* […]?"[67] He states that the Ulama who are under the patronage of the regime have succeeded in convincing these collaborators that the Mujahideen are infidels and that it is therefore permissible to fight against them.[68]

Al-'Amili states that these collaborators must unequivocally be considered infidels and Muslims who have left their religion, even if they uphold the five pillars of Islam. These collaborators must be treated in the same manner as they treat the Mujahideen. Thus, if the collaborators seek to kill the Mujahideen, then the Mujahideen must aspire to kill the collaborators as well. Al-'Amili supports adopting a proactive initiative against collaborators: "*we must move on to the*

[65] Ibid, page 82.
[66] Ibid, page 40.
[67] Ibid, page 83.
[68] Ibid.

offensive stage and not be satisfied with the weak and defensive stage".[69] Such a confrontation, however, should take place within the limits of the Mujahideen's strength and it may be best to postpone it to a time when the conditions are ripe or when the Mujahideen feel that they are ready. Al-'Amili adds that "*It is possible that the confrontation should be coordinated with the brothers overseas in order to realize joint interests* […]".[70]

Furthermore, Al-'Amili explains that the Mujahideen must kill security and intelligence personnel at the first opportunity, in order to reduce the danger to which they are exposed. He details that "*they should take their weapons and other means in their possession, such as means of communication, identity papers and similar material which can be used by the Mujahideen without harming themselves.*"[71] However, Al-'Amili claims that there are certain intelligence and security personnel who express their solidarity with the Mujahideen and who even try to protect them. In such cases, the Mujahideen must cooperate with them and not harm them, in order to try and persuade them to cross over to the Mujahideen's side "*or at least to derive some benefit from the information which they supply to us on the enemy*".[72]

Treatment of the General Population

Al-'Amili stresses that the Mujahideen must be merciful and show kindness towards the general population, so as not to rouse them against the Mujahideen and so as to even earn their respect. In this way, they will be able to convince

---

[69] Ibid, page 84.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid, page 85.
[72] Ibid.

some of them to join the ranks of the Mujahideen or provide the Mujahideen with aid.

However, Al-'Amili states that the Mujahideen must exhibit a different attitude in the event that they encounter people with means, notable persons or Muslims who finance the regime. Such people must be treated in the same manner as the tyrant regimes – harshly and offensively.[73]

Treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood

Al-'Amili says that the Muslim Brotherhood should be perceived as a group spreading opinions and as a misleading political party, which does not differentiate between religion and politics. Nevertheless, he asks that a distinction be made between the corrupt leadership of the organization and its followers. One must focus on Da'awa amongst its followers in order to free them from their affiliation with the Brotherhood. However, he recommends not wasting time or effort on Da'awa amongst the followers who demonstrate blind compliance with the movement's leadership or amongst the followers who joined the Muslim Brotherhood out of personal interests instead of in the interest of faithfully serving Islam.[74]

Al-'Amili suggests that his readers examine the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood towards the crusader enemy and the "Muslim" governments: *"Unfortunately, whether in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, where there is a crusader occupier, or whether in countries occupied by regimes that have abandoned Islam, the position of this group towards these two*

---

[73] Ibid, page 86.
[74] Ibid, pages 86-87.

occupiers is one of collaboration and support and its position towards the Mujahideen is one of hostility and of a declaration of war against them."[75]

Al-'Amili therefore determines that it is a duty to put the Muslim Brotherhood in the same category as the enemies, and to treat members of the group accordingly. Al-'Amili adds that there are two obligations with regards to the Muslim Brotherhood: to publicly expose the group's erroneous ways by launching an information campaign against it, and to eliminate its religious leaders, who sanctify the war against the Mujahideen and who speak out against their religion.[76]

Despite his stance against the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-'Amili is of the opinion that it is permissible to collaborate with Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in the areas of Da'awa and charity, which focus on, for example, encouraging adherence to the commandment of prayer or wearing the veil. However, the Mujahideen must avoid participating in their assemblies "*where they preach for their principles such as democracy, and where the sexes are mixed at their general meetings.*" In addition, the target audiences of these Da'awa efforts should be preached to on the principle of monotheism (Tawhid) and should be encouraged to renounce the rulers and to remove themselves from the corrupt reality surrounding them.[77]

Takfir

Al-'Amili differentiates between individual Takfir (Takfir ayn), i.e. applying the law of a heretic on an individual person after examining the conditions which enable it, and absolute Takfir, i.e. a saying and/or deed carried out by a person which is

[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid .
[77] Ibid, pages 91-92.

considered to be heresy or the affiliation of a person to a heretic group, such as the collaborators' affiliation with the tyrant regimes. Such collaborators include soldiers, Ulama, intelligence officials, and more. Al-'Amili criticizes the idea that dealing with the issue of Takfir is forbidden and that it should be left to God.[78] He recommends referring to the writings of leading Salafi sheikhs, such as Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Sheikh Abu Qatada Al-Filastini and Sheikh Abu Basir Al-Tartusi, who deal with the rules for the declaring Takfir.[79] Al-'Amili contends that those who seek to wage Jihad against the ruling regimes must be convinced that these regimes are heretic and that their actions go against the Islamic religion.[80]

Shiites

According to Al-'Amili, the Shiites were endowed with a treacherous nature and, all throughout history, have strived to undermine the Sunnis' existence. He gives the example of the Shiite minority in Lebanon who collaborated with the Maronites, the Crusaders and the Jews in the 1980s against the Palestinians and the Sunnis. He also points to the Hezbollah, a Shiite organization whose loyalty is to Iran. He accuses Hezbollah of protecting Israel's northern border and preventing the infiltration of Mujahideen into Israeli territory from Lebanon. In addition, he claims that the West is purposely "exaggerating" the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program and is sowing fear in the hearts of the Sunni Muslims in order to undermine the political stability of the Sunni regimes in the Middle East, which will facilitate the West's takeover of these Muslim lands.

---

[78] Ibid, page 92.
[79] Ibid, page 93.
[80] Ibid, page 106.

According to Al-'Amili, the Mujahideen are obliged today to operate on a large number of Jihad fronts because they have so many enemies. As a result, they are unable to assign sufficient fighters to properly deal with the Shiite threat. Moreover, the conflict with the Shiite enemy is not of the highest priority compared to the other enemies at this point in time. Al-'Amili stresses that avoiding the opening of a front against the Shiites is not due to cowardice and should not be seen as a shirking of responsibility, but rather it is the result of a lack of material resources and manpower. Opening such a front requires a change in the operational strategy and proper preparation.

Al-'Amili points to the propaganda sphere as the main arena in which the Mujahideen can fight the Shiites, for example by creating awareness of the Shiite danger and by spreading the Sunni faith among the Shiite populations. This should be done despite the considerable difficulties hindering the Mujahideen's propaganda activities, including the Shiites' activities, and the actions of the tyrant regimes.[81]

The General Public

Al-'Amili explains that the general public is under the false impression that the tyrant rulers are legitimate political authorities who must be obeyed. He points to two main groups within the general public: (a) government employees who work in the tyrant regime's institutions, and (b) independent employees who are not tied to the existing regime's apparatus. Both pay taxes to the tyrant regime, and, as such, help to strengthen it. Al-'Amili claims that, in most cases, this obedience stems from a lack of knowledge and ignorance. However, if one's obedience stems from a clear knowledge that the ruling regime is heretic and, despite this,

---

[81] Ibid, page 94.

one continues to aid the regime in some manner, then one too must be considered a heretic and one's faith discounted.[82] Al-'Amili also mentions Muslims who are not supporters of the regime but who are forced to turn to the courts of the tyrant government and adhere to its laws out of fear for their property or person. Such Muslims are not to be considered heretics, on the condition that they act to change the existing situation and "*strengthen the groups of truth who act to bring about the downfall of these regimes*".[83] Al-'Amili also contends that Muslims are allowed to give food and water to collaborators if their lives are in danger or if there is a risk that their aid to the Mujahideen will be exposed.[84]

According to Al-'Amili, one must not carry out the commandment of charity if it will go to the ruling regime or to the secular or opposition parties who are part of the government because "*in giving such aid you are helping them and strengthening them to continue in their way, when you should be preventing them so as to make them understand that the reason for their poverty and ignorance and their need is because they are tainted*".[85]

Human Rights Organizations

According to Al-'Amili, the human rights organizations on Muslim lands are in fact intelligence bodies operating under the pretense of human rights organizations. These organizations are "*striving to remove the Muslims from their religion and corrupt their offspring*".[86]

---

[82] Ibid, page 97.
[83] Ibid, page 98.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid, page 99.
[86] Ibid, page 101.

Women

Al-'Amili claims that many Muslim women have been incarcerated in Muslim prisons in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Caucasus, Palestine, Somalia, and others, accused of giving aid to family members who carry out the commandment of Jihad. As a result, these women have been dishonored. Al-'Amili demands that the Mujahideen act to end this practice.[87]

Al-'Amili also unequivocally refutes the idea of keeping the wives of Muslims who fight the Mujahideen locked up. He believes that there is no justification for this unless there is proof that their wives have taken part in the fight against the Mujahideen.[88]

Al-'Amili states that it is permissible to take the wives of heretics prisoner in countries which are at war against the Mujahideen. Once they are taken prisoner, the Mujahideen are allowed to treat them the same way as the heretics treat the Muslim women prisoners. The Mujahideen are also permitted to make demands which will serve their interests, such as calling for the release of their brothers in captivity in exchange for the return of these women. Nevertheless, he believes that it is not permissible to capture women from countries which are not at war with the Muslims.[89]

Fourth segment: Jihad today and in the Future in the Islamic World

Al-Sham (Syria, Lebanon, Israel)

Al-'Amili has a positive attitude towards Jihadi cells in the Al-Sham arena, particularly in the Palestinian territory. However, he asks these brothers to act

---

[87] Ibid, page 106.
[88] Ibid, page 107.
[89] Ibid.

with restraint and to remain where they are, owing to the "*difficult and complicated circumstances in which the brothers live in Al-Sham in general and in Syria and Lebanon in particular, and to wait for the orders of the top leadership, so as not to torpedo the brothers' plans who are operating from the inside. At the same time, they must seek out the brothers who have started to operate and join them* […]".[90]

He gives Lebanon as an example of an arena where many of Salafi-Jihadi leaders, such as Sheikh Shaker Al-Abasi, who was the head of the "Fatah Al-Islam" organization in Lebanon, are now incarcerated in Syrian prisons. Al-'Amili claims that, as more time passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate between the various Jihadi factions in the Lebanese arena. Moreover, the Jihad factions in Lebanon are surrounded by intelligence and security officials of every kind, such as the Crusaders, Jews, Alawis, and Shiites, all of whom are aware of the developments in the Jihadi arena.[91] The Sheikh therefore requests that these Jihadi factions make every effort to unite and to rise above their differences.[92]

Al-'Amili is unable to answer whether there is an intention to open a new Jihadi front in the Al-Sham area.[93] He does however say that opening a front against the Ba'ath regime in Syria would require a special deployment of fighters, and it is not, at present time, at the top of the Mujahideen's list of priorities.[94]

Al-'Amili once again states that those Muslims who find it difficult to leave their countries for the various Jihadi arenas should remain in their own countries until such time that they are able to emigrate. In the meantime, they must participate in Da'awa activities in their country on behalf of the Mujahideen and the Jihad.

[90] Ibid, page 108.
[91] Ibid, page 134.
[92] Ibid, page 113.
[93] Ibid, page 109.
[94] Ibid, page 115.

Al-'Amili believes that the Jihad arena of Iraq is the most worthy to emigrate to for a Muslim from the Al-Sham region. This is because it is the closest physically and the easiest to get to, and because of the many training camps and safe areas for the Mujahideen that have already been established in this arena. After Iraq, Al-'Amili mentions Yemen as a Jihadi theater which should be given special attention. This theatre also offers good training camps.[95]

The Jews/Israel

Al-'Amili does not believe that fighting the Jews is a priority over fighting the Arab rulers, or vice versa. Rather, he believes that both objectives are legitimate and should be pursued by a Mujahid based on his preference and according to the circumstances and conditions. Al-'Amili explains that the Mujahideen may feel that, in a certain place, it would be better to fight the Jews and, in another place, the Arab rulers. The Sheikh adds that such a decision must be coordinated with the other Mujahideen so as to prevent harming the overall Jihadi efforts.[96]

The Hamas

As far as the Palestinians are concerned, Al-'Amili does not differentiate between Abu Mazen's government and that of Hamas and its officials. In his opinion, these are two groups who deny Allah's religion and are therefore no longer considered Muslims. He says that Hamas has failed to apply Sharia, and many contradictions to the Sharia bordering heresy can be seen in their rule. He gives three examples that he believes depict Hamas' non-Muslim character, listing them in order of least to most serious:

---

[95] Ibid, page 114.
[96] Ibid, page 108.

1. Hamas' cruel oppression of Salafi-Jihadi groups in its territory, expressed through killings and propaganda against them.

2. Non-imposition of the Sharia within its territory and expression of solidarity with Arab regimes including the Palestinian Authority led by Abbas.

3. The imposition of man-made laws instead of Allah's laws. This is considered heresy. This is the most serious of the offenses committed by Hamas.

Al-'Amili mentions an old article he wrote on this issue and quotes: "*Hamas occupied Gaza in order to take over the role played by Fatah in confronting the Jihadi dissemination in Palestine and in Al-Sham in general*".[97] The Sheikh asserts that the Hamas is a dangerous enemy who is striving to rule and who serves as a pawn of the Arab regimes that cooperate with the Jews and the Crusaders. In the end, Hamas will apply a policy similar to that of the enemies of the Muslim nation – one of fighting again the Salafi-Jihadi stream.[98]

According to Al-'Amili, overthrowing the Hamas regime could be considered a legitimate objective for the Mujahideen activists in Gaza and Palestine. Alternatively, they should try to attack the legitimacy of the Hamas leadership in order to convince the people to seek an alternative.[99]

Al-'Amili believes that, at present time, the Salafi-Jihadists should concentrate on Da'awa activities with respect to the Hamas, in order to pressure Hamas supporters and followers to leave the organization and to turn to Allah. According to Al-'Amili, "*This requires patience and great wisdom*". This trend will change, however, once the Salafi-Jihadists have amassed sufficient strength to defend

---

[97] Ibid, page 117.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid, page 119.

themselves and their supporters from their opponents, whether they are Hamas or others.[100]

Al-'Amili claims that the brutal slaughter in the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque was caused by the Hamas leadership's desire to display its strength in the field, in order to camouflage its weakness and defeatism to the Jews. Al-'Amili explains his belief that this slaughter was "*a matter which was planned on the spur of the moment in order to further external interests or Crusader objectives via 'Islamic' hands*".[101] Al-'Amili wishes to bring those who are guilty to justice as soon as the Salafi-Jihadists in Gaza are strong enough. They should not wait for the Jews to enter Gaza and should take advantage of this time for vengeance.[102]

Hamas also serves to defend Israel's security interests, as evidenced by the brutal slaughter of the Salafi-Jihadists in the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, which was a security threat to the Jews.[103] Al-'Amili contends that since Hamas is considered an enemy, it must be treated in accordance with the sources, which means applying subterfuge, concealing the truth, etc.[104]

Al-'Amili criticizes Muslims who participate in and belonging to the security apparatus in the Gaza Strip because it is a repressive tool in the hands of the Hamas leadership who employs it against the Salafi-Jihadists. Al-'Amili stresses, "*We must warn the young men from joining these entities and it does not matter what the pretext is. The economic factor cannot serve as a reason for taking part in the war against Allah's religion and in deporting the fighting youth in a heretic, Crusader and even Jewish leadership*".[105]

---

[100] Ibid, page 121.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid, page 124.
[104] Ibid, page 125.
[105] Ibid, page 129.

Al-'Amili was asked by one surfer to explain what should be done in instances where relatives of the Salafi activists serve in Hamas' security apparatus. His response is that first Da'awa should be used in an effort to persuade them to leave their jobs. However, if this does not succeed, then his position is indisputable: "*Are we fighting for Allah or are we fighting for blood relationships?*" in other words, he emphasizes implementation of Allah's laws over family interests or ties.[106]

The Salafi-Jihadi stream in the Gaza Strip

Al-'Amili offers advice to those belonging to the Palestinian Salafi-Jihadi stream. He counsels them to do the following:

1. To hasten in appointing a new Emir for the Islamic emirate in Gaza to take the place of Abu Al-Nur Al-Maqdisi. "*I suggest that the Emir remain anonymous and that his picture not appear in the media. The Islamic State of Iraq should serve as a model for this*".[107]

2. To strive for unity and to support the new Emir of the Islamic Emirate and swear allegiance to him.

3. To purge the Salafi-Jihadi ranks of all the foreigners, the self-righteous and the weak of character, in order to prepare a solid base to enable the establishment of the Emirate.

4. To adhere to the uniqueness of God in Jihad and to demonstrate patience in order to influence the people and the dissenters and draw them into the ranks of the Islamic Emirate.

5. To concentrate on unifying the ranks and accumulating strength and vital equipment which will serve the brothers when the time comes to avenge the

---

[106] Ibid, page 131.
[107] Ibid, page 118.

blood of those slaughtered in the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. The Salafi-Jihadists must also demand that the Hamas leadership expose the murderers and the participants in the slaughter, so as to bring them to justice, as stated in the Quran and the Sunna. If they refuse to do so, then the Hamas leadership will become a legitimate target and the spilling of their blood will be permitted.

6. To prevent the intervention of Hamas and its leadership in the Jihad activities of the Salafi-Jihadi stream in Gaza and in its preparations for the "*great war*" against the Jews. In the event that Hamas continues to place such or other obstacles in the way of the Sharia, then there is no choice but to wage Jihad against Hamas before waging Jihad against Jews.

7. To rescue Hamas members by converting them to the Salafi-Jihadists' side and to ensure that their loyalty truly lies with Allah and no longer with the Hamas leadership.

8. Despite the fact that there may be difficult days ahead, spiritual and material preparations should be made in the utmost secrecy.[108]

Al-'Amili does not favor the idea of Muslims emigrating from Gaza to other Jihadi arenas, although he does not rule it out completely and even admits that this is permitted. Nevertheless, he accepts such emigration if it is in order to acquire military training and professional knowledge which will aid the Jihad in Gaza and Palestine. "*I advise the brothers to strengthen the internal arena and to intensify the efforts in order to break this total blockade on the Mujahideen and to hasten the preparations*". Al-'Amili supports the idea that Jihad should be carried out against both the distant enemy, i.e. the Jews, and the close enemy, i.e. Hamas. He says that such a war will be fought on two fronts and will require aid from

---

[108] Ibid, pages 118, 122.

outside Palestine. For this reasons, it is necessary that the Salafi-Jihadists remaining within Palestine and not emigrate to other Jihadi fronts.[109]

Al-'Amili stresses that every Muslim has an obligation to help the Muslims in Gaza.[110] They must act against the long siege on Gaza by pressuring the Egyptian government to open the border crossing points and to halt the building of the wall. Moreover, Al-'Amili states that, in addition to the Jews, the Salafi brothers in Gaza have another enemy – the Hamas government. In the Sheikh's opinion, reorganizing and unifying the Salafi-Jihadi ranks will facilitate the removal of Hamas and the imposition of Allah's rule in Gaza.[111] At the same time, he asks that Al-Qaeda not be forced to bear full responsibility for solving the Palestinian issue. He asserts that the Salafi-Jihadists who operate in the Palestinian territory should be the first to take on this responsibility. As such, they must therefore first ensure that the ranks are unified.[112]

On the subject of immigrating to the Palestinian Jihadi front, Al-'Amili explains that, in his opinion, the Jihadi front in Palestine today is not able to absorb immigrants because it cannot provide security or ensure their freedom of action. Therefore, if Mujahideen do travel to Palestine, it will be difficult for them to carry out the commandment of Jihad. Al-'Amili suggests that those Muslims who wish to aid the Jihad in the Palestinian arena postpone the "*idea of immigrating into Gaza at this stage until the situation calms down",* and in order to give the Salafi-Jihadists already active in Gaza the chance to unify their ranks and gather enough strength to overthrow the Hamas regime.[113]

---

[109] Ibid, page 123.
[110] Ibid, page 127.
[111] Ibid, page 128.
[112] Ibid, page 130.
[113] Ibid, page 137.

Palestinians – Democracy

Al-'Amili expresses his aversion to democratic elections, whether they be in the West Bank or in Gaza. In his opinion, the results are known well in advance and are false. Al-'Amili claims that the West, encouraged by the Jews, determines who will rule in the region. Furthermore, he believes that the opposition, whether nationalistic or Islamic, is not genuine, but rather is just a game. According to Al-'Amili, this is particularly true for the West Bank. The Sheikh explains that the Jews are extremely sensitive regarding who is in power in this area, because of the great security importance of this territory which lies between Palestine and Al-Sham, where the Mujahideen are able to cross over. Therefore, the Jews have a hand in the West Bank's politics, in order to protect these security interests.[114]

Al-'Amili expresses the same opposition to the elections in Iraq and Afghanistan and he forbids participating in them. He claims that the results of the elections in Iraq and Afghanistan are determined in advance by the crusader occupiers, who are also responsible for making the laws in these countries. Therefore, "*all those who participate in these elections are considered polytheists, who are misleading the people, and, in participating in the occupation of Iraq in the name of 'democracy', are lending legitimacy to these isolationist parties and allowing them to rule Iraq with heretic laws, under the crusaders' protection*".[115] Al-'Amili also determines that voting and any other form of participation in a heretic regime is considered heresy.[116]

---

[114] Ibid, page 124.
[115] Ibid, page 146.
[116] Ibid.

The Islamic Jihad

Al-'Amili perceives the Islamic Jihad movement to be Iran's ambassador in Palestine and the equivalent of Lebanon's Hezbollah. He claims that the movement is afraid of operating in areas controlled by the Salafi-Jihadists. Lately, it has played the role of intermediary between the Hamas and the Salafi-Jihadi movements.[117] According to the Sheikh, the movement is in a weakened state and its members are divided into two main factions, one expressing support for Hamas and the other expressing support for the Salafi-Jihadi stream, even if only covertly. Al-'Amili states that the Islamic Jihad movement has lost its legitimacy in the area and he predicts its political collapse.[118]

Iraq

Al-'Amili was asked by several surfers to speak on the subject of what will occur the day after the American forces' withdrawal from Iraq. For example, he was asked if the Mujahideen intend to act against the Shiite danger in Iraq. In his response, Al-'Amili groups the Shiites and the Kurds together, describing them as a worse enemy than the Crusaders. He claims that the Shiites are interested in continuing the American occupation of Iraq because their strength comes from the Americans, while the Kurds have warm ties with the Jews and the Crusaders. In Al-'Amili's opinion, the Jihad should be stepped up after the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Iraq. Then a policy of openness towards neutral groups in Iraq should be adopted, in order to persuade them to support the plan to create the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-'Amili recognizes the Al-'Asha'ir Al-'Iraqiyya group[119]

---

[117] Ibid, page 135.
[118] Ibid, page 136.
[119] An important Iraqi political organization. For more information on the origins of this organization, see: "The role of Al-'Asha'ir Al-'Iraqiyya in the formation of Iraq's future", Al-Jazeera, May 5th 2003:
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/3F66F222-1B7E-4479-AD25-7FA5C78C0B33.htm

in particular as a neutral group that should be approached, "*as they are good people and will give the state new fighters, experience and capabilities which must not be relinquished under any circumstances*".[120] At the same time, the Mujahideen must act to foil the enemies' plans. Al-'Amili emphasizes that he supports the unification of the ranks and the coordination between the various factions in Iraq and opposes descending into civil war.[121]

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Al-'Amili relates that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban organizations have succeeded in recovering their military strength relatively quickly since being forced to retreat from Afghanistan due to the mass bombing campaigns by the enemy. This recovery of strength is exemplified by the fact that they have pushed the enemy to "safe" areas, rehabilitated their propaganda apparatus, rebuilt their forces inside Afghanistan whilst coordinating between both organizations, and succeeded in exporting their doctrine and plans outside of Afghanistan's borders. Speaking of the last accomplishment, Al-'Amili stresses that "*this point is important because Afghanistan is not the main target and is not the only one behind the emigration of thousands of supporters and the rejuvenation of thousands of Taliban fighters. it is only a means and a position towards the future. This is so people will understand that the Jihad in Afghanistan is not intended to liberate the country but to be an exit point for the liberation of all the Muslim countries. A good witness of this is the presence of various nationalities within the ranks of the Mujahideen*".[122]

Al-'Amili explains that the Mujahideen's plan now in Afghanistan is an offensive one, intended to surprise the enemy and to harm it militarily and economically.

[120] Al-'Amili, *Educational Insights and Guidance*, page 144.
[121] Ibid, page 145.
[122] Ibid, page 149.

Al-'Amili stresses that "*we must invade them now otherwise they will invade us*".[123]

Al-'Amili states that establishing the Taliban organization in more places within Pakistan is only a question of time. He explains that the Taliban are gathering their forces on the Pakistani-Afghan border, particularly in the Waziristan region.[124] Al-'Amili expresses his anger at the collaboration of the Pakistani regime with the Crusader forces, which began in the 1990s and which is expressed in the hounding of Al-Qaeda and Taliban activists and their incarceration, as well as the Pakistani government's supplying of intelligence to the Crusader enemy.[125] The Mujahideen are therefore conducting a wide campaign intended to overthrow the Pakistani regime, inter alia. This campaign includes assassination attempts of senior government officials and collaborators and large scale attacks against military and security facilities.[126]

Al-'Amili explains that when the American forces withdraw from Afghanistan, all that remains to be done is to officially declare the establishment of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. He claims that the Mujahideen of the Taliban organization control over 80% of Afghanistan's territory and each liberated region has its own governor.[127] However, even after the official establishment of the Islamic Afghan Emirate, the Jihad will continue, focusing on other occupied Muslim lands.[128] He claims that there are ongoing preparations to build a strong infrastructure to

---

[123] Ibid, page 150.
[124] Ibid, page 150.
[125] Ibid, page 151.
[126] Ibid, page 153.
[127] Ibid, Al-'Amili points to the important role played by the Pakistani Pashtu tribes who live on the Afghan border, and are an important supportive base in the Afghan Taliban movement, Ibid, page 150.
[128] Ibid, page 154.

establish an Islamic Emirate, such as in Somalia and in the Arabian Peninsula. Regarding fronts which are further away, where there is a conflict between the Mujahideen and the heretic regimes, such as Eastern Turkistan and Chechnya, Al-'Amili states that they receive aid by sending fighters.[129]

The Arabian Peninsula

In this section of the booklet, Al-'Amili relates, in great length, the history of Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and their merger. He states that Al-Qaeda chose Yemen as **a main operational base** from which to conduct the war against **the enemies of the Islamic nation** for several reasons: (a) it is strategically located and has a mountainous and desert topography, which provides the Mujahideen with security and allows them to carry out their Jihadi operations safely; (b) Yemen's large tribes fervently protect Islam and express their willingness to take part in the Jihadi operations. Al-'Amili contends that the great number of Yemenites participating in various Jihadi arenas and the fact that Yemenites comprise half of the prisoners incarcerated in the Guantanamo prison demonstrates how fanatical the Muslim Yemenites are in adhering to Islam.[130]

The Yemenite regime and the Houthi are considered the enemies of Allah. In general, Al-'Amili perceives the Houthi to be a 5th column in Yemen, who is trying to accomplish what Hezbollah did in Lebanon – the Shiitization of Yemen under the sponsorship of Iran. Al-'Amili believes that the Mujahideen are conducting their war against the Yemenite regime wisely, and, even though their actions sometimes entail cooperating with abominable forces, this is only in order to

---

[129] Ibid, page 155.
[130] Ibid, page 157.

weaken other forces. Al-'Amili explains that it must be taken into account that the Jihadi arena in Yemen is a complex one, as there are many forces involved there such as Iran, the U.S., the Houthi and the Yemenite regime.[131]

The Maghreb and the African coast

Al-'Amili explains that in the Colonial era, the foreigners – the French, Italians and Spanish – failed in their plans to remove the power of Islam from the inhabitants of North Africa. However, when they finally withdrew their occupying forces from the continent, they left behind regimes controlled by 'Muslim' collaborators, who continued to carry out the colonialists' plan to distance the Muslim inhabitants from the Islamic religion. According to Al-'Amili, the Jihad organizations in the Maghreb are fighting against these collaborators and have succeeded in recruiting additional supporters in the Sahara and East-African regions, which have numerous Jihadi bases.[132]

In the Sheikh's opinion, the Algerian Mujahideen in particular excel at carrying out daring Jihad operations. Moreover, Al-'Amili contends that the Al-Qaeda organization in Algeria carries the main burden in the Maghreb. The organization is also the representative of the global Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. Al-'Amili foresees that the Mujahideen in Algeria will eventually succeed in drawing in the masses, as they are a model for perfect behavior and display a fair and kind attitude towards the people in every sphere. He expects that the Jihad arena will expand to neighboring countries, particularly Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Nigeria, followed by Chad. Al-'Amili notes that, already, one can see Mujahideen

[131] Ibid, page 160.
[132] Ibid, page 162.

Jihadi activity in areas such as southern Algeria, northern Mali, eastern and northern Nigeria and north-east Mauritania.[133]

Al-'Amili agrees with one of the surfers that attacking French targets in France itself could benefit the Mujahideen in the Maghreb. However, he believes that the Mujahideen prefer, for the time being, to postpone such attacks and to instead concentrate on instilling fear.[134]

Somalia and the Horn of Africa region

Al-'Amili states that the Al-Shabab Al Mujahideen movement is a Salafi-Jihadi movement similar to the Afghan Taliban movement. In this section of the booklet, he presents a summary of the history of the movement and credits it with impressive achievements in the Somali arena, such as the conquest of many areas within Somalia in a relatively short period. Al-'Amili explains that Somalia is considered a strategic area for several reasons: it connects Africa and Asia, it is rich in minerals and it has a large port that is used by commercial ships from Asia, Europe and Africa.

According to Al-'Amili, there is considerable Western and Jewish involvement in the affairs of Africa. Their interest in the continent stems from security and economic motivations. The Ethiopian regime, for example, receives financial and military support from the Crusader-Zionist alliance to fight the Mujahideen and the country acts as a bridge to Somalia for the Western forces. Another example is the large American army base in Djibouti. Al-'Amili points out that these facts have not escaped the attention of the Mujahideen. Al-'Amili explains that the West and the Jews will never reconcile themselves to the Islamic government in

---

[133] Ibid, page 165.
[134] Ibid, page 166.

the Africa Horn, due to fear of losing their economic and security interests and of the spread of Islam in the area, which would be detrimental to their plans.[135] As such, Al-'Amili declares that the Salafi-Jihadi movements in Somalia must be helped, particularly the Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen movement.[136]

Egypt

Al-'Amili perceives Egypt as the cradle of Jihad, the place where the foundations were laid in the previous century by great intellectuals who produced enthusiastic supporters and leaders of Jihad such as Sayyid Qutb, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, the former Minister of Defense of the Islamic State of Iraq. He contends that the West and the Jews recognized the fact that there is a potential threat in this country and, therefore, together with the local tyrant rulers, they have acted to thwart the Egyptian Jihadi activities. Their actions include employing propaganda against the Jihadi preachers and supporters in the goal of tarnishing their image and the face of Islam and carrying out mass arrests.[137] Due to these measures being taken by the enemies, Al-'Amili strongly recommends that the supporters of Jihad in Egypt act in secrecy at present time and avoid public declarations.[138] Overall, he believes that considerable caution must be taken, owing to the increased security on the border with the Gaza Strip. He even goes as far as to suggest halting the Jihad activities so as to not arouse the suspicions of the Egyptian security officials.

Al-'Amili believes that Egypt should be seen today as a country where preparations are being made to build a military and organizational infrastructure

---

[135] Ibid, page 167.
[136] Ibid, page 168.
[137] Ibid, page 169.
[138] Ibid, page 170.

that will serve future Jihadi activities.[139] Nevertheless, he states that, for those who want to fight, it is possible to move to Jihadi arenas outside Egypt. While any arena is acceptable, he thinks that the Arabian Peninsula is a convenient arena because of its proximity to Egypt and the similarities in language, skin color, customs, etc.[140] Al-'Amili clarifies that he believes leaving Egypt for other Jihadi fronts should only be done for the purpose of gaining professional and military knowledge. Once this goal has been achieved, the Mujahideen should return to Egypt in order to assist in developing the Jihadi infrastructure there.[141] Once such an infrastructure has been established, the Jihad supports will be able to move to the stage of confrontation with the Egyptian regime. This stage will also aid the Muslims in Gaza.[142] However, Al-'Amili rejects the idea of joining the war effort in Gaza at this stage due to the complicated security situation there and the area's inability to receive Jihadi supporters for the time being.[143]

The Caucasus

It should be noted that only a small number of questions were posed by surfers regarding the Caucasus Jihad arena. Therefore, it can be assumed that this Jihad theatre is of less importance than the others. Al-'Amili does state, however, that the Caucasus always needs new Jihadi fighters and financial aid.[144]

Fifth segment: the Role of Jihadi Propaganda

Al-'Amili believes that Jihadi propaganda, which is being published by Jihadi propaganda institutions, in particular the Jihadi forums, is very important. He

---

[139] Ibid .
[140] Ibid, page 173.
[141] Ibid, page 171.
[142] Ibid, page 172.
[143] Ibid, page 174.
[144] Ibid, page 175.

explains that this propaganda is so crucial because the Mujahideen and global Jihad are constantly being attacked by the West's own deceiving propaganda, which tries to tarnish the Mujahideen's image and turn the rest of the Muslim nation against them[145].

Al-'Amili details the many functions propaganda serves: "*In the nature of things, its [propaganda's] role is to provide moral support, information and logistics for the fighting Mujahideen. It also contributes to the Da'awa and the preparations and serves to confuse the enemy. Moreover, it sows fear in their hearts due to an ongoing psychological propaganda war* […]".[146] The Jihadi propaganda system that exists today has been built as a result of the establishment of Jihadi institutions in the various Jihad arenas, such as the "Al-Andalus Institute" which is operated by Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and as a result of the activities of the Jihadi forums, headed by "Shumukh Al-Islam", "Al-Faloja", "Atahadi", who are considered the main propaganda channels.[147]

Al-'Amili gives some advice to the all the institutions and individuals who participate in Jihadi propaganda, including the Jihadi forums:

1. Continue propaganda activities with devotion and dedication, and with the knowledge that "*their propaganda efforts are considered to be of great help and are the flip side of the Jihadi coin* […]".

2. Develop means of publishing Jihadi information and material whilst ensuring that the channels by which this is done are secured and that the names of the members and writers who take part in this propaganda are not disclosed.

---

[145] Ibid, page 176.
[146] Ibid, page 177.
[147] Ibid, page 182. He believes that there has been considerable improvement on all the levels of Jihadi activities, military, organizational and informational. He points for example to the Mujahideen's successes in Afghanistan and Pakistan in causing heavy losses in lives and property belonging to NATO and the American and Muslim collaborators forces. Ibid, pages 17-18.

3. Increase the coordination, cooperation, and knowledge being shared between the information channels and the Jihadi forums. The Jihadi leaders must realize how important these forums are to the information front, since they act as an independent front and contribute a great deal to the Mujahideen's campaign. There must also be coordination and cooperation between the various Jihadi information institutions themselves, at least until "*one leadership, whose role will be to coordinate and hand out the missions and the areas of expertise between the various informational groups, is found*".

4. Strengthen the ties with the Mujahideen and increase the number of communication channels with them. Moreover, search for faster communication means, so that updates may be provided in real-time or the Mujahideen may be made aware in time on certain matters. All this should be done whilst taking precautions to protect the data and information.

5. Increase the number of Jihadi information activists and expand such activities amongst the Mujahideen. At the same time, strive to obtain up-to-date technology which will aid in influencing the public, including both supporters and opponents.

6. Invest funds in improving the information system, such as the purchase of new technologies "*in order to surpass our enemies and provide a full and correct picture of our path and the results of our wars against our enemies*".

7. Exploit the enemies' propaganda institutions to gain information on technologies and programs used by them, until such technologies are appropriated by the Jihadi information institutions.

8. The Mujahideen, with the aid of their supporters, must strive to obtain a satellite channel which will supply new data and will broadcast the Mujahideen's activities. It will also transmit interviews and meetings with

Jihadi leaders. "*It is quite possible that this goal will be achieved much quicker than everyone thinks. The brothers, who are participating in the propaganda, must spare no effort in achieving this goal*".[148]

Sixth segment: Various Sharia Questions

In this segment, Al-'Amili responds mostly to questions regarding the financing of the Jihad through sources which are not considered appropriate according to the Sharia, such as through funds originating from personal interest. In response, Al-'Amili maintains that questions regarding fundraising for Jihad and for the Mujahideen should be addressed with the Sharia in mind. Imposing the principle of Ijtihad here cannot be avoided because of the importance and sensitivity of the issue. Moreover, even if a wrong Sharia opinion is given on the issue, it is still preferable to showing passiveness or non-involvement.[149]

Al-'Amili explains that it is preferable to use funds whose source is acceptable according to the laws of Sharia, so that Allah will give his blessing to the Jihad financed by this money.[150] For example, Al-'Amili does not sanction taking loans from banks, which lend money at an interest, in order to purchase land that will make a large profit, under the pretext that this will finance the Jihad. The Sheikh also believes that growing drugs or keeping prostitutes, for example, are questionable financing means which go against the Sharia and which will harm the Mujahideen's image. **However, one can discern from the above that Al-'Amili is avoiding giving a clear-cut opinion on this matter. He even explicitly states that he is not interested in discussing the matter so as not to sabotage or place obstacles in their path**. At the same time, he

---

[148] Ibid, pages 178-179.
[149] Ibid, page 186.
[150] Ibid, page 187.

stresses that the Mujahideen must make every effort to raise funds from targets which belong to the West or the tyrant rulers.[151]

Summary

The open platforms in which surfers' questions are answered by Salafi sheikhs on Jihadi forums seems to be beneficial for all three of players involved – the surfers, the Salafi guest sheikh and the Jihadi forum. The surfers, on their part, receive advice or clarifications on various issues from respected sheikhs and are able to bask in the sheikh's eminence. The Salafi sheikhs receive widespread exposure and the chance to present their beliefs and reasoning. Lastly, through this platform, the Jihadi forums strengthen their ties with the surfers and thereby contribute to the propaganda campaign, which benefits the Mujahideen and the Jihad.

It should be noted that Al-'Amili's desire to remain anonymous is a testament to the Jihad leaders' deep fear that they will be found and eliminated, which would lead to a power vacuum in the leadership as a result of the lack of trained people to take their places. It is also possible that Al-'Amili wishes to set an example for the Mujahideen and encourage them to act under a cloak of heavy secrecy, in order to make it difficult for the enemy to track and surprise them.

From this "open meeting", recorded in the booklet, we were able to learn the burning issues which occupy the minds of the members of the Jihadi forums, ranging from the position of the Hamas movement in light of its cruel slaughter in the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, to the various Jihadi arenas, to the treatment of different groups who have not joined the Mujahideen, and more.

---

[151] Ibid, page 189.